area handbook series 

Cambodia 

a country study 



Cambodia 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by Russell R. Ross 
Research Completed 
December 1987 



On the cover: Detail from a tower of the Bayon Temple, circa 
A.D. 1200 



Third Edition, First Printing, 1990. 

Copyright ®1990 United States Government as represented by 
the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Cambodia: A Country Study. 

Area handbook series, DA pam 550-50 
Research completed December 1987. 
Bibliography: pp. 323-44. 
Includes index. 

1. Cambodia. I. Ross, Russell R., 1935- . II. Library of Con- 
gress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: Area hand- 
book series. 

DS554.3.C34 1989 959.6 89-600150 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-50 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors are indebted to a number of individuals in govern- 
ment agencies and at private institutions who shared their time and 
specialized knowledge to provide research data and perspective to 
the production of this book. Among them were Bill Herod and 
Patricia D. Norland of the Indochina Project, Ok Soeum of the 
Cambodian Buddhist Association, and Rath Chhim of the MRM 
Language Research Center. Bill Herod, Frank Tatu, and Mr. and 
Mrs. Robert E. Hammerquist generously shared their personal and, 
in many cases, unique photographs of Cambodia for use in this 
book. 

The authors also wish to express their appreciation to members 
of the Library of Congress staff who contributed to the prepara- 
tion of this volume. These included Richard F. Nyrop who reviewed 
and coordinated all chapters; Robert L. Worden who reviewed all 
draft chapters; and Martha E. Hopkins, who, in addition to edit- 
ing a chapter, managed editing and production of the entire book. 
Andrea Matles Savada was responsible for seeing the book through 
to its completion after the departure of the editor of the book. Other 
Library of Congress staff members who contributed substan- 
tial efforts were David P. Cabitto, Sandra K. Cotugno, and 
Kimberly A. Lord, who prepared and arranged all graphic material; 
Teresa E. Kamp, who drew the cover and chapter heading illus- 
trations; Harriett R. Blood, who drew the topography map; 
Susan M. Lender, who reviewed the maps; Tracy Henry Coleman 
and Meridel Jackson, who performed word processing for all chap- 
ters; editorial assistants Barbara Edgerton, Izella Watson, and 
Monica Shimmin, who helped prepared the manuscript in final 
form; and Malinda B. Neale of the Library of Congress Compos- 
ing Unit, who prepared the camera-ready copy under the super- 
vision of Peggy F. Pixley. 

Others who contributed to the book were Richard Kollodge, 
Marilyn L. Majeska, Michael Pleasants, and Catherine Schwartz- 
stein, who edited chapters, and Shirley Kessel, who prepared the 
index. 



v 



Contents 



Page 



Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction XXV 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Donald M. Seekins 

PREHISTORY AND EARLY KINGDOMS 6 

Early Indianized Kingdom of Funan 6 

The Successor State of Chenla 9 

THE ANGKORIAN PERIOD 9 

CAMBODIA'S STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL, 1432-1887 . . 12 

Domination by Thailand and by Vietnam 14 

The French Protectorate 16 

THE FRENCH COLONIAL PERIOD, 1887-1953 18 

The Colonial Economy 19 

The Emergence of Nationalism 20 

The Struggle for Independence 22 

CAMBODIA UNDER SIHANOUK, 1954-70 26 

The Geneva Conference 27 

Domestic Developments 28 

Nonaligned Foreign Policy 30 

The Cambodian Left: The Early Phases 35 

The Paris Student Group 38 

The KPRP Second Congress 40 

INTO THE MAELSTROM: INSURRECTION 

AND WAR, 1967-75 41 

The March 1970 Coup d'Etat 43 

The Widening War 44 

Early Khmer Rouge Atrocities 46 

The Fall of Phnom Penh 47 

DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, 1975-78 48 

Revolutionary Terror 51 

Society under the Angkar 51 

Politics under the Khmer Rouge 59 

Establishing Democratic Kampuchea 60 



vii 



An Elusive Party 61 

The Fall of Democratic Kampuchea 66 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 73 

Robert K. Headley, Jr. 

ENVIRONMENT 76 

Topography 76 

Climate 79 

Drainage 80 

Regional Divisions 81 

POPULATION 83 

Dynamics 83 

Distribution 83 

Migration and Refugees 85 

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION 87 

The Khmer 88 

Other Ethnic Groups 99 

LANGUAGES 110 

Austroasiatic-Mon-Khmer 110 

Austronesian 112 

RELIGION 112 

Buddhism 112 

Chinese Religion 122 

Islam 122 

Other Religions 124 

EDUCATION 125 

Public School System 125 

Buddhist Education 130 

Private Education 131 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 132 

Public Health 132 

Welfare Programs 135 

Chapter 3. The Economy 139 

Tuyet L. Cosslett 

ECONOMIC SETTING 142 

Natural Resources 143 

Labor Force 144 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 

AFTER INDEPENDENCE 145 

Sihanouk's Peacetime Economy, 1953-70 146 

The Wartime Economy, 1970-75 149 

The Economy under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79 .... 151 



vin 



ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE'S 

REVOLUTIONARY PARTY 155 

New Economic Policy and System 156 

First Plan, 1986-90 158 

AGRICULTURE 159 

Collectivization and Solidarity Groups 160 

Rice Production and Cultivation 162 

Other Food and Commercial Crops 164 

INDUSTRY 165 

Major Manufacturing Industries 166 

Handicrafts 167 

DOMESTIC COMMERCE 167 

FOREIGN TRADE AND AID 168 

Composition of Trade 169 

Major Trading Partners 169 

Illicit Trade with Thailand and with Singapore 173 

Foreign Economic and Technical Assistance 173 

FINANCE 176 

Banking 176 

Currency 176 

Taxes 177 

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 177 

Roads and Highways 178 

Railroads 178 

Water Transportation 178 

Ports 181 

Airports 181 

Telecommunications 182 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 185 

Rinn-Sup Shinn 

MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1977-81 190 

Background 190 

Cambodia in Turmoil 190 

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC 

KAMPUCHEA 195 

Origins of the Coalition 195 

Coalition Structure 201 

Democratic Kampuchea 203 

The Khmer People's National Liberation Front 206 

National United Front for an Independent, Peaceful, 

Neutral, and Cooperative Cambodia 207 

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA 208 

The Constitution 209 

Government Structure 210 

ix 



THE MEDIA 214 

THE KAMPUCHEAN (OR KHMER) PEOPLE'S 

REVOLUTIONARY PARTY 215 

THE KAMPUCHEAN (OR KHMER) UNITED FRONT 

FOR NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND DEFENSE ... 220 

FOREIGN AFFAIRS 222 

The Coalition's Strategy 222 

Phnom Penh and Its Allies 224 

The Search for Peace 224 

Chapter 5. National Security 239 

Frank Tatu 

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 242 

The Time of Greatness, A.D. 802-1431 242 

Period of Decline, 1431-1863 243 

The French Protectorate, 1863-1954 243 

The Japanese Occupation, 1941-45 245 

The First Indochina War, 1945-54 247 

The Second Indochina War, 1954-75 250 

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE 

KHMER ROUGE 261 

Khmer Rouge Armed Forces 261 

Khmer-Vietnamese Border Tensions 262 

The Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia 264 

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN POSTWAR 

CAMBODIA 267 

Tenuous Security 267 

Coalition Government Resistance Forces 268 

National Army of Democratic Kampuchea 269 

Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces . . 272 

Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste 275 

Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary 

Armed Forces 276 

Foreign Troops and Advisers 295 

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COUNTERSUBVERSION . . 298 

People's Security Service 298 

Protection under the Law 299 

Penal System 302 

Appendix A. Tables 305 

Appendix B. Major Political and Military 
Organizations 315 

Bibliography 321 



X 



Glossary 341 

Index 343 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Cambodia, 1986 xxiv 

2 Early States of Indochina 8 

3 Khmer Rouge Administrative Zones for Democratic 

Kampuchea, 1975-78 56 

4 Topography and Drainage 78 

5 Annual Rainfall and Monsoon Airflow, 1985 82 

6 Annual Flooding Around Tonle Sap, 1985 84 

7 Ethnolinguistic Groups of Cambodia, 1983 102 

8 Transportation System, 1987 180 

9 Successive Governments in Cambodia (since 

Independence) 188 

10 Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, 1987 . . . 202 

11 Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, 1987 . 212 

12 Organization of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's 

Revolutionary Party, 1987 216 

13 Armed Forces of the Coalition Government of Democratic 

Kampuchea, 1987 270 

14 Organization of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's 

Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1986-87 282 

15 Military Regions, 1987 288 



XI 



Preface 



The previous edition of Cambodia: A Country Study was compiled 
in 1972 when the ill-fated Khmer Republic (see Appendix B) was 
fighting for its life against the Khmer Rouge (see Appendix B). 
In the one and one-half decades since that time, profound upheavals 
have wrought substantial political changes in the country. These 
changes, and the regimes that sought to impose them, are only now 
beginning to be studied with objectivity. In addition, the quicken- 
ing pace of negotiations concerning the future of the country sug- 
gests that a watershed period in its modern history may be 
approaching. It is, accordingly, time for a new country study, not 
only to catch up with the momentous developments of the past 
fifteen years, but also to establish some point of departure, some 
bench mark by which to interpret future events. 

This is a completely new book, and, unlike the previous edition, 
it follows the standard, revised format of the entire country study 
series. It presents its narrative under five major concomitants of 
the Cambodian experience: historical setting, society and environ- 
ment, economy, government and politics, and national security. 
Sources of information for this study included both monographs 
and serials, especially material published since 1975. Chapter bib- 
liographies appear at the end of the book, and a brief, annotated 
bibliographic note on sources recommended for further reading is 
included at the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in 
the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist readers 
who are unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1 , Appen- 
dix A). A glossary is included. 

It should be noted that, as a result of the Khmer Rouge policy 
of eradicating the traces of its predecessor and of establishing a ruth- 
lessly self-sufficient, anti-modernistic regime, after mid- 1975, 
statistical and quantitative data for Democratic Kampuchea are 
contradictory and virtually nonexistent. As for its successor, the 
People's Republic of Kampuchea, such data are only now becom- 
ing available, and they remain fragmentary and contradictory. 
Cambodia continues to be a desperately poor country, its infras- 
tructure ravaged by war, and its thin stratum of educated citizens 
either in exile or nearly wiped out during the Khmer Rouge years; 
it is thus scarcely able to compile data that one has come to expect 
of other nations. Nevertheless, the country is making an effort to 
bind its wounds and to reestablish sovereignty over its territory, 
without enduring either a suffocating Vietnamese presence or a 



xiii 



chilling reimposition of Khmer Rouge authority. More and better 
data should become available as Cambodia slowly rehabilitates itself 
and resumes its place in the Asian family of nations. 

A word of explanation is needed concerning the use of ' 'Cam- 
bodia" instead of "Kampuchea" to designate the country. Accord- 
ing to historian David P. Chandler, both terms are derived from 
"Kambuja," a Sanskrit word thought to have been applied origi- 
nally to a north Indian tribe. The selection of "Cambodia," there- 
fore, was without ideological connotation. It is more recognizable 
to the English-speaking reader, and it adheres to the standard prac- 
tice of the United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN), which 
also has been followed in the spelling of all place names. In April 
1989, after the cut-off date of research for this book, Prime Minister 
Hun Sen of the People's Republic of Kampuchea announced that 
the name of the country had been changed to the State of Cambo- 
dia. In recent years some provinces have been combined, renamed, 
and then divided again several times. The most recent case is that 
of Bantay Meanchey, the formation of which — from parts of Bat- 
dambang, Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey, and Pouthisat — was an- 
nounced in late 1987 to take effect in 1988. For the geographic terms 
occurring most frequently, such as names of provinces, the BGN 
designations together with the more common, journalistic equiva- 
lents are as follows: 



BGN Name 


Common Name 


Batdambang 


Battambang 


Kampong Cham 


Kompong Cham 


Kampong Chhnang 


Kompong Chnang 


Kampong Saom 


Kompong Som 


Kampong Spoe 


Kompong Speu 


Kampong Thum 


Kompong Thorn 


Kaoh Kong 


Koh Kong 


Kracheh 


Kratie 


Mondol Kiri 


Mondolkiri 


Otdar Meanchey 


Oddar Meanchey 


Pouthisat 


Pursat 


Rotanokiri 


Ratanakiri 


Stoeng Treng 


Stung Treng 


Takev 


Takeo 



xiv 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(CGDK) (insurgent coalition) 

People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) (government in Phnom 
Penh) 

Short Form: Cambodia 

Term for Citizens: Cambodians 

Capital: Phnom Penh 

Date of Independence: November 9, 1953 

Geography 

Size: Total area 181,040 square kilometers, about size of Missouri; 
country shares 800-kilometer border with Thailand on north and 
west, 541 -kilometer border with Laos on northeast, 1 ,2 28-kilometer 
border with Vietnam on east and southeast; coastline along Gulf 
of Thailand about 443 kilometers. 



xv 



Topography: Most salient topographical feature lacustrine plain 
formed by inundations of Tonle Sap (Great Lake), measuring about 
2,590 square kilometers during dry season to about 24,605 square 
kilometers during rainy season. This densely populated plain de- 
voted to wet rice cultivation constitutes heartland of Cambodia. 
Most (about 75 percent) of country lies at elevations of less than 
100 meters above sea level, except for Cardamom Mountains 
(highest elevation 1,771 meters), their north-south extension to the 
east, Elephant Range (elevation range 500-1,000 meters) and steep 
escarpment of Dangrek Mountains (average elevation 500 meters) 
along northern border with Thailand. 

Climate: Temperatures range from 10°C to 38°C. Tropical mon- 
soons: southwest monsoon blowing inland in northeasterly direc- 
tion brings moisture-laden winds from Gulf of Thailand/Indian 
Ocean from May to October with period of heaviest precipitation 
September-October; northeast monsoon blowing in southwesterly 
direction toward coast ushers in dry season, November to March, 
with period of least rainfall January-February. 

Society 

Population: In 1987 estimates vary from 6.3 to 7.3 million with 
possibly more than 500,000 Cambodians scattered in Thailand and 
abroad as refugees; average annual growth targeted at 2.3 percent; 
estimated urban population of more than 10 percent; estimated 
population density averages about 36 per square kilometer. 

Ethnic Groups: Ethnically homogeneous, more than 90 percent 
Khmer; national minorities comprise about 3 percent of total popu- 
lation; Cham (see Glossary), of Islamic faith, most significant 
minority group, other scattered tribal minorities in upland and 
forested areas. Reportedly some Vietnamese immigration since 
1981-82. Some Chinese in urban areas, numbers unknown. 

Languages: National language Khmer, a member of Mon-Khmer 
subfamily of Austroasiatic language group. Russian and Vietnamese 
taught in Phnom Penh and other urban areas. 

Religion: Theravada Buddhism, suppressed by Khmer Rouge (see 
Appendix B), revived but controlled under successor regime; wats 
(temples) and monks privately supported; wats administered by 
lay committees; Buddhist clergy or sangha (see Glossary); chair- 
man (pratheari) heads ecclesiastical hierarchy. 

Education: Rate of literacy about 48 percent. In late 1980s total 
estimated school enrollment 1.3 million (primary), 369,500 



xvi 



(secondary). Schooling follows Vietnamese model with three levels: 
primary grades 1-4; lower secondary education, grades 5-7; upper 
secondary education, grades 8-10; education at all levels hampered 
by lack of facilities, teachers, and instructional materials. Post- 
secondary education consists of twenty teacher- training schools, 
plus institutions offering professional or technical instruction. Soviet 
and Vietnamese instructors heavily represented in educational insti- 
tutions. Admission to higher education based on political reliability. 

Health: Average life expectancy 48.5 years (male 47 years, female 
49.9 years) for the period 1985-90; some prevalent diseases are 
tuberculosis, malaria, infectious and parasitical illnesses; infant mor- 
tality 160 per thousand live births (1986); nonspecific gastro-enteritis 
accounts for disproportionate number of infant deaths; localized 
malnutrition and poor hygienic conditions exacerbate debility of 
population and susceptibility to illness. Total of 34 hospitals and 
1,349 rural dispensaries nationwide; in countryside, network of 
primary care facilities being established with international help; 
hospitals planned or already established in provincial capitals, dis- 
pensaries at district (srok) level, first aid stations at village (khurri) 
level; extension of health care greatly impeded by lack of trained 
personnel and inadequately developed infrastructure (especially 
clean water, and distribution or availability of medical sup- 
plies/ equipment . ) 

Economy 

General — Statistical economic data, including gross national 
product (GNP — see Glossary), gross domestic product (GDP — 
see Glossary) and balance of payments generally unavailable, lack- 
ing, or unreliable in late 1980s. Nation evolving toward socialistic 
central planning, but more than 50 percent of economy, especially 
retail trade and small scale manufacturing, remains in private sec- 
tor. First Five-Year Program for Socioeconomic Restoration and 
Development (1986-90), hereafter called First Plan, inaugurated, 
with priority on increased cultivation of rice and rubber, increased 
exploitation of forest and aquatic resources; economically active 
population about 2.5 to 3 million. Collectivization of agriculture 
undertaken through organization of from seven to fifteen-families 
in solidarity groups {krom samaki) as basic production units. 

Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing: About 80 percent of labor force 
engaged in agriculture, forestry, fishing. Main crop is paddy rice; 
output 2 million tons in 1986; area under cultivation 1.2 million 
hectares in 1987. Under First Plan, output expected to increase 



xvn 



7 percent annually to 350 kilograms per person by 1990. Produc- 
tion impeded by neglected irrigation systems during Pol Pot years, 
localized insecurity caused by forays of anti- Vietnamese Khmer in- 
surgents, and lack of phosphate fertilizers. In 1986 principal food 
crops were maize, cassavas, sweet potatoes, groundnuts, beans, and 
sesame seeds. Principal commercial crop is rubber. Forests cover 
approximately 70 percent of land area; first reforestation project ini- 
tiated in northeastern and southwestern regions of country. Fish- 
ing conducted in Tonle Sap, rivers, and offshore in Gulf of Thailand. 

Industry: Industrial sector developing slowly because of lack of 
power and raw materials; accounts for less than 10 percent of labor 
force. In countryside, unknown number of rice-processing mills and 
sawmills reportedly back into operation by 1986; in urban areas about 
sixty state-owned factories produce light consumer goods such as 
plastic items, hand tools, soft drinks, cigarettes, textiles, nails, jute 
bags, soap, and basic pharmaceuticals; phosphate fertilizer plant, 
distillery, and brick tile plant reportedly operating; in 1987 small- 
scale artisans being collectivized in Phnom Penh, development plans 
call for opening of brewery, plywood, and cement factories. 

Services: Total public sector employment (including state em- 
ployees, industrial workers, artisans, party cadres, teachers, and 
armed forces personnel) amounts to about 8 percent of economi- 
cally active population. 

Resources: Limited: gemstones, gold, silver, phosphate, limestone, 
clay; possible deposits of salt and coal; unexploited deposits of iron 
and manganese ore, bauxite, and silicon reported; hydroelectric 
potential from Mekong and Basak rivers. 

Exports: Approximately US$3 million in 1986; principal exports 
natural rubber (latex), timber, resin, maize, tobacco, and soybeans. 
Rubber and forest products offer best hope for expansion in near 
term; main export partners Vietnam, Soviet Union (purchases 
nearly entire Cambodian output of latex), and other countries be- 
longing to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, 
CEMA, or Comecon — Glossary). 

Imports: Approximately US$17 million in 1986; principal imports 
foodstuffs, fuels, machinery, textiles, pharmaceuticals, and chem- 
icals. Main import partners Vietnam, Soviet Union, and other 
Comecon countries, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia. 

Balance of Payments: Negative trade balance from 1979 until 
1987. In 1984 extended public debt US$503 million; debt service 
payments US$4 million. 



xvin 



Exchange Rate: Official rate 100 Cambodian riels per United States 
dollar; unofficial rate about 123 riels per dollar; Cambodian riel 
not negotiable in international money markets. 

Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: Two routes of one-meter-gauge-track: Phnom Penh- 
Kampong Saom route, 260 kilometers long; Phnom Penh- 
Batdambang-Sisophon route, 352 kilometers long; railroads dis- 
rupted during regime of Democratic Kampuchea but restored to 
service early 1980s. Both routes remain insecure and subject to 
sporadic guerrilla attacks. 

Roads: Total 13,350 kilometers; about 2,600 kilometers paved 
(bituminous), 7,150 kilometers improved (crushed stone, gravel, 
earth), 3,600 kilometers unimproved; main roads paved but in vary- 
ing states of disrepair. 

Ports: Main seaport Kampong Saom, (Gulf of Thailand). Main 
riverine port Phnom Penh, at junction of Tonle Sab, Mekong, and 
Basak rivers; minor ports (Gulf of Thailand) Ream and Kampot. 
National merchant marine consists of three vessels with total dis- 
placement of 3,800 deadweight tons. 

Inland Waterways: Total length about 3,982 kilometers; principal 
arteries are middle Mekong River (runs from Laos through Cam- 
bodia and Vietnam to South China Sea), and Tonle Sab and Basak 
rivers from Tonle Sap (Great Lake) to Cambodian- Vietnamese 
border; both wide (up to two kilometers) and navigable, with fer- 
ries at Kampong Cham, Tonle Bet, Sre Ambel, StoengTreng, and 
Phumi Prek Khsay (Neak Luong); precipitous falls and rapids occur 
near Laotian border and in vicinity of Kracheh city. 

Civil Airports: Thirteen usable airfields, including 8 with perma- 
nent surface runways, 2 with runways 2,400 to 3,600 meters, 5 
with runways 1,200 to 2,400 meters; main international airport 
Pochentong near Phnom Penh; secondary airports at Kang Keng 
at Ream, at Siemreab and Batdambang. National airline Air Kam- 
puchea, inventory three Antonov-24s; scheduled air service to Bat- 
dambang and Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam). 

Telecommunications: In late 1980s, one earth satellite station, 
part of Intersputnik communications network; radio telephone 
link (via Intersputnik) between Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh 
City (Vietnam); about 7,300 telephones countrywide. One radio 
broadcasting station ("Voice of the Kampuchean People") with 
medium and short wave capability; about 171,000 radio receivers 



xix 



countrywide, television service inaugurated with broadcasts twice 
a week in late 1980s. 

Government and Politics 

Two governments compete for internal legitimacy and for in- 
ternational recognition: Coalition Government of Democratic Kam- 
puchea (CGDK — see Appendix B) and People's Republic of 
Kampuchea (PRK — see Appendix B). 

CGDK: Tripartite coalition consisting of Party of Democratic Kam- 
puchea (PDK — see Appendix B, or Khmer Rouge — see Appen- 
dix B), and two noncommunist movements, Khmer People's 
National Liberation Front (KPNLF — see Appendix B) and Na- 
tional United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and 
Cooperative Cambodia (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge 
Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif— FUNCINPEC— 
see Appendix B). CGDK recognized internationally by the United 
Nations and a few non-communist states; controls little territory 
except inaccessible guerrilla areas in northeastern and southwestern 
Cambodia; administers some camps along Thai border. 

Government: A president and a prime minister; vice-president in 
charge of foreign affairs, and at next subordinate echelon, six coor- 
dinating committees established: culture and education, national 
defense, economy and finance, public health and social affairs, mili- 
tary affairs, and press and information affairs. 

Politics: Coalition partners exist in uneasy alliance, united only 
by opposition to Vietnamese occupation forces and government 
in Phnom Penh; coordinating committees staffed by one member 
from each movement comprising CGDK. 

Major International Memberships: United Nations and many 
of its specialized agencies; Asian Development Bank, Group of 77, 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, World Bank (see Glos- 
sary), International Monetary Fund (see Glossary), Interpol, In- 
ternational Red Cross, International Telecommunications Union, 
and Nonaligned Movement. 

PRK: Constitutes the government in Phnom Penh which exercises 
de facto control over most of Cambodian territory; recognized in- 
ternationally by about three dozen Marxist and nonaligned states 
and revolutionary movements. 

Government: Marxist government evolving toward socialism, sus- 
tained by large Vietnamese military presence. National Assembly, 

xx 



117 members defined constitutionally as "supreme organ of state 
power," and body in which legislative authority vested; assembly 
selects members of Council of State that promulgates and interprets 
laws, the chairman of which serves as head of state; Council of State 
acts as secretariat for National Assembly and performs some assembly 
functions between parliamentary sessions. Council of Ministers, also 
responsible to National Assembly, exercises direct executive authority 
for administering government of the PRK down to local levels. 

Politics: Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party 
(KPRP — see Appendix B) only political party permitted in late 1987 
in areas under Phnomh Penh's control; functions at national level 
through Political Bureau (nine full and two candidate members) and 
Central Committee (thirty-one full and fourteen candidate mem- 
bers); mass auxiliary organizations foster patriotism and nurture 
party activism among population; most prominent of organization 
Kampuchean (or Khmer) United Front for National Construction 
and Defense (KUFNCD— see Appendix B); both KPRP and 
KUFNCD active down to local level and maintain nationwide net- 
work of committees at all provincial and district echelons. Other 
mass organizations include Kampuchean Federation of Trade 
Unions, Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Youth Union, Kam- 
puchean Revolutionary Women's Association, and Kampuchean 
Revolutionary Youth Association. 

Administrative Divisions: Two municipalities (Phnom Penh and 
Kampong Saom); eighteen provinces, subdivided into about 122 
districts. 

Legal System: Ministry of Justice, Office of Public Prosecutor, 
and People's Supreme Court exist at national level; at subordinate 
echelons, people's revolutionary courts established at provincial and 
municipal levels; court officials include president, vice-president 
and people's councillors. Separate system of military tribunals exist 
for armed forces, but in 1987 functions remained unknown. 

Major International Memberships: None; nevertheless, govern- 
ment in Phnom Penh receives assistance from a number of com- 
munist and nonaligned states and from private international 
humanitarian organizations. Close bilateral relationship exists with 
Vietnam as result of Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Coopera- 
tion signed in February 1979. 

National Security 

Armed Forces of CGDK: In 1987 coalition forces remained 
unintegrated, with total numbers unknown. National Army of 



xxi 



Democratic Kampuchea (NADK — see Appendix B, also known 
as Khmer Rouge) — roughly 40,000 to 50,000 combatants in three 
to six divisions, distributed in four autonomous military regions. 
Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF — 
see Appendix B) — strength waning; but conjecturally had 8,000 
to 14,000 combatants organized into battalions and regiments, 
grouped administratively into 9 military regions. Sihanouk National 
Army (Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste — ANS — see Appendix B), 
strength increasing; has 7,000 to 11,000 combatants organized into 
a command structure and maneuver battalions grouped under 6 
brigade headquarters. 

Armed Forces of PRK: In 1987 military establishment comprised 
regular/main forces, provincial/regional forces, and village militia/ 
local forces; embryonic coastal/riverine navy and air force existed; 
total military strength for all components unknown, but estimated 
to surpass 40,000 personnel; armed forces organized administra- 
tively into four military regions under Ministry of National Defense 
and General Staff in Phnom Penh. 

Major Tactical Units of CGDK: Tactical units deployed usually 
comprise platoons or companies, occasionally single battalions. 
(People's Republic of Kampuchea) : Seven understrength regular/ 
main force divisions, with at least three deployed in border provinces 
of western Cambodia; several independent brigades and regiments; 
as many as four tank battalions, and combat support formations; 
naval forces one battalion; air force possibly two to four under- 
strength squadrons; provincial/regional forces organized into bat- 
talions, generally deployed one per province, with greater number 
in border provinces; village militia/local forces organized into pla- 
toons and squads, generally deployed at subdistrict and village level; 
women heavily represented in militia/local forces. 

Major Weapons/Equipment of CGDK: Small arms, light crew- 
served weapons, and equipment originating from China and pos- 
sibly from Singapore. 

Major Weapons/Equipment of PRK: Obsolescent tanks of Soviet 
or Chinese origin; armored personnel carriers of Soviet or United 
States origin; light to medium artillery pieces; small arms of Soviet 
origin; naval forces, small patrol and amphibious craft; air force, 
possibly MiG-2 1 /FISHBED fighter aircraft, and Mi-8 (HIP) trans- 
port helicopters. 

Security Expenditures of CGDK: Unknown; all military materiel 
assumed to be grant aid from China and from members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 



xxn 



Security Expenditures of PRK: Unknown; all military materiel 
assumed to be grant aid from Soviet Union and Vietnam; estimated 
value of imported armaments US$150 million in 1986. 

Foreign Troops and Advisers: (People's Republic of Kampuchea): 
Vietnamese expeditionary force numbering possibly 100,000 to 
200,00 troops organized into 10 to 12 divisions under 4 Military 
Fronts; Vietnamese force to be withdrawn by 1990. Vietnamese 
military advisers with Cambodian units at least to battalion level; 
Warsaw Pact advisers at armed forces training institutions and pos- 
sibly at upper defense echelons. 

Internal Security: In 1987 insurgents of the Coalition Govern- 
ment of Democratic Kampuchea, backed by China and ASEAN 
nations, engaged in guerrilla warfare against People's Republic of 
Kampuchea government in Phnom Penh, and Vietnamese forces 
in Cambodia; some of country insecure because of sporadic guer- 
rilla raids and ambushes, but guerrillas possessed insufficient 
strength or armaments to take and hold any urban area or to top- 
ple government. 



xxm 




Gulf of Thailand 



International boundary 

Province boundary 

® National capital 

m Province capital 

25 50 Kilo meters 
25 50 Miles 



South China Sea 



Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Cambodia, 1986 



xxiv 



Introduction 



ALTHOUGH THE LAND occupied by Cambodia has been 
populated for millennia, the area's history was unrecorded until 
the Chinese chronicles of the early Christian era. In the fewer than 
2,000 years of its imperfectly documented existence, the Cambo- 
dian state has evolved along the lines of ascension, dominance, and 
retrogression inherent in all civilizations. 

Historians surmise that by the first century A.D. a small num- 
ber of Khmer (or Cambodian) states already existed on the fringes 
of the earliest recorded state in the region, the empire of Funan. 
Centered in the Mekong Delta of present-day Vietnam, Funan de- 
rived its power from commerce. With its port of Oc Eo on the Gulf 
of Thailand, Funan was well-placed to control maritime traffic be- 
tween India and China. According to Chinese annals, Funan was 
a highly developed and prosperous state with an extensive canal 
system for transportation and irrigation, a fleet of naval vessels, 
a capital city with brick buildings, and a writing system based on 
Sanskrit. The inhabitants, whose adherence to Indian cultural in- 
stitutions apparently coexisted with Mahayana Buddhism, were 
organized into a highly stratified society. 

When the small Khmer states to the northwest of the Mekong 
Delta emerged into recorded history, it was to make war upon 
the declining empire of Funan. Between A.D. 550-650, these 
Khmer states overran their adversary, which fell apart, losing its 
tributary states on the Kra Isthmus and along the Gulf of Thailand. 

Chaos and economic decline followed the fall of Funan, but the 
sequence of events over the next 500 years led to the ascension of 
the Cambodian state and its evolution into an increasingly power- 
ful and dynamic entity. The first unified and distinctiy Khmer polity 
to emerge after Funan was Chenla. It absorbed the Indianized cul- 
tural legacy of its predecessor and established its capital near the 
Tonle Sap (Great Lake), the heartland of Cambodia, then as now. 
Under expansionist rulers, its authority was pushed into the terri- 
tories of present-day Thailand and Laos. The development of 
Chenla was not marked by an unrelieved accretion of power, 
however. Divisive forces quickly resulted in a split into Land (or 
Upper) Chenla and Water (or Lower) Chenla. Land Chenla 
demonstrated the greater vitality, controlled some thirty provin- 
cial cities, and sent emissaries to China under the Tang dynasty. 
Water Chenla slipped into vassalage to Java. 



xxv 



The historical ascension of the Khmer polity began during the 
early 800s. The initiator of the period was the first empire builder, 
Jayavarman II (A.D. 802-50), who carved out a feudal state gener- 
ally encompassing modern Cambodia. Jayavarman revived the cult 
of Devaraja, an Indianized cultural institution that was intended 
to confer, through elaborate rituals and symbols, heavenly appro- 
bation or even divine status upon the ruler. Following the reign 
of Jayavarman II, the two Chenlas were reunited peacefully, and 
the Khmer polity continued to develop, establishing over time a 
priestly hierarchy, an armed force and police, a provincial adminis- 
tration of subordinate officials, a system of courts, corvee labor by 
the peasants, and a capital on the site of Angkor near the Tonle Sap. 

The Khmer state reached its apogee in the Angkorian period — 
also called the empire of Angkor — during the period from the 
eleventh century to the thirteenth century, when it was ruled by 
a succession of able monarchs. The last great monarch of the Ang- 
korian period was Jayavarman VII (1181-ca. 1218). He reversed 
the Cham encroachments that had taken place after the death of 
Suryavarman II (1 1 13-50) and carried the war to the enemy, con- 
quering Champa itself and briefly reducing it to a Khmer vassal 
state. At its greatest extent, the Angkorian empire of Jayavarman 
VII encompassed not only Champa on the coast of southern Viet- 
nam but also extended north to the vicinity of Vientiane in present- 
day Laos and south to include the small trading city-states of the 
Malay Peninsula. Jayavarman continued the public works program 
of his predecessors, uniting his realm by elevated military cause- 
ways with resthouses at intervals. He also built hospitals for the 
aged and the infirm and sponsored the construction of Angkor 
Thorn and the Bayon, the last major temples of Angkorian times 
and splendid edifices in their own right, but presaging the deca- 
dence that shortly set in (see The Angkorian Period, ch. 1). 

Jayavarman VII' s wars and public works exacted a heavy toll 
on the finances and the human labor force of the Angkorian em- 
pire. The drain of resources coincided with the gradual intrusion 
of Theravada Buddhism, with its egalitarian focus, at the expense 
of the Indianized cults that stressed a hierarchical, stratified soci- 
ety (see Buddhism, ch. 2). Whether it was this development or the 
inability of the Khmer monarchs to command the fealty of their 
subjects that led to a societal breakdown remains open to conjec- 
ture. Also coupled with these internal developments was the ac- 
celerated southward migration of the Thai, who, dislodged from 
their state in southwestern China by the Mongols in the mid- 1200s, 
flooded into the Menam Chao Phraya Valley. Subject to internal 
and external pressures, the Khmer state became unable to defend 



xxvi 



itself at the very time its enemies were growing stronger. Thai at- 
tacks were stepped up around 1350, and they continued until Ang- 
kor itself was captured and sacked in 1430-31 . The fall of Angkor 
ended the dominant period of the Khmer state. Thereafter, its bord- 
ers shrank, and it controlled little more than the area around the 
Tonle Sap, the alluvial plain to the southeast, and some territory 
west of the Mekong River. To the east, the collapse of the king- 
dom of Champa in 1471 opened the Khmer lands of the Mekong 
Delta to the steady Vietnamese expansion southward. 

The long waning of the Cambodian empire after the fall of Ang- 
kor is not well documented. The transfer of the capital from the 
Angkorian region around the Tonle Sap to the vicinity of Phnom 
Penh may have heralded the shift of emphasis from an agricultural 
to a trading society. Even with this change, the Khmer state re- 
tained some of its vitality into the seventeenth century, alternately 
trading and warring with its neighbors. By the eighteenth century, 
however, it had become a backwater buffer state, existing solely 
on the sufferance of its increasingly powerful neighbors, Thailand 
and Vietnam. The imposition of the French protectorate upon Cam- 
bodia prevented its neighbors from swallowing it completely. 

Cambodia's status declined further under the French, however, 
when the last vestiges of its sovereignty were lost, especially after 
1884, when Paris imposed another unequal treaty that went be- 
yond the original protectorate of 1863. The newer pact limited the 
authority of the king, abolished slavery, stationed colonial officials 
in the countryside, and codified land ownership. Reaction to the 
1884 treaty produced the only sustained rebellion during colonial 
times. Unrest persisted until 1886 and was put down with troops 
from Vietnam (see The French Protectorate, ch. 1). Thereafter, 
the French consolidated their grasp on the country, and Cambo- 
dia became merely a heavily taxed, efficient rice-producing colony, 
the inhabitants of which were known for their passivity. 

As the Southeast Asian colonies of the European powers stood 
on the brink of World War II in 1940 and 1941, the utter power- 
lessness of Cambodia was illustrated by the fact that it was com- 
pelled to surrender its provinces of Siemreab and Batdambang 
(Battambang), which included some of the country's most fertile 
agricultural area, to Thailand, as a result of the brief Franco- 
Siamese War. In addition, some months later it was the French, 
not the Cambodians, who selected the candidate who would sit on 
the throne in Phnom Penh. Their choice was the young Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk, because French officials considered him more 
manipulable than the heir apparent. (Sihanouk was then a shy 
youth, well-disposed toward his role as figurehead monarch, and 



xxvn 



totally inexperienced in governing. His formidable international 
reputation lay far in the future.) 

In March 1945, the Japanese swept aside the Vichy French ad- 
ministration in Cambodia (as elsewhere in Indochina), and they 
induced the young king to proclaim independence. The event 
offered little occasion for euphoria, however. The Japanese re- 
mained in control, and then, after the Japanese surrender, the 
French returned to reimpose their authority, granting the Cam- 
bodians, as consolation prizes in early 1946, the right to have a 
constitution and the right to form political parties. 

In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the struggle for indepen- 
dence in Cambodia took place on several levels. Two political parties 
were formed under princes of the royal house. The Liberal Party, 
the more conservative of the two, advocated an evolutionary ap- 
proach to independence. The Democratic Party, the more radical 
one, favored the rapid attainment of independence and the for- 
mation of whatever political alliances might be necessary. Under- 
ground, Cambodian guerrillas took to the jungles to fight the 
returning French. The Khmer Issarak (see Appendix B), as these 
guerrillas were called, encompassed disaffected Cambodians from 
across the entire political spectrum. Meanwhile, the French 
managed to secure the return of Cambodia's two provinces lost 
to Thailand in 1941. In 1949, under increasing military pressure 
from the Viet Minh (see Appendix B) in neighboring Vietnam, 
the French granted Cambodia qualified self-government in certain 
areas and an autonomous zone in Batdambang and Siemreab. 

Sihanouk continued the political struggle above ground, embark- 
ing upon a campaign for independence. Using a combination of 
private and public initiatives and grandiose gestures, he exacted 
grudging concessions from a French government increasingly hard- 
pressed in Indochina by its war against the Viet Minh. In November 
1953, Sihanouk announced dramatically that independence had 
been gained, and he returned triumphantly from Paris to Phnom 
Penh. 

Sihanouk quickly emerged as a leader of stature in his newly 
independent country. In an effort to gain a freer hand in the poli- 
tics of his nation, a role he was not permitted to play as the ruler 
in a constitutional monarchy, he abdicated the throne in 1955 and 
formed a political movement, the Popular Socialist Community 
(Sangkum Riastre Niyum, or Sangkum). With control of the Sang- 
kum, Sihanouk succeeded in having himself named both chief of 
state and head of government. For nearly sixteen years, from 1954 
to 1970, he dominated Cambodian politics and ruled at the head 
of a highly authoritarian and centralized government. 



xxvin 



In the countryside, Sihanouk kept the support of the people 
through his charismatic personality, his highly visible personal 
forays among the rural peasantry, and his adherence to the tradi- 
tional symbols and institutions of the Khmer monarchy, such as 
public audiences and participation in time-honored ceremonies. 
Among the politicized urban elite, Sihanouk maintained power and 
kept his opponents off-balance through a range of manipulative 
stratagems, pitting them against one another when he could and 
co-opting them with government positions when he could not. 

In spite of Sihanouk's efforts, the situation in Cambodia began 
to go awry in the mid- to late 1960s. Internally, the country had 
been savaged by economic reverses. The budget was chronically 
in deficit; United States aid had been terminated; and state social- 
ism had stifled development (see Sihanouk's Peacetime Economy 
1953-70, ch. 3). Prices for Cambodia's export commodities — rice 
and rubber — were declining. Numerous members of the youthful, 
educated elite were underemployed and dissatisfied. Among the 
politicized middle class, the military leadership, the intellectuals, 
and the students, opposition was developing to Sihanouk's 
authoritarianism. In the countryside, heavy taxation had ignited 
the shortlived Samlot Rebellion in Batdambang Province. Although 
suppressed ruthlessly, it refused to die out, and smoldered on in 
remote corners of Cambodia. Disaffected elements still were at large, 
and some of the country remained insecure. The radical wing of 
the Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist Party, (KCP — see 
Appendix B), led by Saloth Sar (later to be known as Pol Pot), 
had gone underground and had taken up arms, unleashing its own 
insurgency against the Sihanouk regime. In the northeast, minority 
ethnic groups were alienated from the government in Phnom Penh 
because of its corvee labor, forced resettlement, and assimilationist 
policies (see Cambodia under Sihanouk, 1954-70, ch. 1). 

Internationally, the picture was not much better. Sihanouk tried 
to maintain a nonaligned course in the country's foreign policy. 
During its first decade of independence, Cambodia had received 
aid from East and from West, and it was respected internationally. 
In the mid- to late 1960s, however, this neutrality was fast erod- 
ing, and Cambodia was about to be engulfed by the war in neigh- 
boring Vietnam. The country rapidly was becoming a logistical 
rear area and a safe haven for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
(see Appendix B) forces fighting the Saigon government. Cambo- 
dia was exposed to cross-border forays and airstrikes from South 
Vietnam to neutralize these enemy installations. The Cambodian 
port of Kampong Saom also was becoming the terminus for Chinese 
weapons and supplies that were then trucked, sometimes in 



xx ix 



Cambodian army vehicles, overland to North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong supply depots. 

Sihanouk sought to adjust to the prevailing trends in Indochina. 
He sought to distance Cambodia from South Vietnam and accepted 
accommodation with North Vietnam and with the National Front 
for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN — see Appendix 
B), the political arm of the Viet Cong. He broke relations with 
Washington, looked for support to Beijing — which was then dis- 
tracted by its Cultural Revolution, and then resumed ties with 
Washington. 

Events in Cambodia were moving out of control, however. When 
Sihanouk went abroad for a lengthy sojourn in January 1970 to 
solicit Soviet and Chinese assistance in curbing the presence of 
North Vietnamese sanctuaries on Cambodian territory, domestic 
opposition to his regime became more outspoken and soon acquired 
a momentum of its own. The entire Cambodian National Assem- 
bly, led by a rightist cabinet under Premier Lon Nol, voted on 
March 22 to bar the return of Sihanouk to the country. Cambo- 
dia's first post-independence era thus ended, and the country soon 
was plunged into a period of war, chaos, and human suffering 
perhaps unparalleled in its history. 

The Lon Nol government that succeeded the fall of Sihanouk 
quickly abolished the monarchy and proclaimed itself the Khmer 
Republic (see Appendix B). It initially enjoyed wide support among 
the urban population, but it soon proved itself unequal to the tasks 
of governing and defending the country and capturing the allegiance 
of the Cambodian masses. The new government in Phnom Penh 
began by fanning anti- Vietnamese sentiment among the Khmer 
population, as a result of which countless numbers of civilian Viet- 
namese migrants in Cambodia were massacred. The government 
then turned against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong by 
calling publicly for their ouster from Cambodia and by initiating 
ineffectual military operations against them. Shortly thereafter, an 
offensive military thrust of the United States and South Vietnam 
into Cambodia dislodged North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units 
from their border sanctuaries; instead of driving them away from 
Cambodian territory, however, it pushed them deeper into the 
country, where they soon swept before them the ill-trained, ill- 
armed, and totally inexperienced Cambodian republican forces. 

At the same time, two concurrent developments conspired to 
erode further the shaky position of the Khmer Republic. The first 
was that Sihanouk established a government-in-exile in Beijing, 
where he had fled following his ouster. There, he raised the stan- 
dard of revolt against the republican regime in Phnom Penh, and 

xxx 



he united in a common front with the armed Khmer communist 
rebels. Both sides saw the advantages to such an alliance of con- 
venience. The Cambodian communists, dubbed the Khmer Rouge 
(see Appendix B) by Sihanouk, had ignited a small-scale insurgency 
in early 1968, but they had not been able to move beyond their 
redoubts in remote corners of Cambodia or to gain mass support 
in their first two years. Their alliance with Sihanouk, in a broad 
resistance front called the National United Front of Kampuchea 
(Front Uni National du Kampuchea — FUNK — see Appendix B), 
transformed their forlorn rebellion, which was aided by Washing- 
ton, into a war of national liberation against a puppet regime in 
Phnom Penh. At the same time, Sihanouk's name attracted to the 
FUNK cause Cambodians of every political persuasion, includ- 
ing many people without communist antecedents. 

The second development, one with equally serious consequences 
for the Khmer Republic, was that the North Vietnamese quickly 
undertook the training of the Khmer Rouge guerrillas to trans- 
form them into a conventional fighting force. While this training 
program was underway, North Vietnamese units temporarily as- 
sumed the burden of keeping the Khmer republican forces at bay, 
an effort that did not tax them unduly. By 1973 the Khmer Rouge 
were conducting most combat operations against the Phnom Penh 
government by themselves. 

The ill-fated Khmer Republic was unable to defend itself. By 
1971 it was on the defensive, and it was losing ground steadily. 
Fleeing the fighting in the countryside, peasant refugees crowded 
into the government's shrinking strongholds around Phnom Penh 
and the provincial centers. Lon Nol's inept and corrupt regime 
went from one military defeat to another. By early 1975, the situ- 
ation of the Khmer Republic was so precarious that Phnom Penh 
itself was invaded, and government control was limited to the 
provincial centers and to a patch of territory in western Cambodia 
around the Tonle Sap. In the following months, the Khmer Rouge 
steadily tightened the noose around the capital until all escape routes 
were cut off, and resistance collapsed. The fall of Phnom Penh in 
April 1975 marked the end of the Khmer Republic (see The Fall 
of Phnom Penh, ch. 1). 

For the Cambodian people, the entry of the Khmer Rouge into 
the capital began the grimmest period in Cambodia's long history. 
The Khmer Rouge rulers of Democratic Kampuchea, as the regime 
that supplanted the Khmer Republic was called, envisioned a to- 
tally self-sufficient Cambodia. This self-sufficiency was to be achieved 
by accelerated agricultural production, which in turn would pro- 
vide the wherewithal to develop the other sectors of the economy. 



xxxi 



Self-sufficiency, however, was pursued with such single-minded 
ruthlessness that between 1 million and 3 million persons died be- 
cause of purges, beatings, malnourishment, and overwork. To head 
off opposition to economic and social restructuring, the new re- 
gime hunted down and executed virtually anyone who had served 
the former government. The regime emptied the cities of inhabi- 
tants and forced the entire population into rudimentary, badly or- 
ganized collectives in the countryside; untold numbers died, worked 
to death under slave labor conditions or executed for minor infrac- 
tions of camp discipline. At the same time, the regime nurtured 
an acute paranoia that brooked no potential opposition but that 
prompted it to eradicate the educated middle class of Cambodia. 
When this eradication was accomplished, it turned on its own cadres 
at every echelon, torturing and executing thousands (see Revolu- 
tionary Terror, ch. 1). The regime's ruthless extermination of op- 
ponents, however, could not ensure its security; ultimately its own 
paranoia brought it down. 

Regionally, the Khmer Rouge paranoia manifested itself in the 
exacerbation of tensions with Vietnam. During the war against the 
United States and its allies, commonalities of enemy and of ideol- 
ogy had enabled the Vietnamese and the Cambodians to bridge 
their mutual distrust. After April 1975, however, with the xenopho- 
bic Pol Pot factions of the KCP in control in Phnom Penh, the 
traditional Cambodian antipathy for the Vietnamese reemerged. 
The source of the friction was the recurrent cross-border forays 
by combatants from both sides into the Mekong Delta and the 
Parrot's Beak area. The Khmer Rouge regime viewed itself as threa- 
tened, its territory violated by Vietnam. Hanoi in turn felt com- 
pelled to deploy substantial military assets along the border, as 
fighting continued to erupt on both sides of the frontier. By 
mid- 1978 Hanoi's patience was rapidly running out, as it became 
obliged to commit division-sized units to pacification missions along 
the Cambodian border. 

Sometime in the fall of 1978, the leadership in Hanoi decided 
to mount a multi-division punitive expedition into Cambodia. To 
lend a veneer of political legitimacy to this military undertaking, 
Hanoi sponsored the establishment of an anti-Pol Pot movement 
called the Kampuchean (or Khmer) National United Front for Na- 
tional Salvation (KNUFNS — see Appendix B), made up of fugi- 
tive Cambodians who had fled the Khmer Rouge. Accompanied 
by token KNUFNS units, the Vietnamese launched their military 
campaign into Cambodia in late December 1978 (see Vietnamese 
Invasion of Cambodia, ch. 5). The Khmer Rouge proved surpris- 
ingly vulnerable to the onslaught, and Phnom Penh fell to Hanoi's 



xxxn 



forces in early January 1979. The Khmer Rouge, defeated militarily 
for the time being, but not destroyed, ignited a persistent insur- 
gency in the remote regions of Cambodia. The country then em- 
barked upon a decade-long period of fitful rehabilitation, made more 
precarious by the lack of resources, the enduring guerilla war, and 
the military occupation by Vietnam. 

It was evident that the institutions of the new Cambodian re- 
gime, which called itself the People's Republic of Kampuchea 
(PRK — see Appendix B), were virtually identical to those of Viet- 
nam. In the PRK, only a single, pro- Vietnamese political party 
was permitted. This party, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's 
Revolutionary Party (KPRP — see Appendix B), was headed by 
a political bureau with a secretariat and a general secretary in 
charge. It also had a central committee with a control commission 
to handle day-by-day affairs (see The Kampuchean, or Khmer, 
People's Revolutionary Party, ch. 4). The party was backed by 
a mass movement — the successor to KNUFNS, the Kampuchean 
(or Khmer) United Front for National Construction and Defense 
(KUFNCD — see Appendix B) and by a number of front organi- 
zations such as labor, women's, and youth groups. As in Vietnam, 
party and government were intertwined: the same individuals held 
concurrent leadership positions in both sectors. The Council of State 
was the highest government body; it reserved to itself the major 
decision-making authority. A Council of Ministers exercised cabinet 
functions and was responsible to a National Assembly elected from 
KPRP members. The National Assembly heard reports from 
ministers and from the rest of national leadership, but appeared 
to exercise little legislative authority (see Government Structure, 
ch. 4). 

Cambodian rehabilitation and development were hampered by 
the civil war that plagued the country after the ouster of the Khmer 
Rouge. When the Vietnamese drove Pol Pot from power in their 
December 1978 invasion, they failed to administer the coup de grace 
to their adversaries, who regrouped their forces and initiated a guer- 
rilla war against Hanoi's occupation forces. Despite their odious 
reputation and their abominable human rights record, the Khmer 
Rouge were able to attract guerrilla recruits to their ranks. The 
Khmer Rouge applied the same coercive measures in the remote 
areas of Cambodia under their control as those they had used when 
they ruled all of Cambodia, and they cast themselves as the sole 
nationalistic force opposing the Vietnamese occupation of Cam- 
bodia. In terms of the number of combatants they could muster, 
the Khmer Rouge, throughout the decade-long civil war, continued 
to be the largest single guerrilla force in the field. 



xxxm 



For many Cambodians, however, the option of joining either 
the Khmer Rouge or the Vietnamese-installed regime was a Hob- 
son's choice. Consequently, soon after Hanoi's invasion, two 
additional insurgent movements arose among the Khmer refugees 
who had fled both Hanoi's and Pol Pot's forces. One of these move- 
ments coalesced around the elderly nationalistic figure of Son Sann, 
a cabinet minister under Sihanouk. Son Sann's movement took 
the name Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF — 
see Appendix B), and its armed wing was called the Khmer Peo- 
ple's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF — see Appen- 
dix B). In the meantime, a third insurgent force rallied under 
Sihanouk and his son Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Sihanouk's 
political movement was called for the National United Front for 
an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia 
(Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, 
Pacifique, et Cooperatif— FUNCINPEC— see Appendix B), and 
his armed wing, the Sihanouk National Army (Armee Nationale 
Sihanoukiste — ANS — see Appendix B). 

The three insurgent forces maintained their own separate struc- 
tures; they initiated their own guerrilla campaigns against the PRK 
regime in Phnom Penh and its Vietnamese mentors. After several 
years of sustained pressure from the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) to form a unified front against the Vietnamese 
occupiers, the Khmer insurgent movements came together in an 
uneasy union, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kam- 
puchea (CGDK — see Appendix B), in mid- 1982. Sihanouk was 
chosen president of the CGDK; during the succeeding years, he 
launched an unending series of attempts to bring reconciliation to 
his divided country and to achieve some power- sharing arrange- 
ment agreeable to all four warring Khmer factions. Although the 
methods for achieving peace in Cambodia remained in dispute, 
there was agreement that the Vietnamese occupation forces must 
depart and that the Khmer Rouge must never again reimpose its 
brutal rule over Cambodia. 

Cambodia's civil war had an international dimension as well. 
Arrayed on one side were the PRK, its Vietnamese allies who did 
much of the fighting, and, by proxy, the Soviet Union. Arrayed 
on the other side were the CGDK, its ASEAN supporters, and 
China. Vietnam was involved because it had placed the PRK in 
power and because it feared being caught between a hostile China 
and a pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge regime. The Soviet Union was 
involved because of its treaty relationship with Hanoi and because 
it provided much of the military hardware used by the PRK and 
by the Vietnamese. ASEAN was involved because it feared a heavily 



xxxiv 



armed, expansionist Vietnamese state, which might not stop at con- 
quest of the Indochinese Peninsula. China was involved and be- 
came the chief supporter of the Khmer Rouge faction in the CGDK 
because it saw the PRK and Vietnam as two more links in the chain 
of Soviet client states being forged around it. 

As the 1980s closed, there were hopeful signs that the situation 
in Cambodia might not be as intractable as it had seemed in previ- 
ous years. For example, the international environment had changed 
considerably. Soviet withdrawals from Afghanistan and Mongo- 
lia, as well as the renewed dialogue between Moscow and Beijing, 
culminating in a Sino-Soviet summit in May 1989, allayed to some 
extent Beijing's fears of encirclement by client states of Moscow. 
China itself stepped back from its support of the Khmer Rouge 
regime of Democratic Kampuchea as the sole legitimate government 
of Cambodia, and seemingly accepted the Vietnamese-installed 
Phnom Penh regime as a partner in any postwar government. The 
United States continued to oppose the return of the Khmer Rouge 
to a position of dominance in a future government, but appeared 
to acquiesce in a power- sharing arrangement between the Phnom 
Penh regime and the non-communist resistance. Vietnam stepped 
up the pace of its troop withdrawal from Cambodia, ending its 
decade of occupation in September 1989 — a year ahead of time. 

Among the four competing Khmer factions who remained at an 
impasse over power-sharing in a post-occupation Cambodia, in- 
formal meetings in Jakarta in February and May 1989 produced 
a useful dialogue, but little agreement on matters of substance. The 
PRK, in an effort to attract the support of Prince Sihanouk and 
the non-communist resistance and to isolate the Khmer Rouge, 
amended the Constitution and changed the name of the country, 
the flag, and the national anthem in April 1989. The amended Con- 
stitution, however, upheld the dominant position of the incumbent 
Kampuchean, or Khmer, People's Revolutionary Party, and made 
no provision for the establishment of a multi-party system in the 
newly named State of Cambodia. As a result of these cosmetic 
gestures, plus a series of meetings between Prince Sihanouk and 
Prime Minister Hun Sen, as well as conciliatory utterances by 
Khmer Rouge leaders, the differences among all sides seem to have 
narrowed, and the hopes for a successful resolution of the Cambo- 
dian situation seemed to have progressed sufficientiy for the French 
government to convene the Paris International Conference on Cam- 
bodia from July 30 to August 30, 1989. 

The optimism on the eve of the conference — attended by nineteen 
countries including the United States, as well as the UN Secretary 
General and the four rival Cambodian factions, proved to be 



XXXV 



ill-founded. The forum expired amid the intransigence of the Khmer 
factions on five basic issues: verification of the Vietnamese troop 
withdrawal; establishment of provisions for a ceasefire in the fight- 
ing; determination of the status of Vietnamese residents in Cam- 
bodia; official characterization of the Khmer Rouge period as a 
genocide; and the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement 
among the four factions. The latter issue proved to be the major 
stumbling block. The non-communist resistance headed by Prince 
Sihanouk lobbied for the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge on the 
grounds that they already exercised a decisive presence in Cam- 
bodian affairs and that their exclusion from a future government 
would lead inevitably to a civil war between them and the coali- 
tion that opposed them. The Phnom Penh regime countered that 
to include the Khmer Rouge in a postwar government would lead 
to a repetition of the cruelty and repression they wrought during 
the Democratic Kampuchea period. Thus, the impasse continued, 
and the failure of the Paris conference brought negotiations to an 
end for the time being. The State of Cambodia, in a preliminary 
fashion, however, cast about for a renewal of the dialogue by recon- 
vening informal talks in Jakarta. 

In the meantime, pessimistic forecasts of a civil war in Cambo- 
dia following the Paris conference, the Vietnamese troop with- 
drawal, and the end of the dry season, seemed to be borne out. 
On the western frontier with Thailand, Khmer resistance forces 
took to the field with renewed aggressiveness, capturing in succes- 
sion a number of border towns. The single-minded purposefulness 
of the Khmer Rouge in the rebel offensive came as no surprise. 
What astonished foreign observers, however, was the unexpected 
combativeness of the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed 
Forces, which in previous years had been reduced to ineffectuality 
by the bickering of its leaders. As this book goes to press, the Thai- 
Cambodian border remains in turmoil, with the Phnom Penh re- 
gime in a defensive posture — increasingly hard-pressed to contain 
rebel actions and confronting increased speculation from foreign 
observers as to whether it can hold its own or indeed survive without 
outside help. 



December 28, 1989 Russell R. Ross 

Andrea Maties Savada 



xxxvi 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



gate of the Angkor Thorn temple complex, circa A D. 1200 



THE KHMER PEOPLE were among the first in Southeast Asia 
to adopt religious ideas and political institutions from India and 
to establish centralized kingdoms encompassing large territories. 
The earliest known kingdom in the area, Funan, flourished from 
around the first century to the sixth century A.D. It was succeeded 
by Chenla, which controlled large areas of modern Cambodia, Viet- 
nam, Laos, and Thailand (known as Siam until 1939). The golden 
age of Khmer civilization, however, was the period from the ninth 
to the thirteenth century, when the kingdom of Kambuja, which 
gave Kampuchea, or Cambodia, its name, ruled large territories 
from its capital in the region of Angkor in western Cambodia. 

Under Jay avarman VII (1181-ca. 1218), Kambuja reached its 
zenith of political power and cultural creativity. Following Jay avar- 
man VII's death, Kambuja experienced gradual decline. Important 
factors were the aggressiveness of neighboring peoples (especially 
the Thai, or Siamese), chronic interdynastic strife, and the gradual 
deterioration of the complex irrigation system that had ensured rice 
surpluses. The Angkorian monarchy survived until 1431, when the 
Thai captured Angkor Thorn and the Cambodian king fled to the 
southern part of his country. 

The fifteenth century to the nineteenth century was a period of 
continued decline and territorial loss. Cambodia enjoyed a brief 
period of prosperity during the sixteenth century because its kings, 
who built their capitals in the region southeast of the Tonle Sap 
(Great Lake) along the Mekong River, promoted trade with other 
parts of Asia. This was the period when Spanish and Portuguese 
adventurers and missionaries first visited the country. But the Thai 
conquest of the new capital at Lovek in 1 594 marked a downturn 
in the country's fortunes, and Cambodia became a pawn in power 
struggles between its two increasingly powerful neighbors, Siam 
and Vietnam. Vietnam's settlement of the Mekong Delta led to 
its annexation of that area at the end of the seventeenth century. 
Cambodia thereby lost some of its richest territory and was cut off 
from the sea. Such foreign encroachments continued through the 
first half of the nineteenth century because Vietnam was determined 
to absorb Khmer land and to force the inhabitants to accept Viet- 
namese culture. Such imperialistic policies created in the Khmer 
an abiding suspicion of their eastern neighbors that flared into 
violent confrontation after the Khmer Rouge (see Appendix B) 
established its regime in 1975. 



3 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

In 1863 King Norodom signed an agreement with the French 
to establish a protectorate over his kingdom. The country gradu- 
ally came under French colonial domination. During World War 
II, the Japanese allowed the French government (based at Vichy) 
that collaborated with the Nazis to continue administering Cam- 
bodia and the other Indochinese territories, but they also fostered 
Khmer nationalism. Cambodia enjoyed a brief period of indepen- 
dence in 1945 before Allied troops restored French control. King 
Norodom Sihanouk, who had been chosen by France to succeed 
King Monivong in 1941, rapidly assumed a central political role 
as he sought to neutralize leftist and republican opponents and 
attempted to negotiate acceptable terms for independence from the 
French. Sihanouk's 4 'royal crusade for independence" resulted in 
grudging French acquiescence to his demands for a transfer of 
sovereignty. A partial agreement was struck in October 1953. 
Sihanouk then declared that independence had been achieved and 
returned in triumph to Phnom Penh. The following year, as a result 
of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, Cambodia was able to 
bring about the withdrawal of the Viet Minh (see Appendix B) 
troops from its territory and to withstand any residual impinge- 
ment upon its sovereignty by external powers. 

In order to play a more active role in national politics, Sihanouk 
abdicated in 1955 and placed his father, Norodom Suramarit, on 
the throne. Now only a prince, Sihanouk organized his own polit- 
ical movement, the Popular Socialist Community, (Sangkum Reastr 
Niyum, or Sangkum), which won all the seats in the National 
Assembly in the 1955 election. The Sangkum dominated the 
political scene until the late 1960s. Sihanouk's highly personal ruling 
style made him immensely popular with the people, especially in 
rural villages. Although the Sangkum was backed by conservative 
interests, Sihanouk included leftists in his government, three of 
whom — Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim — later became 
leaders of the Khmer Rouge. In 1963 he announced the nationali- 
zation of banking, foreign trade, and insurance in a socialist 
experiment that dried up foreign investment and alienated the right 
wing. In foreign relations, Sihanouk pursued a policy of neutral- 
ity and nonalignment. He accepted United States economic and 
military aid, but he also promoted close relations with China and 
attempted to keep on good terms with the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (North Vietnam). The principal objectives of his for- 
eign policy were to preserve Cambodia's independence and to keep 
the country out of the widening conflict in neighboring Vietnam. 
Relations with Washington grew stormy in the early 1960s. In 1963 



Historical Setting 



the prince rejected further United States aid, and, two years later, 
he severed diplomatic relations. 

Both the domestic and the international situations had deterio- 
rated by the late 1960s. The increasingly powerful right wing 
challenged Sihanouk's control of the political system. Peasant resent- 
ment over harsh tax collection measures and the expropriation of 
land to build a sugar refinery led to a violent revolt in 1967 in the 
northwestern province of Batdambang (Battambang). The armed 
forces, commanded by General Lon Nol (who was also prime 
minister), quelled the revolt, but a communist-led insurgency spread 
throughout the country. The spillover of the Second Indochina War 
(or Vietnam War) into the Cambodian border areas also was be- 
coming a serious problem. Apparently one factor in Sihanouk's 
decision to reestablish relations with Washington in 1969 was his 
fear of further incursions by the North Vietnamese and the Viet 
Cong (see Appendix B). In March 1970, however, he was over- 
thrown by General Lon Nol and other right-wing leaders, who seven 
months later abolished the monarchy and established the Khmer 
Republic (see Appendix B). 

The Khmer Republic faced not only North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong combat units but also an effective, homegrown communist 
movement that grew more lethal as time went on. The Cambo- 
dian communists, whom Sihanouk had labeled Khmer Rouge, 
traced their movement back to the struggle for independence and 
the creation in 1951, under Vietnamese auspices, of the Kam- 
puchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP — see 
Appendix B). During the early 1960s, however, a group of Paris- 
trained communist intellectuals, of whom the most important were 
Saloth Sar (known as Pol Pot after 1976), Khieu Samphan, and 
Ieng Sary, seized control of the party. They gradually purged or 
neutralized rivals whom they considered too subservient to Viet- 
nam. After the March 1970 coup d'etat that toppled Sihanouk, 
the Khmer Rouge formed a united front with the ousted leader, 
a move that won them the goodwill of peasants who were still loyal 
to the prince. 

Despite massive United States aid to the newly proclaimed 
Khmer Republic and the bombing of North Vietnamese and Khmer 
Rouge installations and troop concentrations in the countryside, 
the Phnom Penh regime rapidly lost most of the country's terri- 
tory to the communists. In January 1975 communist forces laid 
siege to Phnom Penh, and in succeeding months they tightened 
the noose around the capital. On April 1, 1975, President Lon Nol 
left the country. Sixteen days later Khmer Rouge troops entered 
the city. 



5 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

The forty-four months the Khmer Rouge were in power was a 
period of unmitigated suffering for the Khmer people. Although 
the severity of revolutionary policies varied from region to region 
because of ideological differences and the personal inclinations of 
local leaders, hundreds of thousands of people starved, died from 
disease, or were executed. "New people" (the intelligentsia and 
those from the cities — those new to the rural areas), being consid- 
ered politically unreliable, were special targets of terror and of a 
harsh, unremitting regime of forced labor. In 1977 Pol Pot launched 
a bloody purge within the communist ranks that accounted for many 
deaths. The slaughter of the Vietnamese minority living in Cam- 
bodia and the Khmer Rouge's aggressive incursions into Vietnam 
led to fighting with Vietnam in 1977 and 1978. In December 1978, 
Vietnamese forces invaded the country. On January 7, 1979, they 
captured Phnom Penh and began to establish the People's Republic 
of Kampuchea (PRK — see Appendix B; fig. 1). The Khmer Rouge 
fled to isolated corners of the country and resumed their guerrilla 
struggle, which continued in the late 1980s. 

Prehistory and Early Kingdoms 

Archaeological evidence indicates that parts of the region now 
called Cambodia were inhabited during the first and second millen- 
nia B.C. by peoples having a Neolithic culture. By the first cen- 
tury A.D., the inhabitants had developed relatively stable, organized 
societies, which had far surpassed the primitive stage in culture 
and technical skills. The most advanced groups lived along the coast 
and in the lower Mekong River valley and delta regions, where 
they cultivated irrigated rice and kept domesticated animals. 

Scholars believe that these people may have been Austroasiatic 
in origin and related to the ancestors of the groups who now inhabit 
insular Southeast Asia and many of the islands of the Pacific Ocean. 
They worked metals, including both iron and bronze, and possessed 
navigational skills. Mon- Khmer people, who arrived at a later date, 
probably intermarried with them. The Khmer who now populate 
Cambodia may have migrated from southeastern China to the 
Indochinese Peninsula before the first century A.D. They are 
believed to have arrived before their present Vietnamese, Thai, 
and Lao neighbors (see fig. 2). 

Early Indianized Kingdom of Funan 

At about the time that the ancient peoples of Western Europe 
were absorbing the classical culture and institutions of the Mediter- 
ranean, the peoples of mainland and insular Southeast Asia were 
responding to the stimulus of a civilization that had arisen in 



6 



Historical Setting 



northern India during the previous millennium. The Britons, Gauls, 
and Iberians experienced Mediterranean influences directly, 
through conquest by and incorporation into the Roman Empire. 
In contrast, the Indianization of Southeast Asia was a slower process 
than the Romanization of Europe because there was no period of 
direct Indian rule and because land and sea barriers that separated 
the region from the Indian subcontinent are considerable. Neverthe- 
less, Indian religion, political thought, literature, mythology, and 
artistic motifs gradually became integral elements in local Southeast 
Asian cultures. The caste system never was adopted, but Indiani- 
zation stimulated the rise of highly-organized, centralized states. 

Funan, the earliest of the Indianized states, generally is consid- 
ered by Cambodians to have been the first Khmer kingdom in the 
area. Founded in the first century A.D., Funan was located on 
the lower reaches of the Mekong River in the delta area. Its capi- 
tal, Vyadhapura, probably was located near the present-day town 
of Phumi Banam in Prey Veng Province. The earliest historical 
reference to Funan is a Chinese description of a mission that 
visited the country in the third century A.D. The name Funan 
derives from the Chinese rendition of the old Khmer word bnam 
(mountain). What the Funanese called themselves, however, is not 
known. 

During this early period in Funan 's history, the population was 
probably concentrated in villages along the Mekong River and along 
the Tonle Sab River below the Tonle Sap. Traffic and communi- 
cations were mostly waterborne on the rivers and their delta tribu- 
taries. The area was a natural region for the development of an 
economy based on fishing and rice cultivation. There is consider- 
able evidence that the Funanese economy depended on rice sur- 
pluses produced by an extensive inland irrigation system. Maritime 
trade also played an extremely important role in the development 
of Funan. The remains of what is believed to have been the king- 
dom's main port, Oc Eo (now part of Vietnam), contain Roman 
as well as Persian, Indian, and Greek artifacts. 

By the fifth century A.D., the state exercised control over the 
lower Mekong River area and the lands around the Tonle Sap. 
It also commanded tribute from smaller states in the area now com- 
prising northern Cambodia, southern Laos, southern Thailand, 
and the northern portion of the Malay Peninsula. 

Indianization was fostered by increasing contact with the sub- 
continent through the travels of merchants, diplomats, and learned 
Brahmans (Hindus of the highest caste traditionally assigned to 
the priesthood). Indian immigrants, believed to have arrived in 
the fourth and the fifth centuries, accelerated the process. By the 



7 



Cambodia: A Country Study 




Gulf of Thailand 



Modern international 

boundary 

50 100 Kilo meters 
50 100 Miles 



Source: Based on information from John F. Cady, Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development, 
New York, 1964. 



Figure 2. Early States of Indochina 



8 



Historical Setting 



fifth century, the elite culture was thoroughly Indianized. Court 
ceremony and the structure of political institutions were based on 
Indian models. The Sanskrit language was widely used; the laws 
of Manu, the Indian legal code, were adopted; and an alphabet 
based on Indian writing systems was introduced. 

Funan reached its zenith in the fifth century A.D. Beginning 
in the early sixth century, civil wars and dynastic strife undermined 
Funan' s stability, making it relatively easy prey to incursions by 
hostile neighbors. By the end of the seventh century, a northern 
neighbor, the kingdom of Chenla, had reduced Funan to a vassal 
state. 

The Successor State of Chenla 

The people of Chenla also were Khmer. Once they established 
control over Funan, they embarked on a course of conquest that 
continued for three centuries. They subjugated central and upper 
Laos, annexed portions of the Mekong Delta, and brought what 
are now western Cambodia and southern Thailand under their 
direct control. 

The royal families of Chenla intermarried with their Funanese 
counterparts and generally preserved the earlier political, social, 
and religious institutions of Funan. In the eighth century A.D., 
however, factional disputes at the Chenla court resulted in the split- 
ting of the kingdom into rival northern and southern halves. Accord- 
ing to Chinese chronicles, the two parts were known as Land (or 
Upper) Chenla and Water (or Lower) Chenla. Land Chenla main- 
tained a relatively stable existence, but Water Chenla underwent 
a period of constant turbulence. 

Late in the eighth century A.D., Water Chenla was subjected 
to attacks by pirates from Java, Sumatra, and the Malay Penin- 
sula. By the beginning of the ninth century, it had apparently be- 
come a vassal of the Sailendra dynasty of Java. The last of the Water 
Chenla kings allegedly was killed around A.D. 790 by a Javanese 
monarch whom he had offended. The ultimate victor in the strife 
that followed was the ruler of a small Khmer state located north 
of the Mekong Delta. His assumption of the throne as Jayavar- 
man II (ca. A.D. 802-50) marked the liberation of the Khmer peo- 
ple from Javanese suzerainty and the beginning of a unified Khmer 
nation. 

The Angkorian Period 

The Angkorian period lasted from the early ninth century to the 
early fifteenth century A.D. In terms of cultural accomplishments 
and political power, this was the golden age of Khmer civilization. 



9 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

The great temple cities of the Angkorian region, located near the 
modern town of Siemreab, are a lasting monument to the great- 
ness of Jayavarman IPs successors. (Even the Khmer Rouge, who 
looked on most of their country's past history and traditions with 
hostility, adopted a stylized Angkorian temple for the flag of 
Democratic Kampuchea. A similar motif is found in the flag of 
the PRK). The kingdom founded by Jayavarman II also gave 
modern-day Cambodia, or Kampuchea, its name. During the early 
ninth to the mid-fifteenth centuries, it was known as Kambuja, 
originally the name of an early north Indian state, from which the 
current forms of the name have been derived. 

Possibly to put distance between himself and the seaborne 
Javanese, Jayavarman II settled north of the Tonle Sap. He built 
several capitals before establishing one, Hariharalaya, near the site 
where the Angkorian complexes were built. Indravarman I (A.D. 
877-89) extended Khmer control as far west as the Korat Plateau 
in Thailand, and he ordered the construction of a huge reservoir 
north of the capital to provide irrigation for wet rice cultivation. 
His son, Yasovarman I (A.D. 889-900), built the Eastern Baray 
(reservoir or tank), evidence of which remains to the present time. 
Its dikes, which may be seen today, are more than 6 kilometers 
long and 1 .6 kilometers wide. The elaborate system of canals and 
reservoirs built under Indravarman I and his successors were the 
key to Kambuja' s prosperity for half a millennium. By freeing cul- 
tivators from dependence on unreliable seasonal monsoons, they 
made possible an early "green revolution" that provided the coun- 
try with large surpluses of rice. Kambuja' s decline during the thir- 
teenth and fourteenth centuries probably was hastened by the 
deterioration of the irrigation system. Attacks by Thai and other 
foreign peoples and the internal discord caused by dynastic rival- 
ries diverted human resources from the system's upkeep, and it 
gradually fell into disrepair. 

Suryavarman II (1113-50), one of the greatest Angkorian 
monarchs, expanded his kingdom's territory in a series of success- 
ful wars against the kingdom of Champa in central Vietnam, the 
kingdom of Nam Viet in northern Vietnam, and the small Mon 
polities as far west as the Irrawaddy River of Burma. He reduced 
to vassalage the Thai peoples who had migrated into Southeast Asia 
from the Yunnan region of southern China and established his 
suzerainty over the northern part of the Malay Peninsula. His 
greatest achievement was the construction of the temple city com- 
plex of Angkor Wat. The largest religious edifice in the world, 
Angkor Wat is considered the greatest single architectural work 
in Southeast Asia. Suryavarman IPs reign was followed, however, 



10 



Historical Setting 



by thirty years of dynastic upheaval and an invasion by the neigh- 
boring Cham (see Glossary), who destroyed the city of Angkor in 
1177. 

The Cham ultimately were driven out and conquered by Jayavar- 
man VII, whose reign (1181-ca. 1218) marked the apogee of Kam- 
buja's power. Unlike his predecessors, who had adopted the cult 
of the Hindu god-king, Jayavarman VII was a fervent patron of 
Mahayana Buddhism. Casting himself as a bodhisattva (see Glos- 
sary), he embarked on a frenzy of building activity that included 
the Angkor Thorn complex and the Bayon, a remarkable temple 
whose stone towers depict 216 faces of buddhas, gods, and kings. 
He also built over 200 rest houses and hospitals throughout his king- 
dom. Like the Roman emperors, he maintained a system of roads 
between his capital and provincial towns. According to historian 
George Coedes, "No other Cambodian king can claim to have 
moved so much stone." Often, quality suffered for the sake of size 
and rapid construction, as is revealed in the intriguing but poorly 
constructed Bayon. 

Carvings show that everyday Angkorian buildings were wooden 
structures not much different from those found in Cambodia today. 
The impressive stone buildings were not used as residences by mem- 
bers of the royal family. Rather, they were the focus of Hindu or 
Buddhist cults that celebrated the divinity, or buddhahood, of the 
monarch and his family. Coedes suggests that they had the dual 
function of both temple and tomb. Typically, their dimensions 
reflected the structure of the Hindu mythological universe. For 
example, five towers at the center of the Angkor Wat complex 
represent the peaks of Mount Meru, the center of the universe; 
an outer wall represents the mountains that ring the world's edge; 
and a moat depicts the cosmic ocean. Like many other ancient 
edifices, the monuments of the Angkorian region absorbed vast 
reserves of resources and human labor and their purpose remains 
shrouded in mystery. 

Angkorian society was strictly hierarchical. The king, regarded 
as divine, owned both the land and his subjects. Immediately below 
the monarch and the royal family were the Brahman priesthood 
and a small class of officials, who numbered about 4,000 in the 
tenth century. Next were the commoners, who were burdened with 
heavy corvee (forced labor) duties. There was also a large slave 
class that, like the nameless multitudes of ancient Egypt, built the 
enduring monuments. 

After Jayavarman VII' s death, Kambuja entered a long period 
of decline that led to its eventual disintegration. The Thai were 
a growing menace on the empire's western borders. The spread 



11 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

of Theravada Buddhism, which came to Kambuja from Sri Lanka 
by way of the Mon kingdoms, challenged the royal Hindu and 
Mahayana Buddhist cults. Preaching austerity and the salvation 
of the individual through his or her own efforts, Theravada Bud- 
dhism did not lend doctrinal support to a society ruled by an opu- 
lent royal establishment maintained through the virtual slavery of 
the masses. 

In 1353 a Thai army captured Angkor. It was recaptured by 
the Khmer, but wars continued and the capital was looted several 
times. During the same period, Khmer territory north of the present 
Laotian border was lost to the Lao kingdom of Lan Xang. In 1431 
the Thai captured Angkor Thorn. Thereafter, the Angkorian region 
did not again encompass a royal capital, except for a brief period 
in the third quarter of the sixteenth century. 

Cambodia's Struggle for Survival, 1432-1887 

The more than four centuries that passed from the abandonment 
of Angkor around the mid-fifteenth century to the establishment 
of a protectorate under the French in 1863 are considered by histori- 
ans to be Cambodia's "dark ages," a period of economic, social, 
and cultural stagnation when the kingdom's internal affairs came 
increasingly under the control of its aggressive neighbors, the Thai 
and the Vietnamese. By the mid-nineteenth century, Cambodia 
had become an almost helpless pawn in the power struggles be- 
tween Thailand and Vietnam and probably would have been com- 
pletely absorbed by one or the other if France had not intervened, 
giving Cambodia a colonially dominated "lease on life." Fear of 
racial and cultural extinction has persisted as a major theme in 
modern Cambodian thought and helps to explain the intense na- 
tionalism and xenophobia of the Khmer Rouge during the 1970s. 
Establishment in 1979 of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, 
a Vietnamese-dominated satellite state, can be seen as the culmi- 
nation of a process of Vietnamese encroachment that was already 
well under way by the seventeenth century. 

The process of internal decay and foreign encroachment was 
gradual rather than precipitous and was hardly evident in the 
fifteenth century when the Khmer were still powerful. Following 
the fall of Angkor Thorn, the Cambodian court abandoned the 
region north of the Tonle Sap, never to return except for a brief 
interlude in the late sixteenth century. By this time however, the 
Khmer penchant for monument building had ceased. Older faiths 
such as Mahayana Buddhism and the Hindu cult of the god-king 
had been supplanted by Theravada Buddhism, and the Cambo- 
dians had become part of the same religious and cultural cosmos 



12 



Historical Setting 



as the Thai. This similarity did not prevent intermittent warfare 
between the two kingdoms, however. During the sixteenth cen- 
tury Cambodian armies, taking advantage of Thai troubles with 
the Burmese, invaded the Thai kingdom several times. 

In the meantime, following the abandonment of the Angkorian 
sites, the Khmer established a new capital several hundred kilo- 
meters to the southeast on the site of what is now Phnom Penh. 
This new center of power was located at the confluence of the 
Mekong and the Tonle Sab rivers. Thus, it controlled the river 
commerce of the Khmer heartland and the Laotian kingdoms and 
had access, by way of the Mekong Delta, to the international trade 
routes that linked the China coast, the South China Sea, and the 
Indian Ocean. A new kind of state and society emerged, more open 
to the outside world and more dependent on commerce as a source 
of wealth than its inland predecessor. The growth of maritime trade 
with China during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) provided lucra- 
tive opportunities for members of the Cambodian elite who con- 
trolled royal trading monopolies. The appearance of Europeans 
in the region in the sixteenth century also stimulated commerce. 

King Ang Chan (1516-66), one of the few great Khmer monarchs 
of the post- Angkorian period, moved the capital from Phnom Penh 
to Lovek. Portuguese and Spanish travelers who visited the city, 
located on the banks of the Tonle Sab, a river north of Phnom Penh, 
described it as a place of fabulous wealth. The products traded there 
included precious stones, metals, silk and cotton, incense, ivory, 
lacquer, livestock (including elephants), and rhinoceros horn (prized 
by the Chinese as a rare and potent medicine). By the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries, Lovek contained flourishing for- 
eign trading communities of Chinese, Indonesians, Malays, 
Japanese, Arabs, Spanish, and Portuguese. They were joined later 
in the century by the English and the Dutch. 

Because the representatives of practically all these nationalities 
were pirates, adventurers, or traders, this was an era of stormy 
cosmopolitanism. Hard-pressed by the Thai, King Sattha (1576-94) 
surrounded himself with a personal guard of Spanish and Por- 
tuguese mercenaries, and in 1593 asked the Spanish governor of 
the Philippines for aid. Attracted by the prospects of establishing 
a Spanish protectorate in Cambodia and of converting the monarch 
to Christianity, the governor sent a force of 120 men, but Lovek 
had already fallen to the Thai when they arrived the following year. 
The Spanish took advantage of the extremely confused situation 
to place one of Sattha' s sons on the throne in 1597. Hopes of mak- 
ing the country a Spanish dependency were dashed, however, when 



13 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

the Spaniards were massacred two years later by an equally 
belligerent contingent of Malay mercenaries. 

The Thai, however, had dealt a fatal blow to Cambodian in- 
dependence by capturing Lovek in 1594. With the posting of a Thai 
military governor in the city, a degree of foreign political control 
was established over the kingdom for the first time. Cambodian 
chronicles describe the fall of Lovek as a catastrophe from which 
the nation never fully recovered. 

Domination by Thailand and by Vietnam 

More than their conquest of Angkor a century and a half earlier, 
the Thai capture of Lovek marked the beginning of a decline in 
Cambodia's fortunes. One possible reason for the decline was the 
labor drain imposed by the Thai conquerors as they marched thou- 
sands of Khmer peasants, skilled artisans, scholars, and members 
of the Buddhist clergy back to their capital of Ayutthaya. This prac- 
tice, common in the history of Southeast Asia, crippled Cambo- 
dia's ability to recover a semblance of its former greatness. A new 
Khmer capital was established at Odongk (Udong), south of Lovek, 
but its monarchs could survive only by entering into what amounted 
to vassal relationships with the Thai and with the Vietnamese. In 
common parlance, Thailand became Cambodia's "father" and 
Vietnam its "mother." 

By the late fifteenth century, the Vietnamese — who, unlike other 
Southeast Asian peoples, had patterned their culture and their civili- 
zation on those of China — had defeated the once-powerful king- 
dom of Champa in central Vietnam. Thousands of Chams fled into 
Khmer territory. By the early seventeenth century, the Vietnamese 
had reached the Mekong Delta, which was inhabited by Khmer 
people. In 1620 the Khmer king Chey Chettha II (1618-28) mar- 
ried a daughter of Sai Vuong, one of the Nguyen lords (1558-1778), 
who ruled southern Vietnam for most of the period of the restored 
Le dynasty (1428-1788). Three years later, Chey Chettha allowed 
the Vietnamese to establish a custom-house at Prey Nokor, near 
what is now Ho Chi Minh City (until 1975, Saigon). By the end 
of the seventeenth century, the region was under Vietnamese 
administrative control, and Cambodia was cut off from access to 
the sea. Trade with the outside world was possible only with Viet- 
namese permission. 

There were periods in the seventeenth and the eighteenth cen- 
turies, when Cambodia's neighbors were preoccupied with inter- 
nal or external strife, that afforded the beleaguered country a 
breathing spell. The Vietnamese were involved in a lengthy civil 
war until 1674, but upon its conclusion they promptly annexed 



14 



Historical Setting 



sizable areas of contiguous Cambodian territory in the region of 
the Mekong Delta. For the next one hundred years they used the 
alleged mistreatment of Vietnamese colonists in the delta as a pretext 
for their continued expansion. By the end of the eighteenth cen- 
tury, they had extended their control to include the area encom- 
passed in the late 1980s by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
(Vietnam). 

Thailand, which might otherwise have been courted as an ally 
against Vietnamese incursions in the eighteenth century, was it- 
self involved in a new conflict with Burma. In 1767 the Thai capi- 
tal of Ayutthaya was besieged and destroyed. The Thai quickly 
recovered, however, and soon reasserted their dominion over Cam- 
bodia. The youthful Khmer king, Ang Eng (1779-96), a refugee 
at the Thai court, was installed as monarch at Odongk by Thai 
troops. At the same time, Thailand quietly annexed Cambodia's 
three northernmost provinces. In addition, the local rulers of the 
northwestern provinces of Batdambang and Siemreab (Siemreap) 
became vassals of the Thai king, and these areas came under the 
Thai sphere of influence. 

A renewed struggle between Thailand and Vietnam for control 
of Cambodia in the nineteenth century resulted in a period when 
Vietnamese officials, working through a puppet Cambodian king, 
ruled the central part of the country and attempted to force Cam- 
bodians to adopt Vietnamese customs. Several rebellions against 
Vietnamese rule ensued. The most important of these occurred in 
1840 to 1841 and spread through much of the country. After two 
years of fighting, Cambodia and its two neighbors reached an ac- 
cord that placed the country under the joint suzerainty of Thailand 
and Vietnam. At the behest of both countries, a new monarch, 
Ang Duong (1848-59), ascended the throne and brought a decade 
of peace and relative independence to Cambodia. 

In their arbitrary treatment of the Khmer population, the Thai 
and the Vietnamese were virtually indistinguishable. The suffer- 
ing and the dislocation caused by war were comparable in many 
ways to similar Cambodian experiences in the 1970s. But the Thai 
and the Vietnamese had fundamentally different attitudes concern- 
ing their relationships with Cambodia. The Thai shared with the 
Khmer a common religion, mythology, literature, and culture. The 
Chakri kings at Bangkok wanted Cambodia's loyalty and tribute, 
but they had no intention of challenging or changing its people's 
values or way of life. The Vietnamese viewed the Khmer people 
as barbarians to be civilized through exposure to Vietnamese 
culture, and they regarded the fertile Khmer lands as legitimate 
sites for colonization by settlers from Vietnam. 



15 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

The French Protectorate 

France's interest in Indochina in the nineteenth century grew 
out of its rivalry with Britain, which had excluded it from India 
and had effectively shut it out of other pans of mainland South- 
east Asia. The French also desired to establish commerce in a region 
that promised so much untapped wealth and to redress the Viet- 
namese state's persecution of Catholic converts, whose welfare was 
a stated aim of French overseas policy. The Nguyen dynasty's 
repeated refusal to establish diplomatic relations and the violently 
anti-Christian policies of the emperors Minh Mang (1820-41), 
Thieu Tri (1841-47). and Tu Due (1848-83) impelled the French 
to engage in gunboat diplomacy that resulted, in 1862, in the es- 
tablishment of French dominion over Saigon and over the three 
eastern provinces of the Cochinchina (Mekong Delta) region. 

In the view of the government in Paris, Cambodia was a promis- 
ing backwater. Persuaded by a missionary envoy to seek French 
protection against both the Thai and the Vietnamese, King Ang 
Duong invited a French diplomatic mission to visit his court. The 
Thai, however, pressured him to refuse to meet with the French 
when they finally arrived at Odongk in 1856. The much-publicized 
travels of the naturalist Henri Mouhot, who visited the Cambo- 
dian court, rediscovered the ruins at Angkor, and journeyed up 
the Mekong River to the Laotian kingdom of Luang Prabang from 
1859 to 1861, piqued French interest in the kingdom's alleged vast 
riches and in the value of the Mekong as a gateway to China's south- 
western provinces. In August 1863, the French concluded a treaty 
with Ang Duong's successor, Norodom (1859-1904). This agree- 
ment afforded the Cambodian monarch French protection (in the 
form of a French official called a resident — in French resident) in 
exchange for giving the French rights to explore and to exploit the 
kingdom's mineral and forest resources. Norodom's coronation, 
in 1864. was an awkward affair at which both French and Thai 
representatives officiated. Although the Thai attempted to thwart 
the expansion of French influence, their own influence over the 
monarch steadily dwindled. In 1867 the French concluded a treaty 
with the Thai that gave the latter control of Batdambang Province 
and of Siemreab Province in exchange for their renunciation of 
all claims of suzerainty over other parts of Cambodia. Loss of the 
northwestern provinces deeply upset Norodom, but he was beholden 
to the French for sending military aid to suppress a rebellion by 
a royal pretender. 

In June 1884, the French governor of Cochinchina went to 
Phnom Penh, Norodom's capital, and demanded approval of a 



16 




Gate of the Dead, 
Angkor Thorn, twelfth century 
Courtesy Mr. and Mrs. 
Robert E. Hammerquist 



Villager resting near 
pre-Angkorian ruins 
Courtesy Bill Herod 




17 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

treaty with Paris that promised far-reaching changes such as the 
abolition of slavery, the institution of private land ownership, and 
the establishment of French residents in provincial cities. Mind- 
ful of a French gunboat anchored in the river, the king reluctantly 
signed the agreement. Local elites opposed its provisions, how- 
ever, especially the one dealing with slavery, and they fomented 
rebellions throughout the country during the following year. 
Though the rebellions were suppressed, and the treaty was rati- 
fied, passive resistance on the part of the Cambodians postponed 
implementation of the reforms it embodied until after Norodom's 
death. 

The French Colonial Period, 1887-1953 

In October 1887, the French proclaimed the Union Indochinoise, 
or Indochina Union, comprising Cambodia and the three constit- 
uent regions of Vietnam: Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina. (Laos 
was added to the Indochina Union after being separated from Thai 
suzerainty in 1893.) Cambodia's chief colonial official, responsi- 
ble to the Union's governor general and appointed by the Minis- 
try of Marine and Colonies in Paris, was a resident general {resident 
superieur). Residents, or local governors, were posted in all the prin- 
cipal provincial centers. In 1897 the incumbent resident general 
complained to Paris that Norodom was no longer capable of rul- 
ing and received permission to assume the king's authority to issue 
decrees, collect taxes, and appoint royal officials. Norodom and 
his successors were left with hollow, figurehead roles as head of 
state and as patron of the Buddhist religion. The colonial bureau- 
cracy expanded rapidly. French nationals naturally held the highest 
positions, but even on the lower rungs of the bureaucracy Cam- 
bodians found few opportunities because the colonial government 
preferred to hire Vietnamese. 

When Norodom died in 1904, the French passed over his sons 
and set his brother Sisowath (1904-27) on the throne. Sisowath's 
branch of the royal family was considered more cooperative than 
that of Norodom because the latter was viewed as partly responsi- 
ble for the revolts of the 1880s and because Norodom's favorite 
son, Prince Yukanthor, had stirred up publicity abroad about 
French colonial injustices. During their generally peaceful reigns, 
Sisowath and his son Monivong (1927-41) were pliant instruments 
of French rule. A measure of the monarchs' status was the will- 
ingness of the French to provide them annually with complimen- 
tary rations of opium. One of the few highlights of Sisowath's reign 
was French success in getting Thailand's King Chulalongkorn to 



18 



Historical Setting 



sign a new treaty in 1907 returning the northwestern provinces of 
Batdambang and Siemreab to Cambodia. 

The Colonial Economy 

Soon after establishing their protectorate in 1863, the French 
realized that Cambodia's hidden wealth was an illusion and that 
Phnom Penh would never become the Singapore of Indochina. 
Aside from collecting taxes more efficiently, the French did little 
to transform Cambodia's village-based economy. Cambodians paid 
the highest taxes per capita in Indochina, and in 1916 a nonvio- 
lent tax revolt brought tens of thousands of peasants into Phnom 
Penh to petition the king for a reduction. The incident shocked 
the French, who had lulled themselves into believing that the Cam- 
bodians were too indolent and individualistic to organize a mass 
protest. Taxes continued to be sorely resented by the Cambodians. 
In 1925 villagers killed a French resident after he threatened to 
arrest tax delinquents (see The French Protectorate, 1863-1954, 
ch. 5). For poor peasants, the corvee service — a tax substitute — of 
as many as ninety days a year on public works projects, was an 
onerous duty. 

According to Hou Yuon (a veteran of the communist movement 
who was murdered by the Khmer Rouge after they seized power 
in 1975), usury vied with taxes as the chief burden upon the peasant- 
ry. Hou's 1955 doctoral thesis at the University of Paris was one 
of the earliest and most thorough studies of conditions in the rural 
areas during the French colonial era. He argued that although most 
landholdings were small (one to five hectares), poor and middle- 
class peasants were victims of flagrantly usurious practices that in- 
cluded effective interest rates of 100 to 200 percent. Foreclosure 
reduced them to the status of sharecroppers or landless laborers. 
Although debt slavery and feudal landholding patterns had been 
abolished by the French, the old elites still controlled the country- 
side. According to Hou, "the great feudal farms, because of their 
precapitalist character, are disguised as small and medium-sized 
farms, in the form of tenancies and share-farms, and materially 
are indistinguishable from other small and medium-seized farms." 
Whether or not the countryside was as polarized in terms of class 
(or property) as Hou argues is open to debate, but it is clear that 
great tension and conflict existed despite the smiles and the easy- 
going manner of Khmer villagers. 

To develop the economic infrastructure, the French built a limited 
number of roads and a railroad that extended from Phnom Penh 
through Batdambang to the Thai border. The cultivation of rub- 
ber and of corn were economically important, and the fertile 



19 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

provinces of Batdambang and Siemreab became the rice baskets 
of Indochina. The prosperous 1920s, when rubber, rice, and corn 
were in demand overseas, were years of considerable economic 
growth, but the world depression after 1929 caused great suffer- 
ing, especially among rice cultivators whose falling incomes made 
them more than ever the victims of moneylenders. 

Industry was rudimentary and was designed primarily to process 
raw materials such as rubber for local use or export. There was 
considerable immigration, which created a plural society similar 
to those of other Southeast Asian countries. As in British Burma 
and Malaya, foreigners dominated the developed sectors of the econ- 
omy. Vietnamese came to serve as laborers on rubber plantations 
and as clerical workers in the government. As their numbers in- 
creased, Vietnamese immigrants also began to play important roles 
in the economy as fishermen and as operators of small businesses. 
The Chinese had been in Cambodia for several centuries before 
the imposition of French rule, and they had dominated precolo- 
nial commerce. This arrangement continued under the French, 
because the colonial government placed no restrictions on the oc- 
cupations in which they could engage. Chinese merchants and 
bankers in Cambodia developed commercial networks that extended 
throughout Indochina as well as overseas to other parts of Southeast 
Asia and to mainland China. 

The Emergence of Nationalism 

In stark contrast to neighboring Cochinchina and to the other 
Vietnamese-populated territories of Indochina, Cambodia was rela- 
tively quiescent politically during the first four decades of the twen- 
tieth century. The carefully maintained fiction of royal rule was 
probably the major factor. Khmer villagers, long inured to abuses 
of power, believed that as long as a monarch occupied the throne 
"all was right with the world. ' ' Low literacy rates, which the French 
were extremely reluctant to improve, also insulated the great major- 
ity of the population from the nationalist currents that were sweep- 
ing other parts of Southeast Asia. 

Nevertheless, national consciousness was emerging among the 
handful of educated Khmer who composed the urban-based elite. 
Restoration of the monuments at Angkor, which the historian 
David P. Chandler suggests was France's most valuable legacy to 
the colony, awakened Cambodians' pride in their culture and in 
their past achievements. Many of the new elite were graduates of 
the Lycee Sisowath in Phnom Penh, where resentment of the 
favored treatment given Vietnamese students resulted in a peti- 
tion to King Monivong during the 1930s. Significantly, the most 



20 



Historical Setting 



articulate of the early nationalists, were Khmer Krom (see Appen- 
dix B) — members of the Cambodian minority who lived in Cochin- 
china. In 1936 Son Ngoc Thanh and another Khmer Krom named 
Pach Chhoeun, began publishing Nagaravatta (Angkor Wat), the 
first Khmer-language newspaper. In its editorials, Nagaravatta mildly 
condemned French colonial policies, the prevalence of usury in the 
rural areas, foreign domination of the economy, and the lack of 
opportunities for educated Khmer. Much of the paper's journalistic 
wrath was directed toward the Vietnamese for their past exploita- 
tion of Cambodia and for their contemporary monopolization of 
civil service and of professional positions. 

The Khmer were fortunate in escaping the suffering endured 
by most other Southeast Asian peoples during World War II. After 
the establishment of the Vichy regime in France in 1940, Japanese 
forces moved into Vietnam and displaced French authority. In 
mid- 1941 , they entered Cambodia but allowed Vichy French colo- 
nial officials to remain at their administrative posts. The pro- 
Japanese regime in Thailand, headed by Prime Minister Field 
Marshal Luang Plaek Phibunsonggram, requested assurances from 
the Vichy regime that, in the event of an interruption of French 
sovereignty, Cambodian and Laotian territories formerly belong- 
ing to Thailand would be returned to Bangkok's authority. The 
request was rejected. In January 1941 , a Thai force invaded Cam- 
bodia. The land fighting was indecisive, but the Vichy French 
defeated the Thai navy in an engagement in the Gulf of Thailand 
(see The Japanese Occupation, 1941-45, ch. 5). At this point, 
Tokyo intervened and compelled the French authorities to agree 
to a treaty ceding the province of Batdambang and part of the 
province of Siemreab to Thailand in exchange for a small com- 
pensation. The Cambodians were allowed to retain Angkor. Thai 
aggression, however, had minimal impact on the lives of most Cam- 
bodians outside the northwestern region. 

King Monivong died in April 1941. Although his son, Prince 
Monireth, had been considered the heir apparent, the French chose 
instead Norodom Sihanouk, the great grandson of King Norodom. 
Sihanouk was an ideal candidate from their point of view because 
of his youth (he was nineteen years old), his lack of experience, 
and his pliability. 

Japanese calls of "Asia for the Asiatics" found a receptive 
audience among Cambodian nationalists, although Tokyo's 
policy in Indochina was to leave the colonial government nomi- 
nally in charge. When a prominent, politically active Buddhist 
monk, Hem Chieu, was arrested and unceremoniously defrocked 
by the French authorities in July 1942, the editors of Nagaravatta 



21 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

led a demonstration demanding his release. They as well as other 
nationalists apparently overestimated the Japanese willingness to 
back them, for the Vichy authorities quickly arrested the demon- 
strators and gave Pach Chhoeun, one of the Nagaravatta editors, 
a life sentence (see The Japanese Occupation, 1941-45, ch. 5). The 
other editor, Son Ngoc Thanh, escaped from Phnom Penh and 
turned up the following year in Tokyo. 

In a desperate effort to enlist local support in the final months 
of the war, the Japanese dissolved the French colonial administra- 
tion on March 9, 1945, and urged Cambodia to declare its indepen- 
dence within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Four 
days later, King Sihanouk decreed an independent Kampuchea 
(the original Khmer pronunciation of Cambodia). Son Ngoc Thanh 
returned from Tokyo in May, and he was appointed foreign 
minister. On August 15, 1945, the day Japan surrendered, a new 
government was established with Son Ngoc Thanh acting as prime 
minister. When an Allied force occupied Phnom Penh in October, 
Thanh was arrested for collaboration with the Japanese and was 
sent into exile in France to remain under house arrest. Some of 
his supporters went to northwestern Cambodia, then still under 
Thai control, where they banded together as one faction in the 
Khmer Issarak (see Appendix B) movement, originally formed with 
Thai encouragement in the 1940s. 

The Struggle for Independence 

Cambodia's situation at the end of the war was chaotic. The Free 
French, under General Charles de Gaulle, were determined to 
recover Indochina, though they offered Cambodia and the other 
Indochinese protectorates a carefully circumscribed measure of self- 
government. Convinced that they had a "civilizing mission," they 
envisioned Indochina' s participation in a French Union of former 
colonies that shared the common experience of French culture. 
Neither the urban professional elites nor the common people, 
however, were attracted by this arrangement. For Cambodians of 
practically all walks of life, the brief period of independence, from 
March to October of 1945, was an invigorating breath of fresh air. 
The lassitude of the Khmer was a thing of the past. 

In Phnom Penh, Sihanouk, acting as head of state, was placed 
in the extremely delicate position of negotiating with the French 
for full independence while trying to neutralize party politicians 
and supporters of the Khmer Issarak and Viet Minh who consid- 
ered him a French collaborator. During the tumultuous period be- 
tween 1946 and 1953, Sihanouk displayed the remarkable aptitude 
for political survival that sustained him before and after his fall 



22 



Angkor Wat from the causeway 
Courtesy Mr. and Mrs. Robert E. Hammerquist 

from power in March 1970. The Khmer Issarak was an extremely 
heterogeneous guerrilla movement, operating in the border areas. 
The group included indigenous leftists, Vietnamese leftists, anti- 
monarchical nationalists (Khmer Serei — see Appendix B) loyal to 
Son Ngoc Thanh, and plain bandits taking advantage of the chaos 
to terrorize villagers. Though their fortunes rose and fell during 
the immediate postwar period (a major blow was the overthrow 
of a friendly leftist government in Bangkok in 1947), by 1954 the 
Khmer Issarak operating with the Viet Minh by some estimates 
controlled as much as 50 percent of Cambodia's territory. 

In 1946 the French allowed the Cambodians to form political 
parties and to hold elections for a Consultative Assembly that would 
advise the monarch on drafting the country's constitution. The two 
major parties were both headed by royal princes. The Democratic 
Party, led by Prince Sisowath Yuthevong, espoused immediate in- 
dependence, democratic reforms, and parliamentary government. 
Its supporters were teachers, civil servants, politically active mem- 
bers of the Buddhist priesthood, and others whose opinions had 
been greatly influenced by the nationalistic appeals of Nagaravatta 
before it was closed down by the French in 1942. Many Democrats 
sympathized with the violent methods of the Khmer Issarak. The 
Liberal Party, led by Prince Norodom Norindeth, represented the 
interests of the old rural elites, including large landowners. They 



23 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

preferred continuing some form of the colonial relationship with 
France, and advocated gradual democratic reform. In the Con- 
sultative Assembly election held in September 1946, the Democrats 
won fifty out of sixty-seven seats. 

With a solid majority in the assembly, the Democrats drafted 
a constitution modeled on that of the French Fourth Republic. 
Power was concentrated in the hands of a popularly elected Na- 
tional Assembly. The king reluctantly proclaimed the new consti- 
tution on May 6, 1947. While it recognized him as the ''spiritual 
head of the state," it reduced him to the status of a constitutional 
monarch, and it left unclear the extent to which he could play an 
active role in the politics of the nation. Sihanouk would turn this 
ambiguity to his advantage in later years, however. 

In the December 1947 elections for the National Assembly, the 
Democrats again won a large majority. Despite this, dissension 
within the party was rampant. Its founder, Prince Yuthevong, had 
died and no clear leader had emerged to succeed him. During the 
period 1948 to 1949, the Democrats appeared united only in their 
opposition to legislation sponsored by the king or his appointees. 
A major issue was the king's receptivity to independence within 
the French Union, proposed in a draft treaty offered by the French 
in late 1948. Following dissolution of the National Assembly in Sep- 
tember 1949, agreement on the pact was reached through an 
exchange of letters between King Sihanouk and the French govern- 
ment. It went into effect two months later, though National Assem- 
bly ratification of the treaty was never secured. 

The treaty granted Cambodia what Sihanouk called "fifty per- 
cent independence": by it, the colonial relationship was formally 
ended, and the Cambodians were given control of most adminis- 
trative functions. Cambodian armed forces were granted freedom 
of action within a self-governing autonomous zone comprising 
Batdambang and Siemreab provinces, which had been recovered 
from Thailand after World War II, but which the French, hard- 
pressed elsewhere, did not have the resources to control. Cambo- 
dia was still required to coordinate foreign policy matters with the 
High Council of the French Union, however, and France retained 
a significant measure of control over the judicial system, finances, 
and customs. Control of wartime military operations outside the 
autonomous zone remained in French hands. France was also per- 
mitted to maintain military bases on Cambodian territory. In 1950 
Cambodia was accorded diplomatic recognition by the United States 
and by most noncommunist powers, but in Asia only Thailand and 
the Republic of Korea (South Korea) extended recognition. 



24 



Historical Setting 



The Democrats won a majority in the second National Assem- 
bly election in September 1951, and they continued their policy 
of opposing the king on practically all fronts. In an effort to win 
greater popular approval, Sihanouk asked the French to release 
nationalist Son Ngoc Thanh from exile and to allow him to return 
to his country. He made a triumphant entry into Phnom Penh on 
October 29, 1951. It was not long, however, before he began 
demanding withdrawal of French troops from Cambodia. He reiter- 
ated this demand in early 1952 in Khmer Krok (Khmer Awake) a 
weekly newspaper that he had founded. The newspaper was forced 
to cease publication in March, and Son Ngoc Thanh fled the capi- 
tal with a few armed followers to join the Khmer Issarak. Branded 
alternately a communist and an agent of the United States Cen- 
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) by Sihanouk, he remained in exile 
until Lon Nol established the Khmer Republic in 1970. 

In June 1952, Sihanouk announced the dismissal of his cabinet, 
suspended the constitution, and assumed control of the govern- 
ment as prime minister. Then, without clear constitutional sanc- 
tion, he dissolved the National Assembly and proclaimed martial 
law in January 1953. Sihanouk exercised direct rule for almost three 
years, from June 1952 until February 1955. After dissolution of 
the assembly, he created an Advisory Council to supplant the legis- 
lature and appointed his father, Norodom Suramarit, as regent. 

In March 1953, Sihanouk went to France. Ostensibly, he was 
traveling for his health; actually, he was mounting an intensive 
campaign to persuade the French to grant complete independence. 
The climate of opinion in Cambodia at the time was such that if 
he did not achieve full independence quickly, the people were likely 
to turn to Son Ngoc Thanh and the Khmer Issarak, who were fully 
committed to attaining that goal. At meetings with the French presi- 
dent and with other high officials, the French suggested that Siha- 
nouk was unduly "alarmist" about internal political conditions. 
The French also made the thinly veiled threat that, if he continued 
to be uncooperative, they might replace him. The trip appeared 
to be a failure, but on his way home by way of the United States, 
Canada, and Japan, Sihanouk publicized Cambodia's plight in the 
media. 

To further dramatize his "royal crusade for independence," 
Sihanouk, declaring that he would not return until the French gave 
assurances that full independence would be granted, left Phnom 
Penh in June to go into self-imposed exile in Thailand. Unwel- 
come in Bangkok, he moved to his royal villa near the ruins of 
Angkor in Siemreab Province. Siemreab, part of the autonomous 
military zone established in 1949, was commanded by Lieutenant 



25 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Colonel Lon Nol, formerly a right-wing politician who was becom- 
ing a prominent, and in time would be an indispensable, Sihanouk 
ally within the military. From his Siemreab base, the king and Lon 
Nol contemplated plans for resistance if the French did not meet 
their terms. 

Sihanouk was making a high- stakes gamble, for the French could 
easily have replaced him with a more pliable monarch; however, 
the military situation was deteriorating throughout Indochina, and 
the French government, on July 3, 1953, declared itself ready to 
grant full independence to the three states of Cambodia, Vietnam, 
and Laos. Sihanouk insisted on his own terms, which included full 
control of national defense, the police, the courts, and financial 
matters. The French yielded: the police and the judiciary were trans- 
ferred to Cambodian control at the end of August, and in October 
the country assumed full command of its military forces. King 
Sihanouk, now a hero in the eyes of his people, returned to Phnom 
Penh in triumph, and independence day was celebrated on Novem- 
ber 9, 1953. Control of residual matters affecting sovereignty, such 
as financial and budgetary affairs, passed to the new Cambodian 
state in 1954. 

Cambodia under Sihanouk, 1954-70 

Sihanouk continues to be one of the most controversial figures 
in Southeast Asia's turbulent, and often tragic, postwar history. 
Admirers view him as one of the country's great patriots, whose 
insistence on strict neutrality kept Cambodia out of the maelstrom 
of war and out of the revolution in neighboring Vietnam for more 
than fifteen years before he was betrayed by his close associate, 
Lon Nol. Critics attack him for his vanity, eccentricities, and in- 
tolerance of any political views different from his own. One such 
critic, Michael Vickery, asserts that beneath the neutralist rhetoric 
Sihanouk presided over a regime that was oppressively reaction- 
ary and, in some instances, as violent in its suppression of politi- 
cal opposition as the Khmer Rouge. According to Vickery, the royal 
armed forces under Lon Nol slaughtered women and children in 
pro-Khmer Issarak regions of Batdambang in 1954 using methods 
that were later to become routine under Pol Pot. Another critical 
observer, Milton E. Osborne, writing as an Australian expatriate 
in Phnom Penh during the late 1960s, describes the Sihanouk years 
in terms of unbridled greed and corruption, of a foreign policy 
inspired more by opportunism than by the desire to preserve na- 
tional independence, of an economy and a political system that were 
rapidly coming apart, and of the prince's obsession with making 
outrageously mediocre films — one of which starred himself and his 
wife, Princess Monique. 



26 



Historical Setting 



Sihanouk was all of these things — patriot, neutralist, embodi- 
ment of the nation's destiny, eccentric, rigid defender of the sta- 
tus quo, and promoter of the worst sort of patron-client politics. 
He believed that he single-handedly had won Cambodia's indepen- 
dence from the French. The contributions of other nationalists, such 
as Son Ngoc Thanh and the Viet Minh, were conveniently forgot- 
ten. Sihanouk also believed he had the right to run the state in 
a manner not very different from that of the ancient Khmer kings — 
that is, as an extension of his household. Unlike the ancient "god- 
kings," however, he established genuine rapport with ordinary 
Cambodians. He made frequent, often impromptu, trips through- 
out the country, visiting isolated villages, chatting with peasants, 
receiving petitions, passing out gifts, and scolding officials for mis- 
management. According to British author and journalist William 
Shawcross, Sihanouk was able to create a "unique brand of per- 
sonal populism." To ordinary Cambodians, his eccentricities, vola- 
tility, short temper, sexual escapades, and artistic flights of fancy 
were an expression of royal charisma rather than an occasion for 
scandal. Sihanouk's delight in making life difficult for foreign diplo- 
mats and journalists, moreover, amused his subjects. Ultimately, 
the eccentric humanity of Sihanouk was to contrast poignantly with 
the random brutality of his Khmer Rouge successors. 

The Geneva Conference 

Although Cambodia had achieved independence by late 1953, 
its military situation remained unsettled. Noncommunist factions 
of the Khmer Issarak had joined the government, but communist 
Viet Minh activities increased at the very time French Union forces 
were stretched thin elsewhere. In April 1954, several Viet Minh 
battalions crossed the border into Cambodia. Royalist forces en- 
gaged them but could not force their complete withdrawal. In part, 
the communists were attempting to strengthen their bargaining 
position at the Geneva Conference that had been scheduled to begin 
in late April. 

The Geneva Conference was attended by representatives of Cam- 
bodia, North Vietnam, the Associated State of Vietnam (the 
predecessor of the Republic of Vietnam, or South Vietnam), Laos, 
the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, France, Brit- 
ain, and the United States. One goal of the conference was to restore 
a lasting peace in Indochina. The discussions on Indochina began 
on May 8, 1954. The North Vietnamese attempted to get represen- 
tation for the resistance government that had been established in 
the south, but failed. On July 21, 1954, the conference reached 
an agreement calling for a cessation of hostilities in Indochina. With 



27 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

respect to Cambodia, the agreement stipulated that all Viet Minh 
military forces be withdrawn within ninety days and that Cambo- 
dian resistance forces be demobilized within thirty days. In a 
separate agreement signed by the Cambodian representative, the 
French and the Viet Minh agreed to withdraw all forces from Cam- 
bodian soil by October 1954. 

In exchange for the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces, the com- 
munist representatives in Geneva wanted full neutrality for Cam- 
bodia and for Laos that would prevent the basing of United States 
military forces in these countries. On the eve of the conference's 
conclusion, however, the Cambodian representative, Sam Sary, 
insisted that, if Cambodia were to be genuinely independent, it 
must not be prohibited from seeking whatever military assistance 
it desired (Cambodia had earlier appealed to Washington for mili- 
tary aid). The conference accepted this point over North Vietnam's 
strenuous objections. In the final agreement, Cambodia accepted 
a watered-down neutrality, vowing not to join any military alli- 
ance "not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations" or to allow the basing of foreign military forces 
on its territory "as long as its security is not threatened." 

The conference agreement established the International Con- 
trol Commission (officially called the International Commission 
for Supervision and Control) in all the Indochinese countries. Made 
up of representatives from Canada, Poland, and India, it super- 
vised the cease-fire, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the release 
of prisoners of war, and overall compliance with the terms of the 
agreement. The French and most of the Viet Minh forces were 
withdrawn on schedule in October 1954. 

Domestic Developments 

The Geneva agreement also stipulated that general elections 
should be held in Cambodia during 1955 and that the International 
Control Commission should monitor them to ensure fairness. 
Sihanouk was more determined than ever to defeat the Democrats 
(who, on the basis of their past record, were expected to win the 
election). The king attempted unsuccessfully to have the constitu- 
tion amended. On March 2, 1955, he announced his abdication 
in favor of his father, Norodom Suramarit. Assuming the title of 
samdech (prince), Sihanouk explained that this action was neces- 
sary in order to give him a free hand to engage in politics. 

To challenge the Democrats, Prince Sihanouk established his own 
political machine, the oddly named Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popu- 
lar Socialist Community), commonly referred to as the Sangkum. 
The name is odd because its most important components were 



28 



Historical Setting 



right-wing parties that were virulently anticommunist. The Sang- 
kum's emergence in early 1955 unified most right-wing groups 
under the prince's auspices. In the September election, Sihanouk's 
new party decisively defeated the Democrats, the Khmer Indepen- 
dence Party of Son Ngoc Thanh, and the leftist Pracheachon 
(Citizens') Party, winning 83 percent of the vote and all of the seats 
in the National Assembly. 

Khmer nationalism, loyalty to the monarch, struggle against in- 
justice and corruption, and protection of the Buddhist religion were 
major themes in Sangkum ideology. The party adopted a particu- 
larly conservative interpretation of Buddhism, common in the Ther- 
avada countries of Southeast Asia, that the social and economic 
inequalities among people were legitimate because of the workings 
of karma (see Buddhism, ch. 2). For the poorer classes, virtuous 
and obedient conduct opened up the possibility of being born into 
a higher station in a future life. The appeal to religion won the 
allegiance of the country's many Buddhist priests, who were a par- 
ticularly influential group in rural villages. 

As the 1960s began, organized political opposition to Sihanouk 
and the Sangkum virtually had disappeared. According to Vick- 
ery, the Democratic Party disbanded in 1957 after its leaders — 
who had been beaten by soldiers — requested the privilege of join- 
ing the Sangkum. 

Despite its defense of the status quo, especially the interests of 
rural elites, the Sangkum was not an exclusively right-wing organi- 
zation. Sihanouk included a number of leftists in his party and 
government. Among these were future leaders of the Khmer Rouge. 
Hu Nim and Hou Yuon served in several ministries between 1958 
and 1963, and Khieu Samphan served briefly as secretary of state 
for commerce in 1963. 

Sihanouk's attitude toward the left was paradoxical. He often 
declared that if he had not been a prince, he would have become 
a revolutionary. Sihanouk's chronic suspicion of United States in- 
tentions in the region, his perception of revolutionary China as 
Cambodia's most valuable ally, his respect for such prominent and 
capable leftists as Hou, Hu, and Khieu, and his vague notions of 
"royal socialism" all impelled him to experiment with socialist poli- 
cies. In 1963 the prince announced the nationalization of bank- 
ing, foreign trade, and insurance as a means of reducing foreign 
control of the economy. In 1964 a state trading company, the Na- 
tional Export-Import Corporation, was established to handle for- 
eign commerce. The declared purposes of nationalization were to 
give Khmer nationals, rather than Chinese or Vietnamese, a greater 
role in the nation's trade, to eliminate middlemen and to conserve 



29 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

foreign exchange through the limiting of unnecessary luxury im- 
ports. As a result of this policy, foreign investment quickly disap- 
peared, and a kind of "crony socialism" emerged somewhat similar 
to the "crony capitalism" that evolved in the Philippines under 
President Ferdinand Marcos. Lucrative state monopolies were par- 
celed out to Sihanouk's most loyal retainers, who "milked" them 
for cash. 

Sihanouk was headed steadily for a collision with the right. To 
counter charges of one-man rule, the prince declared that he would 
relinquish control of candidate selection and would permit more 
than one Sangkum candidate to run for each seat in the Septem- 
ber 1966 National Assembly election. The returns showed a sur- 
prising upsurge in the conservative vote at the expense of more 
moderate and left-wing elements, although Hou, Hu, and Khieu 
were reelected by their constituencies. General Lon Nol became 
prime minister. 

Out of concern that the right wing might cause an irreparable 
split within the Sangkum and might challenge his domination of 
the political system, Sihanouk set up a "counter government" (like 
the British "shadow cabinet") packed with his most loyal personal 
followers and with leading leftists, hoping that it would exert a re- 
straining influence on Lon Nol. Leftists accused the general of being 
groomed by Western intelligence agencies to lead a bloody anticom- 
munist coup d'etat similar to that of General Soeharto in Indone- 
sia. Injured in an automobile accident, Lon Nol resigned in April 
1967. Sihanouk replaced him with a trusted centrist, Son Sann. 
This was the twenty-third successive Sangkum cabinet and govern- 
ment to have been appointed by Sihanouk since the party was 
formed in 1955. 

Nonaligned Foreign Policy 

Sihanouk's nonaligned foreign policy, which emerged in the 
months following the Geneva Conference, cannot be understood 
without reference to Cambodia's past history of foreign subjuga- 
tion and its very uncertain prospects for survival as the war be- 
tween North Vietnam and South Vietnam intensified. Soon after 
the 1954 Geneva Conference, Sihanouk expressed some interest 
in integrating Cambodia into the framework of the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO), which included Cambodia, Laos, 
and South Vietnam within the "treaty area," although none of 
these states was a signatory. But meetings in late 1954 with India's 
Prime Minister J awaharlal Nehru and Burma's Premier U Nu 
made him receptive to the appeal of nonalignment. Moreover, the 
prince was somewhat uneasy about a United States-dominated 



30 



Angkor Wat and its galleries 
Courtesy Mr. and Mrs. Robert E. Hammerquist 

alliance that included one old enemy, Thailand, and encompassed 
another, South Vietnam, each of which offered sanctuary to anti- 
Sihanouk dissidents. 

At the Bandung Conference in April 1955, Sihanouk held pri- 
vate meetings with Premier Zhou Enlai of China and Foreign 
Minister Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam. Both assured him 
that their countries would respect Cambodia's independence and 
territorial integrity. His experience with the French, first as a client, 
then as the self-proclaimed leader of the "royal crusade for indepen- 
dence," apparently led him to conclude that the United States, 
like France, would eventually be forced to leave Southeast Asia. 
From this perspective, the Western presence in Indochina was only 
a temporary interruption of the dynamics of the region — continued 
Vietnamese (and perhaps even Thai) expansion at Cambodia's ex- 
pense. Accommodation with North Vietnam and friendly ties with 
China during the late 1950s and the 1960s were tactics designed 
to counteract these dynamics. China accepted Sihanouk's overtures 
and became a valuable counterweight to growing Vietnamese and 
Thai pressure on Cambodia. 

Cambodia's relations with China were based on mutual interests. 
Sihanouk hoped that China would restrain the Vietnamese and the 
Thai from acting to Cambodia's detriment. The Chinese, in turn, 
viewed Cambodia's nonalignment as vital in order to prevent the 



31 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

encirclement of their country by the United States and its allies. 
When Premier Zhou Enlai visited Phnom Penh in 1956, he asked 
the country's Chinese minority, numbering about 300,000, to 
cooperate in Cambodia's development, to stay out of politics, and 
to consider adopting Cambodian citizenship. This gesture helped 
to resolve a sensitive issue — the loyalty of Cambodian Chinese — 
that had troubled the relationship between Phnom Penh and Bei- 
jing. In 1960 the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
Nonaggression. After the Sino-Soviet rift Sihanouk's ardent friend- 
ship with China contributed to generally cooler ties with Moscow. 

China was not the only large power to which Sihanouk looked 
for patronage, however. Cambodia's quest for security and nation- 
building assistance impelled the prince to search beyond Asia and 
to accept help from all donors as long as there was no impinge- 
ment upon his country's sovereignty. With this end in mind, 
Sihanouk turned to the United States in 1955 and negotiated a mili- 
tary aid agreement that secured funds and equipment for the Royal 
Khmer Armed Forces (Forces Armees Royales Khmeres — 
FARK — see Appendix B). A United States Military Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG) was established in Phnom Penh to super- 
vise the delivery and the use of equipment that began to arrive from 
the United States. By the early 1960s, aid from Washington con- 
stituted 30 percent of Cambodia's defense budget and 14 percent 
of total budget inflows (see The First Indochina War, 1945-54, 
ch. 5). 

Relations with the United States, however, proved to be stormy. 
United States officials both in Washington and in Phnom Penh 
frequently underestimated the prince and considered him to be an 
erratic figure with minimal understanding of the threat posed by 
Asian communism. Sihanouk easily reciprocated this mistrust be- 
cause several developments aroused his suspicion of United States 
intentions toward his country. 

One of these developments was the growing United States in- 
fluence within the Cambodian armed forces. The processing of 
equipment deliveries and the training of Cambodian personnel had 
forged close ties between United States military advisers and their 
Cambodian counterparts. Military officers of both nations also 
shared apprehensions about the spread of communism in Southeast 
Asia. Sihanouk considered FARK to be Washington's most power- 
ful constituency in his country. The prince also feared that a number 
of high-ranking, rightist FARK officers led by Lon Nol were be- 
coming too powerful and that, by association with these officers, 
United States influence in Cambodia was becoming too deeply 
rooted. 



32 



Historical Setting 



A second development included the repetition of overflights by 
United States and South Vietnamese military aircraft within Cam- 
bodian airspace and border incursions by South Vietnamese troops 
in hot pursuit of Viet Cong insurgents who crossed into Cambo- 
dian territory when military pressure upon them became too sus- 
tained. As the early 1960s wore on, this increasingly sensitive issue 
contributed to the deterioration of relations between Phnom Penh 
and Washington. 

A third development was Sihanouk's own belief that he had been 
targeted by United States intelligence agencies for replacement by 
a more pro-Western leader. Evidence to support this suspicion came 
to light in 1959 when the government discovered a plot to over- 
throw Sihanouk. The conspiracy involved several Khmer leaders 
suspected of American connections. Among them were Sam Sary, 
a leader of right-wing Khmer Serei troops in South Vietnam; Son 
Ngoc Thanh, the early nationalist leader once exiled into Thailand; 
and Dap Chhuon, the military governor of Siemreab Province. 
Another alleged plot involved Dap Chhuon' s establishment of a 
"free" state that would have included Siemreab Province and Kam- 
pong Thum (Kampong Thorn) Province and the southern areas 
of Laos that were controlled by the rightist Laotian prince, Boun 
Oum. 

These developments, magnified by Sihanouk's abiding suspi- 
cions, eventually undermined Phnom Penh's relations with Wash- 
ington. In November 1963, the prince charged that the United 
States was continuing to support the subversive activities of the 
Khmer Serei in Thailand and in South Vietnam, and he announced 
the immediate termination of Washington's aid program to Cam- 
bodia. Relations continued to deteriorate, and the final break came 
in May 1965 amid increasing indications of airspace violations by 
South Vietnamese and by United States aircraft and of ground fight- 
ing between Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops and 
Viet Cong insurgents in the Cambodian border areas. 

In the meantime, Cambodia's relations with North Vietnam and 
with South Vietnam, as well as the rupture with Washington, 
reflected Sihanouk's efforts to adjust to geopolitical realities in 
Southeast Asia and to keep his country out of the escalating con- 
flict in neighboring South Vietnam. In the early to mid-1960s, this 
effort required a tilt toward Hanoi because the government in 
Saigon tottered on the brink of anarchy. In the cities, the adminis- 
tration of Ngo Dinh Diem and the military regimes that succeeded 
it had become increasingly ineffectual and unstable, while in the 
countryside the government forces were steadily losing ground to 
the Hanoi-backed insurgents. To observers in Phnom Penh, South 



33 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Vietnam's short-term viability was seriously in doubt, and this com- 
pelled a new tack in Cambodian foreign policy. First, Cambodia 
severed diplomatic ties with Saigon in August 1963. The follow- 
ing March, Sihanouk announced plans to establish diplomatic re- 
lations with North Vietnam and to negotiate a border settlement 
directly with Hanoi. These plans were not implemented quickly, 
however, because the North Vietnamese told the prince that any 
problem concerning Cambodia's border with South Vietnam would 
have to be negotiated directly with the National Front for the Liber- 
ation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN — see Appendix B). Cambodia 
opened border talks with the front in mid- 1966, and the latter recog- 
nized the inviolability of Cambodia's borders a year later. North 
Vietnam quickly followed suit. Cambodia was the first foreign 
government to recognize the NFLSVN 's Provisional Revolution- 
ary Government after it was established in June 1969. Sihanouk 
was the only foreign head of state to attend the funeral of Ho Chi 
Minh, North Vietnam's deceased leader, in Hanoi three months 
later. 

In the late 1960s, while preserving relations with China and with 
North Vietnam, Sihanouk sought to restore a measure of equilib- 
rium by improving Cambodia's ties with the West. This shift in 
course by the prince represented another adjustment to prevailing 
conditions in Southeast Asia. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
forces were increasing their use of sanctuaries in Cambodia, which 
also served as the southern terminus of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, 
their logistical resupply route originating in North Vietnam. Cam- 
bodian neutrality in the conflict thus was eroding, and China, preoc- 
cupied with its Cultural Revolution, did not intercede with Hanoi. 
On Cambodia's eastern border, South Vietnam, surprisingly, had 
not collapsed, even in the face of the communist Tet Offensive in 
1968, and President Nguyen Van Thieu's government was bring- 
ing a measure of stability to the war-ravaged country. As the govern- 
ment in Phnom Penh began to feel keenly the loss of economic and 
military aid from the United States, which had totaled about 
US$400 million between 1955 and 1963, it began to have second 
thoughts about the rupture with Washington. The unavailability 
of American equipment and spare parts was exacerbated by the 
poor quality and the small numbers of Soviet, Chinese, and French 
substitutes. 

In late 1967 and in early 1968, Sihanouk signaled that he would 
raise no objection to hot pursuit of communist forces by South Viet- 
namese or by United States troops into Cambodian territory. 
Washington, in the meantime, accepted the recommendation of 
the United States Military Assistance Command — Vietnam 



34 



Historical Setting 



(MACV) and, beginning in March 1969, ordered a series of air- 
strikes (dubbed the Menu series) against Cambodian sanctuaries 
used by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. Whether or not 
these bombing missions were authorized aroused considerable con- 
troversy, and assertions by the Nixon administration that Sihanouk 
had "allowed" or even "encouraged" them were disputed by critics 
such as British journalist William Shawcross. On a diplomatic level, 
however, the Menu airstrikes did not impede bilateral relations from 
moving forward. In April 1969, Nixon sent a note to the prince 
affirming that the United States recognized and respected "the 
sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of 
Cambodia with its present frontiers." Shortly thereafter, in June 
1969, full diplomatic relations were restored between Phnom Penh 
and Washington. 

The Cambodian Left: The Early Phases 

The history of the communist movement in Cambodia can be 
divided into six phases: the emergence of the Indochinese Com- 
munist Party (ICP — see Appendix B), whose members were almost 
exclusively Vietnamese, before World War II; the ten-year strug- 
gle for independence from the French, when a separate Cambo- 
dian communist party, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's 
Revolutionary Party (KPRP — see Appendix B), was established 
under Vietnamese auspices; the period following the Second Party 
Congress of the KPRP in 1960, when Saloth Sar (Pol Pot after 
1976) and other future Khmer Rouge leaders gained control of its 
apparatus; the revolutionary struggle from the initiation of the 
Khmer Rouge insurgency in 1967-68 to the fall of the Lon Nol 
government in April 1975; the Democratic Kampuchea regime, 
from April 1975 to January 1979; and the period following the Third 
Party Congress of the KPRP in January 1979, when Hanoi effec- 
tively assumed control over Cambodia's government and com- 
munist party. 

Much of the movement's history has been shrouded in mystery, 
largely because successive purges, especially during the Democratic 
Kampuchea period, have left so few survivors to recount their 
experiences. One thing is evident, however; the tension between 
Khmer and Vietnamese was a major theme in the movement's 
development. In the three decades between the end of World War 
II and the Khmer Rouge victory, the appeal of communism to 
Western-educated intellectuals (and to a lesser extent its more 
inchoate attraction for poor peasants) was tempered by the appre- 
hension that the much stronger Vietnamese movement was using 
communism as an ideological rationale for dominating the Khmer. 



35 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

The analogy between the Vietnamese communists and the Nguyen 
dynasty, which had legitimized its encroachments in the nineteenth 
century in terms of the 4 'civilizing mission" of Confucianism, was 
persuasive. Thus, the new brand of indigenous communism that 
emerged after 1960 combined nationalist and revolutionary appeals 
and, when it could afford to, exploited the virulent anti- Vietnamese 
sentiments of the Khmers. Khmer Rouge literature in the 1970s 
frequently referred to the Vietnamese asyuon (barbarian), a term 
dating from the Angkorian period. 

In 1930 Ho Chi Minh founded the Vietnamese Communist Party 
by unifying three smaller communist movements that had emerged 
in Tonkin, in Annam, and in Cochinchina during the late 1920s. 
The name was changed almost immediately to the ICP, ostensi- 
bly to include revolutionaries from Cambodia and Laos. Almost 
without exception, however, all the earliest party members were 
Vietnamese. By the end of World War II, a handful of Cambo- 
dians had joined its ranks, but their influence on the Indochinese 
communist movement and on developments within Cambodia was 
negligible. 

Viet Minh units occasionally made forays into Cambodia bases 
during their war against the French, and, in conjunction with the 
leftist government that ruled Thailand until 1947, the Viet Minh 
encouraged the formation of armed, left-wing Khmer Issarak bands. 
On April 17, 1950 (twenty-five years to the day before the Khmer 
Rouge captured Phnom Penh), the first nationwide congress of the 
Khmer Issarak groups convened, and the United Issarak Front was 
established. Its leader was Son Ngoc Minh (possibly a brother of 
the nationalist Son Ngoc Thanh), and a third of its leadership con- 
sisted of members of the ICP. According to the historian David P. 
Chandler, the leftist Issarak groups, aided by the Viet Minh, oc- 
cupied a sixth of Cambodia's territory by 1952; and, on the eve 
of the Geneva Conference, they controlled as much as one half of 
the country. 

In 1951 the ICP was reorganized into three national units — the 
Vietnam Workers' Party, the Lao Itsala, and the KPRP. Accord- 
ing to a document issued after the reorganization, the Vietnam 
Workers' Party would continue to "supervise" the smaller Laotian 
and Cambodian movements. Most KPRP leaders and rank-and- 
file seem to have been either Khmer Krom, or ethnic Vietnamese 
living in Cambodia. The party's appeal to indigenous Khmers 
appears to have been minimal. 

According to Democratic Kampuchea's version of party history, 
the Viet Minh's failure to negotiate a political role for the KPRP 
at the 1954 Geneva Conference represented a betrayal of the 



36 



Ruins of the Bay on Temple, thirteenth century 
Courtesy Mr. and Mrs. Robert E. Hammerquist 

Cambodian movement, which still controlled large areas of the 
countryside and which commanded at least 5,000 armed men. Fol- 
lowing the conference, about 1,000 members of the KPRP, includ- 
ing Son Ngoc Minh, made a "Long March" into North Vietnam, 
where they remained in exile. In late 1954, those who stayed in 
Cambodia founded a legal political party, the Pracheachon Party, 
which participated in the 1955 and the 1958 National Assembly 
elections. In the September 1955 election, it won about 4 percent 
of the vote but did not secure a seat in the legislature. Members 
of the Pracheachon were subject to constant harassment and to 
arrests because the party remained outside Sihanouk's Sangkum. 
Government attacks prevented it from participating in the 1962 
election and drove it underground. Sihanouk habitually labeled 
local leftists the Khmer Rouge (see Appendix B), a term that later 
came to signify the party and the state headed by Pol Pot, Ieng 
Sary, Khieu Samphan, and their associates. 

During the mid-1950s, KPRP factions, the "urban committee" 
(headed by Tou Samouth), and the "rural committee" (headed 
by Sieu Heng), emerged. In very general terms, these groups es- 
poused divergent revolutionary lines. The prevalent "urban" line, 
endorsed by North Vietnam, recognized that Sihanouk, by virtue 
of his success in winning independence from the French, was a 
genuine national leader whose neutralism and deep distrust of the 



37 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



United States made him a valuable asset in Hanoi's struggle to 
"liberate" South Vietnam. Champions of this line hoped that the 
prince could be persuaded to distance himself from the right wing 
and to adopt leftist policies. The other line, supported for the most 
part by rural cadres who were familiar with the harsh realities of 
the countryside, advocated an immediate struggle to overthrow the 
"feudalist" Sihanouk. In 1959 Sieu Heng defected to the govern- 
ment and provided the security forces with information that enabled 
them to destroy as much as 90 percent of the party's rural appara- 
tus. Although communist networks in Phnom Penh and in other 
towns under Tou Samouth's jurisdiction fared better, only a few 
hundred communists remained active in the country by 1960. 

The Paris Student Group 

During the 1950s, Khmer students in Paris organized their own 
communist movement, which had little, if any, connection to the 
hard-pressed party in their homeland. From their ranks came the 
men and women who returned home and took command of the 
party apparatus during the 1960s, led an effective insurgency against 
Sihanouk and Lon Nol from 1968 until 1975, and established the 
regime of Democratic Kampuchea. 

Pol Pot, who rose to the leadership of the communist movement 
in the 1960s, was born in 1928 (some sources say in 1925) in Kam- 
pong Thum Province, north of Phnom Penh. He attended a tech- 
nical high school in the capital and then went to Paris in 1949 to 
study radio electronics (other sources say he attended a school for 
printers and typesetters and also studied civil engineering). 
Described by one source as a "determined, rather plodding or- 
ganizer," he failed to obtain a degree, but, according to the Jesuit 
priest, Father Francois Ponchaud, he acquired a taste for the clas- 
sics of French literature as well as for the writings of Marx. 

Another member of the Paris student group was Ieng Sary. He 
was a Chinese-Khmer born in 1930 in South Vietnam. He attended 
the elite Lycee Sisowath in Phnom Penh before beginning courses 
in commerce and politics at the Institut d' Etudes Politiques in 
France. Khieu Samphan, considered "one of the most brilliant in- 
tellects of his generation," was born in 1931 and specialized in eco- 
nomics and politics during his time in Paris. In talent he was rivaled 
by Hou Yuon, born in 1930, who was described as being "of truly 
astounding physical and intellectual strength," and who studied 
economics and law. Son Sen, born in 1930, studied education and 
literature; Hu Nim, born in 1932, studied law. 

These men were perhaps the most educated leaders in the his- 
tory of Asian communism. Two of them, Khieu Samphan and Hou 



38 



Historical Setting 



Yuon, earned doctorates from the University of Paris; Hu Nim 
obtained his degree from the University of Phnom Penh in 1965. 
In retrospect, it seems enigmatic that these talented members of 
the elite, sent to France on government scholarships, could launch 
the bloodiest and most radical revolution in modern Asian history. 
Most came from landowner or civil servant families. Pol Pot and 
Hou Yuon may have been related to the royal family. An older 
sister of Pol Pot had been a concubine at the court of King 
Monivong. Three of the Paris group forged a bond that survived 
years of revolutionary struggle and intraparty strife, Pol Pot and 
Ieng Sary married Khieu Ponnary and Khieu Thirith (also known 
as Ieng Thirith), purportedly relatives of Khieu Samphan. These 
two well-educated women also played a central role in the regime 
of Democratic Kampuchea. 

The intellectual ferment of Paris must have been a dizzying ex- 
perience for young Khmers fresh from Phnom Penh or the 
provinces. A number sought refuge in the dogma of orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism. At some time between 1949 and 1951, Pol Pot 
and Ieng Sary joined the French Communist Party, the most tightiy 
disciplined and Stalinist of Western Europe's communist move- 
ments. In 1951 the two men went to East Berlin to participate in 
a youth festival. This experience is considered to have been a turning 
point in their ideological development. Meeting with Khmers who 
were fighting with the Viet Minn (and whom they subsequently 
judged to be too subservient to the Vietnamese), they became con- 
vinced that only a tighdy disciplined party organization and a read- 
iness for armed struggle could achieve revolution. They transformed 
the Khmer Students' Association (KSA), to which most of the 200 
or so Khmer students in Paris belonged, into a platform for na- 
tionalist and leftist ideas. In 1952 Pol Pot, Hou Yuon, Ieng Sary, 
and other leftists gained notoriety by sending an open letter to 
Sihanouk calling him the "strangler of infant democracy." A year 
later, the French authorities closed down the KSA. In 1956, 
however, Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan helped to establish a new 
Marxist-oriented group, the Khmer Students' Union. 

The doctoral dissertations written by Hou Yuon and Khieu Sam- 
phan express basic themes that were later to become the corner- 
stones of the policy adopted by Democratic Kampuchea. The central 
role of the peasants in national development was espoused by Hou 
Yuon in his 1955 thesis, "The Cambodian Peasants and Their 
Prospects for Modernization," which challenged the conventional 
view that urbanization and industrialization are necessary precur- 
sors of development. The major argument in Khieu Samphan 's 
1959 thesis, "Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development," 



39 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

was that the country had to become self-reliant and had to end its 
economic dependency on the developed world. In its general con- 
tours, Khieu's work reflected the influence of a branch of the "de- 
pendency theory" school, which blamed lack of development in 
the Third World on the economic domination of the industrial- 
ized nations. 

The KPRP Second Congress 

After returning to Cambodia in 1953, Pol Pot threw himself into 
party work first in Kampong Cham Province (Kompong Cham) 
and then in Phnom Penh under Tou Samouth's "urban commit- 
tee." His comrades, Ieng Sary and Hou Yuon, became teachers 
at a new private high school, the Lycee Kambuboth, which Hou 
Yuon helped to establish. Khieu Samphan returned from Paris in 
1959, taught as a member of the law faculty of the University of 
Phnom Penh, and started a left-wing, French-language publica- 
tion, L'Observateur. The paper soon acquired a reputation in Phnom 
Penh's small academic circle. The following year, the government 
closed the paper, and Sihanouk's police publicly humiliated Khieu 
by undressing and photographing him in public — as Shawcross 
notes, "not the sort of humiliation that men forgive or forget." 
Yet the experience did not prevent Khieu from advocating cooper- 
ation with Sihanouk in order to promote a united front against 
United States activities in South Vietnam. As mentioned, Khieu 
Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim tried to "work through the 
system" by joining the Sangkum and by accepting posts in the 
prince's government. Hardliners like Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Son 
Sen advocated resistance. 

In late September 1960, twenty-one leaders of the KPRP held 
a secret congress in a vacant room of the Phnom Penh railroad 
station. This pivotal event remains shrouded in mystery because 
its outcome has become an object of contention (and considerable 
historical rewriting) between pro-Vietnamese and anti- Vietnamese 
Khmer communist factions. The question of cooperation with, or 
resistance to, Sihanouk was thoroughly discussed. Tou Samouth, 
who advocated a policy of cooperation, was elected general secre- 
tary of the KPRP that was renamed the Workers' Party of Kam- 
puchea (WPK — see Appendix B). His ally, Nuon Chea (also known 
as Long Reth), became deputy general secretary; however, Pol Pot 
and Ieng Sary were named to the Political Bureau to occupy the 
third and the fifth highest positions in the renamed party's hierar- 
chy. The name change is significant. By calling itself a workers' 
party, the Cambodian movement claimed equal status with the 
Vietnam Workers' Party. The pro- Vietnamese regime of the 



40 



Historical Setting 



People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK — see Appendix B) implied 
in the 1980s that the September 1960 meeting was nothing more 
than the second congress of the KPRP. 

On July 20, 1962, Tou Samouth disappeared. He may have been 
the victim of Sihanouk's police, but some observers suggest that 
Pol Pot, who had built up a strong faction within the party, had 
him eliminated. In February 1963, at the WPK's second congress, 
Pol Pot was chosen to succeed Tou Samouth as the party's gen- 
eral secretary. Tou's allies, Nuon Chea and Keo Meas, were re- 
moved from the Central Committee and replaced by Son Sen and 
Vorn Vet. From then on, Pol Pot and loyal comrades from his Paris 
student days controlled the party center, edging out older veterans 
whom they considered excessively pro-Vietnamese. 

In July 1963, Pol Pot and most of the central committee left 
Phnom Penh to establish an insurgent base in Rotanokiri 
(Ratanakiri) Province in the northeast. This is a region inhabited 
by tribal minorities, the Khmer Loeu (see Appendix B), whose 
rough treatment (including resettlement and forced assimilation) 
at the hands of the central government made them willing recruits 
for a guerrilla struggle. In 1965 Pol Pot made a visit of several 
months duration to North Vietnam and China. He probably 
received some training in China, which must have enhanced his 
prestige when he returned to the WPK's liberated areas. Despite 
friendly relations between Sihanouk and the Chinese, the latter kept 
Pol Pot's visit a secret from Sihanouk. In September 1966, the party 
changed its name a second time, to the Kampuchean (or Khmer) 
Communist Party (KCP — see Appendix B). Adopting the label 
4 'communist" suggested that the Cambodian movement was more 
advanced than Vietnam's (which was merely a "workers' party"), 
and was on the same level as China's. 

Into the Maelstrom: Insurrection and War, 1967-75 

By the mid-1960s, Sihanouk's delicate balancing act was begin- 
ning to go awry. Regionally, the presence of large-scale North Viet- 
namese and Viet Cong logistical bases on Cambodian territory and 
the use of Kampong Saom (then Sihanoukville) as a port of dis- 
embarkation for supplies being sent to communist troops, as well 
as the covert intelligence-gathering, sabotage missions, and over- 
flights by South Vietnamese and United States teams had made 
a sham of Cambodian neutrality. Domestically, Sihanouk's sporadic 
harassment of the leftists and the withdrawal of his endorsement 
from all candidates in the 1966 elections cost the radicals their 
chance for victory and alienated them from the prince as well. 
Sihanouk also lost the support of the rightists by his failure to come 



41 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

to grips with the deteriorating economic situation in the country 
and with the growing North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military 
presence in Cambodia. In addition to these regional develop- 
ments and the clash of interests among Phnom Penh's politicized 
elite, social tensions also were creating a favorable environment 
for the growth of a domestic communist insurgency in the rural 
areas. 

In early 1967, an insurrection broke out in the area around 
Samlot in Batdambang, a province long noted for the presence of 
large landowners and great disparities of wealth. Local resentment 
focused on tax collections and on the decision of the revenue-starved 
government to expropriate land to build a sugar refinery near 
Samlot. In January 1967, irate villagers attacked a tax collection 
brigade — an incident that recalled the 1925 murder of the French 
resident in the area. With the probable encouragement of local com- 
munist cadres, the insurrection quickly spread through the whole 
region. Sihanouk was on one of his frequent sojourns in France, 
and Lon Nol, the prime minister, responded harshly. After return- 
ing home in March 1967, Sihanouk personally supervised counter- 
insurgency measures. He later mentioned, in an offhand way, that 
the effectiveness of the royal armed forces had restored the peace 
but that approximately 10,000 people had died. 

The insurgency was not suppressed completely. It spread rapidly 
from Batdambang to the southern and to the southwestern provinces 
of Pouthisat (Pursat), Kampong Chhnang (Kompong Chang), 
Kampong Cham, Kampong Spoe (Kompong Speu), Kampot, and 
the central province of Kampong Thum. By the end of 1968, un- 
rest was reported in eleven of the country's eighteen provinces. 
The Khmer Loeu regions of Mondol Kiri (Mondolkiri) Province 
and Rotanokiri Province fell almost entirely under KCP control 
by the end of the decade. 

In January 1968, the communists established the Revolution- 
ary Army of Kampuchea (RAK — see Appendix B; The Second 
Indochina War, 1954-75, ch. 5). During Sihanouk's last two years 
in power, the RAK obtained minimal assistance from the North 
Vietnamese, the Viet Cong, and the Chinese. Although North Viet- 
nam had established a special unit in 1966 to train the Cambo- 
dian communists, it was extremely reluctant to alienate Sihanouk 
at a time when vital supplies were passing through the port of 
Kampong Saom and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Viet Cong 
bases along the Cambodia- Vietnam border. Beijing and Moscow 
also were providing Sihanouk with arms, many of which were being 
used against the insurgents. The indifference of the world com- 
munist movement to the Cambodian struggle from 1967 to 1969 



42 



Historical Setting 



made a permanent impression on Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge 
leaders. 

The March 1970 Coup d'Etat 

Sihanouk was away on a trip to Moscow and Beijing when Gen- 
eral Lon Nol launched a successful coup d'etat. On the morning 
of March 18, 1970, the National Assembly was hastily convened, 
and voted unanimously to depose Sihanouk as head of state. Lon 
Nol, who had been serving as prime minister, was granted emer- 
gency powers. Sirik Matak, an ultraconservative royal prince who 
in 1941 had been passed over by the French in favor of his cousin 
Norodom Sihanouk as king, retained his post as deputy prime 
minister. The new government emphasized that the transfer of 
power had been totally legal and constitutional, and it received the 
recognition of most foreign governments. 

Most middle-class and educated Khmers in Phnom Penh had 
grown weary of Sihanouk and apparently welcomed the change 
of government. But he was still popular in the villages. Days after 
the coup, the prince, now in Beijing, broadcast an appeal to the 
people to resist the usurpers. Demonstrations and riots occurred 
throughout the country. In one incident on March 29, an estimated 
40,000 peasants began a march on the capital to demand Sihanouk's 
reinstatement. They were dispersed, with many casualties, by con- 
tingents of the armed forces and the Khmer Serei. 

From Beijing, Sihanouk proclaimed his intention to create a 
National United Front of Kampuchea (Front Uni National du 
Kampuchea— FUNK — see Appendix B). In the prince's words, 
this front would embrace 4 'all Khmer both inside and outside the 
country — including the faithful, religious people, military men, 
civilians, and men and women who cherish the ideals of indepen- 
dence, democracy, neutrality, progressivism, socialism, Buddhism, 
nationalism, territorial integrity, and anti-imperialism." A coali- 
tion, brokered by the Chinese, was hastily formed between the 
prince and the KCP. On May 5, 1970, the actual establishment 
of FUNK and of the Royal Government of National Union of Kam- 
puchea (Gouvernement Royal d' Union Nationale du Kampuchea — 
GRUNK — see Appendix B), were announced. Sihanouk assumed 
the post of GRUNK head of state, appointing Penn Nouth, one 
of his most loyal supporters, as prime minister. Khieu Samphan 
was designated deputy prime minister, minister of defense, and 
commander in chief of the GRUNK armed forces (though ac- 
tual military operations were directed by Pol Pot). Hu Nim be- 
came minister of information, and Hou Yuon assumed multiple 
responsibilities as minister of interior, communal reforms, and 



43 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

cooperatives. GRUNK claimed that it was not a government-in- 
exile because Khieu Samphan and the insurgents remained inside 
Cambodia. 

For Sihanouk and the KCP, this was an extremely useful mar- 
riage of convenience. Peasants, motivated by loyalty to the monar- 
chy, rallied to the FUNK cause. The appeal of the Sihanouk-KCP 
coalition grew immensely after October 9, 1970, when Lon Nol 
abolished the monarchy and redesignated Cambodia as the Khmer 
Republic. The concept of a republic was not popular with most 
villagers, who had grown up with the idea that something was seri- 
ously awry in a Cambodia without a monarch. 

GRUNK operated on two tiers. Sihanouk and his loyalists re- 
mained in Beijing, although the prince did make a visit to the "liber- 
ated areas" of Cambodia, including Angkor Wat, in March 1973. 
The KCP commanded the insurgency within the country. Gradu- 
ally, the prince was deprived of everything but a passive, figure- 
head role in the coalition. The KCP told people inside Cambodia 
that expressions of support for Sihanouk would result in their liq- 
uidation, and when the prince appeared in public overseas to pub- 
licize the GRUNK cause, he was treated with almost open contempt 
by Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan. In June 1973, the prince told 
the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci that when "they [the Khmer 
Rouge] no longer need me, they will spit me out like a cherry pit! " 
By the end of that year, Sihanouk loyalists had been purged from 
all of GRUNK 's ministries. 

The Widening War 

The 1970 coup d'etat that toppled Sihanouk dragged Cambo- 
dia into the vortex of a wider war. The escalating conflict pitted 
government troops, now renamed the Khmer National Armed 
Forces (Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres — FANK — see Appen- 
dix B), initially against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, 
and subsequently against the old RAK, now revitalized and re- 
named the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces 
(CPNLAF— see Appendix B). 

As combat operations quickly disclosed, the two sides were mis- 
matched. The inequality lay not so much in sheer numbers. Thou- 
sands of young urban Cambodians flocked to join FANK in the 
months following the coup and, throughout its five-year life, the 
republican government forces held a numerical edge over their op- 
ponents, the padded payrolls and the phantom units reported in 
the press notwithstanding. Instead, FANK was outclassed in train- 
ing and leadership. With the surge of recruits, the government forces 
expanded beyond their capacity to absorb the new inductees. Later, 



44 



Historical Setting 



given the press of tactical operations and the need to replace com- 
bat casualties, there was insufficient time to impart needed skills 
to individuals or to units, and lack of training remained the bane 
of FANK's existence until its collapse. While individual soldiers 
and some government units fought bravely, their leaders — with 
notable exceptions — were both corrupt and incompetent. Arrayed 
against an armed force of such limited capability was arguably the 
best light infantry in the world at the time — the North Vietnamese 
and the Viet Cong. And when these forces were supplanted, it was 
by the tough, rigidly indoctrinated peasant army of the CPNLAF 
with its core of Khmer Rouge leaders. 

With the fall of Sihanouk, the North Vietnamese and the Viet 
Cong became alarmed at the prospect of a pro- Western regime that 
might allow the United States to establish a military presence on 
their western flank. To prevent this from happening, they began 
transferring their military installations away from the border area 
to locations deeper within Cambodian territory. A new command 
center was established at the city of Kracheh (Kratie). On April 
29, 1970, South Vietnamese and United States units unleashed a 
multi-pronged offensive into Cambodia to destroy the Central Office 
for South Vietnam (COSVN), the headquarters for North Viet- 
namese and Viet Cong combat operations in South Vietnam. Ex- 
tensive logistical installations and large amounts of supplies were 
found and destroyed, but as reporting from the United States 
MACV subsequently disclosed, still larger amounts of material 
already had been moved deeper into Cambodia. 

The North Vietnamese army turned on the republican govern- 
ment forces, and by June 1970, three months after the coup, they 
and the CPNLAF had swept FANK from the entire northeastern 
third of the country. After defeating the government forces, they 
turned newly won territories over to the local insurgents. The 
Khmer Rouge also established "liberated areas" in the south and 
the southwestern parts of the country, where they operated indepen- 
dendy of the Vietnamese. The KCP's debt to the North Vietnamese 
after March 1970 was one that Pol Pot was loath to acknowledge; 
however, it is clear that without North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
assistance, the revolutionary struggle would have dragged on much 
longer than it did. 

United States bombing of enemy troop dispositions in 
Cambodia — particularly in the summer of 1973, when intense aerial 
bombardment (known as Arclight) was used to halt a Khmer Rouge 
assault on Phnom Penh — bought time for the Lon Nol government, 
but did not stem the momentum of the communist forces. United 
States official documents give a figure of 79,959 sorties by B-52 



45 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

and F— 1 1 1 aircraft over the country, during which a total of 539, 129 
tons of ordnance were dropped, about 350 percent of the tonnage 
(153,000 tons) dropped on Japan during World War II. Many of 
the bombs that fell in Cambodia struck relatively uninhabited 
mountain or forest regions; however, as declassified United States 
Air Force maps show, others fell over some of the most densely 
inhabited areas of the country, such as Siemreab Province, Kam- 
pong Chhnang Province, and the countryside around Phnom Penh. 
Deaths from the bombing are extremely difficult to estimate, and 
figures range from a low of 30,000 to a high of 500,000. Whatever 
the real extent of the casualties, the Arclight missions over Cam- 
bodia, which were halted in August 15, 1973, by the United States 
Congress, delivered shattering blows to the structure of life in many 
of the country's villages, and, according to some critics, drove the 
Cambodian people into the arms of the Khmer Rouge. 

The bombing was by far the most controversial aspect of the 
United States presence in Cambodia. In his book Sideshow, William 
Shawcross provides a vivid image of the hellish conditions, espe- 
cially in the months of January to August 1973, when the Arclight 
sorties were most intense. He claims that the bombing contributed 
to the forging of a brutal and singlemindedly fanatical Khmer Rouge 
movement. However, his arguments have been disputed by several 
United States officials — including the former ambassador to Cam- 
bodia, Emory C. Swank, and the former Air Force commander 
in Thailand, General John W. Vogt — in an appendix to the second 
volume of the memoirs of then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. 

From the Khmer Rouge perspective, however, the severity of 
the bombings was matched by the treachery of the North Viet- 
namese. The Cambodian communists had refused to take part in 
the Paris peace talks. When North Vietnam and the United States 
signed the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, bombing mis- 
sions over Vietnam and Laos were terminated. The fighter bom- 
bers and other aircraft thus released were diverted to strike Khmer 
Rouge positions in Cambodia. 

Early Khmer Rouge Atrocities 

One of the earliest accounts of life under the Khmer Rouge was 
written in 1973 by a school administrator, Ith Sarin, who had joined 
the movement after becoming disillusioned with Lon Nol and the 
Khmer Republic, then rose to the status of candidate member of 
the KCP, but left the party and returned to Phnom Penh after nine 
months in the underground. His work, Regrets for the Khmer Soul 
(in Khmer, Sranaoh Pralung Khmer), revealed the secrecy with which 
the Khmer Rouge concealed the existence of the communist party, 



46 



Historical Setting 



which they referred to by the sinister term Angkar Loeu (High 
Organization), or simply, Angkar. The KCP Central Committee 
was referred to as the Kena Mocchhim (or Committee Machine, 
mocchhim being derived from the Western term, "machine"). 

Territories under Angkar control were well organized. Ith Sarin 
described a five-level hierarchy of Angkar-controlled bodies reaching 
from the six areas, or phumphaek (see Glossary) into which the coun- 
try was divided down to the hamlet, or phum level. The Angkar 
imposed a grim regime in which hatred for Lon Nol, the Ameri- 
cans, and, at times, the North Vietnamese "allies" was assidu- 
ously cultivated. Expressions of support for Sihanouk were firmly 
discouraged and people were encouraged to spy on each other. Dis- 
cipline was unremittingly harsh. Ith Sarin concluded from his 
experience that the great majority of the people did not like the 
Angkar and the collective way of life it imposed, that they despaired 
that Sihanouk would ever return to power, and that they would 
support the Khmer Republic if it carried out genuine reforms. 
Oddly, Lon Nol's security forces banned the book for a time on 
the grounds that it was "pro-communist." Although this was not 
true, it did provide a foretaste of what the entire Cambodian popu- 
lation would endure after April 1975. 

Disturbing stories of Khmer Rouge atrocities began to surface 
as the communists prepared to deal the coup de grace to the Khmer 
Republic. In March 1974, they captured the old capital city of 
Odongk north of Phnom Penh, destroyed it, dispersed its 20,000 
inhabitants into the countryside, and executed the teachers and civil 
servants. The same year, they brutally murdered sixty people, in- 
cluding women and children, in a small village called Sar Sarsdam 
in Siemreab Province. A similar incident was reported at Ang Snuol, 
a town west of the capital. Other instances of what one observer, 
Donald Kirk, described as a "sweeping, almost cosmic policy" of 
^discriminate terror, were recounted by refugees who fled to Phnom 
Penh or across the Thai border. Kirk contrasted this behavior with 
the Viet Cong's use of "a modicum of care and precision" in ap- 
plying terror in South Vietnam (for instance, assassination of land- 
lords or of South Vietnamese officials). Atrocity stories, however, 
were considered to be anticommunist propaganda by many, if not 
most, Western journalists and other observers; nevertheless, Phnom 
Penh's population swelled to as many as 2.5 million people as terri- 
fied refugees sought to escape not only the United States bombing 
and the ground fighting, but the harshness of life under the Angkar. 

The Fall of Phnom Penh 

The Khmer Rouge initiated their dry- season offensive to cap- 
ture the beleaguered Cambodian capital on January 1, 1975. Their 



47 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

troops controlled the banks of the Mekong River, and they were 
able to rig ingenious mines to sink convoys bringing relief supplies 
of food, fuel, and ammunition to the slowly starving city. After 
the river was effectively blocked in early February, the United States 
began airlifts of supplies. This was extremely risky because of 
Khmer Rouge rockets. The communists also fired rockets and shells 
into the city, causing many civilian deaths. Doomed units of repub- 
lican soldiers dug in around the capital; many of them had run 
out of ammunition, and they were overrun as the Khmer Rouge 
advanced. American observers, who generally had little esteem for 
FANK officer corps, were impressed by the determination of the 
Khmer enlisted men to fight to the end. 

On April 1 , 1975, President Lon Nol resigned and left the coun- 
try. His exit was prompted by fear of certain death if he fell into 
Khmer Rouge hands. The communists had included him among 
"seven traitors" who were marked for execution. (The others were 
non-communist, nationalist leaders Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh, 
In Tarn, Prime Minister Long Boret, Cheng Heng, who became 
head of state after Sihanouk's ouster, and Sosthene Fernandez, the 
FANK commander in chief) . Saukham Khoy became acting presi- 
dent of a government that had less than three weeks to live. Last- 
minute efforts on the part of the United States to arrange a peace 
agreement involving Sihanouk ended in failure. On April 12, 
United States embassy personnel were evacuated by helicopter. The 
ambassador, John Gunther Dean, invited high officials of the 
Khmer Republic to join them. But Sirik Matak, Long Boret, Lon 
Non (Lon Nol's brother), and most members of Lon Nol's cabi- 
net declined. They chose to share the fate of their people. All were 
executed soon after Khmer Rouge units entered Phnom Penh on 
April 17, 1975. 

Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-78 

Mid-April is the beginning of the Cambodian new year, the 
year's most festive celebration. For many Cambodians, the fall of 
Phnom Penh promised both a new year and a new era of peace. 
The people of Phnom Penh and of other cities waited in anticipa- 
tion for the appearance of their new rulers. The troops who en- 
tered the capital on April 1 7 were mostly grim-faced youths clad 
in black with the checkered scarves that had become the uniform 
of the movement. Their unsmiling demeanor quickly dispelled 
popular enthusiasm. People began to realize that, in the eyes of 
the victors, the war was not over; it was just beginning, and the 
people were the new enemy. According to Father Ponchaud, as 



48 



Historical Setting 



the sense of consternation and dread grew, it seemed that "a slab 
of lead had fallen on the city." 

Evacuation of Phnom Penh began immediately. The black-clad 
troops told the residents that they would move only about "two 
or three kilometers" outside the city and would return in "two 
or three days. ' ' Other witnesses report being told that the evacua- 
tion was because of the threat of an American bombing and that 
they did not have to lock their houses since the Khmer Rouge would 
"take care of everything" until they returned. The roads out of 
the city were clogged with evacuees. Phnom Penh — the popula- 
tion of which, numbering 2.5 million people, included as many 
as 1 . 5 million wartime refugees living with relatives or in shanty- 
towns around the urban center — was soon emptied. Similar evacu- 
ations occurred at Batdambang, Kampong Cham, Siemreab, 
Kampong Thum, and the country's other towns and cities. 

There were no exceptions to the evacuation. Even Phnom Penh's 
hospitals were emptied of their patients. The Khmer Rouge pro- 
vided transportation for some of the aged and the disabled, and 
they set up stockpiles of food outside the city for the refugees; 
however, the supplies were inadequate to sustain the hundreds of 
thousands of people on the road. Even seriously injured hospital 
patients, many without any means of conveyance, were summarily 
forced to leave regardless of their condition. According to Khieu 
Samphan, the evacuation of Phnom Penh's famished and disease- 
racked population resulted in 2,000 to 3,000 deaths, which is prob- 
ably an understatement. The foreign community, about 800 per- 
sons, was quarantined in the French embassy compound, and by 
the end of the month the foreigners were taken by truck to the Thai 
border. Khmer women who were married to foreigners were allowed 
to accompany their husbands, but Khmer men were not permit- 
ted to leave with their foreign wives. 

Promises that urban residents forced into the countryside would 
be allowed to return home were never kept. Instead, the town 
dwellers, regarded as politically unreliable "new people," were put 
to work in forced labor battalions throughout the country. One refu- 
gee, for example, recalled that her family was sent to the region 
around Moung Roessei in Batdambang Province to clear land and 
grow rice. 

Aside from the alleged threat of United States air strikes, the 
Khmer Rouge justified the evacuations in terms of the impossibil- 
ity of transporting sufficient food to feed an urban population of 
between 2 and 3 million people. Lack of adequate transportation 
meant that, instead of bringing food to the people (tons of it lay 
in storehouses in the port city of Kampong Saom, according to 



49 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Father Ponchaud), the people had to be brought to (and had to 
grow) the food. But there were other, more basic motivations. The 
Khmer Rouge was determined to turn the country into a nation 
of peasants in which the corruption and parasitism of city life would 
be completely uprooted. In addition, Pol Pot wanted to break up 
the "enemy spy organizations" that allegedly were based in the 
urban areas. Finally, it seems that Pol Pot and his hard-line asso- 
ciates on the KCP Political Bureau used the forced evacuations 
to gain control of the city's population and to weaken the position 
of their factional rivals within the communist party. Had Phnom 
Penh been controlled by one of the more moderate communist lead- 
ers, the exodus might not have taken place when it did. 

The regime immediately seized and executed as many Khmer 
Republic civil servants, police, and military officers as it could find. 
Evacuees who had been associated with the Lon Nol government 
had to feign peasant or working-class backgrounds to avoid cer- 
tain death. One refugee wrote that she and her family, who came 
from the middle or upper middle class, dyed their city clothes black 
(like those of peasants) to help them escape detection. In one inci- 
dent, soon after the fall of Phnom Penh, more than 300 former 
military officers were told to put on their dress uniforms in order 
to "meet Sihanouk." Instead, they were taken to a jungle clear- 
ing in Batdambang Province and were machine-gunned or clubbed 
to death. The wives and the children of people with government 
backgrounds were also killed, apparently to eliminate people who 
might harbor feelings of revenge toward the regime. 

According to refugee accounts, the rate of killing had decreased 
by the summer of 1975. Some civil servants and educated people 
were sent to "reeducation centers" and, if they showed "genuine" 
contrition, were put in forced labor battalions. There were new 
killings, however, in late 1975 and in early 1976. Many of the vic- 
tims were educated people, such as schoolteachers. During the entire 
Democratic Kampuchea period from 1975 to 1978, cadres exer- 
cised the power of life and death, especially over "new people," 
for whom threats of being struck with a pickax or an ax handle 
and of being "put in a plastic bag" were a part of everyday life. 
In order to save ammunition, firearms were rarely used. People 
were murdered for not working hard, for complaining about liv- 
ing conditions, for collecting or stealing food for their own use, 
for wearing jewelry, for having sexual relations, for grieving over 
the loss of relatives or friends, or for expressing religious sentiments. 
Sick people were often eliminated. The killings often, if not usually, 
occurred without any kind of trial, and they continued, uninter- 
rupted, until the 1979 Vietnamese invasion. People who displeased 



50 



Historical Setting 



the Angkar, or its local representatives, customarily received a for- 
mal warning (kosang) to mend their ways. More than two warn- 
ings resulted in being given an "invitation," which meant certain 
death. In 1977 and 1978 the violence reached a climax as the revolu- 
tionaries turned against each other in bloody purges. 

Revolutionary Terror 

Estimates of the number of people who perished under the Khmer 
Rouge vary tremendously. A figure of three million deaths between 
1975 and 1979 was given by the Vietnamese-sponsored Phnom 
Penh regime, the PRK. Father Ponchaud suggested 2.3 million. 
Amnesty International estimated 1 .4 million dead; the United States 
Department of State, 1.2 million. Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot, 
who could be expected to give underestimations, cited figures of 
1 million and 800,000, respectively. In 1962 the year of the last 
census taken before Cambodia was engulfed by war, the popula- 
tion of the country was cited at 5.7 million. Ten years later, in 
1972, the population was estimated to have reached 7.1 million. 
Using Pol Pot's rather modest figure of 800,000 deaths, about 11 
percent of the population would have died from unnatural causes 
between 1975 and 1978. By contrast, Amnesty International's figure 
would yield a death rate of almost 20 percent of the population; 
Father Ponchaud' s, of approximately 32 percent. The revolution 
was easily, in proportion to the size of the country's population, 
the bloodiest in modern Asian history. 

As is evident from the accounts of refugees, the greatest causes 
of death were hunger, disease, and exposure. Many city people 
could not survive the rigors of life in the countryside, the forced 
marches, and the hard physical labor. People died from the bites 
of venomous snakes, drowned in flooded areas during the rainy 
season, and were killed by wild beasts in jungle areas. Many fell 
victim to malaria. Others died in the fighting between Vietnam 
and Cambodia in 1978 and in 1979. Nonetheless, executions ac- 
counted for hundreds of thousands of victims and perhaps for as 
many as 1 million. Western journalists have been shown "killing 
fields" containing as many as 16,000 bodies. 

Society under the Angkar 

The social transformation wrought by the Khmer Rouge, first, 
in the areas that they occupied during the war with Lon Nol and, 
then, in varying degrees, throughout the country, was far more 
radical than anything attempted by the Russian, Chinese, or Viet- 
namese revolutions. According to Pol Pot, five classes existed in 
prerevolutionary Cambodia — peasants, workers, bourgeoisie, 



51 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

capitalists, and feudalists. Postrevolutionary society, as defined by 
the 1976 Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, consisted of 
workers, peasants, and "all other Kampuchean working people." 
No allowance was made for a transitional stage such as China's 
"New Democracy" in which "patriotic" landlord or bourgeois ele- 
ments were permitted to play a role in socialist construction. Siha- 
nouk writes that in 1975 he, Khieu Samphan, and Khieu Thirith 
went to visit Zhou Enlai, who was gravely ill. Zhou warned them 
not to attempt to achieve communism suddenly by one ' ' great leap 
forward" without intermediate steps, as China had done with dis- 
astrous results in the late 1950s. Khieu Samphan and Khieu Thirith 
"just smiled an incredulous and superior smile." Khieu Samphan 
and Son Sen later boasted to Sihanouk that "we will be the first 
nation to create a completely communist society without wasting 
time on intermediate steps." 

Although conditions varied from region to region, a situation 
that was, in part, a reflection of factional divisions that still existed 
within the KCP during the 1970s, the testimony of refugees reveals 
that the most salient social division was between the politically sus- 
pect "new people," those driven out of the towns after the com- 
munist victory, and the more reliable "old people," the poor and 
lower middle-class peasants who had remained in the countryside. 
Despite the ideological commitment to radical equality, KCP mem- 
bers and the armed forces constituted a clearly recognizable elite. 
The working class was a negligible factor because of the evacua- 
tion of the urban areas and the idling of most of the country's few 
factories. The one important working class group in prerevolution- 
ary Cambodia — laborers on large rubber plantations — traditionally 
had consisted mostly of Vietnamese emigrants and thus was polit- 
ically suspect. 

The number of people, including refugees, living in the urban 
areas, on the eve of the communist victory probably was some- 
what more than 3 million, in a wartime population that has been 
estimated at between 5.7 and 7.3 million. As mentioned, despite 
their rural origins, the refugees were considered "new people" — 
that is, people unsympathetic to Democratic Kampuchea. Some 
doubtless passed as "old people" after returning to their native 
villages, but the Khmer Rouge seem to have been extremely vigilant 
in recording and keeping track of the movements of families and 
of individuals. The lowest unit of social control, the krom (group), 
consisted of ten to fifteen nuclear families whose activities were close- 
ly supervised by a three-person committee. The committee chair- 
man was selected by the KCP. This grass roots leadership was 
required to note the social origin of each family under its jurisdiction 



52 



Historical Setting 



and to report it to persons higher up in the Angkar hierarchy. The 
number of "new people" may initially have been as high as 2.5 
million. 

The "new people" were treated as slave laborers. They were 
constantly moved, were forced to do the hardest physical labor, 
and worked in the most inhospitable, fever-ridden parts of the coun- 
try, such as forests, upland areas, and swamps. "New people" were 
segregated from "old people," enjoyed little or no privacy, and 
received the smallest rice rations. When the country experienced 
food shortages in 1977, the "new people" suffered the most. The 
medical care available to them was primitive or nonexistent. Fami- 
lies often were separated because people were divided into work 
brigades according to age and sex and sent to different parts of 
the country. "New people" were subjected to unending political 
indoctrination and could be executed without trial. The creation 
of what amounted to a slave class suggests continuity between the 
Cambodian revolution and the country's ancient history. Like the 
Khmer Rouge leadership, the god-kings of Angkor had commanded 
armies of slaves. Pol Pot boasted in 1977 that "if our people can 
make Angkor, they can make anything." 

The situation of the "old people" under Khmer Rouge rule was 
more ambiguous. Refugee interviews reveal cases in which villagers 
were treated as harshly as the "new people," enduring forced labor, 
indoctrination, the separation of children from parents, and exe- 
cutions; however, they were generally allowed to remain in their 
native villages. Because of their age-old resentment of the urban 
and rural elites, many of the poorest peasants probably were sym- 
pathetic to Khmer Rouge goals. In the early 1980s, visiting Western 
journalists found that the issue of peasant support for the Khmer 
Rouge was an extremely sensitive subject that officials of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of Kampuchea had little inclination to discuss. 

On the basis of interviews with refugees from different parts of 
the country as well as other sources, Vickery has argued that there 
was a wide regional variation in the severity of policies adopted 
by local Khmer Rouge authorities. Ideology had something to do 
with the differences, but the availability of food, the level of local 
development, and the personal qualities of cadres also were im- 
portant factors. The greatest number of deaths occurred in undevel- 
oped districts, where "new people" were sent to clear land. While 
conditions were hellish in some localities, they apparentiy were toler- 
able in others. Vickery describes the Eastern Zone, which was domi- 
nated by pro- Vietnamese cadres, as one in which the extreme 
policies of the Pol Pot leadership were not adopted (at least until 
1978, when the Eastern leadership was liquidated in a bloody 



53 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

purge). Executions were few, "old people" and "new people" were 
treated largely the same, and food was made available to the en- 
tire population. Although the Southwestern Zone was an original 
center of power of the Khmer Rouge, and cadres administered it 
with strict discipline, random executions were relatively rare, and 
"new people" were not persecuted if they had a cooperative atti- 
tude. In the Western Zone and in the Northwestern Zone, condi- 
tions were harsh. Starvation was widespread in the latter zone 
because cadres sent rice to Phnom Penh rather than distributed 
it to the local population. In the Northern Zone and in the Cen- 
tral Zone, there seem to have been more executions than there were 
victims of starvation. Little reliable information emerged on con- 
ditions in the Northeastern Zone, one of the most isolated parts 
of Cambodia (see fig. 3). 

On the surface, society in Democratic Kampuchea was strictly 
egalitarian. The Khmer language, like many in Southeast Asia, 
has a complex system of usages to define speakers' rank and social 
status. These usages were abandoned. People were encouraged to 
call each other "friend," or "comrade" (in Khmer, mit or met), 
and to avoid traditional signs of deference such as bowing or fold- 
ing the hands in salutation. Language was transformed in other 
ways. The Khmer Rouge invented new terms. People were told 
they must "forge" {lot dam) a new revolutionary character, that 
they were the "instruments" (opokar) of the Angkar, and that nostal- 
gia for prerevolutionary times (cchoeu sttak aram, or "memory sick- 
ness") could result in their receiving Angkar's "invitation." 

As in other revolutionary states, however, some people were 
"more equal" than others. Members and candidate members of 
the KCP, local-level leaders of poor peasant background who col- 
laborated with the Angkar, and members of the armed forces had 
a higher standard of living than the rest of the population. Refu- 
gees agree that, even during times of severe food shortage, mem- 
bers of the grass-roots elite had adequate, if not luxurious, supplies 
of food. One refugee wrote that "pretty new bamboo houses" were 
built for Khmer Rouge cadres along the river in Phnom Penh. 
According to Craig Etcheson, an authority on Democratic Kam- 
puchea, members of the revolutionary army lived in self-contained 
colonies, and they had a "distinctive warrior-caste ethos." Armed 
forces units personally loyal to Pol Pot, known as the "Uncondi- 
tional Divisions," were a privileged group within the military. 

Given the severity of their revolutionary ideology, it is surpris- 
ing that the highest ranks of the Khmer Rouge leadership exhib- 
ited a talent for cronyism that matched that of the Sihanouk-era 
elite. Pol Pot's wife, Khieu Ponnary, was head of the Association 



54 



Historical Setting 



of Democratic Khmer Women and her younger sister, Khieu 
Thirith, served as minister of social action. These two women are 
considered among the half-dozen most powerful personalities in 
Democratic Kampuchea. Son Sen's wife, Yun Yat, served as 
minister for culture, education and learning. Several of Pol Pot's 
nephews and nieces were given jobs in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. One of Ieng Sary's daughters was appointed head of the 
Calmette Hospital although she had not graduated from secondary 
school. A niece of Ieng Sary was given a job as English translator 
for Radio Phnom Penh although her fluency in the language was 
extremely limited. Family ties were important, both because of the 
culture and because of the leadership's intense secretiveness and 
distrust of outsiders, especially of pro- Vietnamese communists. 
Greed was also a motive. Different ministries, such as the Minis- 
try of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Industry, were controlled 
and exploited by powerful Khmer Rouge families. Administering 
the diplomatic corps was regarded as an especially profitable 
fiefdom. 

Religious and Minority Communities 

Article 20 of the 1976 Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea 
guaranteed religious freedom, but it also declared that "all reac- 
tionary religions that are detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea 
and the Kampuchean People are strictly forbidden." About 85 per- 
cent of the population follows the Theravada school of Buddhism 
(see Buddhism, ch. 2). Before 1975 the Khmer Rouge tolerated 
the activities of the community of Buddhist monks, or sangha (see 
Glossary), in the liberated areas in order to win popular support. 
This changed abruptly after the fall of Phnom Penh. The coun- 
try's 40,000 to 60,000 Buddhist monks, regarded by the regime 
as social parasites, were defrocked and forced into labor brigades. 
Many monks were executed; temples and pagodas were destroyed 
or turned into storehouses or jails. Images of the Buddha were 
defaced and dumped into rivers and lakes. People who were dis- 
covered praying or expressing religious sentiments in other ways 
were often killed. The Christian and Muslim communities also were 
persecuted. The Roman Catholic cathedral of Phnom Penh was 
completely razed. The Khmer Rouge forced Muslims to eat pork, 
which they regard as an abomination. Many of those who refused 
were killed. Christian clergy and Muslim leaders were executed. 

The Khmer Rouge's treatment of minorities seems to have varied 
from group to group. The Vietnamese endured the greatest suffer- 
ing. Tens of thousands were murdered in regime-organized mas- 
sacres. Most of the survivors fled to Vietnam. The Cham, a Muslim 



55 



Cambodia: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Michael Vickery. Cambodia: 1975-82, Boston. 1984. 
and Elizabeth Becker. Wkn :ht \\'c r Was 0:-r. New York. 1986. 



Figure 3. Khmer Rouge Administrative Zones for Democratic Kampuchea. 
1975-78 



minority who are the descendants of migrants from the old state 
of Champa, were forced to adopt the Khmer language and cus- 
toms. Their communities, which traditionally had existed apart 
from Khmer villages, were broken up. Forty thousand Cham were 
killed in two districts of Kampong Cham Province alone. Thai 
minorities living near the Thai border also were persecuted. 

Despite the fact that Chinese and Sino-Khmers had dominated 
the Cambodian economy for centuries and could be considered ex- 
ploiters of the peasantry, the Khmer Rouge apparently did not sin- 
gle them out for harsh treatment. The war drove most rural Chmese 
into the cities, and after the forced evacuations they and their urban 



56 



Historical Setting 



compatriots were regarded as "new people." They shared the same 
hardships as Khmers, however. Phnom Penh's close relationship 
with China was probably a factor in the regime's reluctance to perse- 
cute them openly. 

In the late 1980s, little was known of Khmer Rouge policies 
toward the tribal peoples of the northeast, the Khmer Loeu. Pol 
Pot established an insurgent base in the tribal areas of Rotanokiri 
Province in the early 1960s, and he may have had a substantial 
Khmer Loeu following (see The Cambodian Left: The Early 
Phases, this ch.). Predominately animist peoples with few ties to 
the Buddhist culture of the lowland Khmers, the Khmer Loeu had 
resented Sihanouk's attempts to "civilize" them. Cambodia ex- 
pert Serge Thion notes that marriage to a tribal person was consi- 
dered "final proof of unconditional loyalty to the party." Khieu 
Samphan may have been married to a tribal woman. 

Education and Health 

Like the radical exponents of the Cultural Revolution in China 
during the 1960s, the Khmer Rouge regarded traditional educa- 
tion with unalloyed hostility. After the fall of Phnom Penh, they 
executed thousands of teachers. Those who had been educators prior 
to 1975 survived by hiding their identities. Aside from teaching 
basic mathematical skills and literacy, the major goal of the new 
educational system was to instill revolutionary values in the young. 
For a regime at war with most of Cambodia's traditional values, 
this meant that it was necessary to create a gap between the values 
of the young and the values of the nonrevolutionary old. 

In a manner reminiscent of George Orwell's 1984, the regime 
recruited children to spy on adults. The pliancy of the younger 
generation made them, in the Angkar's words, the "dictatorial in- 
strument of the party." In 1962 the communists had created a spe- 
cial secret organization, the Alliance of Democratic Khmer Youth, 
that, in the early 1970s, changed its name to the Alliance of Com- 
munist Youth of Kampuchea. Pol Pot considered Alliance alumni 
as his most loyal and reliable supporters, and used them to gain 
control of the central and of the regional KCP apparatus. The 
powerful Khieu Thirith, minister of social action, was responsible 
for directing the youth movement. 

Hardened young cadres, many little more than twelve years of 
age, were enthusiastic accomplices in some of the regime's worst 
atrocities. Sihanouk, who was kept under virtual house arrest in 
Phnom Penh between 1976 and 1978, wrote in War and Hope that 
his youthful guards, having been separated from their families and 
given a thorough indoctrination, were encouraged to play cruel 



57 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

games involving the torture of animals. Having lost parents, sib- 
lings, and friends in the war and lacking the Buddhist values of 
their elders, the Khmer Rouge youth also lacked the inhibitions 
that would have dampened their zeal for revolutionary terror. 

Health facilities in the years 1975 to 1978 were abysmally poor. 
Many physicians either were executed or were prohibited from prac- 
ticing. It appears that the party and the armed forces elite had access 
to Western medicine and to a system of hospitals that offered 
reasonable treatment but ordinary people, especially ' 'new peo- 
ple," were expected to use traditional plant and herbal remedies 
that usually were ineffective. Some bartered their rice rations and 
personal possessions to obtain aspirin and other simple drugs. 

The Economy 

In its general contours, Democratic Kampuchea's economic pol- 
icy was similar to, and possibly inspired by, China's radical Great 
Leap Forward that carried out immediate collectivization of the 
Chinese countryside in 1958. During the early 1970s, the Khmer 
Rouge established "mutual assistance groups" in the areas they 
occupied. After 1973 these were organized into "low-level cooper- 
atives" in which land and agricultural implements were lent by 
peasants to the community but remained their private property. 
"High-level cooperatives," in which private property was abolished 
and the harvest became the collective property of the peasants, 
appeared in 1974. "Communities," introduced in early 1976, were 
a more advanced form of high-level cooperative in which communal 
dining was instituted. State-owned farms also were established. 

Far more than had the Chinese communists, the Khmer Rouge 
relentlessly pursued the ideal of economic self-sufficiency, in their 
case the version that Khieu Samphan had outlined in his 1959 doc- 
toral dissertation. Extreme measures were taken. Currency was 
abolished, and domestic trade or commerce could be conducted 
only through barter. Rice, measured in tins, became the most im- 
portant medium of exchange, although people also bartered gold, 
jewelry, and other personal possessions. Foreign trade was almost 
completely halted, though there was a limited revival in late 1976 
and early 1977. China was the most important trading partner, 
but commerce amounting to a few million dollars was also con- 
ducted with France, with Britain,' and with the United States 
through a Hong Kong intermediary. 

From the Khmer Rouge perspective, the country was free of for- 
eign economic domination for the first time in its 2,000-year his- 
tory. By mobilizing the people into work brigades organized in a 
military fashion, the Khmer Rouge hoped to unleash the masses' 



58 



Historical Setting 



productive forces. There was an "Angkorian" component to eco- 
nomic policy. That ancient kingdom had grown rich and power- 
ful because it controlled extensive irrigation systems that produced 
surpluses of rice. Agriculture in modern Cambodia depended, for 
the most part, on seasonal rains. By building a nationwide system 
of irrigation canals, dams, and reservoirs, the leadership believed 
it would be possible to produce rice on a year-round basis. It was 
the ''new people" who suffered and sacrificed the most to com- 
plete these ambitious projects. 

Although the Khmer Rouge implemented an "agriculture first" 
policy in order to achieve self-sufficiency, they were not, as some 
observers have argued, "back-to-nature" primitivists. Although 
the 1970-75 war and the evacuation of the cities had destroyed or 
idled most industry, small contingents of workers were allowed to 
return to the urban areas to reopen some plants. Like their Chinese 
counterparts, the Cambodian communists had great faith in the 
inventive power and the technical aptitude of the masses, and they 
constantly published reports of peasants' adapting old mechanical 
parts to new uses. Much as the Chinese had attempted unsuccess- 
fully to build a new steel industry based on backyard furnaces during 
the Great Leap Forward, the Khmer Rouge sought to move in- 
dustry to the countryside. Significantly, the seal of Democratic 
Kampuchea displayed not only sheaves of rice and irrigation sluices, 
but also a factory with smokestacks. 

Politics under the Khmer Rouge 

By the April 1975 communist victory, Pol Pot and his close as- 
sociates occupied the most important positions in the KCP and in 
the state hierarchies. He had been KCP general secretary since 
February 1963. His associates functioned as the party's Political 
Bureau, and they controlled a majority of the seats on the Central 
Committee. Khieu Thirith's management of youth groups meant 
that Pol Pot had ample reserves of zealous young cadres, "the 
nucleus and wick of the struggle," committed to imposing the party 
center's will throughout the country. But his domination of the 
revolutionary movement was not complete. In different areas of 
the country, especially in the Eastern Zone, pro- Vietnamese and 
veteran Khmer Issarak commanders were jealous of their indepen- 
dence. They questioned, and at times openly defied, his policies 
of revolutionary terror and hostility toward Vietnam. The highest 
ranks of the party were not free of dissension. 

Like Joseph Stalin in the late 1920s and in the 1930s, Pol Pot 
initiated a purge of his opponents, both imagined and real. In terms 
of the number of people liquidated in relation to the total population, 



59 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

the Khmer Rouge terror was far bloodier than Stalin's. Through 
the 1970s, and especially after mid- 1975, the party was shaken by 
factional struggles. There were even armed attempts to topple Pol 
Pot. The resultant purges reached a crest in 1977 and 1978 when 
hundreds of thousands of people, including some of the most im- 
portant KCP leaders, were executed. 

Establishing Democratic Kampuchea 

The communists had exercised real power behind the facade, 
since its establishment in 1970, of the Royal Government of 
National Union of Kampuchea, (Governement Royal d'Union 
Nationale du Kampuchea — GRUNK — see Appendix B). It re- 
mained formally in control of the country until the proclamation 
of the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea on January 5, 1976. 
Three months later, on April 2, Sihanouk resigned as head of state. 
Sihanouk remained under comfortable, but insecure, house arrest 
in Phnom Penh, until he departed for China on the last flight before 
Vietnamese forces captured the city on January 7, 1979. 

Khieu Samphan described the 1976 Constitution as "not the 
result of any research on foreign documents, nor . . . the fruit of 
any research by scholars. In fact the people — workers, peasants, 
and Revolutionary Army — wrote the Constitution with their own 
hands." It was a brief document of sixteen chapters and twenty- 
one articles that defined the character of the state; the goals of eco- 
nomic, social and cultural policies; and the basic tenets of foreign 
policy. The "rights and duties of the individual" were briefly de- 
fined in Article 12. They included none of what are commonly 
regarded as guarantees of political human rights except the state- 
ment that "men and women are equal in every respect." The docu- 
ment declared, however, that "all workers" and "all peasants" 
were "masters" of their factories and fields. An assertion that "there 
is absolutely no unemployment in Democratic Kampuchea" rings 
true in light of the regime's massive use of forced labor. 

The Constitution defined Democratic Kampuchea's foreign pol- 
icy principles in Article 21, the document's longest, in terms of 
"independence, peace, neutrality, and nonalignment." It pledged 
the country's support to anti-imperialist struggles in the Third 
World. In light of the regime's aggressive attacks against Viet- 
namese, Thai, and Lao territory during 1977 and 1978, the promise 
to "maintain close and friendly relations with all countries shar- 
ing a common border" bore little resemblance to reality. 

Governmental institutions were outiined very briefly in the Con- 
stitution. The legislature, the Kampuchean People's Representa- 
tive Assembly (KPRA), contained 250 members "representing 



60 



Historical Setting 



workers, peasants, and other working people and the Kampuchean 
Revolutionary army." One hundred and fifty KPRA seats were 
allocated for peasant representatives; fifty, for the armed forces; 
and fifty, for worker and other representatives. The legislature was 
to be popularly elected for a five-year term. Its first and only elec- 
tion was held on March 20, 1976. ' 'New people" apparently were 
not allowed to participate. 

The executive branch of government also was chosen by the 
KPRA. It consisted of a state presidium " responsible for represent- 
ing the state of Democratic Kampuchea inside and outside the coun- 
try." It served for a five-year term, and its president was head of 
state. Khieu Samphan was the first and only person to serve in 
this office, which he assumed after Sihanouk's resignation. The 
judicial system was composed of "people's courts," the judges for 
which were appointed by the KPRA, as was the executive branch. 

The Constitution did not mention regional or local government 
institutions. After assuming power, the Khmer Rouge abolished 
the old provinces (khet) and replaced them with seven zones; the 
Northern Zone, Northeastern Zone, Northwestern Zone, Central 
Zone, Eastern Zone, Western Zone, and Southwestern Zone. There 
were also two other regional-level units: the Kracheh Special Region 
Number 505 and, until 1977, the Siemreab Special Region Num- 
ber 106. The zones were divided into damban (regions) that were 
given numbers. Number One, appropriately, encompassed the 
Samlot region of the Northwestern Zone (including Batdambang 
Province), where the insurrection against Sihanouk had erupted 
in early 1967. With this exception, the damban appear to have been 
numbered arbitrarily. 

The damban were divided into srok (districts), khum (subdistricts), 
and phum (villages), the latter usually containing several hundred 
people. This pattern was roughly similar to that which existed under 
Sihanouk and the Khmer Republic, but inhabitants of the villages 
were organized into krom (groups) composed of ten to fifteen fami- 
lies. On each level, administration was directed by a three-person 
committee (kanak, or kena). KCP members occupied committee posts 
at the higher levels. Subdistrict and village committees were often 
staffed by local poor peasants, and, very rarely, by "new people." 
Cooperatives (sahakor), similar in jurisdictional area to the khum, 
assumed local government responsibilities in some areas. 

An Elusive Party 

To most people inside and outside Democratic Kampuchea, the 
communist party was known simply as the Angkar Loeu. The 
party's commitment to revolution was expressed in the terminology 



61 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

of the 1976 Constitution, but no mention was made of a specifi- 
cally Marxist-Leninist ideology. The KCP's real leaders and iden- 
tity were kept closely guarded secrets from non-members until 1977. 
Head of state Khieu Samphan was a front — Sihanouk describes 
him as a ' 'bit player" — for the most important leader, Saloth Sar, 
whose appearances and speeches were not publicized in the offi- 
cial media. Under the name Pol Pot, Saloth Sar was elected to a 
seat in the KPRA in March 1976 as a representative of rubber plan- 
tation workers, and he became Democratic Kampuchea's prime 
minister the following month. 

The histories of most revolutionary movements contain a clan- 
destine theme, but rarely have any approached the near-paranoia 
of the Cambodian communists. In part, this reflected the profound 
distrust with which Pol Pot and his associates regarded people out- 
side their small, closed circle that had begun its association in Paris 
in the 1950s. Also, there may have been an unwillingness to risk 
the support of a still-conservative peasantry by publicly embrac- 
ing Marxism-Leninism. The most important reason for the ob- 
session with secrecy, however, was intraparty strife — the KCP's 
continuing failure to resolve factional differences and to achieve 
consensus on its mission and policies. Even more than the future, 
however, the past was a focus of bitter controversy: how much 
should the KCP acknowledge its debt to the Vietnamese com- 
munists? 

On September 18, in a speech mourning the death of Mao 
Zedong, Pol Pot announced that the Angkar was "Marxist- 
Leninist" and that it enjoyed "fraternal relations" with the Chinese 
Communist Party. But it was not until a year later, in September 
1977, that Pol Pot revealed the existence of the KCP and its his- 
tory in a five-hour recorded radio speech. He stated that the KCP 
was seventeen years old and that its founding date had been Sep- 
tember 30, 1960. He noted that the KCP's decision to disclose its 
real identity had been encouraged by "foreign friends" (the 
Chinese) who wanted the KCP to take credit for the revolutionary 
victory. 

Pol Pot's mention of the September 1960 founding date was ex- 
tremely significant. Within the party ranks, September 30, 1951, 
traditionally had been recognized as its founding date. This was 
the day when the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolution- 
ary Party (KPRP — see Appendix B) was established following the 
reorganization of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP — see 
Appendix B). The September 1960 meeting had been considered 
the KPRP's second congress, but in the September-October 1976 
edition of the party's official journal, Tung Padevat (Revolutionary 



62 



Historical Setting 



Flag), the date of birth of the KPRP was given as September 30, 
1960. Tung Padevat declared that the new founding date was adopted 
because 4 'we must arrange the history of the party into something 
clean and perfect, in line with our policies of independence and 
self-mastery." Pol Pot's speech a year later gave official sanction 
to this view. 

Another party journal, Tung Kraham (Red Flag), mentioned the 
traditional founding date, September 30, 1951, in its September 
1976 issue. The argument over the birth date reflected deep fac- 
tional divisions within the KCP. Backers of the 1951 birth date, 
if not pro- Vietnamese, were at least willing to recognize their move- 
ment's past dependence on Vietnamese support. Pol Pot and his 
associates adopted the 1960 birthday to emphasize the party's Cam- 
bodian identity and to distance it from any association with the 
Vietnamese communists. The party's official history, or "Black 
Booh, " published in 1978 after pro- Vietnamese elements had been 
liquidated, stated that the KCP had severed fraternal party rela- 
tions with the Vietnam Workers' Party as early as 1973. 

Intraparty Conflict 

On the eve of its 1975 victory against the Lon Nol forces, the 
KCP was, in terms of personnel, ideological viewpoints, and fac- 
tional loyalties, quite heterogeneous. Etcheson, in The Rise and 
Demise of Democratic Kampuchea, identifies six factions: the Pol Pot 
group (members of which he labels "Stalinists"); internationalists 
(pro- Vietnamese elements who were based in Hanoi after 1954, 
and who returned to the country when the FUNK united front was 
declared in 1970); veterans of the leftist Khmer Issarak (who re- 
mained in the country after 1954, mostly in the southern and in 
western parts of the country); veterans of the Pracheachon Party 
founded in 1954 (which had contested Sihanouk's Sangkum openly 
until being driven underground in the 1960s); pro-Chinese or 
Maoist elements (including Paris-group intellectuals Hou Yuon and 
Hu Nim); and the pro-Sihanouk Khmer Rumdo (see Appendix 
B). Ben Kiernan, another analyst of Cambodia, identifies three 
factions: the Pol Pot faction, the pro- Vietnamese communists, and 
the adherents of the Chinese Cultural Revolution model. The roles 
of ideology and of conflicting party lines in factional struggles, 
however, should not be overemphasized. Behind doctrinal differ- 
ences lay the dynamics of personal rivalry and the strong sense of 
patron-client loyalty that has always characterized Cambodian 
politics. 

Although the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK) was 
"reestablished" in July 1975 to bring all Khmer Rouge units 



63 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



formally under central authority, real control of regional armed 
forces remained in the hands of the zone party committee heads. 
The most important center of regional resistance to the Pol Pot- 
dominated party center was the Eastern Zone, comprising part or 
all of the old provinces of Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, Kandal, and 
Kampong Cham that adjoined Vietnam. Its leader was So Phim, 
a pro- Vietnamese internationalist. 

Differences between the Eastern Zone revolutionaries and the 
other Khmer Rouge were readily apparent by 1975. While the uni- 
forms of Pol Pot loyalists and their allies were black, the uniforms 
of the Eastern Zone were a distinctive green. In addition, cadre 
behavior toward the civilian population in the Eastern Zone was 
generally exemplary. It seems that some of the Eastern cadres were 
sympathetic to Sihanouk; refugee Molyda Szymusiak wrote that 
during the evacuation of Phnom Penh, a "Sihanouk Khmer" sol- 
dier advised her relatives (who were distantly related to the royal 
family) to accompany him to Prey Veng Province on Cambodia's 
southern border. 

At least two coups d'etat against the center were attempted — in 
July and in September, 1975. The latter incident involved Eastern 
Zone troops. After April 1975, Hou Yuon, one of the original Paris 
group, disappeared. His colleague, Hu Nim, who was tortured and 
killed in the Tuol Sleng detention center in 1977, indicated in his 
confession that Hou Yuon had been liquidated for opposing the 
extremism of the center's policies. 

Pol Pot loyalists occupied most of the important positions in the 
new government that was formed after the March 20, 1976, elec- 
tions; however, Vorn Vet, a pro- Vietnamese leader, was appointed 
second vice premier with responsibility over six ministry-level eco- 
nomic committees, and he also headed the special Phnom Penh 
capital zone. So Phim, a longtime rival of Pol Pot within the com- 
munist movement, was first vice president of the presidium and 
a member of the KCP Political Bureau. (The second vice presi- 
dent, Nhim Ros, was a Pol Pot loyalist who commanded the North- 
western Zone.) The year 1976 appears to have been a time initially 
of retreat for the faction led by Pol Pot. Many communists were 
alienated by his authoritarian behavior. Article 4 of the Constitu- 
tion, "Democratic Kampuchea applies the collective principle in 
leadership and in work," apparently reflects this opinion. In rela- 
tion to what had gone before and what was to come, policies dur- 
ing 1976 were moderate. The terror eased. Relations with Hanoi 
were placed on a friendlier footing. Trade and diplomatic relations 
were expanded. 



64 



Historical Setting 



On September 27, 1976, Pol Pot resigned as premier "for rea- 
sons of health. ' ' Nuon Chea, the pro-Vietnamese deputy premier, 
became acting premier. Little is known of the intense factional 
maneuvering that was occurring at this time, but by late October 
1976, Pol Pot had regained his post. On October 22, his come- 
back was confirmed with his issuance of a statement in his capac- 
ity as prime minister condemning China's "counterrevolutionary 
Gang of Four," who had been arrested in Beijing on October 6. 

The influence of China on Democratic Kampuchea's internal 
politics apparently was a crucial, though little understood, factor 
in Pol Pot's defeat of his pro- Vietnamese rivals. Etcheson and Kier- 
nan have suggested, in separate articles, that radicals in the Chinese 
Communist Party may have backed pro-Vietnamese Internation- 
alist elements in the KCP in 1976 because they were interested in 
preserving good relations with Hanoi. The fall of the radicals in 
October 1976, a month after Mao Zedong's death, brought in the 
moderates, led by Deng Xiaoping. As the subsequent break be- 
tween Beijing and Hanoi shows, Deng was inclined to regard Viet- 
nam as an agent of Soviet ' 'hegemonism. ' ' Chinese support of the 
Pol Pot faction may have been a crucial element in its ability to 
triumph over the pro- Vietnamese communists in the fall of 1976. 
From an ideological standpoint, the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping and 
the ultra- radical Pol Pot were polar opposites, but from the geo- 
political perspective, the post-Mao Zedong leadership recognized 
the value of having a well-armed Cambodian thorn in the side of 
Vietnam. Immediately after making his September 27, 1977, speech 
revealing the KCP's existence, Pol Pot, accompanied by Ieng Sary 
and Vorn Vet, visited Beijing, where he acknowledged the impor- 
tance of Maoist thought to the Cambodian revolution. In early 
1978, the Chinese sent substantial military aid, which included 
armor, artillery, and antitank guns. 

The Purge 

In 1975 Pol Pot concluded an alliance with the party head of 
the Southwestern Zone, Ta Mok, who was a Khmer Issarak veter- 
an and, like Pol Pot, was strongly anti- Vietnamese. During 1977 
and 1978, Ta Mok provided the backing that enabled Pol Pot to 
liquidate the opposition within the KCP and to initiate new ter- 
rorism against the local population. In February 1977, Southwestern 
cadres went into the Eastern, Northern, and Western zones to purge 
local Khmer Rouge. Four months later, the same process was begun 
in the Northwestern Zone. The purges intensified following an abor- 
tive coup d'etat in August. 



65 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

After the fall of the capital, Ta Mok's lieutenant, a former high 
school teacher who assumed the name Mit (Comrade) Deuch, be- 
came head of the secret police, and established the Tuol Sleng in- 
terrogation and detention center on the site of a former Phnom 
Penh high school. In the 1975 to 1976 period, Tuol Sleng' s 
meticulous records show that 2,404 "antiparty elements" were tor- 
tured and executed. The terror escalated in 1977, when the num- 
ber of victims rose to 6,330. In the first six months of 1978, records 
show that 5,765 people were killed; records for the latter half of 
that year have not been discovered. The victims who passed through 
Tuol Sleng from mid- 1975 to January 1979 numbered about 
20,000. Among those who met death in the infamous prison were 
Paris alumni Hu Nim and (presumably) Hou Yuon. Similar centers 
were set up throughout the country (Tuol Sleng' s code designa- 
tion, S-21 , suggests that at least twenty other similar sites had been 
established). Molyda Szymusiak writes that a new wave of terror 
began in the Batdambang region after cadres arrived from the south. 
The Sala Som Niat, a school for political education was converted 
into an extermination center where local communists were tortured 
and executed. The pattern in these centers was much the same: 
victims were tortured, forced to write often absurd confessions, and 
then killed. A young British teacher, captured in a yacht off the 
Cambodian coast, confessed at Tuol Sleng that he had been 
recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United 
States when he was twelve years old; he was subsequently mur- 
dered. Hu Nim was forced to confess that he had become a CIA 
agent in 1957. 

The Eastern Zone apparently remained largely unaffected by 
the purge until May 1978, when So Phim led a revolt that pro- 
voked massive retaliation by Pol Pot and his Southwestern hench- 
men. In the bloodiest purge of the entire 1975 to 1978 period, as 
many as 100,000 people in the Eastern Zone — labeled people with 
"Khmer bodies but Vietnamese minds" — were liquidated or were 
deported to face certain death in other parts of the country. Most 
of the victims were political cadres, "new people," and Vietnamese 
or part- Vietnamese residents. So Phim reportedly committed sui- 
cide as he faced capture. Some of his subordinates, including Heng 
Samrin, the leader of the PRK after 1979, fled to Vietnam. 

The Fall of Democratic Kampuchea 

Immediately following the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975, there 
were skirmishes between their troops and Vietnamese forces. A 
number of incidents occurred in May 1975. The Cambodians 
launched attacks on the Vietnamese islands of Phu Quoc and Tho 



66 




67 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Chu and intruded into Vietnamese border provinces. In late May, 
at about the same time that the United States launched an air strike 
against the oil refinery at Kampong Saom, following the Mayaguez 
incident, Vietnamese forces seized the Cambodian island of Poulo 
Wai. The following month, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary visited Hanoi. 
They proposed a friendship treaty between the two countries, an 
idea that met with a cool reception from Vietnam's leaders. 
Although the Vietnamese evacuated Poulo Wai in August, inci- 
dents continued along Cambodian's northeastern border. At the 
instigation of the Phnom Penh regime, thousands of Vietnamese 
also were driven out of Cambodia. 

Relations between Cambodia and Vietnam improved in 1976, 
in part because of Pol Pot's preoccupation with intraparty 
challenges. In May Cambodian and Vietnamese representatives 
met in Phnom Penh in order to establish a commission to resolve 
border disagreements. The Vietnamese, however, refused to recog- 
nize the Brevie Line — the colonial-era demarcation of maritime 
borders between the two countries — and the negotiations broke 
down. In late September, however, a few days before Pol Pot was 
forced to resign as prime minister, air links were established be- 
tween Phnom Penh and Hanoi. 

With Pol Pot back in the forefront of the regime in 1977, the 
situation rapidly deteriorated. Incidents escalated along all of Cam- 
bodia's borders. Khmer Rouge forces attacked villages in the border 
areas of Thailand near Aranyaprathet. Brutal murders of Thai vil- 
lagers, including women and children, were the first widely reported 
concrete evidence of Khmer Rouge atrocities. There were also in- 
cidents along the Laotian border. At approximately the same time, 
villages in Vietnam's border areas underwent renewed attacks. In 
turn, Vietnam launched air strikes against Cambodia. In Septem- 
ber, border fighting resulted in as many as 1,000 Vietnamese 
civilian casualties. The following month, the Vietnamese counter- 
attacked in a campaign involving a force of 20,000 personnel. Viet- 
namese defense minister General Vo Nguyen Giap underestimated 
the tenacity of the Khmer Rouge, however, and was obliged to 
commit an additional 58,000 reinforcements in December. On 
January 6, 1978, Giap's forces began an orderly withdrawal from 
Cambodian territory. The Vietnamese apparently believed they 
had ''taught a lesson" to the Cambodians, but Pol Pot proclaimed 
this a "victory" even greater than that of April 17, 1975. 

Faced with growing Khmer Rouge belligerence, the Vietnamese 
leadership decided in early 1978 to support internal resistance to 
the Pol Pot regime, with the result that the Eastern Zone became 
a focus of insurrection. War hysteria reached bizarre levels within 



68 



Historical Setting 



Democratic Kampuchea. In May 1978, on the eve of So Phim's 
Eastern Zone uprising, Radio Phnom Penh declared that if each 
Cambodian soldier killed thirty Vietnamese, only 2 million troops 
would be needed to eliminate the entire Vietnamese population 
of 50 million. It appears that the leadership in Phnom Penh was 
seized with immense territorial ambitions, i.e., to recover the 
Mekong Delta region, which they regarded as Khmer territory. 

Massacres of ethnic Vietnamese and of their sympathizers by 
the Khmer Rouge intensified in the Eastern Zone after the May 
revolt. In November, Vorn Vet led an unsuccessful coup d'etat. 
There were now tens of thousands of Cambodian and Vietnamese 
exiles on Vietnamese territory. On December 3, 1978, Radio Hanoi 
announced the formation of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) National 
United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS— see Appendix B). 
This was a heterogeneous group of communist and noncommunist 
exiles who shared an antipathy to the Pol Pot regime and a virtu- 
ally total dependence on Vietnamese backing and protection. The 
KNUFNS provided the semblance, if not the reality, of legitimacy 
for Vietnam's invasion of Democratic Kampuchea and for its sub- 
sequent establishment of a satellite regime in Phnom Penh (see The 
Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia, ch. 5). 

In the meantime, as 1978 wore on, Cambodian bellicosity in 
the border areas surpassed Hanoi's threshold of tolerance. Viet- 
namese policy makers opted for a military solution and, on De- 
cember 22, Vietnam launched its offensive with the intent of 
overthrowing Democratic Kampuchea. An invasion force of 
120,000, consisting of combined armor and infantry units with 
strong artillery support, drove west into the level countryside of 
Cambodia's southeastern provinces. After a seventeen-day blitz- 
krieg, Phnom Penh fell to the advancing Vietnamese on January 
7, 1979. From new redoubts in the mountain and jungle fastness 
of Cambodia's periphery, Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge lead- 
ers regrouped their units, issued a new call to arms, and reignited 
a stubborn insurgency against the regime in power as they had done 
in the late 1960s. For the moment, however, the Vietnamese in- 
vasion had accomplished its purpose of deposing an unlamented 
and particularly loathsome dictatorship. A new administration 
under the mentorship of Hanoi was quickly established, and it set 
about competing, both domestically and internationally, with the 
Khmer Rouge as the legitimate government of Cambodia. Peace 
still eluded the war- ravaged nation, however, and although the in- 
surgency set in motion by the Khmer Rouge proved unable to topple 
the new Vietnamese-backed regime in Phnom Penh, it did nonethe- 
less keep the country in a permanent state of insecurity. The 



69 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

fledgling Khmer administration, weak and lacking in manpower 
and in resources, was propped up by a substantial Vietnamese mili- 
tary force and civilian advisory effort. As events in the 1980s 
progressed, the main preoccupations of the new regime were sur- 
vival, restoring the economy, and combating the Khmer Rouge 
insurgency by military and by political means. The fostering of 
activity to meet these imperatives and the building of institutions 
are described in subsequent chapters (see The People's Republic 
of Kampuchea, ch. 4; The Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia, 
ch. 5). 

* * * 

Probably the most definitive account of Cambodian history in 
English is David P. Chandler's^ History of Cambodia, which covers 
this subject from the earliest centuries to the attainment of indepen- 
dence. An earlier work, Martin Herz's A Short History of Cambodia 
from the Days of Angkor to the Present, is somewhat dated but contains 
highly specific material on the early Sihanouk years. The sections 
on Cambodia in D.G.E. Hall's classic, A History of South- East Asia, 
are also useful. Hall's parallel treatments of Vietnamese and Thai 
history provide interesting perspective. George Coedes' Angkor: An 
Introduction and The Making of South East Asia are informative on 
the ancient kingdoms. The former provides good descriptions of 
the monuments of Angkor, their architectural motifs, and their re- 
ligious significance. For an understanding of the rise of communism 
in Cambodia an essential source is Ben Kiernan's How Pol Pot Came 
to Power, 

William Shawcross's Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruc- 
tion of Cambodia is a critical account of United States involvement 
in the country before and during the years, 1970 to 1975, when 
Lon Nol was in power. Another perspective is provided by Henry 
Kissinger in White House Years and in Years of Upheaval. 

A large number of books have been written on the horrors of 
the Democratic Kampuchea period. Molyda Szymusiak's The Stones 
Cry Out is one of the most gripping. Others include Francois Pon- 
chaud's Cambodia: Year Zero and Sydney Schanberg's The Death and 
Life of Dith Pran. The film "The Killing Fields" is also based on 
the experiences in Cambodia during and after the war of Dith 
Pran — journalist Schanberg's cameraman in wartime Phnom Penh. 
Norodom Sihanouk's War and Hope provides another close-up. 
Useful scholarly treatments of the period include Craig Etcheson's 
perspective on the Khmer Rouge, The Rise and Demise of Demo- 
cratic Kampuchea; two collections of essays, Peasants and Politics in 



70 



Historical Setting 



Kampuchea, 1942-81, edited by Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua; 
and Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea, edited by David P. 
Chandler and Ben Kiernan. One well-reviewed account of life in 
Democratic Kampuchea and the transition to its successor regime 
is Elizabeth Becker's When the War Was Over; another account, 
equally well-regarded by critics, addressing the abiding enmity be- 
tween Cambodia and Vietnam is Nayan Chanda's Brother Enemy. 
Familiarity with both sources is essential for an understanding of 
what occurred in Cambodia after 1975. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



71 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Members of the ethnic Cham minority near Kampong Cham 



SINCE 1975 CAMBODIA has suffered through one of the most 
catastrophic periods in its long history. The takeover of the coun- 
try by the communist Khmer Rouge (see Appendix B) in 1975, 
its violent aftermath, and the constant warfare between communist 
and noncommunist factions has resulted in widespread and major 
changes in the Cambodian social fabric. The country was plunged 
into a dark age from which it was slowly emerging in the late 1980s. 

Under the Khmer Rouge, the entire social structure of the coun- 
try suffered radical and massive changes. An estimated 1 million 
to 2 million Cambodians died during the first three-and-one-half 
years of communist rule. Traditional family life was violently dis- 
rupted and virtually abolished between 1975 and 1979. Nuclear 
families — the most important units of Cambodian society — were 
broken up and were replaced with communal groupings. About 
97 percent of the population was forced into communal economic 
programs. Urban dwellers were driven into the countryside in mass 
marches that caused great suffering and many deaths. Rural soci- 
ety was reorganized into interfamilial units known as krom (groups). 
Urban Cambodians, ethnic minorities, and educated people suffered 
especially harsh treatment. The ethnic Chinese, because they were 
engaged extensively in small businesses and were mainly urban 
dwellers, were targets for communist persecution, as were the Cham 
(see Glossary), a prominent ethnic minority group. Educated people 
were special targets for extermination, and most of the teachers 
and physicians fled the country or were massacred. Those who 
showed evidence of Western influence, such as using the English 
language, were suspect. Although freedom of religion was guaran- 
teed in theory under the Khmer Rouge, in fact Buddhism and other 
religions were repressed ruthlessly. Temples were destroyed or put 
to secular uses, and monks were defrocked and forced do manual 
labor. 

The Vietnamese invasion in December 1978 ameliorated the sit- 
uation somewhat. As a result of the invasion, the Khmer Rouge 
government of Democratic Kampuchea was overthrown, and the 
People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK — see Appendix B) under 
Heng Samrin was installed in 1979. The PRK allowed consider- 
ably more freedom than had its predecessor. In the late 1980s, 
Marxist-Leninist socialism as it existed in Vietnam was the goal 
of the PRK government in Phnom Penh. The regime was not 
pushing hard to convert the country, but was planning a gradual 



75 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

conversion instead. Religions were allowed to function. The govern- 
ment allowed Buddhist monks to return to their temples, although 
narrow limits were placed on those who could become monks and 
on aspects of ritual. The education system, which had suffered 
almost total destruction under the Khmer Rouge, was reconstituted, 
and the number of students attending formal classes rose dramati- 
cally in the early 1980s. The public health service was functioning 
again in the mid-1980s, and modern medical services were avail- 
able although trained medical personnel and some medicines con- 
tinued to be in short supply. The shortage of medical personnel 
was partially filled by foreign doctors and technicians. The PRK 
did not neglect to court ethnic minorities. Members of one of the 
Khmer Loeu (or highland Khmer) tribal minorities were made lead- 
ers in several northeastern provinces, and members of the Cham 
minority served in the central government. 

Environment 

Cambodia covers 181,040 square kilometers in the southwestern 
part of the Indochina peninsula. It lies completely within the tropics; 
its southernmost points are only slightly more than 10° above the 
equator. Roughly square in shape, the country is bounded on the 
north by Thailand and by Laos, on the east and southeast by Viet- 
nam, and on the west by the Gulf of Thailand and by Thailand. 
Much of the country's area consists of rolling plains. Dominant 
features are the large, almost centrally located, Tonle Sap (Great 
Lake) and the Mekong River, which traverses the country from 
north to south. 

The climate is monsoonal and has marked wet and dry seasons 
of relatively equal length. Both temperature and humidity gener- 
ally are high throughout the year. Forest covers about two-thirds 
of the country, but it has been somewhat degraded in the more 
readily accessible areas by a method called slash-and-burn agri- 
culture. 

Topography 

Cambodia falls within several well-defined geographic regions. 
The largest part of the country — about 75 percent of the total — 
consists of the Tonle Sap Basin and the Mekong Lowlands. To 
the southeast of this great basin is the Mekong Delta, which ex- 
tends through Vietnam to the South China Sea. The basin and 
delta regions are rimmed with mountain ranges to the southwest 
(the Cardamom Mountains, the Elephant Range) and to the north 
(Dangrek Mountains). Higher land to the northeast and to the east 
merges into the Central Highlands of southern Vietnam (see fig. 4). 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Tonle Sap Basin-Mekong Lowlands region consists chiefly 
of plains with elevations generally of less than 100 meters. As the 
elevation increases, the terrain becomes more rolling and dissected. 

The Cardamom Mountains in the southwest, oriented generally 
in a northwest- southeast direction, rise to more than 1 ,500 meters. 
The highest mountain in Cambodia — Phnom Aural, at 1,771 
meters — is in the eastern part of this range. The Elephant Range, 
an extension running toward the south and the southeast from the 
Cardamom Mountains, rises to elevations of between 500 and 1,000 
meters. These two ranges are bordered on the west by a narrow 
coastal plain that contains Kampong Saom Bay, which faces the 
Gulf of Thailand. This area was largely isolated until the opening 
of the port of Kampong Saom (formerly called Sihanoukville) and 
the construction of a road and railroad connecting Kampong Saom, 
Kampot, Takev, and Phnom Penh in the 1960s. 

The Dangrek Mountains at the northern rim of the Tonle Sap 
Basin consist of a steep escarpment with an average elevation of 
about 500 meters, the highest points of which reach more than 700 
meters. The escarpment faces southward and is the southern edge 
of the Korat Plateau in Thailand. The watershed along the escarp- 
ment marks the boundary between Thailand and Cambodia. The 
main road through a pass in the Dangrek Mountains at O Smach 
connects northwestern Cambodia with Thailand. Despite this road 
and those running through a few other passes, in general the escarp- 
ment impedes easy communication between the two countries. Be- 
tween the western part of the Dangrek and the northern part of 
the Cardamom ranges, however, lies an extension of the Tonle Sap 
Basin that merges into lowlands in Thailand, which allows easy 
access from the border to Bangkok. 

The Mekong Valley, which offers a communication route be- 
tween Cambodia and Laos, separates the eastern end of the Dan- 
grek Mountains and the northeastern highlands. To the southeast, 
the basin joins the Mekong Delta, which, extending into Vietnam, 
provides both water and land communications between the two 
countries. 

Climate 

Cambodia's climate — like that of the rest of Southeast Asia — is 
dominated by the monsoons, which are known as tropical wet and 
dry because of the distinctiy marked seasonal differences. The mon- 
soonal airflows are caused by annual alternating high pressure and 
low pressure over the Central Asian landmass. In summer, 
moisture-laden air — the southwest monsoon — is drawn landward 
from the Indian Ocean. The flow is reversed during the winter, 



79 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

and the northeast monsoon sends back dry air. The southwest mon- 
soon brings the rainy season from mid-May to mid-September or 
to early October, and the northeast monsoon flow of drier and cooler 
air lasts from early November to March. The southern third of 
the country has a two-month dry season; the northern two- thirds, 
a four-month one. Short transitional periods, which are marked 
by some difference in humidity but by little change in tempera- 
ture, intervene between the alternating seasons. Temperatures are 
fairly uniform throughout the Tonle Sap Basin area, with only small 
variations from the average annual mean of around 25°C. The 
maximum mean is about 28°C; the minimum mean, about 22°C. 
Maximum temperatures of higher than 32 °C, however, are com- 
mon and, just before the start of the rainy season, they may rise 
to more than 38°C. Minimum temperatures rarely fall below 
10°C. January is the coldest month, and April is the warmest. 
Typhoons — tropical cyclones — that often devastate coastal Viet- 
nam rarely cause damage in Cambodia (see fig. 5). 

The total annual rainfall average is between 100 and 150 cen- 
timeters, and the heaviest amounts fall in the southeast. Rainfall 
from April to September in the Tonle Sap Basin-Mekong Lowlands 
area averages 130 to 190 centimeters annually, but the amount 
varies considerably from year to year. Rainfall around the basin 
increases with elevation. It is heaviest in the mountains along the 
coast in the southwest, which receive from 250 to more than 500 
centimeters of precipitation annually as the southwest monsoon 
reaches the coast. This area of greatest rainfall, however, drains 
mostly to the sea; only a small quantity goes into the rivers flow- 
ing into the basin. The relative humidity is high at night through- 
out the year; usually it exceeds 90 percent. During the daytime 
in the dry season, humidity averages about 50 percent or slightly 
lower, but it may remain about 60 percent in the rainy period. 

Drainage 

Except for the smaller rivers in the southeast, most of the major 
rivers and river systems in Cambodia drain into the Tonle Sap or 
into the Mekong River. The Cardamom Mountains and Elephant 
Range form a separate drainage divide. To the east the rivers flow 
into the Tonle Sap, while on the west they flow into the Gulf of 
Thailand. Toward the southern end of the Elephant Mountains, 
however, because of the topography, some small rivers flow south- 
ward on the eastern side of the divide. 

The Mekong River in Cambodia flows southward from the 
Cambodia-Laos border to a point below Kracheh city, where it 
turns west for about 50 kilometers and then turns southwest to 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



Phnom Penh. Extensive rapids run above Kracheh city. From Kam- 
pong Cham the gradient slopes very gently, and inundation of areas 
along the river occurs at flood stage — June through November — 
through breaks in the natural levees that have built up along its 
course. At Phnom Penh four major water courses meet at a point 
called the Chattomukh (Four Faces). The Mekong River flows in 
from the northeast and the Tonle Sab — a river emanating from 
the Tonle Sap — flows in from the northwest. They divide into two 
parallel channels, the Mekong River proper and the Basak River, 
and flow independently through the delta areas of Cambodia and 
Vietnam to the South China Sea. 

The flow of water into the Tonle Sab is seasonal. In September 
or in October, the flow of the Mekong River, fed by monsoon rains, 
increases to a point where its outlets through the delta cannot handle 
the enormous volume of water. At this point, the water pushes 
northward up the Tonle Sab and empties into the Tonle Sap, 
thereby increasing the size of the lake from about 2,590 square 
kilometers to about 24,605 square kilometers at the height of the 
flooding (see fig. 6). After the Mekong's waters crest — when its 
downstream channels can handle the volume of water — the flow 
reverses, and water flows out of the engorged lake. 

As the level of the Tonle Sap retreats, it deposits a new layer 
of sediment. The annual flooding, combined with poor drainage 
immediately around the lake, transforms the surrounding area into 
marshlands unusable for agricultural purposes during the dry sea- 
son. The sediment deposited into the lake during the Mekong's 
flood stage appears to be greater than the quantity carried away 
later by the Tonle Sab River. Gradual silting of the lake would 
seem to be occurring; during low- water level, it is only about 1.5 
meters deep, while at flood stage it is between 10 and 15 meters 
deep. 

Regional Divisions 

Cambodia's boundaries in 1987 were for the most part based 
upon those recognized by France and by neighboring countries dur- 
ing the colonial period. The 800-kilometer boundary with Thailand, 
coincides with a natural feature, the watershed of the Dangrek 
Mountains, only in its northern sector. The 541 -kilometer border 
with Laos and the 1,228-kilometer border with Vietnam result 
largely from French administrative decisions and do not follow 
major natural features. Border disputes have broken out in the past 
between Cambodia and Thailand as well as between, Cambodia 
and Vietnam. 



81 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



106° 



National Capital 



50 100 KILOMETERS 
I i i L_ 



50 



n 

100 MILES 



Figures represent annual rainfall in centimeters. 




106° 



Figure 5. Annual Rainfall and Monsoon Airflow 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



Population 

Between 1874 and 1921, the total population increased from 
about 946,000 to 2.4 million. By 1950 it had increased to between 
3,710,107 and 4,073,967, and in 1962 it had reached 5.7 million. 
From the 1960s until 1975, the population of Cambodia increased 
by about 2.2 percent yearly, the lowest increase in Southeast Asia. 
By 1975 when the Khmer Rouge took power, it was estimated at 
7.3 million. Of this total an estimated one million to two million 
reportedly died between 1975 and 1978. In 1981 the PRK gave 
the official population figure as nearly 6.7 million, although approxi- 
mately 6.3 million to 6.4 million is probably a more accurate one. 
The average annual rate of population growth from 1978 to 1985 
was 2.3 percent (see table 2, Appendix A). Life expectancy at birth 
was 44.2 years for males and 43.3 years for females in 1959. By 
1970 life expectancy had increased by about 2.5 years since 1945. 
The greater longevity for females apparentiy reflected improved 
health practices during maternity and childbirth. 

In 1959 about 45 percent of the population was under 15 years 
of age; by 1962 this figure had increased slightly to 46 percent. 
In 1962 an estimated 52 percent of the population was between 
15 and 64 years of age, while 2 percent was older than 65. The 
percentage of males and females in the three groups was almost 
the same. 

The population of Cambodia has been fairly homogeneous. In 
1962 about 80 percent of the population was ethnic Khmer. The 
remaining 20 percent included Chinese, Vietnamese, Cham, 
Khmer Loeu (see Appendix B), Europeans. By 1981 as a result 
of the Vietnamese repatriation in 1970 to 1971 and the deaths and 
emigration of large numbers of Cham and Chinese, ethnic Khmer 
accounted for about 90 percent or more of the population. 

Dynamics 

Rapid and drastic population movements occurred in the early 
1970s, when large numbers of rural Cambodians fled to the cities 
to escape the fighting in the countryside, and between 1975 and 
1979, when the government forcibly relocated urban dwellers to 
rural sites throughout the country. Large scale emigration also 
occurred between 1975 and 1979. 

Distribution 

Population density varies throughout Cambodia. The national 
average in 1972 was about 22 persons per square kilometer. At 
one end of the density scale were the provinces around Phnom Penh, 



83 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



Batdambang; 



PHNOM PENH 



Kampong Saom 



"9 



Gulf of Thailand 



International boundary 

® National capital 
• Populated place 
Area of generalized 
flooding 
25 50 Kilo meters 
6 "25 50 Miles 



V 



South 
China Sea 



Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 6. Annual Flooding Around Tonle Sap, 1985 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



where the number of inhabitants per square kilometer could reach 
as many as 500, but more generally varied between 200 and 500. 
At the lower end of the scale were outlying provinces, like 
Rotanokiri (Ratanakiri) and Mondol Kiri (Mondolkiri) in the north- 
east and Kaoh Kong in the southwest, where the density was as 
low as zero to five persons per square kilometer. For almost two- 
thirds of the country, the density was approximately five persons 
per square kilometer (see table 3, Appendix A). 

Ethnic Khmer were concentrated in central and in southeastern 
Cambodia. The Cham lived in their own towns and sections in 
larger cities. The Chinese lived mainly in urban centers; in Phnom 
Penh they were concentrated around the markets. The Vietnamese 
tended to live in their own villages and in certain sections of Phnom 
Penh. The Khmer Loeu were concentrated in the northeastern and 
southwestern areas of Cambodia. 

Migration and Refugees 

Over the decades, some movement of the rural population in 
Cambodia — either to urban areas in quest of employment or to 
other villages in search of more favorable agricultural sites — has 
been customary. Many highland tribal groups practice slash-and- 
burn agriculture that requires movement to a new area once the 
soil is exhausted in a given location. Warfare in the early 1970s 
drove large numbers of rural people to the cities in search of safety. 
The population of Phnom Penh, for example, increased from 
393,995 in 1962 to about 1.2 miUion in 1971, but had decreased 
to about 500,000 by 1985. With their takeover in April 1975, the 
Khmer Rouge forced most of the population out of Phnom Penh 
into the countryside, where large numbers either died because of 
hardship or were executed. Many such population movements were 
forced upon the populace under the Khmer Rouge regime. Many 
Cambodians who had left the country to study abroad became de 
facto emigrants when the communists took over. Thousands more 
fled into neighboring Thailand and Vietnam in 1975 and at the 
time of the Vietnamese invasion in late 1978. Cham, Vietnamese, 
and Chinese communities alike were persecuted, and their mem- 
bers were killed, under the Khmer Rouge. Forced repatriation in 
1970 and deaths during the Khmer Rouge era reduced the Viet- 
namese population in Cambodia from between 250,000 and 300,000 
in 1969 to a reported 56,000 in 1984. Postwar emigration of Viet- 
namese civilians to Cambodia remained a subject of controversy. 
Some social scientists believed that the number of Vietnamese in 
Cambodia in 1988 had reached at least the prewar level, and, 



85 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

indeed, many Khmer feared that even more Vietnamese immi- 
grants would inundate their population. 

During the Khmer Rouge era, about 50,000 Cambodians fled 
to Thailand, and an estimated 150,000 fled to Vietnam. As soon 
as the Khmer Rouge regime began to crumble under the onslaught 
of the Vietnamese in late 1978, a massive exodus of Cambodians 
began. About 630,000 — braving hostile fire, minefields, bandits, 
and border guards — left the country between 1979 and 1981. In 
subsequent years, about 208,000 resettled in other countries; these 
included 136,000 in the United States, 32,000 in France, and 13,000 
each in Australia and in Canada. 

In late 1987, about 265,000 Cambodians— about 150,000 of them 
below the age of 15 — remained in Thailand. The Khmer refugees 
were supported by the United Nations Border Relief Operation 
(which assumed the task from the United Nations High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees in the early 1980s) and private agencies at an 
annual cost of US$36 million in 1986. The refugees were grouped 
in nine camps on the Thailand side of that country's common 
border with Cambodia. Of the nine installations, the most promi- 
nent was Khao-I-Dang, located near Aranyaprathet, Prachin Buri 
Province, Thailand. It was controlled by the Thai military, and 
its inhabitants were the only ones to be regarded legally as refu- 
gees by the Thai government. In 1987 Khao-I-Dang had a popu- 
lation of about 21,000 to 25,000 (down from a peak of 130,000 
at its founding in 1979), of whom about 12,000 to 15,000 were 
eligible for resettlement. 

The other eight camps were under the control of the three Khmer 
resistance factions (see Coalition Government of Democratic Kam- 
puchea, ch. 4; Coalition Government Resistance Forces, ch. 5). 
These camps were considered reception centers rather than bona 
fide refugee facilities by the Thai government, and their inmates, 
unlike the residents of Khao-I-Dang, were considered displaced 
persons rather than refugees. Of these eight installations, five were 
controlled by the Khmer Rouge; two, by the Khmer People's 
National Liberation Front (KPNLF — see Appendix B); and one, 
by the Sihanouk National Army (Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste — 
ANS — see Appendix B). Khmer insurgents freely visited the camps 
controlled by their own resistance factions and used them as rest 
and recuperation centers. 

The Khmer Rouge camps sheltered between 50,000 and 60,000 
inhabitants. Access to them was granted grudgingly, if at all, even 
to United Nations officials. Occasional visiting journalists reported 
in the 1980s that an atmosphere of repression and fear prevailed 
at these facilities. The largest Khmer Rouge installation, located 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



on the southwestern part of the border between Cambodia and 
Thailand, was known as Site 8 and held about 30,000 persons. 
Smaller installations, inhabited by 20,000 or more people altogether, 
were reported at Na Trao and Huay Chan, in Sisaket Province, 
Thailand, and at the seldom- visited encampments of Borai and in 
Ta Luen, Trat Province, Thailand. 

The KPNLF controlled two camps containing a total of about 
160,000 persons. The principal installation was Site 2, with a popu- 
lation of between 145,000 and 150,000 and an environment noted 
for its rampant lawlessness. Site 2 was located in the vicinity of 
Ta Phraya, Prachin Buri Province, Thailand, and, at one time in 
the early 1980s, held the largest concentration Cambodians out- 
side of Phnom Penh. 

The lone camp controlled by the ANS was Site B, also known 
as "Green Hill," which was located about 50 kilometers north of 
Ta Phraya and had a population of between 40,000 and 50,000. 
Site B was considered by observers to be the most orderly and well- 
managed of the refugee camps; it offered more living space, in- 
cluding room for personal gardens, than did the others. 

Social Structure and Organization 

The ethnic groups that constitute Cambodian society possess a 
number of economic and demographic commonalities — for exam- 
ple, Chinese merchants play middlemen in many economic cycles, 
but they also preserve differences in their social and cultural insti- 
tutions. The major differences among these groups lie in social 
organization, language, and religion. The majority of the inhabi- 
tants of Cambodia are settled in fairly permanent villages near the 
major bodies of water in the Tonle Sap Basin-Mekong Lowlands 
region. The contemporary locations of major Khmer population 
centers date back to antiquity according to geographer Jacques 
Nepote. He points out that contemporary Khmer Krom (see 
Appendix B) settlements are located in the same areas as the an- 
cient site of Funan, and that the Khmer setdements extending from 
Phnom Penh in a southeastern direction are located where pre- 
Angkorian archaeological sites are clustered (see Prehistory and 
Early Kingdoms, ch. 1). The Khmer Loeu live in widely scattered 
villages that are abandoned when the cultivated land in the vicin- 
ity is exhausted. 

The permanently settled Khmer and Cham villages usually are 
located on or near the banks of a river or other bodies of water. 
Cham villages usually are made up almost entirely of Cham, but 
Khmer villages, especially in central and in southeastern Cambo- 
dia, typically include sizable Chinese communities. In his study 



87 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

of the coastal Chinese in Kampot Province and in Kaoh Kong 
Province, French geographer Roland Pourtier points out that the 
Chinese dwellings and shops — usually in the same structures — 
are located at the center of the town or village, while the Khmer 
houses are scattered at some distance from the center. He also finds 
that there are some villages made up almost entirely of Chinese. 

The Khmer 

Household and Family Structure 

In the late 1980s, the nuclear family, consisting of a husband 
and a wife and their unmarried children, probably continued to 
be the most important kin group within Khmer society. The fam- 
ily is the major unit of both production and consumption. Within 
this unit are the strongest emotional ties, the assurance of aid in 
the event of trouble, economic cooperation in labor, sharing of 
produce and income, and contribution as a unit to ceremonial 
obligations. A larger grouping, the personal kindred that includes 
a nuclear family with the children, grandchildren, grandparents, 
uncles, aunts, first cousins, nephews, and nieces, may be included 
in the household. Family organization is weak, and ties between 
related families beyond the kindred are loosely defined at best. There 
is no tradition of family names, although the French tried to legis- 
late their use in the early twentieth century. Most Khmer geneal- 
ogies extend back only two or three generations, which contrasts 
with the veneration of ancestors by the Vietnamese and by the 
Chinese. Noble families and royal families, some of which can trace 
their descent for several generations, are exceptions. 

The individual Khmer is surrounded by a small inner circle of 
family and friends who constitute his or her closest associates, those 
he would approach first for help. In rural communities, neigh- 
bors — who are often also kin — may be important, too, and much 
of housebuilding and other heavy labor intensive tasks are per- 
formed by groups of neighbors. Beyond this close circle are more 
distant relatives and casual friends. In rural Cambodia, the stron- 
gest ties a Khmer may develop — besides those to the nuclear family 
and to close friends — are those to other members of the local com- 
munity. A strong feeling of pride — for the village, for the district, 
and province — usually characterizes Cambodian community life. 
There is much sharing of religious life through the local Buddhist 
temple, and there are many cross-cutting kin relations within the 
community. Formerly, the Buddhist priesthood, the national armed 
forces, and, to a lesser extent, the civil service all served to con- 
nect the Khmer to the wider national community. The priesthood 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



served only males, however, while membership in some compo- 
nents of the armed forces and in the civil service was open to women 
as well. 

Two fictive relationships in Cambodia transcend kinship bound- 
aries and serve to strengthen interpersonal and interfamily ties. 
A Khmer may establish a fictive child-parent or sibling relation- 
ship called thoa (roughly translating as adoptive parent or sibling). 
The person desiring to establish the thoa relationship will ask the 
other person for permission to enter into the relationship. The thoa 
relationship may become as close as the participants desire. The 
second fictive relationship is that of kloeu (close male friend). This 
is similar, in many ways, to becoming a blood brother. A person 
from one place may ask a go-between in another place to help him 
establish a kloeu relationship with someone in that place. Once the 
participants agree, a ceremony is held that includes ritual drink- 
ing of water into which small amounts of the participants' blood 
have been mixed and bullets and knives have been dipped; pray- 
ers are also recited by an achar (or ceremonial leader) before wit- 
nesses. The kloeu relationship is much stronger than the thoa. One 
kloeu will use the same kinship terms when addressing his kloeu 's 
parents and siblings as he would when addressing his own. The 
two friends can call upon each other for any kind of help at any 
time. The kloeu relationship apparently is limited to some rural parts 
of Cambodia and to Khmer-speaking areas in Thailand. As of the 
late 1980s, it may have become obsolete. The female equivalent 
of kloeu is mreak. 

Legally, the husband is the head of the Khmer family, but the 
wife has considerable authority, especially in family economics. The 
husband is responsible for providing shelter and food for his fam- 
ily; the wife is generally in charge of the family budget, and she 
serves as the major ethical and religious model for the children, 
especially the daughters. In rural areas, the male is mainly respon- 
sible for such activities as plowing and harrowing the rice paddies, 
threshing rice, collecting sugar palm juice, caring for cattle, car- 
pentry, and buying and selling cows and chickens. Women are 
mainly responsible for pulling and transplanting rice seedlings, har- 
vesting and winnowing rice, tending gardens, making sugar, weav- 
ing, and caring for the household money. Both males and females 
may work at preparing the rice paddies for planting, tending the 
paddies, and buying and selling land. 

Ownership of property among the rural Khmer was vested in 
the nuclear family. Descent and inheritance is bilateral. Legal chil- 
dren might inherit equally from their parents. The division of 
property was theoretically equal among siblings, but in practice 



89 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

the oldest child might inherit more. Each of the spouses might bring 
inherited land into the family, and the family might acquire joint 
land during the married life of the couple. Each spouse was free 
to dispose of his or her land as he or she chose. A will was usually 
oral, although a written one was preferred. 

Private ownership of land was abolished by the Khmer Rouge 
in the 1970s. Such ownership is also not recognized by the PRK 
government, which for example, refused to support former owners 
when they returned and found others living on and working their 
land. Some peasants were able to remain on their own land dur- 
ing the Khmer Rouge era, however, and generally they were al- 
lowed to continue to work the land as if it were their own property. 
In 1987 the future of private ownership of land remained in doubt. 
According to Cambodia. scholar Michael Vickery, the PRK govern- 
ment planned to collectivize in three stages. The first stage involved 
allotting land to families at the beginning of the season and allow- 
ing the cultivators to keep the harvest. The second stage involved 
allotting land to each family according to the number of members. 
The families in the interfamily units known as solidarity groups 
(krom samaki) were to work to prepare the fields, but subsequently 
each family was responsible for the upkeep of its own parcel of land. 
At this stage, each family could dispose of its own produce. In the 
final stage, all labor was to be performed in common, and at the 
end of the season any remuneration was distributed according to 
a work point system. Livestock at this stage would still belong to 
the family. By 1984 the first stage groups accounted for 35 per- 
cent of the rural population, but the third level accounted for only 
10 percent of the farms (see Agriculture, ch. 3). 

Housing 

The nuclear family, in rural Cambodia, typically lives in a rect- 
angular house that may vary in size from four by six meters to 
six by ten meters. It is constructed of a wooden frame with gabled 
thatch roof and walls of woven bamboo. Khmer houses typically 
are raised on stilts as much as three meters for protection from an- 
nual floods. Two ladders or wooden staircases provide access to 
the house. The steep thatch roof overhanging the house walls pro- 
tects the interior from rain. Typically a house contains three rooms 
separated by partitions of woven bamboo. The front room serves 
as a living room used to receive visitors, the next room is the par- 
ents' bedroom, and the third is for unmarried daughters. Sons sleep 
anywhere they can find space. Family members and neighbors work 
together to build the house, and a house-raising ceremony is held 
upon its completion. The houses of poorer persons may contain 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



only a single large room. Food is prepared in a separate kitchen 
located near the house but usually behind it. Toilet facilities con- 
sist of simple pits in the ground, located away from the house, that 
are covered up when filled. Any livestock is kept below the house. 

Chinese and Vietnamese houses in Cambodian town and vil- 
lages typically are built directly on the ground and have earthen, 
cement, or tile floors, depending upon the economic status of the 
owner. Urban housing and commercial buildings may be of brick, 
masonry, or wood. 

Diet 

Dietary habits appear to be basically the same among the Khmer 
and other ethnic groups, although the Muslim Cham do not eat 
pork. The basic foods are rice — in several varieties, fish, and vegeta- 
bles, especially trakuon (water convolvulus). Rice may be less 
thoroughly milled than it is in many other rice-eating countries, 
and consequently it contains more vitamins and roughage. The 
average rice consumption per person per day before 1970 was almost 
one-half kilogram. Fermented fish in the form of sauce or of paste 
are important protein supplements to the diet. Hot peppers, lemon 
grass, mint, and ginger add flavor to many Khmer dishes; sugar 
is added to many foods. Several kinds of noodles are eaten. The 
basic diet is supplemented by vegetables and by fruits — bananas, 
mangoes, papayas, rambutan, and palm fruit — both wild and cul- 
tivated, which grow abundandy throughout the country. Beef, pork, 
poultry, and eggs are added to meals on special occasions, or, if 
the family can afford it, daily. In the cities, the diet has been af- 
fected by many Western items of food. French, Chinese, Viet- 
namese, and Indian cuisine were available in Phnom Penh in 
pre-Khmer Rouge days. 

Rural Khmer typically eat several times a day; the first meal 
consists of a piece of fruit or cake, which workers eat after arriving 
at the fields. The first full meal is at about 9:00 or 10:00 in the 
morning; it is prepared by the wife or daughter and brought to 
the man in the field. Workers eat a large meal at about noon in 
the field and then have supper with their families after returning 
home around 5:00 P.M. 

Before the early 1970s, the Cambodian people produced a food 
supply that provided an adequate diet, although children gave evi- 
dence of caloric underconsumption and of a deficiency in B vita- 
mins. During the Khmer Rouge era, malnutrition increased, 
especially among the people who were identified as "new people" 
by the authorities (see Society under the Angkar, ch. 1). Collec- 
tive meals were introduced by 1977. Food rations for the new people 



91 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

were meager. Refugees' statements contain the following descrip- 
tions: ' 1 [daily rations of] a tin of boiled rice a day mixed with . . . 
sauce"; "we ate twice a day, boiled soup and rice only"; "one 
tin of rice a day shared between three people. Never any meat or 
fruit"; "Ration was two tins of rice between four persons per day 
with fish sauce. " People were reduced to eating anything they could 
find — insects, small mammals, arachnids, crabs, and plants. 

The food situation improved under the PRK, although in the 
regime's early years there were still serious food shortages. Inter- 
national food donations improved the situation somewhat. In 1980 
monthly rice rations distributed by the government averaged only 
one to two kilograms per person. People supplemented the ration 
by growing secondary crops such as corn and potatoes, by fishing, 
by gathering fruit and vegetables, and by collecting crabs and other 
edible animals. A 1984 estimate reported that as many as 50 per- 
cent of all young people in Cambodia were undernourished. 

Dress 

The traditional Khmer costume consisted of a shirt or blouse 
and a skirt-like lower garment — sampot for women and sarong for 
men, a tube- shaped garment about a meter wide and as much as 
three meters in circumference. Made of cotton or of silk in many 
different styles and patterns, it is pulled on over the legs and fastened 
around the waist. On ceremonial occasions, elegant sampot and 
sarong, embroidered with gold or silver threads, may be worn with 
a long piece of material gathered at the waist, passed between the 
legs, and tucked into the waistband in back. Members of the urban 
middle and upper classes may wear Western- style clothing at work 
and more traditional clothing at home. 

At home both sexes wear the sampot and the sarong. In rural 
areas, working men and women may wear loose-fitting pants and 
shirts or blouses. Many men wear Western- style pants or shorts. 
A third essential part of Khmer dress is the krama, or long scarf, 
that is worn around the neck, over the shoulders, or wrapped 
turban- style around the head. School children wear Western- style 
clothing to school. The boys wear shirts and shorts; the girls wear 
skirts and blouses. 

The Khmer Rouge were noted for their unisex black "pajamas." 
Their typical garb was the peasant outfit of collarless black shirt — 
baggy trousers and checkered krama (a scarf knotted loosely about 
the neck). French anthropologist Marie Alexandrine Martin re- 
ported that the wearing of brightly colored clothing was prohibited 
under the Khmer Rouge and that women, young and old, wore 
black, dark blue, or maroon sampot with short-sleeved plain blouses. 



92 




93 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Women were forbidden to wear Western-style pants at any time. 
The conical hat characteristic of the Vietnamese has been adopted 
to a certain extent by Khmer in the provinces adjacent to Vietnam. 

Families 

The birth of a child is a happy event for the family. According 
to traditional beliefs, however, confinement and childbirth expose 
the family, and especially the mother and the child to harm from 
the spirit world. A woman who dies in childbirth — crosses the river 
(chhlong tonle) in Khmer — is believed to become an evil spirit. In 
traditional Khmer society, a pregnant woman respects a number 
of food taboos and avoids certain situations. These traditions remain 
in practice in rural Cambodia, but they have become weakened 
in urban areas. 

No extensive information exists on birth control or on the use 
of contraceptives in Cambodia. Before the Khmer Rouge takeover, 
no organizations in Cambodia were known to be concerned with 
family planning. Traditional Khmer families were normally smaller 
than Chinese or Vietnamese families; the desired number of chil- 
dren was five. Reports suggest that several methods of contracep- 
tion are currently available in Cambodia and that these are practiced 
in the PRK (see Public Health, this ch.). A recent study of Cam- 
bodian women in France reported that 91 percent of the sample 
wished to use some method of birth control and that 74 percent 
knew of at least one method. The most common methods used in 
that group were the oral contraceptive pill and some form of sterili- 
zation. It is not known to what extent the attitudes of this group 
reflect those of Cambodian women in general. 

A Cambodian child may be nursed until he or she is between 
two and four years of age. Up to the age of three or four, the child 
is given considerable physical affection and freedom. There is lit- 
tle corporal punishment. After reaching the age of about four, chil- 
dren are expected to feed and bathe themselves and to control their 
bowel functions. Children around five years of age also may be 
expected to help look after younger siblings. Children's games em- 
phasize socialization or skill rather than winning and losing. 

Most children begin school when they are seven or eight. By 
the time they reach this age, they are familiar with the society's 
norms of politeness, obedience, and respect toward their elders and 
toward Buddhist monks. The father at this time begins his perma- 
nent retreat into a relatively remote, authoritarian role. By age ten, 
a girl is expected to help her mother in basic household tasks; a 
boy knows how to care for the family's livestock and can do farm 
work under the supervision of older males. 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



In precommunist days, parents exerted complete authority over 
their children until the children were married, and the parents con- 
tinued to maintain some control well into the marriage. Punish- 
ment was meted out sparingly, but it might have involved physical 
contact. Age difference was strictly recognized. The proper polite 
vocabulary was used in the precommunist period, and special 
generational terms for "you" continued to be used in the late 1980s. 
Younger speakers had to show respect to older people, including 
siblings, even if their ages differed by only a few minutes. 

Between the ages of seven and nineteen, but most commonly 
between the ages of eleven and nineteen, a boy may become a tem- 
ple servant and go on to serve a time as a novice monk. Having 
a son chosen for such a position is a great honor for the parents, 
and earns the individual son much merit (see Religion, this ch.). 

Formerly, and perhaps still in some rural areas, a ceremony 
marked the entrance of a girl into puberty. Upon the onset of men- 
struation, a girl would participate in a ritual called chol mlup (enter- 
ing the shadow). Certain foods were taboo at this time, and she 
would be isolated from her family for a period of a few days to 
six months. After the period of seclusion, she was considered mar- 
riageable. 

Adolescent children usually play with members of the same sex. 
The main exception to this occurs during festivals, especially hap- 
py ones such as the New Year Festival, when boys and girls take 
part in group games. Young people then have the opportunity to 
begin looking for future mates. Virginity is highly valued in brides, 
and premarital sex is deplored. The girl who becomes pregnant 
out of wedlock brings shame to her family. 

The choice of a spouse is a complex one for the young male, 
and it may involve not only his parents and his friends, as well 
as those of the young woman, but also a matchmaker. A young 
man can decide on a likely spouse on his own and then ask his 
parents to arrange the marriage negotiations, or the young per- 
son's parents may make the choice of spouse, giving the child lit- 
tle to say in the selection. In theory, a girl may veto the spouse 
her parents have chosen. 

Courtship patterns differ between rural and urban Khmer. Atti- 
tudes in the larger cities have been influenced by Western ideas 
of romantic love that do not apply in the countryside. A man usually 
marries between the ages of nineteen and twenty-five, a girl be- 
tween the ages of sixteen and twenty-two. Marriage between close 
blood relatives is forbidden. After a spouse has been selected, a 
go-between meets with the parents and broaches the subject of mar- 
riage. Then each family investigates the other to make sure its child 



95 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

is marrying into a good family. When both sides agree to the mar- 
riage and presents have been exchanged and accepted, the fami- 
lies consult an achar to set the wedding date. In rural areas, there 
is a form of bride- service; that is, the young man may take a vow 
to serve his prospective father-in-law for a period of time. 

The traditional wedding is a long and colorful affair. Formerly 
it lasted three days, but in the 1980s it more commonly lasted a 
day and a half. The ceremony begins in the morning at the home 
of the bride and is directed by the achar. Buddhist priests offer a 
short sermon and recite prayers of blessing. Parts of the ceremony 
involve ritual hair cutting, tying cotton threads soaked in holy water 
around the bride's and groom's wrists, and passing a candle around 
a circle of happily married and respected couples to bless the union. 
After the wedding, a banquet is held. In the city, the banquet is 
held at a restaurant; in the country, it is held in a temporary shelter 
and is prepared by the two families. Newlyweds traditionally move 
in with the wife's parents and may live with them up to a year, 
until they can build a new house nearby. These patterns changed 
drastically under the communists. The Khmer Rouge divided fami- 
lies and separated the men from the women. The father, mother, 
and children frequently were separated for many months. A man 
and woman often did not have time to consummate a marriage, 
and sexual relations were limited by long separations. Extramari- 
tal relations and even flirtations between young people were heav- 
ily punished. 

Divorce is legal, relatively easy to obtain, but not common. 
Divorced persons are viewed with some disapproval, and they are 
not invited to take part in the blessing of a newlywed couple. Some 
of the grounds for divorce are incompatibility, prolonged absence 
without good reason, abandonment by either partner, refusal of 
the husband to provide for the family, adultery, immoral conduct, 
and refusal, for more than a year, to permit sexual intercourse. 
A magistrate may legalize the divorce. Each spouse retains whatever 
property he or she brought into the marriage. Property acquired 
jointly is divided equally. Divorced persons may remarry, but the 
woman must wait ten months. Custody of minor children is usually 
given to the mother. Both parents continue to have an obligation 
to contribute financially toward the rearing and education of the 
child. 

In theory a man may have multiple wives if he can afford them, 
but this is rare in practice; the first wife may veto the taking of 
a second wife. Concubinage also exists, although it is more fre- 
quent in the cities. While second wives have certain legal rights, 
concubines have none. 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



As the married couple moves through life they have children, 
nurture and train them, educate them, and marry them off. When 
they become too old to support themselves, they may invite the 
youngest child's family to move in and to take over running the 
household. At this stage in their lives, they enjoy a position of high 
status, they help care for grandchildren, and they devote more time 
in service to the wat (temple). 

Death is not viewed with the great outpouring of grief common 
to Western society; it is viewed as the end of one life and as the 
beginning of another life that one hopes will be better. Buddhist 
Khmer usually are cremated, and their ashes are deposited in a 
stupa in the temple compound. A corpse is washed, dressed, and 
placed in a coffin, which may be decorated with flowers and with 
a photograph of the deceased. White pennant-shaped flags, called 
"white crocodile flags," outside a house indicate that someone in 
that household has died. A funeral procession consisting of an achar, 
Buddhist monks, members of the family, and other mourners ac- 
companies the coffin to the crematorium. The spouse and the chil- 
dren show mourning by shaving their heads and by wearing white 
clothing. Relics such as teeth or pieces of bone are prized by the 
survivors, and they are often worn on gold chains as amulets. 

Social Stratification and Social Mobility 

Social strata in precommunist Cambodia may be viewed as con- 
stituting a spectrum, with an elite group or upper class at one end 
and a lower class consisting of rural peasants and unskilled urban 
workers at the other end. The elite group was composed of high- 
ranking government, military, and religious leaders, characterized 
by high prestige, wealth, and education or by members one of the 
royal or noble families. Each one of the subgroups had its own 
internal ranking system. Before the ouster of Sihanouk in 1970, 
the highest ranks of the elite group were filled largely by those born 
into them. The republican regime in the early 1970s invalidated 
all royal and noble tides, and the only titles of social significance 
legally in use in connection with the elite group were those gained 
through achievement. Military and government titles tended to 
replace royal and noble titles. In spite of the legislated loss of titles, 
however, wide public recognition of the royalty and the nobility 
continued. The deferential linguistic usages and the behavior styles 
directed toward members of these groups persisted through the 
1970s and, to a limited extent, were still present in the late 1980s. 

In the early 1970s, the senior military officers, some of whom 
were also members of the aristocracy, replaced the hereditary 
aristocracy as the most influential group in the country. To some 



97 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

extent, this upper stratum of the upper class was closed, and it was 
extremely difficult to move into it and to attain positions of high 
power. The closed nature of the group frustrated many members 
of the small intellectual elite. This group, positioned at the lower 
end of the elite group, consisted of civil servants, professional peo- 
ple, university students, and some members of the Buddhist hier- 
archy. It had become large enough to be politically influential by 
the 1970s, for example, student strikes were serious enough in 1972 
to force the government to close some schools. 

Somewhere in the middle of this social spectrum was a small mid- 
dle class, which included both Khmer and non-Khmer of medium 
prestige. Members of this class included businessmen, white-collar 
workers, teachers, physicians, most of the Buddhist clergy, shop- 
keepers, clerks, and military officers of lower and middle rank. 
Many Chinese, Vietnamese, and members of other ethnic minori- 
ties belonged to the middle class. The Khmer were a majority only 
among the military and among the civil servants. 

The lower class consisted of rural small farmers, fishermen, crafts- 
men, and blue-collar urban workers. The majority of Cambodi- 
ans belonged to this group. Most of the members of the lower class 
were Khmer, but other ethnic groups, including most of the Cham, 
Khmer Loeu, some Vietnamese, and a few Chinese, were included. 
This class was virtually isolated from, and was uninterested in, the 
activities of the much smaller urban middle and upper classes. 

Within the lower class, fewer status distinctions existed; those 
that did depended upon attributes such as age, sex, moral behavior, 
and religious piety. Traditional Buddhist values were important 
on the village level. Old age was respected, and older men and 
women received deferential treatment in terms of language and 
behavior. All else being equal, males generally were accorded a 
higher social status than females. Good character — honesty, 
generosity, compassion, avoidance of quarrels, chastity, warmth — 
and personal religious piety also increased status. Generosity toward 
others and to the wat was important. Villagers accorded respect 
and honor to those whom they perceived as having authority or 
prestige. Buddhist monks and nuns, teachers, high-ranking govern- 
ment officials, and members of the hereditary aristocracy made up 
this category. Persons associated with those who possessed pres- 
tige tended to derive prestige and to be accorded respect therefrom. 

The Khmer language reflects a somewhat different classification 
of Khmer society based on a more traditional model and charac- 
terized by differing linguistic usages (see Languages, this ch.). This 
classification divided Cambodian society into three broad cate- 
gories: royalty and nobility, clergy, and laity. The Khmer language 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



had — and to a lesser extent still has — partially different lexicons 
for each of these groups. For example, nham (to eat) was used when 
speaking of oneself or to those on a lower social level; pisa (to eat) 
was used when speaking politely of someone else; chhan (to eat) was 
used of Buddhist clergy, and saoy (to eat) was used of royalty. The 
Khmer Rouge attempted to do away with the different lexicons 
and to establish a single one for all; for example, they tried to sub- 
stitute a single, rural word, hop (to eat), for all of the above words. 

Social mobility was played out on an urban stage. There was 
little opportunity among the majority of the rural Cambodians to 
change social status; this absence of opportunity was a reflection 
of traditional Buddhist fatalism. A man could achieve higher sta- 
tus by entering the monkhood or by acquiring an education and 
then entering the military or the civil service. Opportunities in 
government service, especially for white-collar positions, were highly 
prized by Cambodian youths. The availability of such positions 
did not keep pace with the number of educated youths, however, 
and in the late 1960s and the early 1970s this lag began to cause 
widespread dissatisfaction. 

The Khmer Rouge characterized Cambodians as being in one 
of several classes: the feudal class (members of the royal family and 
high government or military officials); the capitalist class (business 
people); the petite bourgeoisie (civil servants, professionals, small 
business people, teachers, servants, and clerics); peasant class (the 
rich, the mid-level, and the poor, based on whether or not they 
could hire people to work their land and on whether or not they 
had enough food); the worker class (the independent worker, the 
industrial worker, and the party members); and the "special" 
classes (revolutionary intellectuals, military and police officials, and 
Buddhist monks). 

Other Ethnic Groups 

The Cham 

The Cham people in Cambodia descend from refugees of the 
kingdom of Champa, which once ruled much of Vietnam between 
Cao Ha in the north and Bien Hoa in the south. In 1471 Champa 
was conquered joy the Vietnamese, and many Cham fled to Cam- 
bodia. Cham scholar Po Dharma points out that the Cham have 
lived in Cambodia since at least 1456. They settled along the Tonle 
Sap and Mekong rivers and in Batdambang, Pouthisat, Takev, 
Kampot, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thum, and Kampong 
Chhnang provinces. At some time before the seventeenth century, 
the Cambodian Cham and some of those in adjacent Vietnam 



99 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

converted to Islam, probably as a result of contacts with their Malay 
kin who had embraced that religion centuries earlier (see Religion, 
this ch.). 

Friendly relations prevailed between the Cham and the Khmer 
for centuries even though, because of the Cham religion, little inter- 
marriage occurred. Under the Khmer Republic (see Appendix B) 
of 1970 to 1975, one of the elite military units was made up of mem- 
bers of the Cham and other ethnic minorities. The Khmer Rouge 
tried, without much success, to recruit the Cham during the struggle 
with the Khmer Republic. The Cham were singled out for partic- 
ularly brutal repression under the Khmer Rouge regime, and large 
numbers were killed. The PRK actively courted the Cham, and 
in 1987 a Cham was a member of the party Central Committee 
and minister of agriculture. Cham sources estimate that in the 1980, 
in addition to the Cham in Cambodia and in Vietnam, there were 
3,000 Cham in Malaysia, 2,000 in the United States, 1,000 in 
Western Europe, 500 in Canada, and several hundred in Indonesia. 

Po Dharma divides the Cambodian Cham into two groups — 
the orthodox and the traditional — based on their religious prac- 
tices. The orthodox group, which makes up about one-third of the 
total number of Cham in the country, were located mainly in the 
Phnom Penh-Odongk area and in the provinces of Takev and Kam- 
pot. The traditional Cham were scattered throughout the midsec- 
tion of the country in the provinces of Batdambang, Kampong 
Thum, Kampong Cham, and Pouthisat. 

The Cham of both groups typically live in villages inhabited only 
by other Cham; the villages may be along the shores of water 
courses, or they may be inland. The Cham refer to the former as 
play krong (river villages) and to the latter as play ngok (upper vil- 
lages). The inhabitants of the river villages engage in fishing, in 
raising rice, and in growing vegetables, especially onions. They 
trade fish to local Khmer for rice. The women in these villages earn 
money by weaving. The Cham who live inland support themselves 
by various means, depending on the village. Some villages specialize 
in metal working; others raise fruit trees or vegetables. The Cham 
also often serve as butchers of catde for their Khmer Buddhist neigh- 
bors and are, in some areas, regarded as skillful water buffalo 
breeders. 

Cham dress is distinctive. The main item of clothing for both 
sexes is a sarong-like garment called a batik, which is worn knot- 
ted at the waist. Men wear shirts over the batik, and women wear 
close-fitting blouses that are open at the throat and have tight 
sleeves. The characteristic headdress is a turban or scarf. 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



Cham society is matriarchal with matrilineal descent. There is 
some trace of an earlier clan system. Parents permit their daugh- 
ters a considerable amount of freedom of choice in marriage. The 
parents of the girl usually make the marriage overtures to the boy. 
A Cham marriage involves little ceremony. Among the Muslim 
Cham, the girl's parents ask the groom if he accepts their daugh- 
ter in marriage, and he is expected to answer yes. The imam acts 
as a witness. This simple ceremony is followed by a feast. Resi- 
dence is matrilocal; the young man goes to live with his wife's 
family. Females inherit the family property. 

The Khmer Loeu 

The Khmer Loeu are the non-Khmer highland tribes in Cam- 
bodia. Although the origins of this group are not clear, some be- 
lieve that the Mon-Khmer- speaking tribes were part of the long 
migration of these people from the northwest. The Austronesian- 
speaking groups, Rade and Jarai, apparently came to coastal Viet- 
nam and then moved west, forming wedges among some of the 
Mon-Khmer groups. The Khmer Loeu are found mainly in the 
northeastern provinces of Rotanokiri, Stoeng Treng, and Mondol 
Kiri. The Cambodian government coined the word Khmer Loeu — 
literally "Highland Khmer" — in the 1960s in order to create a feel- 
ing of unity between the highland tribal groups and the ruling 
lowland ethnic Khmer. Traditionally the Khmer have referred to 
these groups as phnong and samre, both of which have pejorative 
meanings. Some of the highland groups, in fact, are related in lan- 
guage to the Khmer, but others are from a very different linguis- 
tic and cultural background (see Languages, this ch.). 

Khmer Loeu form the majority population in Rotanokiri and 
Mondol Kiri provinces, and they also are present in substantial 
numbers in Kracheh and Stoeng Treng provinces (see fig. 7). Their 
total population in 1969 was estimated at 90,000 persons. In 1971 
the number of Khmer Loeu was estimated variously between 40,000 
and 100,000 persons. Population figures were unavailable in 1987, 
but the total probably was nearly 100,000 persons. 

Most Khmer Loeu live in scattered temporary villages that have 
only a few hundred inhabitants. These villages usually are governed 
by a council of local elders or by a village headman. 

The Khmer Loeu cultivate a wide variety of plants, but the main 
crop is dry or upland rice grown by the slash-and-burn method. 
Hunting, fishing, and gathering supplement the cultivated vegetable 
foods in the Khmer Loeu diet. Houses vary from huge multifamily 
longhouses to small single-family structures. They may be built 
close to the ground or on stilts. 



101 



Cambodia: A Country Study 




CZH Khmer 
Cham 
I* * r\ Pearic groups 
^ Kuy 

l-^-^l Mon-Khmer groups 
miHUU Austronesian groups 

25 50 Kil ometers 
25 50 Miles 

i ; l 



Figure 7. Ethno-Linquistic Groups of Cambodia, 1983 




102 



The Society and Its Environment 



During the period of the French Protectorate, the French did 
not interfere in the affairs of the Khmer Loeu (see The French Pro- 
tectorate, ch. 1). Reportedly, French army commanders considered 
the Khmer Loeu as an excellent source of personnel for army out- 
posts, and they recruited large numbers to serve with the French 
forces. Many Khmer Loeu continued this tradition by enlisting 
in the Cambodian army. 

In the 1960s, the Cambodian government carried out a broad 
civic action program— for which the army had responsibility — 
among the Khmer Loeu in Mondol Kiri, Rotanokiri, Stoeng Treng, 
and Kaoh Kong provinces. The goals of this program were to edu- 
cate the Khmer Loeu, to teach them Khmer, and eventually to 
assimilate them into the mainstream of Cambodian society. There 
was some effort at resettlement; in other cases, civil servants went 
out to live with individual Khmer Loeu groups to teach their mem- 
bers Khmer ways. Schools were provided for some Khmer Loeu 
communities, and in each large village a resident government 
representative disseminated information and encouraged the Khmer 
Loeu to learn the lowland Khmer way of life. Civil servants sent 
to work among the Khmer Loeu often viewed the assignment as 
a kind of punishment. 

In the late 1960s, an estimated 5,000 Khmer Loeu in eastern 
Cambodia rose in rebellion against the government and demanded 
self-determination and independence. The government press re- 
ported that local leaders loyal to the government had been as- 
sassinated. Following the rebellion, the hill people's widespread 
resentment of ethnic Khmer settlers caused them to refuse to cooper- 
ate with the Cambodian army in its suppression of rural unrest. 
Both the Khmer and the Vietnamese communists took advantage 
of this disaffection, and they actively recruited Khmer Loeu into 
their ranks. In late 1970, the government forces withdrew from 
Rotanokiri and Mondol Kiri provinces and abandoned the area 
to the rapidly growing Khmer communist insurgent force, the 
Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK — see Appendix B), and 
to its Vietnamese mentors (see Into the Maelstrom: ch. 1; Insur- 
rection and War, 1967-75, ch. 1; National Army of Democratic 
Kampuchea, ch. 5). There is some evidence that in the 1960s and 
in the 1970s the Front Uni pour la Liberation des Races Opprimes 
(FULRO — United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races) 
united tribes in the mountainous areas of southern Vietnam and 
had members from Khmer Loeu groups as well as from the Cham 
in Cambodia. 

In the early 1980s, Khmer Rouge propaganda teams infiltrated 
the northeastern provinces and encouraged rebellion against the 



103 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

central government. In 1981 the government structure included 
four Khmer Loeu province chiefs, all reportedly from the Brao 
group, in the northeastern provinces of Mondol Kiri, Rotanokiri, 
Stoeng Treng, and Preah Vihear. According to a 1984 resolution 
of the PRK National Cadres Conference entitled "Policy Toward 
Ethnic Minorities," the minorities were considered an integral part 
of the Cambodian nation, and they were to be encouraged to par- 
ticipate in collectivization. Government policy aimed to transform 
minority groups into modern Cambodians. The same resolution 
called for the elimination of illiteracy, with the stipulations that 
minority languages be respected and that each tribe be allowed to 
write, speak, and teach in its own language. 

The major Khmer Loeu groups in Cambodia are the Kuy, 
Mnong, Stieng, Brao, Pear, Jarai, and Rade. All but the last two 
speak Mon-Khmer languages (see Language, this ch.). 

In the late 1980s, about 160,000 Kuy lived in the northern Cam- 
bodian provinces of Kampong Thum, Preah Vihear, and Stoeng 
Treng as well as in adjacent Thailand. (Approximately 70,000 Kuy 
had been reported in Cambodia itself in 1978.) Most of the Kuy 
have been assimilated into the predominant culture of the country 
in which they live. Many are Buddhists, and the majority practice 
wet-rice cultivation. They have the reputation of being skilled black- 
smiths. 

The Brao, including the Tampuon subgroup, inhabit north- 
eastern Cambodia and adjacent Laos. In 1962 the Brao popula- 
tion in Laos was estimated at about 9,000 persons. In 1984 it was 
reported that the total Brao population was between 10,000 and 
15,000 persons. About 3,000 Brao reportedly moved into Cambo- 
dia from Laos in the 1920s. The Brao live in large villages cen- 
tered on a communal house. They cultivate dry-rice and produce 
some pottery. They appear to have a bilateral kinship system. 

A total of 23,000 Mnong were thought to be living in Cambo- 
dia and in Vietnam in the early 1980s. In Cambodia the Mnong 
are found in Mondol Kiri, Kracheh, and Kampong Cham provinces 
in villages consisting of several longhouses each of which is divided 
into compartments that house nuclear families. The Mnong prac- 
tice dry-rice farming, and some also cultivate a wide variety of 
vegetables, fruits, and other useful plants as secondary crops. Some 
subgroups weave cloth. At least two of the Mnong subgroups 
have matrilineal descent. Monogamy is the predominant form of 
marriage, and residence is usually matrilocal. Wealth distinctions 
are measured by the number of buffalo that a notable person 
sacrifices on a funereal or ceremonial occasion as a mark of status 
and as a means of eliciting social approval. Slavery is known to 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



have existed in the past, but the system allowed a slave to gain 
freedom. The Stieng are closely related to the Mnong. Both groups 
straddle the Cambodian- Vietnamese border, and their languages 
belong to the same subfamily of Mon-Khmer. In 1978 the Cam- 
bodian Stieng numbered about 20,000 persons in all. The Stieng 
cultivate dry-field rice. Their society is apparently patriarchal; resi- 
dence after marriage is patrilocal if a bride-price was paid. The 
groups have a very loose political organization; each village has 
its own leaders and tribunals. 

Several small groups, perhaps totalling no more than 10,000 peo- 
ple in Cambodia and southeastern Thailand, make up the Pearic 
group. The main members are the Pear in Batdambang, Pouthisat, 
and Kampong Thum provinces; the Chong in Thailand and Bat- 
dambang Province; the Saoch in Kampot Province; the Samre in 
what was formerly Siemreab Province (now part of Siemreab-Otdar 
Meanchey Province); and the Suoi in Kampong Chhnang Province. 
Some believe that this group constitutes the remnant of the pre- 
Khmer population of Cambodia. Many members of the Pearic 
group grow dry-field rice, which they supplement by hunting and 
by gathering. They have totemic clans, each headed by a chief who 
inherited his office patrilineally. Marriage occurs at an early age; 
there is a small bride-price. Residence may be matrilocal until the 
birth of the first child, or it may be patrilocal as it is among the 
Saoch. The village headman is the highest political leader. The 
Saoch have a council of elders who judge infractions of traditional 
law. Two chief sorcerers, whose main function is to control the 
weather, play a major role in Pearic religion. Among the Saoch, 
a corpse is buried instead of being burned as among the Khmer. 

The Austronesian groups of Jarai and Rade form two of the larg- 
est ethnic minorities in Vietnam. Both groups spill over into north- 
eastern Cambodia, and they share many cultural similarities. The 
total Jarai population stands at about 200,000; the Rade number 
about 120,000. According to 1978 population figures, there were 
10,000 Jarai and 15,000 Rade in Cambodia in the late 1970s. They 
live in longhouses containing several compartments occupied by 
matrilineally linked nuclear families. There may be twenty to sixty 
longhouses in one village. The Rade and Jarai cultivate dry-field 
rice and secondary crops such as maize. Both groups have exoga- 
mous matrilineal descent groups (consanguineous kin groups that 
acknowledge a traditional bond of common descent in the mater- 
nal line and within which they do not marry). Women initiate mar- 
riage negotiations, and residence is matrilocal. Each village has 
its own political hierarchy and is governed by an oligarchy of the 
leading families. In the past, sorcerers known as the "kings of fire 



105 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

and water" exerted political power that extended beyond an in- 
dividual village. The Rade and the Jarai have been involved inti- 
mately in the FULRO movement, and many of the leaders in the 
movement are from these two groups. 

The Chinese 

The Chinese in Cambodia formed the country's largest ethnic 
minority in the late 1960s and in the early 1970s. In the late 1960s, 
an estimated 425,000 ethnic Chinese lived in Cambodia, but by 
1984, as a result of warfare, Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese perse- 
cution, and emigration, only about 61,400 Chinese remained in 
the country. Sixty percent of the Chinese were urban dwellers en- 
gaged mainly in commerce; the other 40 percent were rural resi- 
dents working as shopkeepers, as buyers and processors of rice, 
palm sugar, fruit, and fish, and as moneylenders. In 1963 William 
Willmott, an expert on overseas Chinese communities, estimated 
that 90 percent of the Chinese in Cambodia were involved in com- 
merce and that 92 percent of those involved in commerce in Cam- 
bodia were Chinese. The Chinese in Kampot Province and in parts 
of Kaoh Kong Province also cultivated black pepper and fruit (es- 
pecially rambutans, durians, and coconuts), and they engaged in 
salt-water fishing. In rural Cambodia, the Chinese were money- 
lenders, and they wielded considerable economic power over the 
ethnic Khmer peasants through usury. Studies in the 1950s dis- 
closed that Chinese shopkeepers would sell to peasants on credit 
at interest rates of from 10 to 20 percent a month. In 1952 accord- 
ing to Australian political analyst Ben Kiernan, the Colonial Credit 
Office found in a survey that 75 percent of the peasants in Cam- 
bodia were in debt. There seemed to be little distinction between 
Chinese and Sino-Khmer (offspring of mixed Chinese and Khmer 
marriages) in the moneylending and shopkeeping enterprises. 

The Chinese in Cambodia represented five major linguistic 
groups, the largest of which was the Teochiu (accounting for about 
60 percent), followed by the Cantonese (accounting for about 20 
percent), the Hokkien (accounting for about 7 percent), and the 
Hakka and the Hainanese (each accounting for about 4 percent). 
Those belonging to certain Chinese linguistic groups in Cambo- 
dia tended to gravitate to certain occupations. The Teochiu, who 
made up about 90 percent of the rural Chinese population, ran 
village stores, controlled rural credit and rice-marketing facilities, 
and grew vegetables. In urban areas they were often engaged in 
such enterprises as the import-export business, the sale of phar- 
maceuticals, and street peddling. The Cantonese, who were the 
majority Chinese group before the Teochiu migrations began in 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



the late 1930s, lived mainly in the city. Typically, the Cantonese 
engaged in transportation and in construction, for the most part 
as mechanics or carpenters. The Hokkien community was involved 
in import-export and in banking, and it included some of the coun- 
try 's richest Chinese. The Hainanese started out as pepper grow- 
ers in Kampot Province, where they continued to dominate that 
business. Many moved to Phnom Penh, where, in the late 1960s, 
they reportedly had a virtual monopoly on the hotel and restau- 
rant business. They also often operated tailor shops and haberdash- 
eries. In Phnom Penh, the newly- arrived Hakka were typically folk 
dentists, sellers of traditional Chinese medicines, and shoemakers. 

Distinction by dialect group also has been important historically 
in the administrative treatment of the Chinese in Cambodia. The 
French brought with them a system devised by the Vietnamese Em- 
peror Gia Long (1802-20) to classify the local Chinese according 
to areas of origin and dialect. These groups were called bang (or 
congregations by the French) and had their own leaders for law, 
order, and tax-collecting. In Cambodia every Chinese was required 
to belong to a bang. The head of a bang, known as the ong bang, 
was elected by popular vote; he functioned as an intermediary be- 
tween the members of his bang and the government. Individual 
Chinese who were not accepted for membership in a bang were 
deported by the French authorities. 

The French system of administering the Chinese community was 
terminated in 1958. During the 1960s, Chinese community affairs 
tended to be handled, at least in Phnom Penh, by the Chinese 
Hospital Committee, an organization set up to fund and to ad- 
minister a hospital established earlier for the Chinese community. 
This committee was the largest association of Chinese merchants 
in the country, and it was required by the organization's constitu- 
tion to include on its fifteen-member board six from the Teochiu 
dialect group, three from the Cantonese, two from the Hokkien, 
two from the Hakka, and two from the Hainanese. The hospital 
board constituted the recognized leadership of Phnom Penh's 
Chinese community. Local Chinese school boards in the smaller 
cities and towns often served a similar function. 

In 1971 the government authorized the formation of a new body, 
the Federated Association of Chinese of Cambodia, which was the 
first organization to embrace all of Cambodia's resident Chinese. 
According to its statutes, the federation was designed to "aid 
Chinese nationals in the social, cultural, public health, and medi- 
cal fields," to administer the property owned joindy by the Chinese 
community in Phnom Penh and elsewhere, and to promote friendly 
relations between Cambodians and Chinese. With leadership that 



107 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

could be expected to include the recognized leaders of the national 
Chinese community, the federation was believed likely to continue 
the trend, evident since the early 1960s, to transcend dialect group 
allegiance in many aspects of its social, political, and economic 
programs. 

Generally, relations between the Chinese and the ethnic Khmer 
were good. There was some intermarriage, and a sizable propor- 
tion of the population in Cambodia was part Sino-Khmer, who 
were assimilated easily into either the Chinese or the Khmer com- 
munity. Willmott assumes that a Sino-Khmer elite dominated com- 
merce in Cambodia from the time of independence well into the 
era of the Khmer Republic. 

The Khmer Rouge takeover was catastrophic for the Chinese 
community for several reasons. When the Khmer Rouge took over 
a town, they immediately disrupted the local market. According 
to Willmott, this disruption virtually eliminated retail trade "and 
the traders (almost all Chinese) became indistinguishable from the 
unpropertied urban classes." The Chinese, in addition to having 
their major livelihood eradicated, also suffered because of their class 
membership. They were mainly well-educated urban merchants, 
thus possessing three characteristics that were anathema to the 
Khmer Rouge. Chinese refugees have reported that they shared 
the same brutal treatment as other urban Cambodians under the 
Khmer Rouge regime and that they were not especially singled out 
as an ethnic group until after the Vietnamese invasion. Observers 
believe that the anti-Chinese stance, of the Vietnamese govern- 
ment and of its officials in Phnom Penh, makes it unlikely that a 
Chinese community on the earlier scale will reappear in Cambo- 
dia in the near future. 

The Vietnamese 

Enmity has existed between the Khmer and the Vietnamese for 
centuries, but this antagonism did not hinder the growth of a siza- 
ble Vietnamese community scattered throughout southeastern and 
central Cambodia. According to an American scholar on Southeast 
Asia, Donald J. Steinberg, an estimated 291,596 Vietnamese, con- 
stituting more than 7 percent at the total population, resided in 
Cambodia in 1950. They were concentrated in Phnom Penh, and 
in Kandal, Prey Veng, and Kampong Cham provinces. 

The Khmer have shown more antipathy toward the Vietnamese 
than toward the Chinese or toward their other neighbors, the Thai. 
Several factors explain this attitude. The expansion of Vietnamese 
power has resulted historically in the loss of Khmer territory. The 
Khmer, in contrast, have lost no territory to the Chinese and little 



108 



An oxcart driver 
wears the checkered scarf 
that distinguishes Cambodians 
from their Thai or 
Vietnamese neighbors. 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



Mother and child 
symbolize a renascent nation. 

Courtesy Bill Herod 




109 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

to the Thai. No close cultural or religious ties exist between Cam- 
bodia and Vietnam. The Vietnamese fall within the Chinese cul- 
ture sphere, rather than within the Indian, where the Thai and 
the Khmer belong. The Vietnamese differ from the Khmer in mode 
of dress, in kinship organization, and in many other ways — for 
example the Vietnamese are Mahayana Buddhists. Although Viet- 
namese lived in urban centers such as Phnom Penh, a substantial 
number lived along the lower Mekong and Basak rivers as well 
as on the shores of the Tonle Sap, where they engaged in fishing. 
Much of the manpower on French-owned rubber plantations was 
provided by the Vietnamese, who also were employed by the French 
as lower level civil servants and as white collar workers in private 
businesses. 

Other Groups 

The Europeans and the Indians constituted the smallest ethnic 
minorities in Cambodia prior to 1975. In 1950 there were about 
4,500 Europeans and about 2,500 Indians in addition to small num- 
bers of other Asians in that country. More than 90 percent of the 
Europeans lived in Phnom Penh, and the next largest number lived 
in Kampong Cham. A small Burmese minority, the Kola, was 
found in unspecified numbers in the gem-mining areas of Batdam- 
bang and Rotanokiri provinces in prewar days. Many of the Euro- 
peans served as technical advisers to the Cambodian government, 
or they worked for Western businesses. The Indians often were 
involved in moneylending and in small businesses, such as those 
that sold books and cloth. In the 1980s, Soviet and East European 
advisers supported the PRK government, but no accurate estimate 
of their numbers was available. 

Languages 

The majority of Cambodians, even those who are not ethnic 
Khmer, speak Khmer, the official language of the country. Eth- 
nic Khmer living in Thailand, in Vietnam, and in Laos speak dia- 
lects of Khmer that are more or less intelligible to Khmer speakers 
from Cambodia. Minority languages include Vietnamese, Cham, 
several dialects of Chinese, and the languages of the various hill 
tribes (see Other Ethnic Groups, this ch.). 

Austroasiatic-Mon-Khmer 

Khmer belongs to the Mon-Khmer family of the Austroasiatic 
phylum of languages. American linguists David Thomas and 
Robert Headley have divided the Mon-Khmer family into nine 
branches: Pearic in western Cambodia and eastern Thailand; 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



Khmer in Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos; Bahnaric in 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; Katuic in Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia; Khmuic in Laos, Thailand, and China; Monic in 
Burma and Thailand; Palaungic in Burma, China, and Thailand; 
Khasi in Assam (India); and Viet-Muong in Vietnam. Of the lan- 
guages in the Mon-Khmer family, Vietnamese has the largest num- 
ber of speakers (about 47 million); Khmer, has the next largest 
(about 8 million). 

Khmer, in contrast to Vietnamese, Thai, Lao, and Chinese, is 
nontonal. Native Khmer words may be composed of one or two 
syllables. Khmer is uninflected, but it has a rich system of affixes, 
including infixes, for derivation. Generally speaking, Khmer has 
nouns (including pronouns as a special subcategory), verbs (includ- 
ing stative verbs or adjectives), adverbs, and various kinds of words 
called particles (including verbal auxiliaries, prepositions, con- 
junctions, final particles, and interjections). Many Khmer words 
change, chameleon-like, from one part of speech to another, de- 
pending on the context. The normal word order is subject-verb- 
object. Adjectival modifiers follow the nouns they modify. 

Khmer, like its neighbors, Thai, Lao, and Burmese, has bor- 
rowed extensively from other languages, especially the Indie lan- 
guages of Sanskrit and Pali. Khmer uses Sanskrit and Pali roots 
much as English and other West European languages use Latin 
and Greek roots to derive new, especially scientific, words. Khmer 
has also borrowed terms — especially financial, commercial, and 
cooking terms — from Chinese. In the nineteenth and twentieth cen- 
turies, Khmer borrowed from French as well. These latter borrow- 
ings have been in the realm of material culture, especially the names 
for items of modern Western technology, such as buuzii (spark plug) 
from the French bougie. 

Khmer is written in a script derived from a south Indian alphabet. 
The language has symbols for thirty-three consonants, twenty-four 
dependent vowels, twelve independent vowels, and several dia- 
critics. Most consonants have reduced or modified forms, called 
subscripts, when they occur as the second member of a consonant 
cluster. Vowels may be written before, after, over, or under a con- 
sonant symbol. 

Some efforts to standardize Khmer spelling have been attempted, 
but inconsistencies persist, and many words have more than one 
accepted spelling. A two- volume dictionary prepared under the 
direction of the Venerable Chuon Nath of the Buddhist Institute 
in Phnom Penh is the standard work on Khmer lexicography. 

Khmer is divided into three stages — Old Khmer (seventh to 
twelfth century A.D.), Middle Khmer (twelfth to seventeenth 



111 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

century A.D.), and Modern Khmer (seventeenth century to the 
present). It is likely that Old Khmer was the language of Chenla. 
What the language of Funan was is not at all certain, but it was 
probably a Mon-Khmer language. The earliest inscription in 
Khmer, found at Angkor Borei in Takev Province south of Phnom 
Penh, dates from A.D. 611 (see Prehistory and Early Kingdoms, 
ch. 1). 

Austronesian 

The Austronesian languages are spread over vast areas of Asia 
and the Pacific, from Madagascar to Easter Island and from Tai- 
wan to Malaysia. Four Austronesian languages — Cham, Jarai, 
Rade, and Malay — are spoken in Cambodia. Cham is spoken by 
the largest number of people. Before 1975, there were about 100,000 
speakers of Western Cham. Western Cham is the term used to dis- 
tinguish (at least two mutually related dialects of) the Cham spoken 
in Cambodia and that used in adjacent inland Vietnam from 
Eastern Cham spoken in the coastal areas of central Vietnam. 
Western Cham is written in Arabic script, or, since the late 1960s 
and the early 1970s, in a romanized script devised by Protestant 
missionaries. The traditional Cham script, based on an Indian 
script, is still known and used by the Eastern Cham in Vietnam, 
but it has been lost by the Western Cham. 

The Cham language is also nontonal. Words may contain one, 
two, or three syllables. Cham contains much linguistic borrowing 
from Arabic, Malay, and Khmer. The normal word order is subject- 
verb-object, and, as in Khmer, modifying adjectives follow the 
nouns that they modify. Most Cham in Cambodia are bilingual 
in Cham and in Khmer and many also know Arabic and Malay. 
Rade and Jarai, close relatives of Cham, are spoken by several thou- 
sand members of both ethnic groups in northeastern Cambodia. 
Both languages are written in romanized scripts based on the Viet- 
namese alphabet. Rade and Jarai have rich oral literatures, and 
the former has two epic tales that have been transcribed and pub- 
lished. 

Religion 
Buddhism 

Origins of Buddhism on the Indian Subcontinent 

Theravada Buddhism is the religion of virtually all of the ethnic 
Khmer, who constitute about 90 percent or more of the Cambodian 
population. Buddhism originated in what are now north India and 



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The Society and Its Environment 



Nepal during the sixth century B.C. It was founded by a Sakya 
prince, Siddhartha Gautama (563-483 B.C.; his traditional dates 
are 623-543 B.C., also called the Gautama Buddha), who, at the 
age of twenty-nine, after witnessing old age, sickness, death, and 
meditation, renounced his high status and left his wife and infant 
son for a life of asceticism. After years of seeking truth, he is said 
to have attained enlightenment while sitting alone under a bo tree. 
He became the Buddha — "the enlightened" — and formed an order 
of monks, the sangha (see Glossary), and later an order of nuns. 
He spent the remainder of his life as a wandering preacher, dying 
at the age of eighty. 

Buddhism began as a reaction to Hindu doctrines and as an ef- 
fort to reform them. Nevertheless, the two faiths share many basic 
assumptions. Both view the universe and all life therein as parts 
of a cycle of eternal flux. In each religion, the present life of an 
individual is a phase in an endless chain of events. Life and death 
are merely alternate aspects of individual existence marked by the 
transition points of birth and death. An individual is thus continually 
reborn, perhaps in human form, perhaps in some non-human form, 
depending upon his or her actions in the previous life. The end- 
less cycle of rebirth is known as samsara (wheel of life). Theravada 
Buddhism is a tolerant, non prescriptive religion that does not re- 
quire belief in a supreme being. Its precepts require that each in- 
dividual take full responsibility for his own actions and omissions. 
Buddhism is based on three concepts: dharma (the doctrine of the 
Buddha, his guide to right actions and belief); karma (the belief 
that one's life now and in future lives depends upon one's own deeds 
and misdeeds and that as an individual one is responsible for, and 
rewarded on the basis of, the sum total of one's acts and omissions 
in all one's incarnations past and present); and sangha, the ascetic 
community within which man can improve his karma. 

The Buddha added the hope of escape — a way to get out of the 
endless cycle of pain and sorrow — to the Brahmanic idea of sam- 
sara. The Buddhist salvation is nirvana, a final extinction of one's 
self. Nirvana may be attained by achieving good karma through 
earning much merit and avoiding misdeeds. A Buddhist's pil- 
grimage through existence is a constant attempt to distance him- 
self or herself from the world and finally to achieve complete 
detachment, or nirvana. 

The fundamentals of Buddhist doctrine are the Four Noble 
Truths: suffering exists; craving (or desire) is the cause of suffer- 
ing; release from suffering can be achieved by stopping all desire; 
and enlightenment — buddhahood — can be attained by following 



113 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

the Noble Eightfold Path (right views, right intention, right speech, 
right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and 
right concentration), which constitutes a middle way between sen- 
suality and ascetism. Enlightenment consists of knowing these 
truths. The average layperson cannot hope for nirvana after the 
end of this life, but can — by complying, as best he or she is able 
to, with the doctrine's rules of moral conduct — hope to improve 
his or her karma and thereby better his condition in the next in- 
carnation. 

The doctrine of karma holds that, through the working of a just, 
automatic, and impersonal cosmic law, one's actions in this incar- 
nation and in all previous ones will determine which position in 
the hierarchy of living things one will occupy in the next incarna- 
tion. An individual's karma can be improved through certain acts 
and omissions. By following the five precepts or commandments, 
a Buddhist can better his or her karma. These commandments are: 
do not kill, do not steal, do not indulge in forbidden sexual plea- 
sures, do not tell lies, and do not take intoxicants or stupefying 
drugs or liquors. 

The most effective way to work actively to improve one's karma 
is to earn merit. Any act of benevolence or generosity can gain 
merit for the doer. Cambodian Buddhists tend to regard opportu- 
nities for earning merit as primarily connected with interaction with 
the sangha, contributing to its support through money, goods, and 
labor, and participating in its activities. Some of the favorite ways 
for a male to earn merit are to enter the sangha as a monk (after 
the age of twenty) or as a novice, or to live in the wat as a temple 
servant; in the case of a female (usually the elderly), the favorite 
way is to become a nun. Other activities that gain merit include 
sponsoring a monk or novice, contributing to a wat, feeding mem- 
bers of the sangha at a public meal, and providing food for either 
of the two daily meals of the sangha. 

In his first sermon to his followers, the Buddha described a moral 
code, the dharma, which the sangha was to teach after him. He left 
no designated successor. Indian emperor Asoka (273-232 B.C.) 
patronized the sangha and encouraged the teaching of the Buddha's 
philosophy throughout his vast empire; by 246 B.C., the new 
religion had reached Sri Lanka. The Tripitaka, the collection of 
basic Buddhist texts, was written down for the first time in Sri Lanka 
during a major Buddhist conference in the second or first century 
B.C. By the time of the conference, a schism had developed separat- 
ing Mahayana (Greater Path) Buddhism from more conservative 
Theravada (Way of the Elders, or Hinayana — Lesser Path) fac- 
tion or Buddhism. The Mahayana faction reinterpreted the original 



114 



Young Buddhist monks pause at a temple entrance. 

Courtesy Bill Herod 

teachings of the Buddha and added a type of deity called a bodhi- 
sattva (see Glossary) to large numbers of other buddhas. The 
Mahay ana adherents believe that nirvana is available to everyone, 
not just to select holy men. Mahayana Buddhism quickly spread 
throughout India, China, Korea, Japan, Central Asia, and to some 
parts of Southeast Asia. According to the Venerable Pang Khat, 
Theravada Buddhism reached Southeast Asia as early as the sec- 
ond or third century A.D., while Mahayana Buddhism did not 
arrive in Cambodia until about A.D. 791. In Southeast Asia, 
Mahayana Buddhism carried many Brahman beliefs with it to the 
royal courts of Funan, of Champa, and of other states. At this time, 
Sanskrit words were added to the Khmer and to the Cham lan- 
guages. Theravada Buddhism (with its scriptures in the Pali lan- 
guage), remained influential in Sri Lanka, and by the thirteenth 
century it had spread into Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambo- 
dia, where it supplanted Mahayana Buddhism. 

Cambodian Adaptations 

Cambodian Buddhism has no formal administrative ties with 
other Buddhist bodies, although Theravada monks from other coun- 
tries, especially Thailand, Laos, Burma, and Sri Lanka, may par- 
ticipate in religious ceremonies in order to make up the requisite 
number of clergy. Cambodian Buddhism is organized nationally 



115 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

in accordance with regulations formulated in 1943 and modified 
in 1948. During the monarchical period, the king led the Buddhist 
clergy. Prince Sihanouk continued in this role even after he had 
abdicated and was governing as head of state. He appointed both 
the heads of the monastic orders and other high-ranking clergy. 
After the overthrow of Sihanouk in 1970, the new head of state, 
Lon Nol, appointed these leaders. 

Two monastic orders constituted the clergy in Cambodia. The 
larger group, to which more than 90 percent of the clergy belonged, 
was the Mohanikay. The Thommayut order was far smaller. The 
Thommayut was introduced into the ruling circles of Cambodia 
from Thailand in 1864; it gained prestige because of its adoption 
by royalty and by the aristocracy, but its adherents were confined 
geographically to the Phnom Penh area. Among the few differences 
between the two orders is stricter observance by the Thommayut 
bonzes (monks) of the rules governing the clergy. In 1961 the 
Mohanikay had more than 52,000 ordained monks in some 2,700 
wat, whereas the Thommayut order had 1,460 monks in just over 
100 wat. In 1967 more than 2,800 Mohanikay wat and 320 Thom- 
mayut wat were in existence in Cambodia. After Phnom Penh, 
the largest number of Thommayut wat were found in Batdam- 
bang, Stoeng Treng, Prey Veng, Kampot, and Kampong Thum 
provinces. 

Each order has its own superior and is organized into a hierar- 
chy of eleven levels. The seven lower levels are known collectively 
as the thananukram; the four higher levels together are called the 
rajagana. The Mohanikay order has thirty-five monks in the rajagana; 
the Thommayut has twenty-one. Each monk must serve for at least 
twenty years to be named to these highest levels. 

The cornerstones of Cambodian Buddhism are the Buddhist 
bonze and the wat. Traditionally, each village has a spiritual 
center — a wat — where from five to more than seventy bonzes re- 
side. A typical wat in rural Cambodia consists of a walled enclosure 
containing a sanctuary, several residences for bonzes, a hall, a kit- 
chen, quarters for nuns, and a pond. The number of monks varies 
according to the size of the local population. The sanctuary, which 
contains an altar with statues of the Buddha and, in rare cases, 
a religious relic, is reserved for major ceremonies and usually only 
for the use of bonzes. Other ceremonies, classes for monks and for 
laity, and meals take place in the hall. Stupas containing the ashes 
of extended family members are constructed near the sanctuary. 
Fruit trees and vegetable gardens tended by local children are also 
part of the local wat. The main entrance, usually only for ceremonial 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



use, faces east; other entrances are located at other points around 
the wall. There are no gates. 

Steinberg notes the striking ratio of bonzes to the total popula- 
tion of Cambodia. In the late 1950s, an estimated 100,000 bonzes 
(including about 40,000 novices) served a population of about 5 
million. This high proportion undoubtedly was caused in large part 
by the ease with which one could enter and leave the sangha. Be- 
coming a bonze and leaving the sangha are matters of individual 
choice although, in theory, nearly all Cambodian males over six- 
teen serve terms as bonzes. Most young men do not intend to be- 
come fully ordained bonzes (bhikkhu), and they remain as monks 
for less than a year. Even a son's temporary ordination as a bonze 
brings great merit to his parents, however, and is considered so 
important that arrangements are made at a parent's funeral if the 
son has not undergone the process while the parent was living. 
There are two classes of bonzes at a wat — the novices (samani or 
nen) and the bhikkhu. Ordination is held from mid- April to mid- 
July, during the rainy season. 

Buddhist monks do not take perpetual vows to remain monks, 
although, in fact, some become monks permanentiy. Traditionally, 
they became monks early in life. It is possible to become a novice 
at as young an age as seven, but in practice thirteen is the earliest 
age for novices. A bhikkhu must be at least twenty. The monk's 
life is regulated by Buddhist law, and life in the wat adheres to 
a rigid routine. A bhikkhu follows 227 rules of monastic discipline 
as well as the 10 basic precepts. These include the five precepts 
that all Buddhists should follow. The five precepts for monastic 
asceticism prohibit eating after noon, participating in any enter- 
tainment (singing, dancing, and watching movies or television), 
using any personal adornments, sleeping on a luxurious bed, and 
handling money. In addition, a monk also is expected to be celi- 
bate. Furthermore, monks supposedly avoid all involvement in 
political affairs. They are not eligible to vote or to hold any politi- 
cal office, and they may not witness a legal document or give tes- 
timony in court. Since the person of a monk is considered sacred, 
he is considered to be outside the normal civil laws and public duties 
that affect lay people. Some of these practices have changed in the 
modern period, however, and in the 1980s Buddhist monks have 
been active even in the PRK government. 

Women are not ordained, but older women, especially widows, 
can become nuns. They live in wat and play an important role in 
the everyday life of the temple. Nuns shave their heads and eye- 
brows and generally follow the same precepts as monks. They may 
prepare the altars and do some of the housekeeping chores. 



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Cambodia: A Country Study 

Role of Buddhism in Cambodian Life 

Buddhist monks traditionally were called upon to perform a num- 
ber of functions in Cambodian life. They participated in all for- 
mal village festivals, ceremonies, marriages, and funerals. They 
also might have participated in ceremonies to name infants and 
in other minor ceremonies or rites of passage. Monks did not lead 
the ceremonies, however, because that role was given to the achar, 
or master of ceremonies; the monk's major function was to say 
prayers of blessing. They were often healers and, in traditional 
Khmer culture, they were the practitioners whose role was closest 
to that of modern psychiatrists. They might also have been skilled 
in astrology. The monk traditionally occupied a unique position 
in the transmission of Khmer culture and values. By his way of 
life, he provided a living model of the most meritorious behavior 
a Buddhist could follow. He also provided the laity with many 
opportunities for gaining merit. For centuries monks were the only 
literate people residing in rural communities; they acted as teachers 
to temple servants, to novices, and to newly ordained monks. Until 
the 1970s, most literate Cambodian males gained literacy solely 
through the instruction of the sangha. 

After independence from France, young Cambodian intellectuals 
changed their attitude toward the clergy. In describing a general 
shift away from Buddhism in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, 
Vickery cites the early work of anthropologist May Mayko Ebihara 
and his own observations. He suggests that the Khmer Rouge was 
able to instill antireligious feelings in younger males because the 
latter were losing interest in becoming monks even during their 
teenage years, the traditional temporary period of service. The 
monks themselves had abandoned some of their traditional restric- 
tions and had become involved in politics. At intervals during the 
colonial period, some monks had demonstrated or had rebelled 
against French rule, and in the 1970s monks joined pro- government 
demonstrations against the communists. Anticlerical feelings 
reached their highest point among the Khmer Rouge, who at first 
attempted to indoctrinate monks and to force them to pass anti- 
clerical ideas on to the laity. Under the Khmer Rouge regime, 
monks were expelled forcibly from the wat and were compelled 
to do manual labor. Article 20 of the 1976 Constitution of Demo- 
cratic Kampuchea permitted freedom of religion but banned all 
reactionary religions, that were "detrimental to the country." The 
minister of culture stated that Buddhism was incompatible with 
the revolution and was an instrument of exploitation. Under this 
regime, to quote the Finnish Inquiry Commission, "The practice 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



of religion was forbidden and the pagodas were systematically de- 
stroyed." Observers estimated that 50,000 monks died during the 
Khmer Rouge regime. The status of Buddhism and of religion in 
general after the Vietnamese invasion was at least partially simi- 
lar to its status in pre-Khmer Rouge times. 

According to Michael Vickery, who has written positively about 
the PRK, public observance of Buddhism and of Islam has been 
reestablished, and government policies allow Cambodians freedom 
to believe or not to believe in Buddhism. Vickery cites some differ- 
ences in this reestablished Buddhism. Religious affairs are over- 
seen by the PRK's Kampuchean (or Khmer) United Front for 
National Construction and Defense (KUFNCD — see Appendix B), 
the mass organization that supports the state by organizing women, 
youths, workers, and religious groups (see The Kampuchean, or 
Khmer, United Front for National Construction and Defense, 
ch. 4). In 1987 there was only a single Buddhist order because the 
Thommayut order had not been revived. The organization of the 
clergy also had been simplified. The sangharaja (primate of the Bud- 
dhist clergy) had been replaced by aprathean (chairman). Commu- 
nities that wanted a wat had to apply to a local front committee 
for permission. The wat were administered by a committee of the 
local laity. Private funds paid for the restoration of the wat damaged 
during the war and the Khmer Rouge era, and they supported the 
restored wat. Monks were ordained by a hierarchy that has been 
reconstituted since an initial ordination in September 1979 by a 
delegation from the Buddhist community in Vietnam. The validity 
of this ordination continues to be questioned. In general, there are 
only two to four monks per wat, which is fewer than before 1975. 
In 1981 about 4,930 monks served in 740 wat in Cambodia. The 
Buddhist General Assembly reported 7,000 monks in 1,821 active 
wat a year later. In 1969 by contrast, observers estimated that 
53,400 monks and 40,000 novice monks served in more than 3,000 
wat. Vickery sums up his observations on the subject by noting 
that, "The government has kept its promise to allow freedom for 
traditional Buddhism, but does not actively encourage it." 

Martin offers another, more pessimistic, view of the religious 
situation in the late 1980s. In a 1986 study, she asserts that the 
PRK showed outsiders only certain aspects of religious freedom; 
she also states that the few wat that were restored had only two 
or three old monks in residence and that public attendance was 
low. The monks were allowed to leave the wat only for an hour 
in the mornings, to collect their food, or during holy days. Lay 
people who practiced their faith were about the same ages as the 
monks, and they were allowed to visit the wat only in the evenings. 



119 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

A government circular had also instructed civil servants to stop 
celebrating the traditional New Year Festival. Some traditional Bud- 
dhist festivals still were tolerated, but the state collected a 50 per- 
cent tithe on donations. Martin believes that Buddhism was 
threatened externally by state repression and by nonsupport and 
internally by invalid clergy. She noted that the two Buddhist su- 
periors, Venerable Long Chhim and Venerable Tep Vong, were 
both believed to be from Vietnam. Venerable Tep Vong was con- 
currently the superior of the Buddhist clergy, vice president of the 
PRK's Khmer National Assembly, and vice president of the 
KUFNCD National Council. She quoted a refugee from Batdam- 
bang as having said, ' ' During the meetings, the Khmer adminis- 
trative authorities, accompanied by the Vietnamese experts, tell 
you, 'Religion is like poison, it's like opium; it's better to give the 
money to the military, so they can fight'." 

Buddhism is still strong among the various Cambodian refugee 
groups throughout the world, although some younger monks, faced 
with the distractions of a foreign culture, have chosen to leave the 
clergy and have become laicized. In the United States in 1984, there 
were twelve Cambodian wat with about twenty-one monks. In the 
1980s, a Cambodian Buddhist wat was constructed near Washing- 
ton, D.C., financed by a massive outpouring of donations from 
Cambodian Buddhists throughout North America. This wat is one 
of the few outside Southeast Asia that has the consecrated bound- 
ary within which ordinations may be performed. 

Most of the major Cambodian annual festivals are connected 
with Buddhist observances. The cholchnam (New Year Festival) takes 
place in mid- April; it was one of the few festivals allowed under 
the Khmer Rouge regime. The phchun ben, celebrated in Septem- 
ber or in October, is a memorial day for deceased ancestors and 
for close friends. Meak bochea, in January or February, com- 
memorates the last sermon of the Buddha. Vissakh bochea, in April 
or in May, is the triple anniversary of the birth, death, and en- 
lightenment of the Buddha. The chol vossa takes place in June or 
in July; it marks the beginning of a penitential season during which 
the monks must remain within the temple compounds. The kathen 
marks the end of this season; celebrated in September, it features 
offerings, especially of robes, to the monks. The kathen was still 
celebrated in the PRK in the late 1980s. 

Cambodian Buddhism exists side-by-side with, and to some 
extent intermingles with, pre-Buddhist animism and Brahman prac- 
tices. Most Cambodians, whether or not they profess to be Budd- 
hists (or Muslims), believe in a rich supernatural world. When ill, 
or at other times of crisis, or to seek supernatural help, Cambodians 



120 



The Society and Its Environment 



may enlist the aid of a practitioner who is believed to be able to 
propitiate or obtain help from various spirits. Local spirits are be- 
lieved to inhabit a variety of objects, and shrines to them may be 
found in houses, in Buddhist temples, along roads, and in forests. 

Several types of supernatural entities are believed to exist; they 
make themselves known by means of inexplicable sounds or hap- 
penings. Among these phenomena are khmoc (ghosts), pret and besach 
(particularly nasty demons, the spirits of people who have died vio- 
lent, untimely, or unnatural deaths), arak (evil spirits, usually fe- 
male), neak ta (tutelary spirits residing in inanimate objects), mneang 
phteah (guardians of the house), meba (ancestral spirits), and mrenh 
kongveal (elf-like guardians of animals) . All spirits must be shown 
proper respect, and, with the exception of the mneang phteah and 
mrenh kongveal, they can cause trouble ranging from mischief to seri- 
ous life-threatening illnesses. An important way for living people 
to show respect for the spirits of the dead is to provide food for 
the spirits. If this food is not provided, the spirit can cause trouble 
for the offending person. For example, if a child does not provide 
food for the spirit of its dead mother, that spirit can cause misfor- 
tunes to happen to the child. 

Aid in dealing with the spirit world may be obtained from a km 
(shaman or spirit practitioner), an achar (ritualist), thmup (witch, 
sorcerer or sorceress), or a rup arak (medium, usually male). The 
km is a kind of sorcerer who prepares charms and amulets to pro- 
tect the wearer from harm. He can cure illnesses, find lost objects, 
and prepare magic potions. Traditionally, Cambodians have held 
strong beliefs about protective charms. Amulets are worn routinely 
by soldiers to ward off bullets, for example. The km are believed 
to have the power to prepare an amulet and to establish a super- 
natural link between it and the owner. A km may acquire consider- 
able local prestige and power. Many km are former Buddhist monks. 

Another kind of magical practitioner is the achar, a specialist in 
ritual. He may function as a kind of master of ceremonies at a wat 
and as a specialist in conducting spirit worship rituals connected 
with life-cycle ceremonies. Rup arak are mediums who can be pos- 
sessed by supernatural beings and communicate with the spirit 
world. The thmup are sorcerers who cause illnesses. 

Fortunetellers and astrologers — haor teay — are important in Cam- 
bodian life. They are consulted about important decisions such as 
marriages, building a new house, or going on a long journey. They 
are believed to be able to foretell future events and to determine 
lucky or unlucky days for various activities. 

Villagers are sensitive to the power and to the needs of the spirit 
world. According to observations by an American missionary in 



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Cambodia: A Country Study 

the early 1970s, villagers consulted the local guardian spirit to find 
out what the coming year would bring, a new province chief held 
a ceremony to ask the protection of the spirits over the province, 
and soldiers obtained magic cloths and amulets from mediums and 
shamans to protect them from the bullets of the enemy. Before em- 
barking on a mission against enemy forces, a province chief might 
burn incense and call on a spirit for aid in defeating the enemy. 
Examples of Brahman influences were various rituals concerned 
with the well-being of the nation carried out by the ruler and the 
baku (a Brahman priesdy group attached to the royal court). These 
rituals were reportedly stopped after Sihanouk's ouster in 1970 (see 
The March 1970 Coup d'Etat, ch. 1). 

Chinese Religion 

Mahay ana Buddhism is the religion of the majority of Chinese 
and Vietnamese in Cambodia. Elements of other religious prac- 
tices, such as veneration of folk heros and ancestors, Confucian- 
ism, and Taoism mix with Chinese and Vietnamese Buddhism. 

In the Chinese home, ancestors and household gods are honored 
during prescribed times to help unite the extended family and to 
gain help from the dead, who can intercede for the living. Taoism 
teaches meditation and the use of magic to gain happiness, wealth, 
health, and immortality. Confucianism, part social philosophy and 
part religion, stresses religious ritual and pays great attention to 
the veneration of ancestors and of great figures of the past. 

Chinese Mahayana Buddhism has become intertwined with 
Taoist and with Confucian beliefs. Adherents honor many bud- 
dhas, including the Gautama Buddha, and they believe in a para- 
dise after death. They also believe in bodhisattvas — people who 
have nearly attained nirvana, but who stay back to help save others. 

Islam 

Islam is the religion of the Cham (also called Khmer Islam) and 
Malay minorities. According to Po Dharma, there were 150,000 
to 200,000 Muslims in Cambodia as late as 1975. Persecution under 
the Khmer Rouge eroded their numbers, however, and by the late 
1980s they probably had not regained their former strength. All 
of the Cham Muslims are Sunnis of the Shafii school. Po Dharma 
divides the Muslim Cham in Cambodia into a traditionalist branch 
and an orthodox branch. 

The Cham have their own mosques. In 1962 there were about 
100 mosques in the country. At the end of the nineteenth century, 
the Muslims in Cambodia formed a unified community under the 
authority of four religious dignitaries — mupti, tuk kalih, raja kalik, 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



and tvan pake. A council of notables in Cham villages consisted of 
one hakem and several katip, bilal, and labi. The four high dignitar- 
ies and the hakem were exempt from personal taxes, and they were 
invited to take part in major national ceremonies at the royal court. 
When Cambodia became independent, the Islamic community was 
placed under the control of a five-member council that represented 
the community in official functions and in contacts with other 
Islamic communities. Each Muslim community has a hakem who 
leads the community and the mosque, an imam who leads the 
prayers, and a bilal who calls the faithful to the daily prayers. The 
peninsula of Chrouy Changvar near Phnom Penh is considered 
the spiritual center of the Cham, and several high Muslim offi- 
cials reside there. Each year some of the Cham go to study the 
Quran at Kelantan in Malaysia, and some go on to study in, or 
make a pilgrimage to, Mecca. According to figures from the late 
1950s, about 7 percent of the Cham had completed the pilgrimage 
and could wear the fez or turban as a sign of their accomplishment. 

The traditional Cham retain many ancient Muslim or pre- 
Muslim traditions and rites. They consider Allah as the all-powerful 
God, but they also recognize other non-Islamic deities. They are 
closer, in many respects, to the Cham of coastal Vietnam than they 
are to other Muslims. The religious dignitaries of the traditional 
Cham (and of the Cham in Vietnam) dress completely in white, 
and they shave their heads and faces. These Cham believe in the 
power of magic and sorcery, and they attach great importance to 
magical practices in order to avoid sickness or slow or violent death. 
They believe in many supernatural powers. Although they show 
little interest in the pilgrimage to Mecca and in the five daily 
prayers, the traditional Cham do celebrate many Muslim festivals 
and rituals. 

The orthodox Cham have adopted a more orthodox religion 
largely because of their close contacts with, and intermarriages with, 
the Malay community. In fact, the orthodox Cham have adopted 
Malay customs and family organization, and many speak the Malay 
language. They send pilgrims to Mecca, and they attend interna- 
tional Islamic conferences. Conflicts between the traditional and 
the orthodox Cham increased between 1954 and 1975. For exam- 
ple, the two groups polarized the population of one village, and 
each group eventually had its own mosque and separate religious 
organization. 

According to Cham sources, 132 mosques were destroyed dur- 
ing the Khmer Rouge era, many others were desecrated, and Mus- 
lims were not allowed to worship. In the PRK, Islam has been given 
the same freedom as Buddhism. Vickery believes that about 185,000 



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Cambodia: A Country Study 

Cham lived in Cambodia in the mid-1980s and that the number 
of mosques was about the same then as it was before 1975. In late 
1987, there were six mosques in the Phnom Penh area and a "good 
number" in the provinces, but Muslim dignitaries were thinly 
stretched; only 20 of the previous 113 most prominent Cham clergy 
in Cambodia survived the Khmer Rouge period. 

Other Religions 

Christianity, introduced into Cambodia by Roman Catholic mis- 
sionaries in 1660, made little headway, at least among the Bud- 
dhists. In 1972 there were probably about 20,000 Christians in 
Cambodia, most of whom were Roman Catholics. Before the 
repatriation of the Vietnamese in 1970 and 1971, possibly as many 
as 62,000 Christians lived in Cambodia. According to Vatican 
statistics, in 1953, members of the Roman Catholic Church in Cam- 
bodia numbered 120,000, making it, at the time, the second larg- 
est religion in the country. In April 1970, just before repatriation, 
estimates indicate that about 50,000 Catholics were Vietnamese. 
Many of the Catholics remaining in Cambodia in 1972 were 
Europeans — chiefly French. Steinberg reported, also in 1953, that 
an American Unitarian mission maintained a teacher-training 
school in Phnom Penh, and Baptist missions functioned in Bat- 
dambang and Siemreab provinces. A Christian and Missionary 
Alliance mission was founded in Cambodia in 1923; by 1962 the 
mission had converted about 2,000 people. 

American Protestant missionary activity increased in Cambo- 
dia, especially among some of the hill tribes and among the Cham, 
after the establishment of the Khmer Republic. The 1962 census, 
which reported 2,000 Protestants in Cambodia, remains the most 
recent statistic for the group. In 1982 French geographer Jean Del- 
vert reported that three Christian villages existed in Cambodia, 
but he gave no indication of the size, location, or type of any of 
them. Observers reported that in 1980 there were more registered 
Khmer Christians among the refugees in camps in Thailand than 
in all of Cambodia before 1970. Kiernan notes that, until June 1980, 
five weekly Protestant services were held in Phnom Penh by a 
Khmer pastor, but that they had been reduced to a single weekly 
service after police harassment. His estimates suggest that in 1987 
the Christian community in Cambodia had shrunk to only a few 
thousand members. 

Highland tribal groups, most with their own local religious sys- 
tems, probably number fewer than 100,000 persons. The Khmer 
Loeu have been loosely described as animists, but most tribal groups 
have their own pantheon of local spirits. In general they see their 



124 



The Society and Its Environment 



world filled with various invisible spirits (often called yang), some 
benevolent, others malevolent. They associate spirits with rice, soil, 
water, fire, stones, paths, and so forth. Sorcerers or specialists in 
each village contact these spirits and prescribe ways to appease them. 
In times of crisis or change, animal sacrifices may be made to pla- 
cate the anger of the spirits. Illness is often believed to be caused 
by evil spirits or sorcerers. Some tribes have special medicine men 
or shamans who treat the sick. In addition to belief in spirits, vil- 
lagers believe in taboos on many objects or practices. Among the 
Khmer Loeu, the Rade and Jar ai groups have a well developed 
hierarchy of spirits with a supreme ruler at its head. 

Education 

Public School System 

Traditional education in Cambodia was handled by the local wat, 
and the bonzes were the teachers. The students were almost en- 
tirely young boys, and the education was limited to memorizing 
Buddhist chants in Pali. During the period of the French protec- 
torate, an educational system based on the French model was in- 
augurated alongside the traditional system. Initially, the French 
neglected education in Cambodia. Only seven high school students 
graduated in 1931, and only 50,000 to 60,000 children were en- 
rolled in primary school in 1936. In the years immediately follow- 
ing independence, the number of students rapidly increased. 
Vickery suggests that education of any kind was considered an 
"absolute good" by all Cambodians and that this attitude eventu- 
ally created a large group of unemployed or underemployed gradu- 
ates by the late 1960s. 

From the early twentieth century until 1975, the system of mass 
education operated on the French model. The educational system 
was divided into primary, secondary, higher, and specialized levels. 
Public education was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Edu- 
cation, which exercised full control over the entire system; it es- 
tablished syllabi, hired and paid teachers, provided supplies, and 
inspected schools. An inspector of primary education, who had con- 
siderable authority, was assigned to each province. Cultural com- 
mittees under the Ministry of Education were responsible for 
"enriching the Cambodian language." 

Primary education, divided into two cycles of three years each, 
was carried out in state-run and temple-run schools. Successful com- 
pletion of a final state examination led to the award of a certificate 
after each cycle. The primary education curriculum consisted of 
arithmetic, history, ethics, civics, drafting, geography, hygiene, 



125 



Vong Dantrey percussion ensemble 
accompanies classical ballet rehearsal. 

Courtesy Bill Herod 

language, and science. In addition, the curriculum included phys- 
ical education and manual work. French language instruction 
began in the second year. Khmer was the language of instruc- 
tion in the first cycle, but French was used in the second cycle 
and thereafter. By the early 1970s, Khmer was used more widely 
in primary education. In the 1980s, primary school ran from the 
first to the fourth grade. Theoretically one primary school served 
each village. Secondary education also was divided into two 
cycles, one of four years taught at a college, followed by one of 
three years taught at a lycee. Upon completion of the first cycle, 
students could take a state examination. Successful candidates 
received a secondary diploma. Upon completion of the first two 
years of the second cycle, students could take a state examina- 
tion for the first baccalaureate, and, following their final year, 
they could take a similar examination for the second baccalaure- 
ate. The Cambodian secondary curriculum was similar to that 
found in France. Beginning in 1967, the last three years of second- 
ary school were split up into three sections according to major 
subjects — letters, mathematics and technology; agriculture; and 
biology. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the country em- 
phasized a technical education. In the PRK, secondary educa- 
tion was reduced to six years (see table 4, Appendix A). 



126 



Students at rehearsal during a revival of classical ballet 

Courtesy Bill Herod 



Higher education lagged well behind primary and secondary edu- 
cation, until the late 1950s. The only facility in the country for 
higher education before the 1960s was the National Institute of 
Legal, Political, and Economic Studies, which trained civil servants. 
In the late 1950s, it had about 250 students. Wealthy Cambodi- 
ans and those who had government scholarships sought university- 
level education abroad. Students attended schools in France, but 
after independence increasing numbers enrolled at universities in 
the United States, Canada, China, the Soviet Union, and the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic (East Germany). By 1970 six universi- 
ties with a total enrollment of nearly 9,000 students served 
Cambodia. The largest, the University of Phnom Penh, had nearly 
4,570 male students and more than 730 female students in eight 
departments — letters and humanities, science and technology, law 
and economics, medicine, pharmacy, commercial science, teacher 
training, and higher teacher training. Universities operated in the 
provinces of Kampong Cham, Takev, Batdambang; and in Phnom 
Penh, the University of Agricultural Sciences and the University 
of Fine Arts offered training. The increased fighting following the 
1970 coup closed the three provincial universities. 

During the Khmer Rouge regime, education was dealt a severe 
setback, and the great strides made in literacy and in education 



127 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

during the two decades following independence were obliterated 
systematically. Schools were closed, and educated people and 
teachers were subjected to, at the least, suspicion and harsh treat- 
ment and, at the worst, execution. At the beginning of the 1970s, 
more than 20,000 teachers lived in Cambodia; only about 5,000 
of the teachers remained 10 years later. Soviet sources report that 
90 percent of all teachers were killed under the Khmer Rouge re- 
gime. Only 50 of the 725 university instructors, 207 of the 2,300 
secondary school teachers, and 2,717 of the 21,311 primary school 
teachers survived. The meager educational fare was centered on 
precepts of the Khmer revolution; young people were rigidly in- 
doctrinated, but literacy was neglected, and an entire generation 
of Cambodian children grew up illiterate. After the Khmer Rouge 
were driven from power, the educational system had to be re-created 
from almost nothing. Illiteracy had climbed to more than 40 per- 
cent, and most young people under the age of 14 lacked any basic 
education. 

Education began making a slow comeback, following the estab- 
lishment of the PRK. In 1986 the following main institutions of 
higher education were reported in the PRK: the Faculty of Medi- 
cine and Pharmacy (reopened in 1980 with a six-year course of 
study); the Chamcar Daung Faculty of Agriculture (opened in 
1985); the Kampuchea-USSR Friendship Technical Institute (which 
includes technical and engineering curricula), the Institute of Lan- 
guages (Vietnamese, German, Russian, and Spanish are taught); 
the Institute of Commerce, the Center for Pedagogical Education 
(formed in 1979); the Normal Advanced School; and the School 
of Fine Arts. Writing about the educational system under the PRK, 
Vickery states, "Both the government and the people have demon- 
strated enthusiasm for education .... The list of subjects covered 
is little different from that of prewar years. There is perhaps more 
time devoted to Khmer language and literature than before the war 
and, until the 1984-85 school year, at least, no foreign language 
instruction." He notes that the secondary school syllabus calls for 
four hours of foreign language instruction per week in either Rus- 
sian, German, or Vietnamese but that there were no teachers 
available . 

Martin describes the educational system in the PRK as based 
very closely on the Vietnamese model, pointing out that even the 
terms for primary and secondary education have been changed into 
direct translations of the Vietnamese terms. Under the PRK re- 
gime, according to Martin, the primary cycle had four instead of 
six classes, the first level of secondary education had three instead 
of four classes, and the second level of secondary education had 



128 




129 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

three classes. Martin writes that not every young person could go 
to school because schooling both in towns and in the countryside 
required enrollment fees. Civil servants pay 25 riels (for value of 
the riel — see Glossary) per month to send a child to school, and 
others pay up to 150 riels per month. Once again, according to 
Martin, "Access to tertiary studies is reserved for children whose 
parents work for the regime and have demonstrated proof of their 
loyalty to the regime. ' ' She writes that, from the primary level on, 
the contents of all textbooks except for alphabet books was politi- 
cally oriented and dealt "more specifically with Vietnam." From 
the beginning of the secondary cycle, Vietnamese language study 
was compulsory. 

Buddhist Education 

Before the French organized a Western- style educational system, 
the Buddhist wat, with monks as teachers, provided the only for- 
mal education in Cambodia. The monks traditionally regarded their 
main educational function as the teaching of Buddhist doctrine and 
history and the importance of gaining merit. Other subjects were 
regarded as secondary. At the wat schools, young boys — girls were 
not allowed to study in these institutions — were taught to read and 
to write Khmer, and they were instructed in the rudiments of 
Buddhism. 

In 1933 a secondary school system for novice monks was created 
within the Buddhist religious system. Many wat schools had so- 
called Pali schools that provided three years of elementary educa- 
tion from which the student could compete for entrance into the 
Buddhist lycees. Graduates of these lycees could sit for the entrance 
examination to the Buddhist University in Phnom Penh. The cur- 
riculum of the Buddhist schools consisted of the study of Pali, of 
Buddhist doctrine, and of Khmer, along with mathematics, Cam- 
bodian history and geography, science, hygiene, civics, and agricul- 
ture. Buddhist instruction was under the authority of the Ministry 
of Religion. 

Nearly 600 Buddhist primary schools, with an enrollment of more 
than 10,000 novices and with 800 monks as instructors, existed 
in 1962. The Preah Suramarit Buddhist Lycee — a four-year insti- 
tution in Phnom Penh founded in 1955 — included courses in Pali, 
in Sanskrit, and in Khmer, as well as in many modern disciplines. 
In 1962 the student body numbered 680. The school's graduates 
could continue their studies in the Preah Sihanouk Raj Buddhist 
University created in 1959. The university offered three cycles of 
instruction; the doctoral degree was awarded after successful com- 
pletion of the third cycle. In 1962 there were 107 students enrolled 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



in the Buddhist University. By the 1969-70 academic year, more 
than 27,000 students were attending Buddhist religious elemen- 
tary schools, 1,328 students were at Buddhist lycees, and 176 stu- 
dents were enrolled at the Buddhist University. 

The Buddhist Institute was a research institution formed in 1930 
from the Royal Library. The institute contained a library, record 
and photograph collections, and a museum. Several commissions 
were part of the institute. A folklore commission published collec- 
tions of Cambodian folktales, a Tripitaka Commission completed 
a translation of the Buddhist canon into Khmer, and a dictionary 
commission produced a definitive two- volume dictionary of Khmer. 
No information was available in 1987 regarding the fate of the tem- 
ple schools, but it is doubtful that they were revived after the fall 
of the Khmer Rouge regime. 

Private Education 

For a portion of the urban population in Cambodia, private edu- 
cation was important in the years before the communist takeover. 
Some private schools were operated by ethnic or religious minori- 
ties — Chinese, Vietnamese, European, Roman Catholic, and Mus- 
lim — so that children could study their own language, culture, or 
religion. Other schools provided education to indigenous children 
who could not gain admission to a public school. Attendance at 
some of the private schools, especially those in Phnom Penh, con- 
ferred a certain amount of prestige on the student and on the stu- 
dent's family. 

The private educational system included Chinese-language 
schools, Vietnamese-language (often Roman Catholic) schools, 
French-language schools, English-language schools, and Khmer- 
language schools. Enrollment in private primary schools rose from 
32,000 in the early 1960s to about 53,500 in 1970, although en- 
rollment in private secondary schools dropped from about 19,000 
to fewer than 8,700 for the same period. In 1962 there were 195 
Chinese schools, 40 Khmer schools, 15 Vietnamese schools, and 
14 French schools operating in Cambodia. Private secondary edu- 
cation was represented by several high schools, notably the Lycee 
Descartes in Phnom Penh. 

All of the Vietnamese schools in Phnom Penh and some of the 
Chinese schools there were closed by government decree in 1970. 
There was no information available in 1987 that would have in- 
dicated the presence of any private schools in the PRK, although 
there was some private instruction, especially in foreign lan- 
guages. 



131 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Health and Welfare 

The government made a great effort to train new medical per- 
sonnel, especially nurses and midwives, following independence 
in 1953. By the late 1950s, however, infant mortality reportedly 
was as high as 50 percent. Dysentery, malaria, yaws, tuberculo- 
sis, trachoma, various skin diseases, and parasitic diseases were 
common. Inadequate nutrition, poor sanitary conditions, poor 
hygiene practices, and a general lack of adequate medical treat- 
ment combined to give the average Cambodian a life expectancy 
of about forty- six years by the late 1960s. This figure represented 
a significant increase from the thirty-year life expectancy reported 
a decade earlier. The catastrophic effects of the war and Khmer 
Rouge rule reversed this positive trend. During the unrest, many 
Western- trained physicians were killed or fled the country. Modern 
medicines were in short supply, and traditional herbal remedies 
were used. 

Public Health 

According to traditional Cambodian beliefs, disease may be 
caused by some underlying spiritual cause. Evil spirits or "bad air" 
are believed to cause many diseases and can be expelled from the 
body of a sick person by trained practitioners, who may be tradi- 
tional healers — bonzes, former bonzes, herbalists, folk healers — 
or Western-trained doctors and nurses. Aside from a wide variety 
of herbal remedies, traditional healing practices include scrap- 
ing the skin with a coin, ring, or other small object; sprinkling or 
spraying water on the sick person; and prayer. The use of cup- 
ping glasses (in French, ventouse) continued in widespread use in 
the late 1980s. 

Sanitation practices in rural Cambodia are often primitive. The 
water supply is the main problem; rivers and streams are common 
sources of drinking water and of water for cooking. These water 
sources are often the same ones used for bathing, washing clothes, 
and disposing of waste products. Adequate sewage disposal is non- 
existent in most rural and suburban areas. Sanitary conditions in 
the largest urban areas — Phnom Penh, Batdambang city, and Kam- 
pong Cham city — were much improved over the conditions in the 
rural areas, however. By the early 1970s, Phnom Penh had three 
water purification plants, which were adequate for the peacetime 
population but could not provide safe water when the city's popu- 
lation increased significantly in the mid-1970s. The city had regu- 
lar garbage collection, and sewage was usually disposed of in septic 
tanks. 



132 



The Society and Its Environment 



The medical situation in Cambodia faced its first crisis at the 
time of independence in 1953. Many French medical personnel 
departed, and few trained Cambodians were left to replace them. 
In addition to a lack of personnel, a shortage of medical supplies 
and facilities threatened health care. To correct the first problem, 
in 1953 the government established a school of medicine and a 
school of nursing, the Royal Faculty of Medicine of Cambodia 
(which became the Faculty of Medicine, Pharmacy, and Paramed- 
ical Science in 1972, and probably the Faculty of Medicine and 
Pharmacy which reopened in 1980). The first class of candidates 
for the degree of doctor of medicine was enrolled in 1958. In 1962 
this school became part of the University of Phnom Penh, and in 
1967 it expanded its teaching program to include training for den- 
tists and for medical specialists (see Public School System, this ch.). 
By the late 1960s, trained Cambodian instructors began replacing 
foreign personnel at the Faculty of Medicine, and by 1971 thirty- 
three Cambodian medical instructors represented sixteen special- 
ized branches of medical study. 

A school for training nurses and midwives was operating before 

1970. This institution also trained sanitation agents, who received 
four years of medical training with emphasis on sanitation and on 
preventive medicine. These agents provided medical services for 
areas where there were no doctors or clinics. The number of nurses 
trained almost quintupled between 1955 and 1970. In Cambodia, 
nursing careers had been primarily reserved for men, but the num- 
ber of women entering the field greatly increased after 1955. Mid- 
wives delivered almost half of the babies in the early 1970s. In 
March 1970, eighty-one pharmacists practiced in government- 
controlled areas. By 1971 the number had dropped to sixty three. 

Cambodia never has had an adequate number of hospitals or 
clinics. In 1930 there was only a single 450-bed hospital serving 
Phnom Penh. By 1953 however, 122 public medical establishments 
operated in Cambodia, and, between 1955 and 1970, many im- 
provements were made by the royal government. Old hospital build- 
ings were replaced or repaired, and new ones were constructed. 
In 1962 provincial hospitals, along with many infirmaries, oper- 
ated in all but three provincial capitals. By March 1970, 29 hospi- 
tals, with a total of 6,186 beds, were in operation; by September 

1971, however, only 13 still functioned. 

Phnom Penh had greater hospital resources than other parts of 
the country. In the late 1960s, hospitals served inhabitants in the 
surrounding area as well as residents of the city. At that time, seven 
hospitals (including five teaching institutions), several private clinics, 
twenty- two public dispensaries or infirmaries, and six military 



133 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

infirmaries operated as well. The major hospitals in Phnom Penh 
were the Preah Ket Mealea Hospital, the largest in the country 
with 1 ,000 beds, which was built in 1893; the 500-bed Soviet-Khmer 
Friendship Hospital, built in 1960; the Preah Monivong military 
hospital complexes; the French-operated Calmette Hospital; a 
Buddhist monks' hospital; and a Chinese hospital. Eight of the 
eighteen operating theaters in Cambodia in the late 1960s were 
in Phnom Penh. 

A leprosarium in Kampong Cham Province provided care for 
about 2,000 patients, and the Sonn Mann Mental Hospital at Ta 
Khmau provided care for 300 patients. In 1971 Sonn Mann had 
about 1 , 100 patients and a staff of six doctors, twenty- two nurses, 
one midwife, fifty-four administrative employees, and eighty-nine 
guards. 

Modern medical practices and pharmaceuticals have been scarce 
in Cambodia since the early 1970s. The situation deteriorated so 
badly between 1975 and 1979 that the population had to resort to 
traditional remedies. A Cambodian refugee described a hospital 
in Batdambang Province in the early days of the Khmer Rouge 
regime: "... the sick were thrown into a big room baptized 'Ang- 
kar Hospital,' where conditions were miserable. Phnom Srok had 
one, where there were 300 to 600 sick people 'nursed' by Red 
Khmer, who used traditional medicines produced from all sorts 
of tree rooths [sic]. Only few stayed alive. The Red Khmer ex- 
plained to us that the healing methods of our ancestors must be 
used and that nothing should be taken from the Western medi- 
cine." International aid produced more medicine after 1979, and 
there was a flourishing black market in medicines, especially anti- 
biotics, at exorbitant prices. Three small pharmaceutical factories 
in Phnom Penh in 1 983 produced about ten tons of pharmaceuti- 
cals. Tetracycline and ampicillin were being produced in limited 
amounts in Phnom Penh, according to 1985 reports. The PRK 
government emphasized traditional medicine to cover the gap in 
its knowledge of modern medical technologies. Each health center 
on the province, district, and subdistrict level had a kru (teacher), 
specializing in traditional herbal remedies, attached to it. An in- 
ventory of medicinal plants was being conducted in each province 
in the late 1980s. 

In 1979 according to observer Andrea Panaritis, of the more than 
500 physicians practicing in Cambodia before 1975, only 45 re- 
mained. In the same year, 728 students returned to the Faculty 
of Medicine. The faculty, with practically no trained Cambodian 
instructors available, relied heavily on teachers, advisers, and 
material aid from Vietnam. Classes were being conducted in both 



134 



The Society and Its Environment 



Khmer and French; sophisticated Western techniques and surgi- 
cal methods were taught alongside traditional Khmer healing 
methods. After some early resistance, the medical faculty and stu- 
dents seemed to have accepted the importance of preventive medi- 
cine and public health. The improvement in health care under the 
PRK was illustrated by a Soviet report about the hospital in Kam- 
pong Spoe. In 1979 it had a staff of three nurses and no doctor. 
By 1985 the hospital had a thirty-three-member professional staff 
that included a physician from Vietnam and two doctors and three 
nurses from Hungary. The Soviet-Khmer Friendship Hospital re- 
opened with sixty beds in mid- 1982. By 1983 six adequate civilian 
hospitals in Phnom Penh and nineteen dispensaries scattered around 
the capital provided increasing numbers of medical services. Well- 
organized provincial hospitals also were reported in Batdambang, 
Takev, Kampong Thum, and Kandal provinces. Panaritis reports 
that rudimentary family planning existed in the PRK in the mid- 
1980s, and that obstetrics stressed prenatal and nutritional care. 
The government did not actively promote birth control, but re- 
quests for abortions and tubal ligations have been noted in some 
reports. Condoms and birth control pills were available, although 
the pills had to be brought in from Bangkok or Singapore. 

As of late 1987, the government in Phnom Penh had dissemi- 
nated no information on the spread of the Acquired Immuno- 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS or HIV virus) in Cambodia. In ad- 
dition, the list of common illnesses in Cambodia, as reported by 
international organizations, does not mention Karposi's sarcoma 
and pneumo-cystic pneumonia (PCP), the most common compli- 
cations resulting from infection by the HIV virus. The risk to the 
Cambodian population of contamination by carriers of the HIV 
virus carriers comes from two sources. The more likely of the two 
consists of infected, illegal border-crossers, including insurgents, 
from Thailand, where authorities identified a hundred cases of 
AIDS in 1987 (triple the number in 1986). Less likely is the risk 
of infection from legal travelers. Cambodia remains a closed coun- 
try, and access by foreigners (except for Vietnamese, Soviet, and 
East European visitors) is limited to a few scholars and to mem- 
bers of international and private aid organizations. 

Welfare Programs 

Steinberg cites twelfth-century King Jayavarman VII as hav- 
ing begun a public welfare system in Cambodia. Jayavarman built 
public rest houses along the roads, distributed rice to the needy, 
and banned tax collectors from places where the sick were cared 
for. 



135 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Beginning in 1936, the French colonial authorities passed legis- 
lation affecting the hours of work, the wages, and the worker's com- 
pensation for foreign employees. Later, Cambodians were covered. 
A system of family allotments was instituted in 1955. Under this 
system, employers were required to contribute a monthly sum for 
the welfare of the worker's family. 

A few welfare organizations were established in Cambodia under 
the Sihanouk regime. In 1949 the National Mutual Help Associa- 
tion was founded to provide money, food, and clothing to the needy. 
In 1951 the Cambodian Red Cross was organized to provide aid 
to disaster victims, especially those suffering from floods. The 
Women's Mutual Health Association was formed in 1953. It was 
associated with the Preah Ket Mealea Hospital in Phnom Penh, 
where it provided prenatal and child care. During the 1950s, the 
Association of Vietnamese in Cambodia opened a dispensary in 
Phnom Penh. The most ubiquitous source of assistance for the aver- 
age Cambodian, however, was the network of Buddhist wats that 
extended down to the grass roots level. Also, relatives and, in the 
case of the Chinese, extended families and business associations 
provided assistance to needy members. 

In the PRK under the government's gradual evolution toward 
Marxist- Leninist socialism, the ability of the wat to extend charitable 
aid was seriously impaired because these institutions existed in con- 
ditions of near penury, following their active suppression under 
the Khmer Rouge, and they were barely tolerated by the PRK re- 
gime. Instead, fragmentary evidence suggests that public welfare 
was decentralized and, because of the paucity of resources, received 
only small amounts in funds from the central government. Accord- 
ing to available literature, the care of needy persons was entrusted 
to local party and government committees and, at the lowest eche- 
lon, to krom samaki (solidarity groups). Leaders at these grass-roots 
levels thus were able to evaluate true need and to extend aid vary- 
ing from in-kind assistance to informal job placement. Such de- 
centralization avoided the bureaucratization of welfare but, at the 
same time, it carried its own potential for abuse because aid could 
be apportioned on the basis of fidelity to regime and to party, or 
even to enforce loyalty to local leaders. The extension to the local 
level of such social services, however, indicated that the PRK was 
slowly extending its presence in the countryside, thus reinforcing 
its claim of nationhood, and its control over its territory and over 
Cambodian society at large. 

* * * 



136 



The Society and Its Environment 



The most important published sources on the geography of Cam- 
bodia are Ashok K. Dutt's collection of articles in Southeast Asia: 
Realm of Contrasts and David J. Steinberg's chapters in Cambodia, 
Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. Among the major resources on Cam- 
bodian society are Jean Delvert's Le Cambodge, a major study of 
Cambodian peasants; May Mayko Ebihara's dissertation, "Svay: 
A Khmer Village in Cambodia"; and Gabrielle Martel's Lovea, 
village des environs d } Angkor. Frank M. Le Bar, Gerald C. Hickey, 
and John K. Musgrave's Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia 
provides useful but somewhat dated sketches of the Khmer and 
several of the ethnic minorities in Cambodia. Cambodge: Faits et 
Problemes de Population by Jacques Migozzi and "Kampuchea: A 
Country Adrift" by Ea Meng Try are useful studies of the popu- 
lation of Cambodia before and after the Khmer Rouge takeover. 
The various works of Michael Vickery, Ben Kiernan, and Marie 
Martin provide data on Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge and 
PRK regimes. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography.) 



137 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Economic activity in Cambodia: Collecting palm sugar 
a bamboo ampong, net fishing on the Mekong River, 
selling in a village market. 



THE ECONOMY OF CAMBODIA in the late 1980s was domi- 
nated by subsistence agriculture; the industrial sector was still in 
its infancy. After it came to power in 1979, the new, Vietnamese- 
installed government in Phnom Penh set restoration of the nation's 
self-sufficiency in food, a situation that the country had enjoyed 
throughout prewar times, as a major goal. A persistent guerrilla 
war and a ravaged infrastructure impeded the achievement of this 
goal and of economic recovery in general, however. At the Fifth 
Party Congress of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolu- 
tionary Party (KPRP — see Appendix B), held in Phnom Penh from 
October 13 to October 16, 1985, General Secretary Heng Samrin 
laid claim to some "important successes in agricultural produc- 
tion" in his political report. At the same time, he acknowledged 
that the country's "backward and unbalanced" economy still faced 
tremendous difficulties, including shortages of fuel, spare parts, 
raw materials, skilled labor, and a cadre of professionals possess- 
ing technical expertise and economic management skills. In short, 
the country's material and technical bases had not been restored 
to prewar levels. Prior to its adjournment, the KPRP Congress 
adopted the First Five-Year Program of Socioeconomic Restora- 
tion and Development (1986-90), hereafter referred to as the First 
Plan. 

In 1987 there were signs that reforms legalizing private enter- 
prise were revitalizing the country's economy. Small industrial en- 
terprises reopened, and transportation and telecommunication 
systems were partially restored. As private market activities re- 
sumed, the population of Phnom Penh grew from 50,000 in 
1978— the last year of the Pol Pot regime— to 700,000. Economic 
revitalization also occurred at Kampong Saom (formerly known 
as Sihanoukville), Cambodia's only seaport and its second largest 
city, which resumed its pre- 1975 industrial and shipping activities. 

Economic rehabilitation has been precarious and has been 
plagued by uncontrollable factors, such as adverse weather and seri- 
ous security problems. In 1987 a severe drought in Southeast Asia 
reduced Cambodia's rice production. According to a senior offi- 
cial of the Ministry of Agriculture, estimated production of milled 
rice fell that year to approximately 1 million tons, about 300,000 
tons below the level of fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1986. (Cam- 
bodia needs at least 1.9 million tons of rice annually for a popula- 
tion of 6.5 million). 



141 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

The prospects for Cambodia's economic revitalization were poor 
in the late 1980s. The country's infrastructure was both weak and 
unstable. Factories and workshops, lacking electricity and supplies, 
operated only intermittently and at low capacity. The economy re- 
lied heavily — and almost completely after 1980 — on foreign aid from 
communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union and the So- 
cialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam); Western nations, Japan, 
and China had terminated economic assistance to Cambodia in 
1980 to protest the presence of Vietnamese troops in that country. 
According to General Secretary Samrin, Cambodia would require 
"dozens of years" to restore its economy and to accomplish "a 
gradual passage toward socialism." Internationally, Cambodia in 
the future may have the option of joining the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA, CEMA, or Comecon — see Glos- 
sary). If the Vietnamese troops leave, the country also may be 
offered some form of economic cooperation by other Asian and 
Western nations. In either case, however, Cambodia is very poor, 
produces littie, and is not likely to prove an enticing economic part- 
ner. For this reason, in the forging of new economic links with the 
East and with the West, the country is likely to be relegated to a 
passive role, and the initiative will probably belong to the larger 
states, who will decide on what terms to share their largesse with 
Cambodia. 

Because of insufficient and inconsistent — and therefore unreli- 
able — data, analysis of Cambodia's war-torn economy can only 
be tentative. In the late 1980s, key economic indicators were missing 
or were difficult to reconcile, particularly for the Pol Pot period 
(1975-78). Since 1979 government economic publications have been 
scarce, and official statistics represent targets and estimates spelled 
out in the country's economic development plans rather than ac- 
tual figures. 

Economic Setting 

Seasonal monsoons and diverse topography significantiy influence 
Cambodia's economy (see Environment, ch. 2). The southwest 
monsoon brings the rainy season (May to October), which is suit- 
able for planting and growing the rice seedlings, and the northeast 
monsoon sends back dry air (November to March), which makes 
possible the paddy harvest. 

The country's lakes and rivers also affect the economy. They 
are an abundant source of fish, a mainstay of the Cambodian diet, 
and they make possible irrigated agriculture, on which the coun- 
try depends for its livelihood (see Climate, ch. 2). The principal 
waterway, the Mekong River, is an important trade route and 



142 



The Economy 



avenue of communication. Since ancient times, the Tonle Sap 
(Great Lake), the Tonle Sab and the Mekong rivers, and their tribu- 
taries have been centers of economic and political power. Phnom 
Penh — the site of the royal residence, the administrative capital, 
and, in general, the locus of power, of culture, and of business — is 
situated at the junction of the Tonle Sab and the Mekong. 

Natural Resources 

Metals and Minerals 

In general, Cambodia's mineral resources appear to be limited. 
In the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, however, exploration 
by Chinese experts in Kampong Thum Province disclosed com- 
mercially exploitable deposits of iron ore amounting to about 5.2 
million tons. Western sources indicated possible reserves of high- 
grade iron ore, ranging from 2.5 million to 4.8 million tons, in 
the northern part of the country. Chinese explorations also revealed 
manganese ore reserves, estimated at about 120,000 tons, in Kam- 
pong Thum Province. 

Deposits of phosphate, limestone, and clay of exploitable qual- 
ity and quantity have also been reported. A few thousand tons of 
phosphate are extracted annually in Kampot Province and are 
processed locally or at a small plant in Batdambang Province. In 
addition, salt and coal also may be present in Cambodia's geolog- 
ical strata. Rubies, sapphires, and zircons have been mined since 
at least the late 1800s, mostly at Ba Kev, Stoeng Treng Province, 
and at Pailin, Batdambang Province. Limited gold and silver 
deposits have been reported in several parts of the country. 

Hydroelectric Power 

The country's hydroelectric generating potential is considera- 
ble, especially from the swift current of the middle Mekong River 
where it flows through Stoeng Treng and Kracheh provinces. Other 
sites of minor importance are on rivers in the highlands of the north- 
eastern and north-central parts of the country. Although the Tonle 
Sap is Cambodia's dominant hydraulic feature, the rivers flowing 
into this great lake have littie or no exploitable potential. In general, 
development of the country's water potential appears to be more 
important for the expansion of irrigation than for the production 
of electricity. 

Petroleum 

In late 1969, the Cambodian government granted a permit to 
a French company to explore for petroleum in the Gulf of Thailand. 



143 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

By 1972 none had been located, and exploration ceased when the 
Khmer Republic (see Appendix B) fell in 1975. Subsequent oil and 
gas discoveries in the Gulf of Thailand and in the South China 
Sea, however, could spark renewed interest in Cambodia's offshore 
area, especially because the country is on the same continental shelf 
as its Southeast Asian oil-producing neighbors. 

Forestry 

Another natural resource is the forests, which cover approxi- 
mately 70 percent of the country and which potentially constitute 
a second pillar of the economy in addition to the primary one, 
agriculture (see table 5). A survey in the 1960s disclosed that Cam- 
bodia had more than 13 million hectares of forests that contained 
many species of tropical growth and trees but not teak or other 
valuable sources of hardwood. Some destruction of the forest en- 
vironment undoubtedly occurred in the war that followed in the 
1970s, but its extent has not been determined. Most of the heavy 
fighting took place in areas uncovered by dense tropical jungle. 
As of late 1987, forest resources had not yet been fully exploited 
because of poor security in the countryside and a lack of electrical 
and mechanical equipment, such as power tools and lumber trucks. 
Nevertheless, the Cambodian government reportedly has discussed 
with Vietnam the possibility of coordinated reforestation programs. 

Timber and firewood are the main forest products. Timber is 
considered one of the four economic initiatives of the government's 
First Plan. Timber production was projected to reach a peak of 
200,000 cubic meters in 1990. 

Labor Force 

Cambodia ranks among the least populated Asian nations with 
an estimated 1987 population of only about 6.3 million to 6.4 mil- 
lion. Its density of approximately 36 persons per square kilometer 
is about one-fifth of Vietnam's population density of 187 persons 
per square kilometer. The First Plan set the population growth rate 
at 2.8 percent per year, up from the average annual growth rate 
of 2.3 percent for the 1978 to 1985 period (see Population, ch. 2). 

In 1987 observers estimated that about 34.5 percent of the popu- 
lation was under 15 years of age and that 3 percent was 62.5 or 
older. An estimated 63 percent of the population (or about 4 mil- 
lion people) were between the ages of 15 and 64. The economi- 
cally active segment of the population, the work force, was probably 
around 3 million people, or 46 percent of the total population. This 
estimated percentage of the labor force remained relatively con- 
stant from 1962 — when the census showed a work force of 2.5 



144 



The Economy 



million people out of a total population of 5.73 million — until the 
1980s. 

In 1983 all public-sector employees, including state employees, 
armed forces personnel, industrial workers, artisans, teachers, and 
party cadres, accounted for approximately 8 percent of an econom- 
ically active population of between 2.5 million and 3 million. Ap- 
proximately 80 percent of the work force was engaged in agriculture, 
in forestry, and in fishing. 

A critical shortage of qualified and professional personnel 
emerged as technicians, engineers, skilled workers, and trained 
managers either fled the country or fell victim to executions under 
the Pol Pot regime. In 1980 the Ministry of Agriculture had only 
200 technicians, down from a total of 1,600 in 1975. 

Moreover, the continuing conflict diverted part of the work force 
to combat zones or to security-related projects (see Military De- 
velopments in Postwar Cambodia, ch. 5). In March 1984, the 
government initiated a forced-labor program, employing civilians 
in ''national defense work" to seal the 830 kilometers of frontier 
with Thailand. This project, code-named K-5, diverted from the 
labor force a number of conscripts (aged 18 to 45) ranging from 
25,000 to 30,000 for each province, or as high as 3,000 for each 
district of Cambodia. The labor shortage constituted a major im- 
pediment to economic progress, a point stressed by Heng Samrin 
at the Fifth Party Congress when he said that "Labor ... is scat- 
tered at present in order to face the needs of the struggle," adding 
that the "lack of qualified labor and specialized cadres . . . has 
prevented us from ensuring that current works satisfy the require- 
ments for development." 

Economic Developments after Independence 

The predominance of agriculture and the lack — or neglect — of 
real industrial development have characterized Cambodia's modern 
economy since independence in 1953. Wet rice cultivation tradi- 
tionally has played a key role in peasant subsistence, in national 
self-sufficiency in food production, in trade relations with other 
states, and in governmental revenues for national development. 
Conversely, the government has made few attempts to industrial- 
ize the nation. 

After Cambodia became independent in 1953, the country's eco- 
nomic policies were shaped by the succession of governments that 
followed. Prince Sihanouk opted for unconditional aid from the 
East and from the West, and the nation made modest strides. The 
Lon Nol government would have adhered to a laissez-faire doc- 
trine, but it was overwhelmed by the war around it. The Khmer 



145 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Rouge (see Appendix B) adopted a fanatical and doctrinaire self- 
reliance, and the Cambodian people and nation were ravaged by 
it. The post- 1979 government of the People's Republic of Kam- 
puchea (PRK — see Appendix B), with its Vietnamese mentors, ac- 
quiesced to a pragmatic combination of socialism and small-scale 
capitalism, and the country achieved some limited rehabilitative 
goals. In the late 1980s, government policies fundamentally relied 
upon the nation's own sparse resources — chiefly agriculture, a na- 
scent industrial base, and modest foreign aid from Comecon coun- 
tries and non- governmental international organizations. 

Sihanouk's Peacetime Economy, 1953-70 

Sihanouk's political neutrality, which formed the cornerstone of 
his foreign policy, had a significant effect on Cambodia's economic 
development. Sihanouk insisted that the economic dimension of 
neutrality meant either total rejection of international aid (as prac- 
ticed by Burma under Ne Win) or acceptance of foreign economic 
assistance from all countries without strings attached. Indeed, dur- 
ing the first decade that he was in power in newly independent Cam- 
bodia (1953-63), the prince carefully practiced his "purer form 
of neutrality between East and West" in seeking foreign economic 
assistance for development (see Cambodia under Sihanouk, 1954- 
70, ch. 1). 

In 1963 however, Cambodia's economy started to stagnate when 
Sihanouk decided to link his economic neutrality policy to the coun- 
try 's territorial integrity and border security. He rejected further 
assistance from the United States, because Washington supported 
the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), and from Thailand, 
with which Cambodia had continuous frontier disputes. In a related 
move, Sihanouk nationalized trading companies, banks, insurance, 
and major industries, thereby causing economic deterioration be- 
tween 1963 and 1969. The 1967 Samlot (Batdambang) revolt and 
the February 1970 government decision to demonetize (or exchange) 
the old 500 riel (for value of the riel — see Glossary) banknotes were 
crucial events contributing to the end of the Sihanouk era (see Into 
the Maelstrom: Insurrection and War, 1967-75, ch. 1; The Sec- 
ond Indochina War, 1954-75, ch. 5). 

During his tenure after independence, Sihanouk used the coun- 
try's ill-defined constitution to monitor all government activities 
of any consequence and to bend the government's decision-making 
process to his advantage. During the course of nation building, 
political aims often prevailed over strictly economic objectives. For 
example, prior to 1967, the government assigned higher priority 
to social improvements, such as health and education, than it did 



146 



Young peasant woman 
pauses during the rice harvest 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



A fruit vendor 
awaits customers in a 
Phnom Penh marketplace 
Courtesy Bill Herod 




147 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

to national economic growth. The government later gave higher 
priority to the productive sectors of agriculture and industry in eco- 
nomic plans for the 1968-72 periods; however, because of war, 
the government did not implement these plans. 

Nonetheless, between 1952 and 1969, Cambodia's gross national 
product (GNP — see Glossary) grew an average of 5 percent a year 
in real terms, with growth higher during the 1950s than during 
the 1960s. In addition, the service sector played an important role 
in Sihanouk's mixed economic system in contrast to its position 
under the regimes of Pol Pot and of Heng Samrin, who considered 
the service sector insignificant and "unproductive." In 1968 the 
service sector accounted for more than 1 5 percent of gross domes- 
tic product (GDP — see Glossary), agriculture accounted for 36 per- 
cent, and manufacturing for 12 percent. 

Agriculture developed under a degree of paternalism from Si- 
hanouk, who donated farm equipment to various villages and, in 
return, received respect and affection from the peasants. In general, 
however, Cambodian agriculture subsisted without much help from 
the government. In 1969 approximately 80 percent of rice farm- 
ers owned the land they cultivated, and the landholding for each 
family averaged slightly more than two hectares. The farmers used 
simple and rudimentary implements that were well suited to their 
needs and to the light weight of their draft animals. Overall, the 
peasants were remarkably self-sufficient. 

Farmers began to cultivate more land, causing rice production 
to increase from an average of 1 .4 million tons in 1955 to 2.4 mil- 
lion tons in 1960. Production remained at that level throughout 
the 1960s. Rice yield per hectare, however, remained low — less 
than 1.2 tons per hectare — during the 1952-69 period. Little was 
done to increase yield through the use of irrigation, chemical fer- 
tilizers, or improved seeds and implements. Average yields in Bat- 
dambang and Kampong Cham provinces, however, were 50 percent 
higher than the national average because of better soil fertility and, 
in the case of Batdambang, larger average landholdings and greater 
use of machines in cultivation. 

Industrial and infrastructural development benefited from for- 
eign economic assistance. In general, the government avoided am- 
bitious plans and focused on small enterprises to meet local needs 
and to reduce foreign imports. In June 1956, the Chinese provided 
Phnom Penh with US$22.4 million in equipment as part of an on- 
going program of industrial economic assistance. In addition, they 
helped build a textile mill and a glass plant in the 1960s. During 
this period, other nations contributed through aid programs of their 
own. Czechoslovakia granted loans for the construction of tractor 



148 



The Economy 



assembly plants, tire-production facilities, and a sugar refinery. 
Other aid donors were the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Japan, and Aus- 
tralia. United States economic assistance to Cambodia amounted 
to more than US$350 million for the 1955 to 1962 period, and it 
was invested mostly in the areas of public health, education, and 
agricultural development. To avoid the appearance of undue de- 
pendence upon foreign aid, Cambodia insisted upon "project shar- 
ing," that is, participation of its own in specific enterprises, such 
as the French- sponsored oil refinery and truck assembly plant at 
Sihanoukville. This stipulation imposed by Phnom Penh also had 
the effect of holding down the scale of many aid projects and the 
amounts of loans extended to the Cambodian government. 

The government also used foreign assistance to expand the coun- 
try's transportation and communication networks. France helped 
to develop Sihanoukville, Cambodia's second largest port, which 
opened in 1960, and the United States constructed a highway link- 
ing the port to Phnom Penh. In addition, the Cambodians, with 
French and West German assistance, built a railway from Sihanouk- 
ville to the capital. 

Despite Sihanouk's claims of economic progress, Cambodia's 
industrial output in 1968 amounted to only 12 percent of GNP, 
or only one- third of agricultural production. Rice and rubber were 
the country's two principal commodity exports and foreign- 
exchange earners during the Sihanouk era. 

The Wartime Economy, 1970-75 

The war that engulfed the rest of Indochina spread to Cambo- 
dia in April 1970, shortly after the coup that deposed Prince Siha- 
nouk. Wartime conditions had a major impact on the country's 
economy, especially on the export sector. Production and export 
of virtually all commodities dropped sharply, as insecurity spread 
throughout the countryside. Intense combat in the nation's most 
densely populated farming areas caused a large segment of the 
peasant population to flee to cities and to towns. By 1975 the popu- 
lation of Phnom Penh had swollen to 2 million, from just 50,000 
in 1955. Moreover, the war seriously dislocated the economic sys- 
tem. Food shortages arose as insurgents interrupted the transpor- 
tation of crops from the countryside to the main marketing centers. 
Increasing budgetary expenditures, skyrocketing inflation, shrinking 
export earnings, and a rising balance-of-payments deficit plagued 
the war-torn economy. 

The war's most damaging effect was on rice production. In 1972 
Cambodia needed to import rice (from Japan and from Thailand) 



149 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

for the first time since independence. Fighting reduced the amount 
of land under rice cultivation to fewer than 800,000 hectares in 
1972, far less than the approximately 3 million hectares that had 
been under cultivation in 1969. The 1972 rice harvest amounted 
to only 26.8 percent of the 1969 harvest. Exports of natural rub- 
ber, the country's second leading foreign-exchange earner, ceased 
shortly after hostilities began in 1970. The war destroyed exten- 
sive rubber plantations and damaged rubber-processing facilities. 

In late 1970, Lon Nol, who succeeded Sihanouk, continued to 
liberalize the economy in an effort to save the country from eco- 
nomic disaster. This endeavor was a continuation of the policies 
he had enacted as head of the government of " national salvation" 
in August 1969. Under Lon Nol's direction, Phnom Penh limited 
the control and the authority of the state export-import agency 
(Societe nationale d'exportation et d'importation — SONEXIM), 
which had been established in 1964 to administer foreign trade, 
to denationalize banks and industries, to encourage private for- 
eign investments, and to allow greater private participation in the 
economy. The new economic policies of the Khmer Republic gradu- 
ally reversed the pattern of state socialism that had formed the 
keystone of Sihanouk's domestic policies. 

On October 29, 1971, the government implemented a com- 
prehensive program of reforms to stabilize the economy. These 
reforms included increased import taxes on all nonessential com- 
modities; increased interest rates on bank deposits and on com- 
mercial loans; elimination of credit to state enterprises and to public 
utilities; introduction of a flexible currency exchange system; and 
simplification of the import system to facilitate the movement of 
goods. The emphasis of the program was to restore monetary sta- 
bility in the face of rising inflation, financial speculation, black mar- 
kets, and other economic problems caused by the war. In a change 
of policy, the government also moved toward greater involvement 
with international and with regional organizations and sought sup- 
port from the World Bank (see Glossary), the International Mone- 
tary Fund (see Glossary), and the Asian Development Bank. 

As the war progressed, Lon Nol's government aimed major eco- 
nomic measures mainly at improving the overall food supply situ- 
ation and at maintaining public confidence in the continued 
availability of essential consumer items. To ensure adequate domes- 
tic supplies, in November 1971 Phnom Penh suspended grants of 
export licenses for major export commodities, such as rice, corn, 
and cattle. Although the move helped maintain stocks of essential 
commodities in the capital and in provincial centers, supplies were 
small relative to demand. 



150 



The Economy 



The Lon Nol government had earlier declared in principle that 
it maintained a policy of "strict neutrality" and would accept for- 
eign assistance from "all countries which love peace and justice." 
As early as April 20, 1970, Cambodia formally requested military 
and economic aid from Washington to help cope with growing war 
expenditures and with an increasing budgetary deficit. As military 
activity in the country intensified, the United States became Cam- 
bodia's largest donor and supplier. Moscow, however, sent medi- 
cal equipment and, in October 1971, the Soviets renewed a financial 
agreement with the republican regime. The Economic Support 
Fund, to which the United Nations (UN), the United States, Brit- 
ain, Japan, New Zealand, Thailand, and Malaysia pledged their 
contributions, provided US$21 million in auxiliary relief. Other 
nations, including Italy, Israel, West Germany, and Switzerland, 
provided funds mostly to assist war victims. France earmarked its 
aid for the maintenance of French educational programs and cul- 
tural institutions. Nevertheless, these palliative measures fell far 
short of what was needed. By 1975 the economy had collapsed, 
and the country was surviving mainly on imported food financed 
by the United States government. 

The Economy under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79 

Under the leadership of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia under- 
went a brutal and radical revolution. When the communist forces 
took power in Phnom Penh in April 1975, their immediate goals 
were to overhaul the social system and to revitalize the national 
economy. The economic development strategy of the Khmer Rouge 
was to build a strong agricultural base supported by local small 
industries and handicrafts. As explained by Deputy Premier Ieng 
Sary, the regime was "pursuing radical transformation of the coun- 
try, with agriculture as the base. With revenues from agriculture 
we are building industry which is to serve the development of 
agriculture." This strategy was also the focus of a doctoral thesis 
written by future Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan at the 
University of Paris in 1959. Samphan argued that Cambodia could 
only achieve economic and industrial development by increasing 
and expanding agricultural production. The new communist 
government implemented the tenets of this thesis; it called for a 
total collectivization of agriculture and for a complete nationaliza- 
tion of all sectors of the economy. 

Strict adherence to the principle of self-reliance constituted the 
central goal of the Khmer Rouge regime. A Phnom Penh radio 
broadcast in early May (about a month after the Khmer Rouge 
arrived in the capital) underscored the importance of Cambodian 



151 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

self-reliance and boasted that during the war the Khmer Rouge 
had used scrap iron and wrecked military vehicles to manufacture 
their own bullets and mines. The statement made it clear that the 
policy of self-reliance would continue in peacetime. In another move 
aimed at reducing foreign influence on the country, the regime 
announced on May 10 that it would not allow foreigners to remain 
in Cambodia but that the measure was only temporary; and it 
added, "We shall reconsider the question [of allowing foreigners 
to enter the country] after the re-establishment of diplomatic, eco- 
nomic and commercial relations with other countries." Although 
Cambodia resumed diplomatic relations with a number of nations, 
the new government informed the UN General Assembly on 
October 6, 1975, that it was neutral and economically self-sufficient 
and would not ask for aid from any country. On September 9, 
however, the Chinese ambassador arrived in Cambodia, and there 
were soon reports that China was providing aid to the Khmer 
Rouge. Estimates of the number of Chinese experts in Cambodia 
after that time ranged from 500 to 2,000. The policy of self-reliance 
also meant that the government organized the entire population 
into forced-labor groups to work in paddies and on other land to 
help the country reach its goal of food self-sufficiency. 

The Khmer Rouge, as soon as it took power on April 17, 1975, 
emptied Phnom Penh (of its approximately 2 million residents) as 
well as other cities and towns, and forced the people into the coun- 
tryside. This overnight evacuation was motivated by the urgent 
need to rebuild the country's war- torn economy and by the Khmer 
Rouge peasantry's hostility toward the cities. According to a Khmer 
Rouge spokesman at the French embassy on May 10, the evacua- 
tion was necessary to "revolutionize" and to "purify" the urban 
residents and to annihilate Phnom Penh, which "Cambodian 
peasants regarded as a satellite of foreigners, first French, and then 
American, and which has been built with their sweat without bring- 
ing them anything in exchange." The only people who were not 
ordered to leave the city were those who operated essential public 
services, such as water and electricity. 

Other Khmer Rouge leaders rationalized the evacuation as a mat- 
ter of self-reliance. They told the Swedish ambassador in early 1976 
that "they didn't have any transportation facilities to bring food 
to the people, and so the logical thing was to bring the people to 
the food, i.e., to evacuate them all and make them get out into 
the ricefields." Indeed, when the evacuees reached their destina- 
tions, they were immediately mobilized to clear land, to harvest 
rice crops, to dig and restore irrigation canals, and to build and 
repair dikes in preparation for the further expansion of agriculture. 



152 



Oxcarts remain a primary conveyance in rural Cambodia. 
(Upturned wagon tongue characterizes Cambodian oxcarts.) 

Courtesy Bill Herod 

The rice crop in November 1976 was reported to be good in rela- 
tion to earlier years. At the same time, plantations producing cot- 
ton, rubber, and bananas were established or rehabilitated. 

While the Khmer Rouge gave high priority to agriculture, it 
neglected industry. Pol Pot sought "to consolidate and perfect 
[existing] factories," rather than to build new ones. About 100 
factories and workshops were put back into production; most of 
them (except a Chinese-built cement plant, a gunny sack factory, 
and textile mills in Phnom Penh and in Batdambang) were repair 
and handicraft shops revived to facilitate agricultural develop- 
ment. 

Cambodia's economic revolution was much more radical and 
ambitious than that in any other communist country. In fact, 
Khmer Rouge leader Premier Ieng Sary explained that Cambo- 
dia wanted "to create something that never was before in history. 
No model exists for what we are building. We are not imitating 
either the Chinese or the Vietnamese model. " The state or cooper- 
atives owned all land; there were no private plots as in China or 
in the Soviet Union. The constitution, adopted in December 1975 
and proclaimed in January 1976, specifically stated that the means 
of production were the collective property of the state (see Demo- 
cratic Kampuchea, 1975-78, ch. 1). 



153 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

The Cambodian economic system was unique in at least two 
respects. First, the government abolished private ownership of land. 
The Khmer Rouge believed that, under the new government, Cam- 
bodia should be a classless society of "perfect harmony" and that 
private ownership was "the source of egoist feelings and conse- 
quently social injustices." Second, Cambodia was a cashless na- 
tion; the government confiscated all republican era currency. Shops 
closed, and workers received their pay in the form of food rations, 
because there was no money in circulation. 

On August 12, 1975, fewer than four months after the Khmer 
Rouge had taken power, Khieu Samphan claimed that, within a 
year or two, Cambodia would have sufficient food supplies and 
would be able to export some of its products. To achieve this goal 
in record time, large communes comprising several villages replaced 
village cooperatives, which had formed in the areas controlled by 
the Khmer Rouge in 1973 and which had spread throughout the 
country by 1975. Unlike China and Vietnam, which had introduced 
collectivization gradually over several years, Cambodia imposed 
the system hastily and without preparation. 

The Khmer Rouge, in line with the slogan, "If we have dikes, 
we will have water; if we have water, we will have rice; if we have 
rice, we can have absolutely everything," organized the workers 
into three "forces." The first force comprised unmarried men (ages 
fifteen to forty) who were assigned to construct canals, dikes, and 
dams. The second force consisted of married men and women who 
were responsible for growing rice near villages. The third force was 
made up of people forty years of age and older who were assigned 
to less arduous tasks, such as weaving, basket-making, or watch- 
ing over the children. Children under the age of fifteen grew vegeta- 
bles or raised poultry. Everyone had to work between ten and twelve 
hours a day, and some worked even more, often under adverse, 
unhealthy conditions. 

On September 27, 1977, in a major speech celebrating the an- 
niversary of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist Party 
(KCP — see Appendix B), Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot asserted 
that, "Our entire people, our entire revolutionary army and all 
our cadres live under a collective regime through a communal sup- 
port system." He then listed the government's achievements in 
rebuilding the economy and concluded that, "Though not yet to 
the point of affluence, our people's standard of living has reached 
a level at which people are basically assured of all needs in all fields. ' ' 

Measuring the economic performance of the Khmer Rouge 
regime was impossible because statistics were not available, and 
no monetary transactions or bookkeeping were carried out. The 



154 



The Economy 



economic life described by foreign diplomats, by Western visitors, 
and by Cambodian refugees in Thai camps ranged from spartan 
to dismal. Phnom Penh became a ghost town of only about 10,000 
people. There were no shops, post offices, telephones, or telegraph 
services. Frequent shortages of water and of electricity occurred 
in all urban areas, and the government prohibited movement across 
provincial borders, except for that of trucks distributing rice and 
fuel. 

Conditions in the cooperatives varied considerably from place 
to place. In some areas, cooperative members had permission to 
cultivate private plots of land and to keep livestock. In others, all 
property was held communally. Conditions were most primitive 
in the new economic zones, where city dwellers had been sent to 
farm virgin soil and where thousands of families lived in impro- 
vised barracks (see Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-78, ch. 1). 

Cambodia made progress in improving the country's irrigation 
network and in expanding its rice cultivation area. Phnom Penh 
radio claimed that a network of ditches, canals, and reservoirs had 
been constructed throughout the country "like giant checkerboards, 
a phenomenon unprecedented in the history of our Cambodia." 
Still, rice production and distribution were reported to be unsatis- 
factory. Rice harvests were poor in 1975 and 1978, when the worst 
floods in seventy years struck the Mekong Valley. Even after the 
better harvests of 1976 and 1977, however, rice distribution was 
unequal, and the government failed to reach the daily ration of 
570 grams per person. (The daily ration of rice per person actually 
varied by region from 250 to 500 grams.) Party leaders, cadres, 
soldiers, and factory workers ate well, but children, the sick, and 
the elderly suffered from malnutrition and starvation. There also 
were reports that the government was stockpiling rice in prepara- 
tion for war with Vietnam and exporting it to China in exchange 
for military supplies. This diverted rice could have been one ex- 
planation for the people's meager rice ration. 

At the end of 1978, when Vietnamese troops invaded Cambo- 
dia, the ensuing turbulence completely disrupted the nation's eco- 
nomic activity, particularly in the countryside, which once again 
became a war theater traversed by a massive population movement. 
Agricultural production was again a major casualty, with the result 
that there was a severe food crisis in 1979. 

Economic Role of the Kampuchean People's 
Revolutionary Party 

After the fall of Pol Pot and the establishment of the People's 
Republic of Kampuchea in January 1979, the Kampuchean (or 



155 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP — see Appendix B), 
led by General Secretary Heng Samrin, set Cambodia's economic 
development policies. Party congresses adopted these policies at 
meetings in January 1979, May 1981, and October 1985. A new 
Constitution, which the National Assembly approved in June 1981, 
defined Cambodia's new socialist direction and the role of the state 
in economic affairs. Then, after six more years of struggling with 
an economy of survival and subsistence, KPRP leaders presented 
their First Plan, which represented a systematic and rational party 
effort at centrally planning and improving the economy. 

New Economic Policy and System 

In contrast to Pol Pot's radical, doctrinaire approach to eco- 
nomic development, Heng Samrin and the leaders of the Kam- 
puchean (or Khmer) National United Front for National Salvation 
(KNUFNS — see Appendix B), the umbrella group of anti-Pol Pot 
forces sponsored by Hanoi, sought to rally public support by for- 
mulating a policy that would be pragmatic, realistic, and flexible. 
In an eleven-point program promulgated shortly before the Viet- 
namese invasion of Cambodia, the front articulated the economic 
guidelines that would mark its tenure in power. These guidelines 
advocated a gradual transformation to socialism; a "planned econ- 
omy with markets"; the restoration of banks, of currency, and of 
trade; the abolition of forced labor; the introduction of an eight- 
hour workday; and pay based on work performed. 

The KPRP socialist economy accepted the private sector. At a 
May 1980 agriculture conference, Samrin reviewed the effective- 
ness of the solidarity groups {krom samaki), production units of seven 
to fifteen families, united in a common endeavor to raise food or 
to produce goods. These production units had been organized in 
line with the policy of moving toward socialism. He affirmed that 
each member of these groups would receive at least one hectare 
of land to cultivate for communal purposes, plus a private plot not 
exceeding a quarter of a hectare on which to grow vegetables or 
to graze livestock. Also, a July 1980 planning conference called 
for a policy of ' ' simultaneous development of family (private) econ- 
omy and national (socialized) economy." The conference also de- 
cided that the state should buy agricultural products from the 
peasants and should sell them manufactured goods at free-market 
prices. 

The KPRP further clarified its economic policy at its Fourth Party 
Congress (its first since taking power in Phnom Penh) from May 26 
to May 29, 1981. It declared that the nation's economic system 
had three main parts — the state economy, the collective economy, 



156 



Lunchtime in Phnom Penh 
Courtesy Bill Herod 

and the family economy, and that each of these parts "had its own 
significant role." 

The state economy covered large-scale agricultural production, 
all industrial production, the communications and transportation 
networks, finance, and domestic and foreign trade. To facilitate 
economic transactions nationwide, the state restored the banking 
system in November 1979, and it reintroduced currency in March 
1980. The KPRP acknowledged that the state economy was small 
and said that it should be expanded. The party leaders, however, 
aware of the pitfalls of central planning, warned against "over- 
expansion and disregard for real needs, production conditions, 
management ability, and economic capability." 

The collective economy — the largest of the three elements — was 
assigned an important role in agricultural rehabilitation and de- 
velopment. It consisted of solidarity groups in agriculture, fishing, 
forestry, and handicrafts. These groups also assumed the task of 
collective purchase and sale. 

The family-run economy included the home economies of the 
peasants, most retail businesses, individual artisans, handicrafts, 
repair shops, and small trade. Although the 1981 Constitution stated 
that the land and other natural resources were state property, it 
gave the citizens usufruct rights to land allotted for a house and 
garden by the state. In some cases, agricultural workers were also 



157 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

allowed to borrow an extra plot of land from the state, to produce 
food on it, and to keep the harvest for their own consumption. 

Private enterprise also made a modest beginning under Cam- 
bodia's hybrid economic system. Citizens were allowed to buy and 
to sell agricultural produce and handicrafts. The law guaranteed 
workers the right to keep their wages, their other income and their 
property. Encouraged and protected by the state, hundreds of small 
shops and factories, each employing a few workers, opened for bus- 
iness in Phnom Penh and in other urban areas. 

This inchoate private sector played such an important role in 
the national economic recovery that party leaders urged its official 
recognition, at the Fifth Congress in October 1985, as a means 
of mitigating the weaknesses of the state-run economy. Thus, the 
government added a fourth component — private economy — to the 
economic system and legitimized it with a constitutional amend- 
ment in February 1986. 

First Plan, 1986-90 

The First Five-Year Program of Socioeconomic Restoration and 
Development (1986-90), or First Plan, originated in February 1984, 
when the heads of the state planning commissions of Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia met in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) and 
agreed to coordinate their 1986 to 1990 economic plans. Heng Sam- 
rin formally announced Cambodia's plan in his political report to 
the congress. 

The plan was intended to open a new phase of the Cambodian 
revolution; it gave highest priority to agricultural production, calling 
it "the first front line," and focused on the four sectors of food, 
rubber, fishing, and timber (see table 6). It set production targets 
for each sector. During the plan period, food production was to 
increase 7 percent a year to keep up with a targeted 2.8 percent 
annual population growth rate, which did not seem to have been 
reached by 1987. The plan projected that by 1990, rubber farm- 
ing would expand to 50,000 hectares in order to produce 50,000 
tons of latex; timber production would reach 200,000 cubic meters; 
jute production would increase to 15,000 tons; and fish pro- 
duction would amount to 130,000 tons. As in the past, the plan 
labeled agriculture and forestry as the real force of the national 
economy. 

The plan was less specific for the industrial sector. It did not 
set industrial production targets, except that for electrical output, 
which was projected to reach 300 million kilowatt hours per year 
in 1990. The plan called attention to the need for selective restora- 
tion of existing industrial production capabilities and for proposed 



158 



The Economy 



progressive construction of a small to medium industrial base, which 
would be more appropriate to the country's situation. 

The plan placed increased emphasis on the distribution of goods. 
Trade organizations were to be perfected at all levels, and socialist 
trading networks were to be expanded in all localities. In particu- 
lar, the trade relationship between the state and the peasantry was 
to be improved and consolidated in accordance with the motto, 
"For the peasantry, selling rice and agricultural products to the 
state is patriotism; for the state, selling goods and delivering them 
directly to the people is being responsible to the people." 

The plan also required that investment be directed toward the 
improvement of the infrastructure, particularly toward the recon- 
struction of communication lines and waterworks. Road, inland 
waterways, and railroad networks had to be restored to serve the 
national economy and defense. 

Last, but not least, the plan cited "export and thrift" (without 
elaboration), as the two primary policies to be followed in order 
to solve the national budget deficit. The plan implied that, into 
the 1990s, exports would have to consist principally of agricultural 
and forestry products, to which some value might be added by low- 
technology processing. "Thrift," although undefined, could, in 
the future, include some kind of government savings plan, with 
incentives for small depositors, to absorb surplus riels generated 
by Cambodia's considerable free-market and black-market sectors. 

Heng Samrin, like his predecessors, Sihanouk and Pol Pot, urged 
Cambodians to undertake the task of economic restoration "in the 
spirit of mainly relying on one's own forces." Unlike Sihanouk 
and Pol Pot, however, the KPRP leader stressed economic and tech- 
nical cooperation with Vietnam. He believed such cooperation 
would be "an indispensable factor" in the development of agricul- 
ture and of forestry in Cambodia. Heng Samrin also advocated 
better economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and with other 
socialist countries. 

Agriculture 

Agriculture, accounting for 90 percent of GDP in 1985 and em- 
ploying approximately 80 percent of the work force, is the tradi- 
tional mainstay of the economy. Rice, the staple food, continued 
to be the principal commodity in this sector. Rice production, a 
vital economic indicator in Cambodia's agrarian society, frequentiy 
fell far short of targets, causing severe food shortages in 1979, 1981, 
1984, and 1987. The plan's 1987 target for the total area to be de- 
voted to rice cultivation was 1.77 million hectares, but the actual 
area under cultivation in 1987 amounted to only 1.15 million 



159 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

hectares (see table 7, Appendix A). After 1979 and through the 
late 1980s, the agricultural sector performed poorly. Adverse 
weather conditions, insufficient numbers of farm implements and 
of draft animals, inexperienced and incompetent personnel, secu- 
rity problems, and government collectivization policies all contrib- 
uted to low productivity. 

Collectivization and Solidarity Groups 

Collectivization of the agricultural sector under the Heng Sam- 
rin regime included the formation of solidarity groups. As small 
aggregates of people living in the same locality, known to one 
another, and able to a certain extent to profit collectively from their 
work, they were an improvement over the dehumanized, forced- 
labor camps and communal life of the Pol Pot era. The organiza- 
tion of individuals and families into solidarity groups also made 
sense in the environment of resources-poor, postwar Cambodia. 
People working together in this way were able to offset somewhat 
the shortages of manpower, draft animals, and farm implements 
(see New Economic and Policy System, this ch.). 

In 1986 more than 97 percent of the rural population belonged 
to the country's more than 100,000 solidarity groups. Unlike the 
large communes of the Khmer Rouge, the solidarity groups were 
relatively small. They consisted initially of between twenty and fifty 
families and were later reduced to between seven and fifteen fami- 
lies. The groups were a form of " peasants' labor association," the 
members of which continued to be owners of the land and of the 
fruits of their labor. According to a Soviet analyst, the solidarity 
groups "organically united" three forms of property — the land, 
which remained state property; the collectively owned farm imple- 
ments and the harvest; and the individual peasant's holding, each 
the private property of a peasant family. 

In theory, each solidarity group received between ten and fifteen 
hectares of common land, depending upon the region and land 
availability. This land had to be cultivated collectively, and the har- 
vest had to be divided among member families according to the 
amount of work each family had contributed as determined by a 
work point system. In dividing the harvest, allowance was made 
first for those who were unable to contribute their labor, such as 
the elderly and the sick, as well as nurses, teachers, and adminis- 
trators. Some of the harvest was set aside as seed for the following 
season, and the rest was distributed to the workers. Those who per- 
formed heavy tasks and who consequently earned more work points 
received a greater share of the harvest than those who worked on 
light tasks. Women without husbands, however, received enough 



160 



The Economy 



to live on even if they did little work and earned few work points. 
Work points also were awarded, beyond personal labor, to individu- 
als or to families who tended group-owned livestock or who lent 
their own animals or tools for solidarity group use. 

Each member family of a solidarity group was entitled to a pri- 
vate plot of between 1,500 and 2,000 square meters (depending 
upon the availability of land) in addition to land it held in com- 
mon with other members. Individual shares of the group harvest 
and of the produce from private plots were the exclusive property 
of the producers, who were free to consume, store, barter, or sell 
them. 

The solidarity groups evolved into three categories, each distinct 
in its level of collectivization and in its provisions for land tenure. 
The first category represented the highest level of collective labor. 
Member families of each solidarity group in this category under- 
took all tasks from plowing to harvesting. Privately owned farm 
implements and draft animals continued to be individual personal 
property, and the owners received remuneration for making them 
available to the solidarity group during the planting and the har- 
vesting seasons. Each group also had collectively owned farm im- 
plements, acquired through state subsidy. 

The second category was described as " a transitional form from 
individual to collective form" at the KPRP National Conference 
in November 1984. This category of group was different from the 
first because it distributed land to member families at the begin- 
ning of the season according to family size. In this second category, 
group members worked collectively only on heavy tasks, such as 
plowing paddy fields and transplanting rice seedlings. Otherwise, 
each family was responsible for the cultivation of its own land 
allotment and continued to be owner of its farm implements and 
animals, which could be traded by private agreement among mem- 
bers. Some groups owned a common pool of rice seeds, contributed 
by member families, and of farm implements, contributed by the 
state. The size of the pool indicated the level of the group's collec- 
tivization. The larger the pool, the greater the collective work. In 
groups that did not have a common pool of rice and tools, produc- 
tive labor was directed primarily to meeting the family's needs, 
and the relationship between the agricultural producers and the 
market or state organizations was very weak. 

The third category was classified as the family economy. As in 
the second category, the group allocated land to families at the be- 
ginning of the season, and farm implements continued to be their 
private property. In this third category, however, the family culti- 
vated its own assigned lot, owned the entire harvest, and sold its 



161 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

surplus directly to state purchasing organizations. In the solidarity 
groups of this category, there was no collective effort, except in 
administrative and sociocultural matters. 

The government credited the solidarity group system with re- 
habilitating the agricultural sector and increasing food production. 
The system's contribution to socialism, however, was less visible 
and significant. According to Chhea Song, deputy minister of 
agriculture, a mere 10 percent of the solidarity groups really worked 
collectively in the mid-1980s (seven years after solidarity groups 
had come into operation). Seventy percent of the solidarity groups 
performed only some tasks in common, such as preparing the fields 
and planting seeds. Finally, 20 percent of the agricultural workers 
farmed their land as individuals and participated in the category 
of the family economy. 

Rice Production and Cultivation 

In 1987 statistics on rice production were sparse, and they varied 
depending upon sources. Cambodian government figures were 
generally lower than those provided by the UN Food and Agricul- 
ture Organization (FAO) for the period from 1979 to 1985 (see 
table 8, Appendix A). 

Political and technical factors account for the discrepancies. Data 
collection in the war-torn nation is difficult because of the lack of 
trained personnel. Moreover, representatives of international and 
of foreign relief organizations are not permitted to travel beyond 
Phnom Penh, except with special permission, because of security 
and logistics problems. In addition, international and Cambodian 
sources use different benchmarks in calculating rice production. 
FAO computes the harvest by calendar year; Cambodian officials 
and private observers base their calculations on the harvest sea- 
son, which runs from November to February and thus extends over 
two calendar years. Last of all, a substantial statistical difference 
exists between milled rice and paddy (unmilled rice) production, 
compounding problems in compiling accurate estimates. In terms 
of weight, milled rice averages only 62 percent of the original un- 
milled paddy. Estimates sometimes refer to these two kinds of rice 
interchangeably . 

Despite statistical discrepancies, there is consensus that annual 
unmilled rice production during the 1979 to 1987 period did not 
reach the 1966 level of 2.5 million tons. Nevertheless, since 1979, 
Cambodian rice production has increased gradually (except dur- 
ing the disastrous 1984 to 1985 season), and the nation in the late 
1980s had just begun to achieve a precarious self-sufficiency, if es- 
timates were borne out (see table 9, Appendix A). 



162 



A woman cuts and 
wraps cakes of soap 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



A machinist plies her trade 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



Cambodia's cultivated rice land can be divided into three areas. 
The first and richest (producing more than one ton of rice per hec- 
tare) covers the area of the Tonle Sap Basin and the provinces of 
Batdambang, Kampong Thum, Kampong Cham, Kandal, Prey 
Veng, and Svay Rieng. The second area, which yields an average 
of four-fifths of a ton of rice per hectare, consists of Kampot and 
Kaoh Kong provinces along the Gulf of Thailand, and some less 
fertile areas of the central provinces. The third area, with rice yields 
of less than three-fifths of a ton per hectare, is comprised of the 
highlands and the mountainous provinces of Preah Vihear, Stoeng 
Treng, Rotanokiri (Ratanakiri), and Mondol Kiri (Mondolkiri) . 

Cambodia has two rice crops each year, a monsoon-season crop 
(long-cycle) and a dry-season crop. The major monsoon crop is 
planted in late May through July, when the first rains of the mon- 
soon season begin to inundate and soften the land. Rice shoots are 
transplanted from late June through September. The main har- 
vest is usually gathered six months later, in December. The dry- 
season crop is smaller, and it takes less time to grow (three months 
from planting to harvest). It is planted in November in areas that 



163 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

have trapped or retained part of the monsoon rains, and it is har- 
vested in January or February. The dry-season crop seldom ex- 
ceeds 15 percent of the total annual production. 

In addition to these two regular crops, peasants plant floating 
rice in April and in May in the areas around the Tonle Sap (Great 
Lake), which floods and expands its banks in September or early 
October (see Environment, ch. 2). Before the flooding occurs, the 
seed is spread on the ground without any preparation of the soil, 
and the floating rice is harvested nine months later, when the stems 
have grown to three or four meters in response to the peak of the 
flood (the floating rice has the property of adjusting its rate of growth 
to the rise of the flood waters so that its grain heads remain above 
water). It has a low yield, probably less than half that of most other 
rice types, but it can be grown inexpensively on land for which 
there is no other use. 

The per-hectare rice yield in Cambodia is among the lowest in 
Asia. The average yield for the wet crop is about 0.95 ton of un- 
milled rice per hectare. The dry-season crop yield is traditionally 
higher — 1.8 tons of unmilled rice per hectare. New rice varieties 
(IR36 and IR42) have much higher yields — between five and six 
tons of unmilled rice per hectare under good conditions. Unlike 
local strains, however, these varieties require a fair amount of urea 
and phosphate fertilizer (25,000 tons for 5,000 tons of seed), which 
the government could not afford to import in the late 1980s. 

Other Food and Commercial Crops 

The main secondary crops in the late 1980s were maize, cassava, 
sweet potatoes, groundnuts, soybeans, sesame seeds, dry beans, 
and rubber (see table 10, Appendix A). According to Phnom Penh, 
the country produced 92,000 tons of corn (maize), as well as 100,000 
tons of cassava, about 34,000 tons of sweet potatoes, and 37,000 
tons of dry beans in 1986. In 1987 local officials urged residents 
of the different agricultural regions of the country to step up the 
cultivation of subsidiary food crops, particularly of starchy crops, 
to make up for the rice deficit caused by a severe drought. 

The principal commercial crop is rubber. In the 1980s, it was 
an important primary commodity, second only to rice, and one 
of the country's few sources of foreign exchange. Rubber planta- 
tions were damaged extensively during the war (as much as 20,000 
hectares was destroyed), and recovery was very slow. In 1986 rubber 
production totaled about 24,500 tons (from an area of 36,000 hect- 
ares, mostly in Kampong Cham Province), far below the 1969 
prewar output of 50,000 tons (produced from an area of 50,000 
hectares). 



164 



The Economy 



The government began exporting rubber and rubber products 
in 1985. A major customer was the Soviet Union, which imported 
slightiy more than 10,000 tons of Cambodian natural rubber an- 
nually in 1985 and in 1986. In the late 1980s, Vietnam helped Cam- 
bodia restore rubber-processing plants. The First Plan made rubber 
the second economic priority, with production targeted at 50,000 
tons — from an expanded cultivated area of 50,000 hectares — by 1990. 

Other commercial crops included sugarcane, cotton, and tobacco. 
Among these secondary crops, the First Plan emphasized the 
production of jute, which was to reach the target of 15,000 tons 
in 1990 (see table 11, Appendix A). 

Livestock 

Animal husbandry has been an essential part of Cambodian eco- 
nomic life, but a part that farmers have carried on mostly as a side- 
line. Traditionally, draft animals — water buffalo and oxen — have 
played a crucial role in the preparation of rice fields for cultiva- 
tion. In 1979 the decreasing number of draft animals hampered 
agricultural expansion. In 1967 there were 1 .2 million head of draft 
animals; in 1979 there were only 768,000. 

In 1987 Quan Dot Nhan Dan (People's Armed Forces, the Viet- 
namese army newspaper) reported a considerable growth in the 
raising of draft animals in Cambodia. Between 1979 and 1987, the 
number of cattle and water buffalo tripled, raising the total to 2.2 
million head in 1987. In the same year, there were 1.3 million hogs 
and 10 million domestic fowl. 

Fisheries 

Cambodia's preferred source of protein is freshwater fish, caught 
mainly from the Tonle Sap and from the Tonle Sab, the Mekong, 
and the Basak rivers. Cambodians eat it fresh, salted, smoked, or 
made into fish sauce and paste. A fishing program, developed with 
Western assistance, was very successful in that it more than quad- 
rupled the output of inland freshwater fish in three years, from 
15,000 tons in 1979 to 68,700 tons in 1982, a peak year. After level- 
ing off, output declined somewhat, dipping to 62,000 tons in 1986. 
The 1986 total was less than half the prewar figure of some 125,000 
tons a year. Saltwater fishing was less developed, and the output 
was insignificant — less than 10 percent of the total catch (see table 
12, Appendix A). According to the First Plan, fisheries were project- 
ed to increase their annual output to 130,000 metric tons by 1990. 

Industry 

Industry accounted for only 5 percent of Cambodia's GDP in 
1985, down from 19 percent in 1969. Industrial activity continued 



165 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

to be concentrated in the processing of agricultural commodities, 
mostly rice, fish, wood, and rubber. Manufacturing plants were 
small, and they employed an average of fewer than 200 workers. 
These plants aimed to produce enough consumer goods (soft drinks, 
cigarettes, and food items) and household products (soap, paper, 
and utensils) to satisfy local demand. 

The extent of Cambodia's industrial rehabilitation could be 
gauged by a comparison of enterprises in prewar and in postwar 
times. In 1969 the last year before the country was engulfed in the 
war sweeping Indochina, a census disclosed 18 large industries coun- 
trywide (13 public and 5 mixed public-private sector) and 33,000 
small and medium privately owned enterprises. About half the fac- 
tories operating in 1969 were rice mills, or were otherwise engaged 
in rice processing. In 1985 the government news agency (Sarpoda- 
mean Kampuchea) announced that fifty- six factories had been reno- 
vated and had been put back into operation. In the capital itself, 
about half of Phnom Penh's prewar plants had reopened by 1985. 
Most industries were producing at far below capacity because of 
frequent power cuts, shortages of spare parts and of raw materials, 
and the lack of both skilled workers and experienced managers. 
Industrial revival continued to be difficult and extremely slow be- 
cause it was based mainly on the use of limited local resources. 

Major Manufacturing Industries 

In early 1986, the major industrial plants in Phnom Penh in- 
cluded the Tuol Kok textile factory, the largest of six textile facto- 
ries in the city (the factory was idle three days a week, however, 
because of power shortages). There were also four power plants, 
a soft drink plant, a tobacco factory, a ferro-concrete factory, and 
some other enterprises that produced consumer goods. 

In the municipality of Kampong Saom and in neighboring Kam- 
pot Province, rice mills, lumber mills, small brick and tile facto- 
ries, power plants, an oil refinery, a tractor- assembly plant, cement 
and phosphate factories, and a refrigeration plant for storing fish 
were reported to be in operation. In the important industrial center 
of Ta Khmau, Kampot Province, were a tire factory (possessing 
its own generator, but lacking rubber and spare parts), several 
mechanical workshops, and warehouses. Batdambang Province had 
shops for repairing farm implements, a cotton gin and textile mill, 
a jute-bag factory, an automobile and tractor repair plant, and a 
phosphate-fertilizer plant. In Kampong Cham Province, the former 
center for tobacco growing and for cotton garment making, there 
were a cotton-spinning textile factory, some silk-weaving opera- 
tions, and an automobile tire and tube plant. 



166 



Village woman weaving 
Courtesy Bill Herod 

Handicrafts 

Small family-run businesses and private enterprises specializing 
in weaving, tailoring (silk sampot and sarongs, the Cambodian 
national dress), and small manufactured products grew more rapidly 
than public industries, and they contributed significantly to eco- 
nomic recovery. According to official estimates, the output value 
of local and of handicraft industries together amounted to 50 per- 
cent of the value of production in state industries in 1984. In Phnom 
Penh alone, there were 1,840 handicraft shops whose output value 
rose from 14 million riels in 1981 to 50 million riels in 1984. 

Domestic Commerce 

No information was available in 1987 on the volume of the 
domestic trade of locally manufactured products or of imported 
goods. Domestic commerce consisted essentially of contracts be- 
tween agricultural producers and the state on the one hand, and 
the private free market on the other hand. Rice was the principal 
commodity sold to state purchasing agencies in exchange for farm 
implements, consumer goods, or cash. The state increasingly found 
itself in competition with private merchants for the procurement 
of rice. In order to force the peasants to sell rice to the state, the 
government prohibited private rice traders from transporting rice 



167 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

across provincial borders, a measure that had only limited success. 
In 1986 state rice procurement amounted to only 154,000 tons, 
or to just over half of the government's goal of 300,000 tons. Farm- 
ers believed that the state purchase price of 2 . 5 riels per kilogram 
of unmilled rice was less than the cost of production. In addition, 
because the government had insufficient supplies of goods such as 
fertilizer, cloth, and soap to be traded as payment, farmers had 
little incentive to sell their crops to state buyers. Consequentiy, in 
August 1987, the government raised the amount paid to farmers 
for monsoon- season (long- cycle) unmilled rice from 2.5 to 5.5 riels 
in an effort to narrow the gap between the official and the free- 
market prices. At the end of 1987, peasants still complained that 
the price paid by the state was too low. For example, one kilogram 
of improved IR rice was priced at between ten and fifteen riels on 
the free market, but it cost only six riels on the official market. 

In contrast to shrinking state domestic trade, private trade con- 
tinued to grow and to prosper with governmental approval and 
encouragement. Spouses of high party officials and cadres were 
actively engaged in petty trade to bring additional incomes to their 
families. Government workers also moonlighted by working in the 
private sector to augment low salaries and to make ends meet. 
Thousands of retail shops, private markets, and restaurants prolifer- 
ated in Phnom Penh and in other cities. Shops and markets offered 
a variety of consumer goods, from gold and silver to bicycles and 
illegally imported consumer items, such as Seiko watches and 
Heineken beer. 

Foreign Trade and Aid 

The government controlled all official foreign trade. In July 1979, 
the Ministry of Local and Foreign Trade set up the Kampuchean 
Export and Import Corporation (KAMPEXIM, the state trading 
agency) to handle exports, imports, and foreign aid. In addition, 
the National Trade Commission was created to be in charge of both 
internal and external economic coordination. In March 1980, the 
Foreign Trade Bank was formed to deal with international pay- 
ments, to expand trade, to provide international loans, and to con- 
trol foreign exchange. There were reports of special clearing 
arrangements for trade among the Indochinese countries and with 
some members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assstance 
(CMEA, CEMA, or Comecon — see Glossary). 

Beginning in 1982, the government made serious efforts to pro- 
mote foreign trade as a means of accelerating national reconstruc- 
tion and development. The First Plan emphasized exports as a way 



168 



The Economy 



to correct imbalances in the national economy, but it did not pro- 
vide any commodity export target figures. In the late 1980s, Cam- 
bodian officials released information revealing the direction and 
the patterns of trade rather than specific numbers. Most official 
trade was being conducted with Comecon countries in the form 
of exchanges of commercial goods. In the absence of authoritative 
data, unofficial Western sources placed Cambodia's trade deficit 
at US$100 million to US$200 million annually from 1981 to 1987. 
According to the Asian Development Bank, the country's total ex- 
ternal debt in 1984 was US$491 million, up from US$426 million 
in 1983, and US$368 million in 1982 (see table 13, Appendix A). 

In an attempt to increase foreign exchange earnings, the Heng 
Samrin regime in 1987 encouraged expatriate Cambodians to remit 
money to relatives and to friends remaining in the country. Cam- 
bodia's Foreign Trade Bank provided the names of sixteen banks 
in Western Europe, Canada, and Australia that were authorized 
to handle such transactions. The list included the Moscow Narodny 
Bank in London and several capitalistic financial institutions, such 
as the Societe Generale in France and the Union des Banques 
Suisses in Switzerland. 

Composition of Trade 

Since 1979 Cambodia's major imports have consisted of 
machinery, tractors, vehicles, fuels and raw materials for light in- 
dustry, consumer goods, clothing, cement, and chemical fertilizers. 
According to government information, imports during the first 10 
months of 1987 amounted to 97 percent of the plan target, an in- 
crease of about 130 percent over the 1986 figure. 

The principal exports included natural rubber (latex), resin, 
maize, tobacco, soybeans, and timber. Private Western sources es- 
timated Cambodia's 1985 export earnings at US$10 million. Other 
sources reported that they were US$3.2 million just one year later. 
In 1987 the government news agency reported that the volume of 
exports handled by the Kampuchean Export and Import Corpo- 
ration in the first ten months of 1987 had increased tenfold over 
the corresponding period in 1979. 

Major Trading Partners 

Cambodia's major trading partners in the 1980s were Vietnam, 
the Soviet Union, and the countries of Eastern Europe, particu- 
larly the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Czecho- 
slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Cambodia also claimed 
to have trade relations with Japan, one of several countries that 
had recognized Sihanouk's Coalition Government of Democratic 



169 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



Table A. Cambodian and Vietnamese Twin Provinces and Cities, 1986-87 



Cambodian 
Province/City 



Vietnamese 
Province/City 



Batdambang 
Kampot 
Kandal 
Kaoh Kong 
Kampong Cham 
Kampong Chhnang 
Kampong Saom (C) 
Kampong Spoe 
Kampong Thum 
Kracheh 
Mondol Kiri 
Phnom Penh (C) 
Preah Vihear 
Prey Veng 
Pouthisat 
Rotanokiri 

Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey 
Stoeng Treng 
Svay Rieng 
Takev 



Quang Nam-Da Nang 

Kien Giang 

Ben Tre 

Minh Hai 

Tay Ninh 

Hau Giang 

Haiphong (C) 

Cuu Long 

Dong Nai 

Song Be 

Dac Lac 

Ho Chi Minh City/Hanoi (C) 
Thuan Hai 
Dong Thap 
Tien Giang 

Nghia Binh, Gia Lai-Kontum 
Binh Tri Thien 
Phu Khanh 
Long An 
An Giang 



(C) = City or independent municipality 

Source: Based on information from Michael Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics, and 
Society, London and Boulder, Colorado, 1986, 149-50. 



Kampuchea (CGDK — see Appendix B) and had imposed a trade 
embargo on the Phnom Penh government of the People's Repub- 
lic of Kampuchea (PRK — see Appendix B; Foreign Affairs, ch. 4). 

Vietnam 

In February 1979, Cambodia signed a Treaty of Peace, Friend- 
ship and Cooperation with Vietnam that formally strengthened 
"solidarity and cooperation" between the two countries. As part 
of the Vietnamese aid program to Cambodia, a joint scheme of 
pairing Cambodian provinces with Vietnamese "sister provinces" 
was inaugurated in the same year for the purposes of economic 
cooperation and of technical, educational and cultural exchange. 
Cambodia's Rotanokiri Province, however, was linked with two 
neighboring Vietnamese provinces — Nghia Binh and Gia Lai-Cong 
Turn. In addition, the municipality of Phnom Penh was paired 
with two Vietnamese cities — Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. Ex- 
cept for the municipalities of Hanoi and Haiphong, all of the Viet- 
namese participants in the scheme were located in former South 
Vietnam near their Cambodian counterparts (see fig. 1; table A). 

The paired provinces were engaged mostly in barter trade the 
volume and value of which were unpublicized. Some observers 



170 



The Economy 



argued that the system facilitated the integration of Cambodia's 
economy into Vietnam's. They pointed to the case of Batdambang 
Province, which sent tons of rice to its overpopulated and underfed 
Vietnamese sister province, Quang Nam-Da Nang, in exchange 
for bicycles and cement. In another case, Cambodia's Siemreab- 
Otdar Meanchey Province, supplied Vietnamese counterparts in 
Binh Tri Thien Province with unmilled rice and other agricultural 
products; in return, Vietnam supplied workers from Hue and its 
suburbs to help run the building industry in Siemreab-Otdar Mean- 
chey. This exchange came at the expense of Cambodian workers, 
who were assigned to find clay, while the new Vietnamese settlers 
produced bricks and tiles and made a good living. In Siemreab 
city, the Vietnamese also assumed control of the biggest fish- sauce 
factory. 

According to a Cambodian official's evaluation of foreign cooper- 
ation, the pairing system worked successfully. The exchange of 
goods between the sister provinces and cities helped "meet the needs 
of the people promptly." Reportedly, the system also helped Cam- 
bodia fulfill all of its development targets for 1986. In February 
1986, Cambodia and Vietnam signed an agreement to double their 
trade for that year. 

Soviet Union 

The first important trade agreement between Cambodia and the 
Soviet Union was signed in February 1983 and covered three years, 
1983 through 1985. According to a Soviet source, Moscow's trade 
turnover with Cambodia during this period increased from 71.8 
to 100.3 million rubles (for value of the ruble, see Glossary). Cam- 
bodian exports were mainly rubber, while imports from the Soviet 
Union consisted of refined petroleum products, textiles, and chem- 
ical fertilizers (see table 14, Appendix A). 

In July 1984, Cambodia — following the examples of Vietnam, 
Laos, and the East European countries — set up an Intergovern- 
mental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Tech- 
nical Cooperation to manage its bilateral trade with the Soviet 
Union. The first session of the commission was held in January 
1985. At its fourth meeting, in December 1987, protocols were 
signed regarding the restoration of rubber plantations and the 
development of some joint state enterprises. 

On March 28, 1986, the two countries signed a five-year trade 
and aid agreement for the period 1986 to 1990 that would double 
the level of trade over that of the previous five-year period. The 
Soviet export package included tractors, fertilizer, petroleum 
products, machines, and raw materials. In exchange, Cambodia 



171 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

was to export raw rubber, timber, and plant-based industrial 
products such as lacquer. According to the Phnom Penh Domes- 
tic News Service, by the end of 1986 Cambodia had shipped 91 
percent of its planned exports to the Soviet Union and had received 
104 percent of its planned imports in return. During Cambodian 
Prime Minister Hun Sen's visit to Moscow in July 1987, the Soviet 
press reported that the volume of goods sold by the Soviet Union 
to Cambodia in the 1986 to 1990 period would increase one-and- 
one-half times over the previous five-year period, whereas goods 
sold by Cambodia would increase more than four times. In Novem- 
ber 1987, the two countries concluded a trade-payments agreement 
for 1988. Under the terms of this agreement, the Soviet Union was 
to ship vehicles, tractor equipment, and fertilizer and would receive 
in exchange "traditional export goods" from Cambodia. Trade 
turnover between the two countries was projected to reach nearly 
80 million rubles in 1988. 

East Germany 

In 1986 the total trade between Cambodia and East Germany 
reached about 14 million rubles, a 17 percent increase over the 1985 
total of 12 million rubles. Cambodia exported more than 12 mil- 
lion rubles worth of rubber to East Germany and an additional 
million rubles worth of other goods. Cambodia's imports from East 
Germany amounted in value to more than 965,000 rubles. 

Czechoslovakia 

Trade between Cambodia and Czechoslovakia totaled 4.4 mil- 
lion rubles in 1985. In 1986 Cambodia exported 800 tons of rub- 
ber, more than 400 cubic meters of timber, and 700 tons of soybeans 
to Czechoslovakia. Cambodian imports from Czechoslovakia con- 
sisted chiefly of medicine and cloth. The two countries signed a 
protocol in Prague on October 29, 1987, on the exchange of goods 
planned for 1988. Under the terms of the protocol, total trade would 
increase by 19 percent over the 1987 level. Cambodia was to ex- 
port rubber, beans, and timber to Czechoslovakia and was to im- 
port tractors, diesel engines, and pharmaceuticals. 

Poland 

Cambodia's trade with Poland between 1982 and 1985 was es- 
timated at 4.4 million rubles. Cambodia exported rubber, timber, 
and soybeans and imported Polish textiles, ship engines, and glass- 
ware. The two countries set a trade target for 1986 to 1990 amount- 
ing to 14.3 million rubles. 



172 



The Economy 



In 1986 the trade between Cambodia and Poland amounted to 
2.1 million rubles. On February 18, 1987, the two countries 
negotiated a trade agreement for the year stipulating that Cambo- 
dia would export crepe rubber, timber, furniture, soybeans, se- 
same seeds, and farm products; it would import, in return, antirust 
paint, soldering rods, sewing machines, boat engines, raw materials 
for medicine, and consumer goods. 

Illicit Trade with Thailand and with Singapore 

In addition to official trade with communist states, undeclared, 
uncontrolled, but government- tolerated trade with Thailand and 
with Singapore took place among private merchants, despite the 
trade embargo these two countries had imposed on Cambodia. 
Prime Minister Hun Sen reportedly declared that, "If the govern- 
ment can't carry out this trade and the people can, we allow them 
to do it." 

Most of Cambodia's trade with Thailand took place in border 
and in coastal areas, particularly at the southwestern island of Kaoh 
Kong in the Gulf of Thailand. The illicit barter consisted of ex- 
changing Cambodian dried fish, fresh crabs, shrimp, lobster, animal 
hides, elephant tusks, baby crocodiles, and gemstones for Thai 
clothing, sandals, toothpaste and toothbrushes, food, and bicycles. 
The total value of this growing illicit trade is not known, but some 
private sources estimated that it amounted to more than US$1 mil- 
lion a month. 

Cambodia's illicit trade with Singapore was more visible. Ships 
registered in Singapore arrived regularly in Phnom Penh to deliver 
supplies to international relief organizations, operating in the coun- 
try, as well as to private companies. International agencies esti- 
mated the value of undeclared trade with Singapore at US$2 million 
in 1985. 

Foreign Economic and Technical Assistance 

In the 1980s, Cambodia's economy relied heavily on multilateral 
aid and on bilateral economic assistance from Comecon countries. 
The largest donor was the Soviet Union, followed by Vietnam. East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria sent 
mostly humanitarian aid, and they offered scientific and cultural 
assistance. Many Cambodian students received scholarships to 
study in these countries. 

Western countries channeled aid through international organi- 
zations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
the UN Children's Fund, and the Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation (FAO), the World Food Program (WFP), and the UN High 



173 



Cambodia 



Commissioner for Refugees. Private agencies that contributed to 
the rehabilitation of the Cambodian economy included Oxfam, the 
American Catholic Relief Services, the American Friends Service 
Committee, the Church World Service, the World Council of 
Churches, the Lutheran World Service, CARE, and the Cooper- 
ation Internationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite (a 
European Roman Catholic group). 

Soviet Aid 

Soviet economic assistance to Cambodia was projected to reach 
284 million rubles for the 1979 to 1990 period, according to figures 
made public in November 1987. During the years 1979 to 1980, 
when the new Cambodian government clung precariously to power, 
Moscow provided Phnom Penh with a 200 million ruble grant to 
help fight famine and to restore the Cambodian economy. From 
1980 to 1985, Soviet aid, amounting to 44 million rubles, supported 
the restoration of medical and educational centers and included 
the provision of tractors, trucks, and road-repair equipment. For 
Cambodia's First Plan, the Soviet Union provided Phnom Penh 
with aid worth 40 million rubles, an amount that represented ap- 
proximately a 1 percent decrease over that given during the previ- 
ous five years. 

During the 1980s, Soviet credits helped to restore thirty facili- 
ties in various sectors, including electricity, agriculture, health, edu- 
cation, transport, and communications. Major Soviet-assisted 
projects included two power plants, one in Phnom Penh (completed 
in 1984) and the other in Kampong Saom (completed in 1985); 
the renovation and servicing of the 500-bed Kampuchea-USSR 
Friendship Hospital (a 200-bed military hospital), the Kampuchea- 
USSR Friendship Technical Institute, the Pushkin Russian Lan- 
guage Institute, the Institute of Agronomy at Chamka Dong (all 
established in 1985-86); a seed development center; and a ferrocon- 
crete factory. To assist the rehabilitation of the rubber industry, 
the Soviet Union helped Cambodia to plant rubber trees on 20,000 
hectares of land and to restart a crepe-processing plant that could 
generate 20,000 tons of natural rubber annually. On April 26, 1986, 
the Soviet Union signed an agreement to provide assistance for 
several projects, including the construction of an Intersputnik 
ground satellite station, a circus, a veterinary center, three tractor- 
repair workshops, and printers for the semiweekly newspaper 
Pracheachon (The People). Moscow also supplied credits for agricul- 
tural and marine projects. Finally, the Soviets provided 1,285 
scholarships to Cambodian students for the period 1986 to 1990, 



174 



The Economy 



many fewer than the 2,364 scholarships that they had awarded from 
1980 to 1986. 

Vietnamese Aid 

Vietnam's economic and technical assistance to Cambodia were 
difficult to evaluate because neither side chose to disclose the pre- 
cise monetary value of such aid. For example, the Cambodian 
Domestic News Service acknowledged that in 1986 the Vietnamese 
had given Cambodia 4 'some aid with no strings attached" for the 
construction of work sites in Kampong Chhnang and for the Phnom 
Penh-Hanoi Friendship Kindergarten but did not disclose the 
amount of money involved in these projects. 

Vietnamese officials have indicated vaguely that their friendship 
treaty with Cambodia committed them to an annual aid package 
of at least US$25 million. During the first years of the emergency 
period, Vietnam's aid was estimated by outside sources at US$56 
million in 1979 and at US$62 million in 1980. 

A large part of Vietnamese aid was assistance in kind, particu- 
larly food, medical and school supplies, household commodities, 
and commercial vehicles, such as passenger buses for Phnom Penh. 
One important and lasting form of Vietnamese aid consisted of 
a technical assistance package that included the services of Viet- 
namese advisers and technical experts as well as training for Cam- 
bodian cadres and personnel. According to the Cambodian official 
news agency, a total of 431 cadres and other personnel received 
technical training in Vietnam in 1986. In addition, through bilateral 
agreements, Vietnamese experts conducted short-term, on-the-job 
training at several Cambodian ministries, general directorates, and 
offices. The Cambodians reportedly preferred this form of on-site 
training. 

It was reported officially that Cambodian- Vietnamese coopera- 
tion had led to the completion of sixty-five projects. Other projects 
scheduled for the First Plan included consumer- goods enterprises, 
small industrial and handicraft workshops, animal breeding, and 
the building of a greenbelt around Phnom Penh. 

International and Western Aid 

UN relief organizations (the UN Children's Fund, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, FAO, and WFP) and the Interna- 
tional Committee of the Red Cross put together a disaster relief 
program in 1979 to help the Cambodian people and refugees over- 
come famine and disease. The cost of the program amounted to 
US$633.9 million from October 1979 through December 1981 . The 
United States contributed approximately one-third of this total 



175 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

emergency aid. Officials in charge of the program channeled about 
one-half of the total US$633.9 million (US$334.6 million) to areas 
under government control. They allocated the other half to relief 
efforts in border areas and to Cambodian refugees living outside 
the country. During the same period, private volunteer agencies 
provided emergency aid amounting to approximately US$100 
million. 

After the emergency period, the UN aid program to the Heng 
Samrin government declined drastically. In 1983 an estimated US$4 
million was raised against a planned budget of US$16 million; 
however, the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) continued 
its aid programs for Cambodian refugees in camps along the Thai- 
Cambodian border. According to the United States Department 
of State, UNBRO spent nearly US$35 million on relief efforts in 
1985, of which the United States contributed US$12 million. The 
same year, the United States gave US$800,000 in commodities to 
the WFP and another US$2 million to the International Commit- 
tee of the Red Cross for their border relief activities. 

Finance 

Reliable information on the national budget, on banking, and 
on the money supply in 1987, was unavailable. However, Cam- 
bodia was known to have raised revenues through rental and utility 
fees, taxes, business registrations, sales of goods by state organi- 
zations, and exports. Budgetary financing came largely from the 
Soviet Union, Vietnam and, to a much smaller extent, from other 
Comecon members. The government allocated most of the budget 
to current expenditures, such as those for defense and for state em- 
ployees' salaries, the latter of which were augmented by allowances 
of rice, cloth, cigarettes, soap, sugar and other consumer goods 
(see table 15, Appendix A). 

Banking 

The creation of the People's National Bank of Kampuchea in 
1980 reestablished Cambodia's banking system, which Pol Pot had 
abolished immediately after the fall of Phnom Penh in 1975. The 
bank's chairman held ministerial rank in the government (see 
Government Structure, ch. 4). By 1984 more than thirty branch 
banks were in operation. The main functions of the bank were to 
provide funds for state commerce and credits for agriculture. 

Currency 

The Heng Samrin government reintroduced the country's cur- 
rency, the riel, in March 1980, at which time the value of one riel 



176 



The Economy 



equaled the value of one kilogram of rice. The state controlled all 
foreign exchange, and the official exchange rate for visitors was 4 
riels to US$1 in 1980. After five years of relative stability, the govern- 
ment devalued the currency to 30 riels per US$1 in January 1986. 
A subsequent devaluation, reducing the rate to 100 riels per US$1 , 
took place in October 1987. The move was intended to curb infla- 
tion, to stop the growing black market, and to bring in more for- 
eign currency. The free-market rate in Phnom Penh at the time was 
125 to 130 riels per US$1. In December 1987, the People's Na- 
tional Bank of Kampuchea issued new five- and ten-riel notes in 
blue and green and invalidated the country's old red bank notes, 
in an effort to eliminate the problem of counterfeit currency. 

Taxes 

The government approved the country's first tax laws in Novem- 
ber 1982 and implemented them in 1983. There were three 
categories of taxes — business, import, and agricultural. In theory, 
the tax laws stipulated that all private economic enterprises should 
pay taxes, while tax schedules varied according to income, goods 
imported, and agricultural productivity. The Ministry of Finance 
was responsible for tax assessments and for collections on a na- 
tional level. At subordinate government echelons, provincial and 
district committees were charged with this duty. 

In practice, the government faced many difficulties in collect- 
ing taxes. Eventually, it revised assessments to make taxation ac- 
ceptable to the business community and to the peasantry. For 
example, the agricultural tax (also called the "patriotic contribu- 
tion"), introduced during the 1983 to 1984 harvest season, report- 
edly was suspended in 1985, but was reimposed a year later. 
Agricultural tax assessments were based on yields and plots, such 
as lowland paddy, river banks, garden, hillside fields, plantation 
crop, or highland cropland. The government, however, granted 
new concessions to some agricultural cooperatives, which previ- 
ously had been taxed heavily on high-yielding rice harvests, without 
regard to the high costs of production and the high risks in testing 
new varieties of rice. Cultivators who grew rice in both the rainy 
and the dry seasons were subject to tax assessments on each crop. 
Partial and full tax exemptions were granted to peasants who 
brought vacant land into production, to families of soldiers, to the 
war handicapped, and to victims of natural calamities. 

Transportation and Communications 

War and continuing fighting severely damaged Cambodia's 
transportation system — a system that had been inadequately 



177 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



developed in peacetime. The country's weak infrastructure hin- 
dered emergency relief efforts and created tremendous problems 
of procurement of supplies in general and of distribution. Cambo- 
dia received Soviet technical assistance and equipment to support 
the maintenance of the transportation network. 

Roads and Highways 

In the late 1980s, Cambodia had about 13,350 kilometers of 
roads, compared with 19,480 kilometers in 1969. Of the current 
total, only about 20 percent of the roads and highways were cov- 
ered with asphalt and were in passable condition; about 50 per- 
cent of the roads were made of crushed stone, gravel, or improved 
earth; and the remaining approximately 30 percent were unim- 
proved earth or were little more than tracks. In 1981 Cambodia 
opened a newly repaired section of National Route 1 , which runs 
southeast from Phnom Penh to the Vietnamese border. The road, 
which suffered damage during the war years, was restored most 
probably by Vietnamese army engineers. In the late 1980s, Cam- 
bodia's road network was both underutilized and unable to meet 
even the modest demands placed upon it by an unindustrialized 
and agrarian society (see fig. 8). Commercial vehicles, such as trucks 
and buses, were insufficient in number and lacked spare parts neces- 
sary to keep them running. Road construction and maintenance 
were ignored by a financially hard-pressed government, while in- 
surgents regularly destroyed bridges and rendered some routes un- 
safe for travel. 

Railroads 

Cambodia had two rail lines, both originating in Phnom Penh, 
totaling about 612 kilometers of single, one-meter- gauge track. The 
French built the first line, which runs from Phnom Penh to Paoy 
Pet on the Thai border, between 1930 and 1940. Assistance from 
France, West Germany, and China, between 1960 and 1969, sup- 
ported the construction of the second line, which runs from Phnom 
Penh to Kampong Saom. Rail service ceased during the war, but 
resumed in the early 1980s. Guerrilla activities, however, continued 
to disrupt service. 

Water Transportation 

The nation's extensive inland waterways were important histor- 
ically in domestic trade. The Mekong and the Tonle Sab rivers, 
their numerous tributaries, and the Tonle Sap provided avenues 
of considerable length, including 3 , 700 kilometers navigable all year 
by craft drawing 0.6 meters and another 282 kilometers navigable 



178 



I 

i 



The Economy 



to craft drawing 1.8 meters. In some areas, especially west of the 
Mekong River and north of the Tonle Sab River, the villages were 
completely dependent on waterways for communications. Launches, 
junks, or barges transported passengers, rice, and other food in 
the absence of roads and railways. 

According to the Ministry of Communications, Transport, and 
Posts, Cambodia's main ferry services crossing the Basak River 
and the middle Mekong River at Neak Luong (Phumi Prek Khsay), 
Tonle Bet, Sre Ambel, Kampong Cham, and Stoeng Treng were 
restored in 1985. The major Mekong River navigation routes also 
were cleared for traffic. 

Ports 

Cambodia has two major ports, Phnom Penh and Kampong 
Saom, and five minor ones. Phnom Penh, located at the junction 
of the Basak, the Mekong, and the Tonle Sab rivers, is the only 
river port capable of receiving 8, 000- ton ships during the wet sea- 
son and 5, 000- ton ships during the dry season. It remains an im- 
portant port for international commerce as well as for domestic 
communications. 

Kampong Saom, Cambodia's only seaport, reopened in late 
1979. It had been built in 1960 with French assistance. In 1980 
some 180 Soviet dockworkers, having brought with them forklifts 
and trucks, were reportedly working at Kampong Saom as long- 
shoremen or as instructors of unskilled Cambodian port workers. 
By 1984 approximately 1,500 Cambodian port workers were han- 
dling 2.5 tons of cargo per day. According to official statistics, Kam- 
pong Saom had handled only 769,500 tons in the four prior years 
(1979 to 1983), a level that contrasted sharply with the port's peace- 
time capacity of about 1 million tons of cargo per year. 

Airports 

The country possesses twenty- six airfields, of which only thir- 
teen were usable in the mid-1980s. Eight airfields had permanent- 
surface runways. Pochentong International Airport near Phnom 
Penh is the largest airport; it also serves as the main base for the 
renascent Cambodian Air Force (see Kampuchean, or Khmer, Peo- 
ple's Revolutionary Armed Forces, ch. 5). Cambodia opened a new 
Soviet-built airfield at Ream near Kampong Saom in late 1983. 
There are additional secondary airports in Siemreab and in Bat- 
dambang. 

Air Kampuchea was established in 1982 and flew only one 
route — from Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam. In 
1984 commercial air service was inaugurated between Phnom Penh 



181 




180 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

and Hanoi with the arrival at Hanoi International Airport of the 
Kampuchean Civil Aviation Company's (AKASCHOR) first flight. 
Since then, there has been regular air service from Phnom Penh 
to Hanoi, Vientiane, and Moscow. 

Telecommunications 

Postal, telegraph, and telegram services under the Ministry of 
Communications, Transport, and Posts were restored throughout 
most of the country in the early 1980s. Radio communications were 
frequent; the Voice of the Kampuchean People broadcasted ten 
hours daily from Phnom Penh in the late 1980s. An estimated 
171,000 radio sets existed in the country in 1984 (the last year for 
which data were available). Cambodia's only television station 
began broadcasting, with Vietnamese assistance, in December 1984. 
Color transmissions began in July 1986. 

In January 1987, the Soviet-aided Intersputnik space commu- 
nications station began operation in Phnom Penh and established 
two-way telecommunication links between the Cambodian capital 
and the cities of Moscow, Hanoi, Vientiane, and Paris. The com- 
pletion of the earth satellite station (built on the grounds of Phnom 
Penh's old Roman Catholic cathedral), restored the telephone and 
telex links among Phnom Penh, Hanoi, and other socialist coun- 
tries for the first time since 1975. Although telecommunications 
services were limited to the government, these advances in com- 
munications helped break down the country's isolation, both in- 
ternally and internationally. 

* * * 

The major publications on statistical data and key indicators of 
Cambodia's economy are the UN Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the 
Pacific, the FAO Production Yearbook, the ADB Key Indicators, the EIU 
Quarterly Economic Review of Indochina, the Far East and Australasia, 
and the Asian Economic Handbook. 

First-hand observations and field reports from Cambodia are 
found in various issues of the Far Eastern Economic Review and Kees- 
ing's Records of World Events. Cambodian official statements, news, 
and radio broadcasts are monitored and translated into English in 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: East Asia 
and the Joint Publications Research Service's Southeast Asia Report, 
two important sources of information. 

Scholarly studies and analytical essays on the Cambodian econ- 
omy are scarce. Among the most useful is Khieu Samphan's doc- 
toral dissertation, Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development, a 



182 



The Economy 



helpful guide to understanding the Pol Pot regime's economic policy 
and thinking. Ben Kiernan's ''Kampuchea 1979-81: National 
Rehabilitation in the Eye of an International Storm" and Michael 
Vickery's Kampuchea offer good analyses of the economic system 
and its problems, particularly in agriculture and in industry. Two 
studies on the serious food problem in Cambodia are The Quality 
of Mercy by William Shawcross, who focused his study on the Emer- 
gency Food Aid Program to Cambodia during the critical 1979-83 
period, and D. Mosyakov's "Solving the Food Problem in Kam- 
puchea." (For further information and complete citations, see Bib- 
liography.) 



183 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




The Independence Monument in Phnom Penh 



THE 1970S WERE cruel years for the Khmer people, and their 
impact was still being felt in the late 1980s. The decade opened 
turbulently, with the deposition of ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk, 
who had been in power from 1941, during the period when the 
war in Vietnam boiled over into Cambodia. The country, mili- 
tarily feeble and putatively neutral, soon plunged into a succes- 
sion of upheavals, punctuated by foreign incursions, civil war, and 
famine. The Khmer Rouge (see Appendix B), under Pol Pot (also 
known as Saloth Sar) and aided initially by the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (North Vietnam), overran in 1975 the pro-Western 
Khmer Republic (see Appendix B) led by the president, General 
Lon Nol. At least 1 million Cambodians either were murdered or 
starved to death under the Pol Pot regime. In 1979, however, Viet- 
nam ousted the Khmer Rouge regime and installed a puppet re- 
gime headed by Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge military 
commander (see fig. 9). 

The Vietnamese set out to tighten their grip on the country by 
occupying and colonizing it. Meanwhile, the deposed Khmer Rouge 
regime regrouped in remote enclaves near the Thai border to give 
armed resistance to Vietnamese forces and the puppet government 
in Phnom Penh, the nation's capital. 

At the end of the 1970s, Cambodia was divided politically and 
territorially under two regimes, each claiming to be the sole legiti- 
mate government of the nation. Since then, the competing regimes 
have been locked in an armed struggle in Cambodia, as one side 
contested the Vietnamese presence and the other acquiesced more 
or less grudgingly to its role as Hanoi's surrogate. 

Vietnam promised repeatedly to leave Cambodia by 1990, and 
by the end of 1987, Hanoi had staged six partial troop withdrawals. 
Officials in Hanoi indicated, however, that phased withdrawals 
would end and that Vietnamese forces would return to Cambodia 
if there were a threat to Vietnam's national security. Members of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and most 
Western nations were skeptical of the moves and viewed them as 
merely disguised troop rotations. Among Cambodia's noncom- 
munist neighbors, Thailand especially was concerned about the 
threat posed to its own security by a large, well-armed Vietnamese 
army just to the east of its borders. On the diplomatic front, the 
United Nations (UN) routinely condemned the Vietnamese mili- 
tary presence in Cambodia on an annual basis, and most countries 



187 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA 
(1953-70) 

I 

KHMER REPUBLIC 

(1970-75) 

i zz: 

DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA 

(DK) (1975-79) 



PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
KAMPUCHEA (PRK) (1979- ) 



DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA 

(DK) (1979-82) 



COALITION GOVERNMENT OF 2 
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA 

(CGDK) (1982- ) 



DEMOCRATIC 3 
KAMPUCHEA 

(DK) 



KHMER PEOPLE'S 
NATIONAL LIBERATION 
FRONT (KPNLF) 



NATIONAL UNITED FRONT 
FOR AN INDEPENDENT, 
NEUTRAL, PEACEFUL, & 

COOPERATIVE CAMBODIA 
(FUNCINPEC) 



Recognized by United Nations as de jure Cambodian state 

_ De facto control of Cambodia since 1979 
Partners in the CGDK 

1 Retained de jure status even after fall of Phnom Penh in January 1979. 

2 Supplanted Democratic Kampuchea as de jure Cambodian representative in 
United Nations since June 1982. 

3 If CDGK proves unworkable, Democratic Kampuchea will resume its status 
as sole, legitimate Cambodian representative in the United Nations. 



Figure 9. Successive Governments in Cambodia (since Independence) 

withheld diplomatic recognition from the pro-Vietnamese Heng 
Samrin regime in Phnom Penh. 

In 1987 uncertain prospects for peace continued to vex Cambo- 
dian nationalists. Differences — among warring Cambodian factions 
and their respective foreign sponsors over the projected terms of 
a possible settlement — were likely to remain unresolved in the fore- 
seeable future. Meanwhile, the Cambodian people continued to 
suffer from the war between anti- Vietnamese guerrillas on the one 
side and the Vietnamese and the Heng Samrin forces on the other 
side. The Cambodian search for reconciliation among contending 



188 



Government and Politics 



parties can be understood only when the perspectives of foreign 
powers are taken into account. 

In the late 1980s, the ruling political organization in Phnom Penh 
was the Marxist-Leninist Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's 
Revolutionary Party (KPRP — see Appendix B), a political offshoot 
of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP — see Appendix B), 
founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1930. Heng Samrin headed both the 
state bureaucracy and the party apparatus in late 1987. Hun Sen, 
prime minister since January 1985, chaired the single-party, KPRP- 
run government, that was administered by the Council of Ministers. 
In seeking to enlist mass support for its regime, the KPRP depended 
on an umbrella popular front organization, affiliated with numer- 
ous social and political groups, that was called the Kampuchean 
(or Khmer) United Front for National Construction and Defense 
(KUFNCD — see Appendix B). The KPRP, in exercising power 
in Phnom Penh under Vietnamese mentorship, pursued three main 
objectives: to combat the enemy (anti- Vietnamese resistance 
groups); to intensify production for the fulfillment of targets set 
in the First Five-Year Program of Socioeconomic Restoration and 
Development (1986-90), hereafter known as the First Plan; and 
to build up the party's revolutionary forces by strengthening the 
regime's political and administrative infrastructure and its national 
security establishment. The party's foreign policy goals were to rein- 
force solidarity with Vietnam and to develop cooperation with the 
Soviet Union, the principal source of economic assistance to the 
government in Phnom Penh. 

The other regime competing for legitimacy in the 1980s was an 
unlikely partnership of feuding communist and noncommunist 
factions, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(CGDK — see Appendix B). The coalition government, with 
Sihanouk serving on and off as president, was formed in 1982 under 
the sponsorship of China and the ASEAN states. The coalition com- 
prised the Khmer Rouge and two noncommunist groups led by 
Sihanouk and Son Sann. Son Sann, a former prime minister under 
Sihanouk, was known for his dislike of Sihanouk and of the Khmer 
Rouge. 

Despite its claim that it was based inside Cambodia, the CGDK 
was a government in exile. It operated out of Beijing, Pyongyang, 
or Bangkok, or wherever its three leaders — Sihanouk, Khieu Sam- 
phan, and Son Sann — happened to be, whether or not they were 
together. In the 1984 to 1985 Vietnamese dry-season offensive, the 
coalition lost nearly all of its fixed guerrilla bases along the Thai 
border. Nonetheless, its fighters continued to operate in small bands 
in many Cambodian provinces. The CGDK's forces sought to drive 



189 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

the Vietnamese out of the country, to win over the Cambodians 
who were resentful of the Vietnamese, to destabilize the Heng 
Samrin regime, and to seek international aid for continued 
resistance. The coalition government had a distinct asset that its 
rival lacked — it was recognized by the United Nations as the law- 
ful representative of the state of Cambodia. 

Major Political Developments, 1977-81 
Background 

The communist conquest of Phnom Penh and of Saigon (re- 
named Ho Chi Minh City) in April 1975 seemed to presage reali- 
zation of Ho Chi Minh's long-cherished political dream — stated 
in a 1935 resolution of the ICP — an Indochinese federation com- 
prising Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Many observers believed — 
because of Vietnam's efforts to nurture a Cambodian communist 
party that was tied closely to Hanoi — that the Indochinese federa- 
tion that emerged would be controlled by Hanoi. The Khmer Rouge 
victory of 1975, however, won by Pol Pot's chauvinistic and hard- 
line party faction with its abiding distrust of Vietnam, doomed this 
prospect for the time being. 

In mid-1975, a series of border clashes erupted between Cam- 
bodian and Vietnamese forces. Each side blamed the other for in- 
itiating the conflicts, which occurred even as Hanoi defended the 
Pol Pot regime against international criticism of atrocities inside 
Cambodia. Border fighting increased in 1977, according to some 
reports. In June of that year, Vietnam proposed negotiations to 
settle the border dispute, but the Khmer Rouge said negotiations 
would be premature. In December, Cambodia accused Vietnam 
of aggression, demanded withdrawal of its troops from the coun- 
try, and severed diplomatic ties. In February 1978, Hanoi called 
for an immediate end to all hostile military activities in the border 
region and for the conclusion of a peace treaty. At the same time, 
Hanoi denied the allegations that it had been trying to incorporate 
Cambodia into an Indochinese federation, adding that Vietnam 
had not entertained the idea of federation since the ICP was dis- 
solved in 1951. The Pol Pot regime continued to claim, however, 
that Vietnam had never abandoned the idea of a federation, and 
the regime called on Hanoi to cease activities aimed at overthrow- 
ing the Government of Democratic Kampuchea. 

Cambodia in Turmoil 

On December 25, 1978, Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion 
of Cambodia (see Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia, ch. 5). Phnom 
Penh fell, after minimal resistance, on January 7, 1979, and on 



190 



Government and Politics 



the following day an anti-Khmer Rouge faction announced the for- 
mation of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council 
(KPRC), with Heng Samrin as president of the new ruling body. 
On January 10, the KPRC proclaimed that the new official name 
of Cambodia was the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK — 
see Appendix B). Within a week, the PRK notified the United 
Nations Security Council that it was the sole legitimate govern- 
ment of the Cambodian people. 

Vietnam was the first country to recognize the new regime, and 
Phnom Penh lost no time in restoring diplomatic relations with 
Hanoi. From February 16 to February 19, the PRK and Vietnam 
held their first summit meeting in Phnom Penh and cemented their 
relationship by signing a twenty-five-year Treaty of Peace, Friend- 
ship and Cooperation. The treaty declared that the "peace and 
security of the two countries are closely interrelated and that the 
two Parties are duty-bound to help each other. ..." Article 2 of 
the treaty dealt specifically with mutual security assistance to help 
each defend against "all schemes and acts of sabotage by the im- 
perialist and international reactionary forces." The two govern- 
ments also signed agreements for cooperation on economic, cultural, 
educational, public health, and scientific and technological issues. 

In rapid succession, the Soviet Union, other Marxist-Leninist 
states, and a number of pro-Moscow developing countries had also 
recognized the new regime. By January 1980, twenty-nine coun- 
tries had recognized the PRK, yet nearly eighty countries continued 
to recognize the Khmer Rouge. 

More countries voiced opposition to Vietnam's involvement in 
Cambodia. Most vocal was Thailand, the security of which was 
threatened directly by the turn of events in Cambodia. (Thailand 
shares an 800-kilometer border with Cambodia, and historically 
it has regarded the country as a buffer against Vietnamese 
expansion — see Regional Divisions, ch. 2.) The Thai government 
demanded Vietnam's immediate withdrawal from Cambodia so 
that the Cambodians would be able to choose their own govern- 
ment without foreign interference. Thailand's allies in ASEAN — 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore — agreed with 
Bangkok's position. 

The United States also agreed with Thailand's position. Although 
it had never recognized Democratic Kampuchea and disapproved 
of the human rights violations perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge, 
the United States nonetheless supported Democratic Kampuchea's 
request for an emergency session of the UN Security Council. 
China expressed its support for the Khmer Rouge and even ac- 
cused Vietnam of attempting to force Cambodia into an Indochinese 



191 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

federation and of serving as an "Asian Cuba" — a surrogate for 
the Soviet policy of global hegemony. 

Soviet leaders hailed the PRK's "remarkable victory" and ex- 
pressed their full support for a peaceful, independent, democratic, 
and nonaligned Cambodia that would advance toward socialism. 
Moscow also accused Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime of genocide 
and implied that China had imposed the regime on Cambodia. 

Despite objections from the Soviet Union and from Czecho- 
slovakia, the UN Security Council allowed Prince Sihanouk to argue 
the case for Democratic Kampuchea in early January 1979. 
Sihanouk — who had distanced himself from Khmer Rouge bru- 
tality, charged that Vietnam had committed flagrant acts of ag- 
gression against Cambodia, and he asked the council to demand 
an end to Hanoi's interference in Cambodian affairs. He also urged 
that the council not recognize the puppet regime in Phnom Penh, 
and he appealed to all nations to suspend aid to Vietnam. 

In the UN Security Council debate, Vietnam unsuccessfully 
challenged Sihanouk's claim to represent Cambodia, asserting that 
he spoke for a regime that no longer existed. Vietnam also charged 
that the Pol Pot regime had provoked the border war and that 
Hanoi's presence in Cambodia was necessary and was strictly an 
issue between Vietnam and the PRK. Hanoi argued, moreover, 
that the Cambodian crisis was a matter of internal strife among 
rival groups that was brought on by Pol Pot's atrocities against 
his own countrymen. Hanoi actually asserted that there was no 
"Cambodian problem" that warranted a debate in the UN or any- 
where else in the international political arena. 

The fifteen-member UN Security Council, however, failed to 
adopt a resolution on Cambodia. Seven nonaligned members on 
the council had submitted a draft resolution, which was endorsed 
by Britain, China, France, Norway, Portugal, and the United 
States. But the draft, which called for a cease-fire in Cambodia 
and for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from that country, was 
not approved because of objections from the Soviet Union and from 
Czechoslovakia. 

The fate of Cambodia was interwoven with the security interests 
of its Asian neighbors. For example, on February 17, 1979, China 
attacked Vietnam, apparently to ease Vietnamese pressure against 
Thailand and against Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge guerril- 
las. The Cambodian question surfaced again in the UN Security 
Council session that was convened on February 23 to consider end- 
ing the hostilities along the Vietnamese-Chinese border and in Cam- 
bodia. This time the focus was on regional power politics; China 
demanded that the UN Security Council censure Vietnam for its 



192 



Government and Politics 



invasion of Cambodia, and the Soviet Union asked that the coun- 
cil condemn China for its "aggression" against Vietnam. The 
United States called for the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Viet- 
nam and of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. 

In late 1979, the stage was set for an international political show- 
down over Cambodia. In September of that year, the UN Gen- 
eral Assembly rejected the efforts of the Soviet Union, the Congo, 
and Panama to challenge the legality of Democratic Kampuchea 
and decided that it should continue to be represented at the United 
Nations. The vote was seventy-one to thirty-five in support of the 
decision, with thirty-four abstentions. (Sihanouk, who no longer 
represented the Khmer Rouge regime, argued that the Cambo- 
dian seat should be left vacant because neither of the two Cambo- 
dian claimants had the mandate of the Cambodian people.) In 
November, the UN General Assembly adopted an ASEAN- 
sponsored resolution by a vote of eighty-one to twenty-one, with 
twenty-nine abstentions, calling for immediate Vietnamese disen- 
gagement from Cambodia. The resolution also called on all states 
to refrain from interference in, and acts of aggression against, Cam- 
bodia and its Southeast Asian neighbors. The assembly mandated 
the UN secretary general to explore the possibility of an interna- 
tional conference on Cambodia and appealed for international 
humanitarian aid for the country's population and for its refugees 
who had fled to neighboring countries. 

Cambodia's PRK regime, under the leadership of Heng Samrin, 
set out to restore the country's social and economic life, which had 
been racked by a decade of political turmoil. During 1979 the coun- 
try was still reeling from the horrors of the Khmer Rouge, and 
the lack of educated and qualified personnel to staff administra- 
tive posts was hampering efforts to reestablish a civil government. 
Most of the country's educated elite had been murdered during 
the Pol Pot era, while others had fled to safety in Vietnam. (In 
August 1979, a Phnom Penh "people's revolutionary tribunal" 
tried Pol Pot and his closest confidant, Foreign Minister Ieng Sary, 
in absentia, on charges of genocidal crimes and then sentenced them 
to death.) Another complication for the Heng Samrin regime was 
the growing Khmer Rouge guerrilla resistance in the western and 
the northwestern border areas. 

By mid- 1980, life in villages and in towns had stabilized some- 
what, and relief aid from the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and some 
Western countries had helped to prevent mass starvation. Mean- 
while, the regime had managed gradually to extend its adminis- 
trative control to outlying areas close to the Thai border and had 
initiated the drafting of a constitution in January 1980. The 



193 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

National Assembly, which had been elected in May 1981, formally 
adopted and promulgated the Constitution in June. 

But opposition to the Heng Samrin regime had been growing 
since 1979. The most prominent opposition group was the Khmer 
Rouge, which sought to reestablish its political legitimacy and to 
mobilize the Cambodian people against the Vietnamese. In Janu- 
ary 1979, Khmer Rouge leaders announced the formation of the 
Patriotic and Democratic Front of the Great National Union of 
Kampuchea (PDFGNUK — see Appendix B), a popular front 
organization in which the Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist 
Party (KCP — see Appendix B), under Pol Pot planned to play a 
dominant role. 

As part of an image-rebuilding effort, the Khmer Rouge an- 
nounced the replacement, in December 1979, of Prime Minister 
Pol Pot with the politically moderate Khieu Samphan. The replace- 
ment did not affect Pol Pot's position as leader of the KCP or his 
control of the Khmer Rouge armed forces, officially called the 
National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK — see Appen- 
dix B; National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, ch. 5). Khieu 
Samphan retained his position as president of the State Presidium 
of Democratic Kampuchea, a post equivalent to head of state under 
the 1975 constitution of Democratic Kampuchea. At about the same 
time, it also was disclosed that the political program of the 
PDFGNUK, adopted in December, would serve as the pro- 
visional fundamental law of Democratic Kampuchea until free elec- 
tions could be held. Sihanouk described the episode as a ploy 
designed to give the Khmer Rouge's "odious face" a mask of 
respectability. 

The first and principal noncommunist resistance group was the 
Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF — see Appen- 
dix B) led by Son Sann. The front's military arm was the Khmer 
People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF — see 
Appendix B). It was originally formed, in March 1979, by Gen- 
eral Dien Del, a former army officer under Lon Non's Khmer 
Republic (see Coalition Government Resistance Forces, ch. 5). Son 
Sann's formation of the KPNLF on October 9, 1979, coincided 
with the ninth anniversary of the founding of the Khmer Repub- 
lic and therefore symbolized rejection of "Sihanoukism." After 1979 
Son Sann and Sihanouk often clashed over the issue of coalition- 
building and national reconciliation, despite their common distaste 
for the Khmer Rouge and for the Vietnamese occupation. After 
1985 the KPNLF fell into disarray as a result of leadership dis- 
putes in the movement's top echelon. By late 1987, it still had not 
regained its former stature or fighting strength. 



194 



Government and Politics 



The second noncommunist, nationalist resistance faction was the 
Sihanouk group called initially the Movement for the National 
Liberation of Kampuchea (Mouvement pour la Liberation Nation- 
ale du Kampuchea — MOULINAKA — see Appendix B), formed 
in August 1979 by Kong Sileah after his split with General Dien 
Del. In September, Sihanouk set up the Confederation of Khmer 
Nationalists from his base in Pyongyang, Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (North Korea). The confederation lacked sup- 
port because key actors in the Cambodian situation perceived it 
to be merely a forum, and that only for "committed Sihanoukists." 
Around March 1981 , the MOULINAKA group joined with other 
small pro-Sihanouk factions to establish a political organization 
called the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, 
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (Front Uni National pour 
un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif — 
FUNCINPEC — see Appendix B). The movement soon formed its 
own armed wing, the Sihanouk National Army (Armee Nationale 
Sihanoukiste — ANS — see Appendix B), which began minor incur- 
sions into Cambodia (see Coalition Government Resistance Forces, 
ch. 5). As a political movement, FUNCINPEC quickly acquired 
a legitimacy beyond its numbers, because of the impeccable na- 
tionalist credentials of its head, Sihanouk. Moreover, although it 
remained the smallest of the Khmer resistance groups until 1985, 
its quest for stature was abetted by its having neither the opprobrious 
human rights record of the Khmer Rouge to live down, nor the 
debilitating leadership disputes of the KPNLF with which to 
contend. 

Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 

The establishment of the tripartite Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK — see Appendix B) in June 1982 
was a significant achievement for the resistance groups, which had 
quarreled bitterly throughout the negotiations that led to unity. 
Following its founding, the CGDK became the center of the anti- 
Vietnamese cause, served as the country's lawful spokesman in in- 
ternational forums, and demonstrated a credible capacity for bring- 
ing the Cambodian conflict to a political and military stalemate. 
In the late 1980s, this stalemate renewed multilateral interest in 
a settlement of the Cambodian question. 

Origins of the Coalition 

In the aftermath of the 1978 Vietnamese invasion, many Cam- 
bodians clamored for national unity, but only a few responded to 
the Khmer Rouge's appeal for unity under the PDFGNUK (see 



195 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Major Political Developments, 1977-81, this ch.). Their reluctance 
to rally behind the Khmer Rouge was understandable because they 
envisioned a new Cambodia that was neither ruled by the Khmer 
Rouge nor controlled by the Vietnamese. Many Cambodians be- 
lieved that an essential condition of any movement aimed at restor- 
ing national freedom should be opposition to the Khmer Rouge 
and the Vietnamese. Sihanouk and Son Sann were both uneasy 
about reconciliation with the Khmer Rouge. Still, Cambodian 
solidarity against Hanoi would be fragile at best without the par- 
ticipation of the Khmer Rouge, the strongest of all the resistance 
groups. 

Then in January 1979, Sihanouk, charged by the Democratic 
Kampuchea leadership with presenting Cambodia's case before the 
United Nations, broke with his sponsors and demanded that the 
Khmer Rouge be expelled from the United Nations for their mass 
murders. And in early 1980, he deplored ASEAN 's continued 
recognition of Democratic Kampuchea, criticized China's military 
aid to the Khmer Rouge, and accused Thai authorities of closing 
their eyes to Chinese arm shipments through Thailand to Khmer 
Rouge rebels. In June 1980, Sihanouk, frustrated, announced his 
permanent retirement from all political activities. 

Meanwhile, Son Sann, who had been indirectly in touch with 
Pol Pot since November 1979, announced in January 1980 that 
he would form an anti- Vietnamese united front with the Khmer 
Rouge if the group's leaders agreed to step down and to relinquish 
their power to his new organization. He also raised the possibility 
of forming his own provisional government to rival the Khmer 
Rouge. Cooperation with Sihanouk seemed unlikely. 

Khieu Samphan, president of the State Presidium of the defunct 
regime of Democratic Kampuchea, proposed that Son Sann join 
forces with the Khmer Rouge on a common political platform. In 
1979 and in 1980, the Khmer Rouge reportedly came under pres- 
sure from China to forge a united front under Sihanouk or Son 
Sann. The ASEAN countries also urged the Khmer Rouge to put 
its blood-stained image behind it and to mend its political fences 
with the noncommunist resistance groups. The United Nations 
informed the Khmer Rouge that a new mode of behavior would 
be necessary if its deposed regime were to retain its seat in the 
organization. 

The united front idea got off to a slow start in 1981. In Febru- 
ary Sihanouk, reversing his retirement from politics, indicated his 
willingness to lead the front if China and the Khmer Rouge sup- 
ported his preconditions of Chinese military and financial assistance 
to all Cambodian resistance factions, not just the Khmer Rouge, 



196 



(Top) Prince Norodom Sihanouk, 
President of the Coalition 
Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea, addresses a 
session of the General 
Assembly of the 
United Nations. 
Courtesy 
United Nations Photo 



(Bottom) Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh reviews combatants of 
the Armee Nationale 
Sihanoukiste on Thai- 
Cambodian border. 
Courtesy Frank Tatu 




197 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

and of the disarming of all resistance groups after the Vietnamese 
disengagement from Cambodia. The disarming was essential, he 
asserted, to prevent the Khmer Rouge from inaugurating a new 
round of terror and a new civil war. As a safeguard, Sihanouk also 
wanted an international peace-keeping force after the Vietnamese 
departure, an internationally guaranteed neutralization of Cam- 
bodia, and a trusteeship under which the country would be a ward 
of the United Nations for five to ten years. Furthermore, he re- 
quested that the country's official name be Cambodia instead of 
Democratic Kampuchea. The name change was a bid to under- 
mine the legal status of the Pol Pot regime as de jure representa- 
tive of Democratic Kampuchea because the latter designation had 
been that of the Khmer Rouge exclusively. 

Son Sann was indifferent to Sihanouk's willingness to lead the 
front. Khieu Samphan, on the other hand, was conciliatory and 
stated that the KCP would be disbanded if necessary. He ac- 
knowledged at the same time that Democratic Kampuchea had 
blundered by trying to develop the country "much too fast," adding 
that this haste had "affected the health of people" and had cost 
the lives of nearly 1 million Cambodians. He also blamed Viet- 
nam's "special warfare of genocide" for the deaths of "2.5 mil- 
lion" Cambodians. In addition, he claimed that a new Cambodia 
would not be socialist, would honor private property, and would 
cooperate on a "large-scale" with the West. He even said that 
Democratic Kampuchea was ready to join ASEAN as a member 
"at any time." 

Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan held their first exploratory unity 
talks in Pyongyang on March 10 and 11, 1981 , without Son Sann, 
who claimed that neither of the two spoke for the Cambodian peo- 
ple. The talks foundered because Khieu Samphan objected to 
Sihanouk's demand that all resistance factions be disarmed in the 
future. 

Sihanouk sought to enlist the cooperation of Son Sann, espe- 
cially in securing arms from China and from the United States. 
Sihanouk realized, however, that China would not back his 
2,000-strong force unless he collaborated with the Khmer Rouge 
on its terms. Then in April, Sihanouk said he was willing to drop 
his demand for the disarmament of Khmer Rouge forces in ex- 
change for Chinese aid to the ANS. 

Son Sann reacted cautiously to the Sihanouk-Khieu Samphan 
talks, distrusting collaboration with the Khmer Rouge at least until 
after the KPNLF's military strength matched that of the communist 
faction. However, he left open the possibility of future coopera- 
tion, citing a KPNLF-Khmer Rouge cease-fire accord in early 1980. 



198 



Government and Politics 



Son Sann also disclosed that he had ignored Sihanouk's four 
attempts at tactical cooperation since 1979. 

By August 1981, unity talks seemed to have collapsed because 
of unacceptable preconditions advanced by the KPNLF and by the 
Khmer Rouge. Son Sann was adamant that Khmer Rouge lead- 
ers "most compromised" by their atrocities be exiled to China and 
that the proposed united front be led by the KPNLF. Meanwhile, 
Khieu Samphan urged his rivals not to undermine the autonomy 
of the Khmer Rouge or to undo the legal status of Democratic Kam- 
puchea. 

The three leaders broke their deadlock, with encouragement from 
ASEAN, and held their first summit in Singapore from Septem- 
ber 2 to 4. They reached a four-point accord that included the cre- 
ation of "a coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea' ' ; the 
establishment of an ad hoc committee to draw up a blueprint for 
the coalition government; an expression of support for the resolu- 
tion of the first International Conference on Kampuchea (held in 
New York, July 13 to July 17, 1981) as well as for other relevant 
UN General Assembly resolutions on Cambodia; and an appeal 
for international support of their common cause. They also decided 
not to air their internal differences publicly "during the whole 
period of the agreement" and not to attack one another on the 
battlefield. Most observers regarded the agreement as a break- 
through that would enable the Khmer Rouge regime to hold onto 
its seat in the United Nations and that would enhance the prospect 
of increased access to foreign military assistance for the KPNLF 
and FUNCINPEC. 

At a joint press conference on September 4, all sides sought to 
paper over their differences. Son Sann muted his demand for the 
removal of the Khmer Rouge leadership, and Khieu Samphan por- 
trayed Democratic Kampuchea in a new, moderate light, main- 
taining that it would respect individual rights and private ownership 
of property. Sihanouk noted that the three resistance groups would 
maintain their separate military units, but under a joint general 
staff and a military council that soon would be established. 

But in a separate press interview the following day, Sihanouk 
provided a glimpse of those differences that persisted among the 
resistance leaders. He revealed his reluctance to join what he called 
"war-mongering" leaders, possibly alluding to Khieu Samphan 
or to Son Sann. Sihanouk held out little hope for a military solu- 
tion to the unrest in Cambodia and emphasized that China, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States would have to lend assistance 
if the crisis were to be solved peacefully. Sihanouk also struck a 
prophetic note, saying that Cambodians must not only reach "an 



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Cambodia: A Country Study 

honorable compromise" with the Vietnamese, but they should also 
work out a comprehensive reconciliation among themselves and 
should include the Vietnamese-installed puppet regime in Phnom 
Penh. 

Between September 13 and November 14, 1981 , the ad hoc com- 
mittee established under the accord met nine times in Bangkok and 
agreed on principles of equal power sharing among the three fac- 
tions, on decision making by consensus, and on use of Democratic 
Kampuchea's legal framework as the basis for the proposed coali- 
tion government. To no one's surprise, these principles were sub- 
ject to conflicting self-serving interpretations. Sihanouk and Son 
Sann feared that the Khmer Rouge group would somehow exploit 
the coalition scheme at their expense. Their fear was well-founded 
in that Khieu Samphan wanted the coalition government to be an 
integral part of Democratic Kampuchea. In an apparent effort to 
offset the perceived Khmer Rouge advantage, Son Sann resurrected 
his demand that Khmer Rouge leaders be excluded from the coa- 
lition government and that the KPNLF be guaranteed control of 
a majority of key ministerial posts. The Khmer Rouge called Son 
Sann's demands "unreasonable." By mid-November, Son Sann 
had announced his dissociation from the coalition scheme. 

On November 22 and 23, Singapore intervened, with backing 
from Thailand and the other ASEAN countries, and proposed the 
formation of "a loose coalition government" in which Democratic 
Kampuchea would become one of three equal partners of the alli- 
ance, not the all-important constitutional anchor for the tripartite 
government. Sihanouk praised the Singapore formula as "a much 
better deal" for the noncommunist groups. The Khmer Rouge re- 
jected the formula, asserted that the loose coalition arrangement 
would not have any legal status as "the Democratic Kampuchean 
Government," and, on December 7, criticized Sihanouk and Son 
Sann for attempting to "isolate and weaken" the Khmer Rouge, 
which was the only force both fighting and stalemating the Viet- 
namese. 

In February 1982, Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan met in Bei- 
jing without Son Sann to clarify several ambiguities. One notable 
result of the meeting was a shift in the Khmer Rouge insistence 
on constitutional linkage between Democratic Kampuchea and the 
proposed coalition government. In what was described as "another 
concession," Khieu Samphan elaborated the position that his side 
would not attempt to integrate the other resistance groups into "the 
Democratic Kampuchean institutions." He emphasized, however, 
that the others must accept and defend the "legal status" of 
Democratic Kampuchea as a UN member state. Sihanouk asked 



200 



Government and Politics 



Son Sann to resolve his differences with Khieu Samphan and to 
join the coalition. By May, Son Sann had softened his anti-Khmer 
Rouge posture and had expressed readiness to cooperate with the 
others under a Thai-proposed plan that would have Sihanouk as 
head of state, Son Sann as prime minister, and Khieu Samphan 
as deputy prime minister. In talks with Khieu Samphan in mid- 
June, Son Sann agreed on the principle of tripartite rule. 

Coalition Structure 

The three leaders finally signed an agreement on the long-sought 
coalition on June 22, 1982, in Kuala Lumpur. Sihanouk pledged 
to be "a loyal partner" and to respect the accord; Son Sann praised 
the CGDK as "an authentic and legal government"; and Khieu 
Samphan voiced hope that the CGDK would last a long time, even 
after the eventual Vietnamese departure. The three signed the coa- 
lition agreement without identifying their organizations because 
Son Sann had refused to recognize Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC. 

The June agreement failed to mitigate substantially suspicion of 
the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk and Son Sann, for instance, refused 
to allow CGDK headquarters to be located on Khmer Rouge- 
controlled territory. Within only a few days of the signing, Siha- 
nouk proposed — at the urging of Singapore and Malaysia — that the 
two noncommunist groups merge in an effort to improve their stand- 
ing vis-a-vis the Khmer Rouge. But Son Sann, wanting to main- 
tain a separate identity, rejected the idea. In addition, Sihanouk 
had planned to announce, in Bangkok on July 12, that the agree- 
ment had been signed, but the Voice of Democratic Kampuchea — 
the Khmer Rouge's clandestine radio station, aired the text of the 
accord on July 11 and upstaged Sihanouk. Animosity between 
Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan grew because of the incident. 

The purpose of the CGDK, as stated in the June accord, was 
"to mobilize all efforts in the common struggle to liberate Kam- 
puchea from the Vietnamese aggressors" and "to bring about the 
implementation of the declaration of the International Conference 
on Kampuchea and other relevant UN General Assembly resolu- 
tions." After the Vietnamese withdrawal, the Cambodians were 
to determine their own future through a general, free, and secret 
election under UN supervision. 

The CGDK was to function within the "legitimacy and frame- 
work of the State of Democratic Kampuchea, ' ' and its three part- 
ners were to share power equally and to make decisions by 
consensus. Each partner would have a certain degree of freedom 
and would maintain organizational and political autonomy. The 
autonomy would be needed should the CGDK prove unworkable, 



201 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
(INNER CABINET) 



PRESIDENT PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK 

(FUNCINPEC) 



VICE PRESIDENT IN CHARGE KHIEU SAMPHAN (DK/PDK) 2 

OF FORIEGN AFFAIRS 



PRIME MINISTER SON SANN (KPNLF) 3 



I 



COORDINATING COMMITTEES 


ECONOMY 
AND FINANCE 


NATIONAL 
DEFENSE 


CULTURE 

AND 
EDUCATION 


PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND 
SOCIAL 
AFFAIRS 


MILITARY 
AFFAIRS 


PRESS AND 
INFORMATION 
AFFAIRS 







PARTNERS IN THE CGDK 4 










1 










1 


DK/PDK 




KPNLF 




FUNCINPEC 


PRIME MINISTER: 
KHIEU SAMPHAN 

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER 
(FOREIGN AFFAIRS): 
IENG SARY 

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER 
(DEFENSE): 
SON SEN 


PRESIDENT: 
SON SANN 

VICE PRESIDENTS 

SECRETARY GENERAL 

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 


PRESIDENT: 
PRINCE NORODOM 
SIHANOUK 

SECRETARY GENERAL 

REPRESENTATIVE OF 
THE PRINCE IN 
CAMBODIA 
AND ASIA - 

NORODOM RANARIDDH 



French acronym for the National United Front for an 
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia 

Democratic Kampuchea/Party of Democratic Kampuchea 

Khmer National Liberation Front 

Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 



Source: Based on information from Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 
Who's Who in Cambodia: A Reference Aid, CR 85-10626, March 1985 (Chart, no pagi- 
nation). 



Figure 10. Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, 1987 

in which case the right to represent Cambodia would revert to the 
Khmer Rouge "in order to ensure the continuity of the state of 
Democratic Kampuchea" as a member of the United Nations. 

The coalition's top governing body was the "inner cabinet," for- 
mally called the Council of Ministers (see fig. 10). The three-member 



202 



Government and Politics 



inner cabinet consisted of Sihanouk as president of Democratic 
Kampuchea, Khieu Samphan as vice president in charge of for- 
eign affairs, and Son Sann as prime minister. The cabinet was to 
meet regularly inside Cambodia — to demonstrate the viability of 
the CGDK — for the purposes of discussing domestic and foreign 
policy matters and of resolving differences within the coalition. 
Below the inner cabinet were six coordinating committees, each 
with one representative from each of the coalition's three factions. 
The six committees, or ministries, were in charge of economy and 
finance; national defense; culture and education; public health and 
social affairs; military affairs, and press and information affairs. 

In the late 1980s, the CGDK claimed to have held an inner cabi- 
net session inside Cambodia at least once a year since its forma- 
tion. According to unconfirmed reports, much of the time in these 
sessions was devoted to charges made by Sihanouk that Khmer 
Rouge soldiers had attacked his troops. The Khmer Rouge denied 
the charges, blaming ' 'Vietnamese agents" for such incidents if, 
indeed, they had occurred at all. 

In 1987 Sihanouk engaged in considerable maneuvering as he 
sought to restore some momentum to the search for a negotiated 
solution to the situation in Cambodia. Adopting the tactic of tem- 
porary abdication of responsibility that he had employed before 
in his long political career, he began a one-year leave of absence 
from his duties as president of the CGDK in May 1987. Sihanouk 
cited several reasons for his decision. The first was his displeasure 
with continued Khmer Rouge attacks on his troops and the human 
rights violations by the Khmer Rouge and by the KPNLF against 
displaced persons in refugee camps controlled by these groups (see 
Migration and Refugees, ch. 2). The second reason was the al- 
leged "duplicity" of unnamed foreign governments, which, Siha- 
nouk said, were exploiting Cambodia as a pawn in their power 
struggle. He also claimed that an unidentified foreign sponsor — 
probably an allusion to China — was deliberately holding back "the 
rebirth of Sihanoukism" for the benefit of the Khmer Rouge. 
Finally, Sihanouk added that he was leaving to explore the prospect 
of reconciliation with leaders of Hanoi and Phnom Penh. Siha- 
nouk's temporary dissociation from the CGDK, some observers 
believed, would free him from the burden of consulting with Son 
Sann and Khieu Samphan. 

Democratic Kampuchea 

In 1987 the United Nations continued to recognize Democratic 
Kampuchea as the legal representative of Cambodia in the General 
Assembly, in spite of objections by the People's Republic of 



203 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Kampuchea (PRK), the Vietnamese-installed regime in Phnom 
Penh; thus, under international law, Democratic Kampuchea con- 
tinued to exist as an entity with full sovereignty even though it did 
not possess all four of the conventional criteria of statehood: peo- 
ple, territory, government, and supreme authority within the bord- 
ers of a given country. Under the 1982 tripartite agreement, the 
CGDK had replaced the Khmer Rouge regime as de jure represen- 
tative of Democratic Kampuchea. Nevertheless, the Khmer Rouge 
continued to identify itself as Democratic Kampuchea even after 
the accord was signed. As a result, the terms Democratic Kam- 
puchea and the Khmer Rouge became virtually synonymous and 
in fact were used interchangeably (see fig. 10). 

In late 1987 Democratic Kampuchea was being governed under 
the political program of the PDFGNUK that had been adopted 
formally in December 1979 as "the provisional fundamental 
law ... at the current stage of our people's war against the Viet- 
namese aggressors" (see Major Political Developments, 1977-81, 
this ch.). It guaranteed "democratic freedoms" in political, reli- 
gious, and economic life; a parliamentary system based on a popu- 
larly elected national assembly under UN supervision; a national 
army; and a national economy respecting "individual or family 
productive activity." The program reflected the Khmer Rouge's 
attempt to create a new image attuned to moderation, national- 
ism, and patriotism. 

The KCP, synonymous with the Khmer Rouge, was the largest 
and strongest component of the CGDK in 1987. In December 1981 , 
however, the party had announced its dissolution, citing the in- 
compatibility of communism with Democratic Kampuchea's anti- 
Vietnamese united front line. It is difficult to ascertain whether 
the KCP was indeed disbanded because the Khmer Rouge always 
were secretive. The change of name to the Party of Democratic 
Kampuchea (PDK — see Appendix B) probably was a cosmetic 
gesture aimed at regaining international respectability following 
the party's imposition of a brutal regime on Cambodia from 1975 
to 1978. The party's essential continuity was probable because the 
PDK leadership remained identical to that of its predecessor, the 
KCP, and the most important party leader — Pol Pot — exercised 
a shadowy, but powerful, influence behind the scenes in 1987 just 
as he had in the 1970s. Fragmentary accounts that reached the out- 
side world hinted that, despite the name change, the party con- 
tinued to treat refugees and peasants under its control with a 
arshness and an arbitrariness that showed little more concern for 
human rights than that of the former communist government of 
Cambodia. 



204 



Government and Politics 



In the name of Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge issued 
a comprehensive conciliatory policy statement on July 6, 1985. It 
noted that the "Democratic Kampuchea side" expressed readiness 
to hold peace talks with Vietnam — but only after Vietnam's com- 
plete withdrawal from Cambodia — and indicated willingness to wel- 
come "other Cambodians, including Heng Samrin and his group" 
as long as they no longer served the Vietnamese. Referring to the 
future of Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge side hinted for the first time 
that it might accept exclusion from a postwar government that might 
include the Heng Samrin regime. The Khmer Rouge also expressed 
greater openness to the establishment of a new Cambodia with a 
parliamentary and liberal capitalist system. 

The Khmer Rouge's principal leaders, from July 1985, were 
Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, and Son Sen, in addition to Pol Pot 
who operated behind the scenes. Khieu Samphan was concurrently 
chairman of the State Presidium, prime minister of Democratic 
Kampuchea, provisional chairman of the PDFGNUK, and vice 
president in charge of foreign affairs of the CGDK. Son Sen served 
as commander in chief of the National Army of Democratic 
Kampuchea (NADK) and, in that capacity, as the Khmer Rouge 
chairman on the Coordinating Committee for National Defense. 
Ieng Sary served as Democratic Kampuchea's deputy prime 
minister in charge of foreign affairs and as its chairman on the Coor- 
dinating Committee for Economy and Finance. Other key figures 
included Ieng Thirith (also known as Khieu Thirith, reportedly 
related to Khieu Samphan), wife of Ieng Sary and head of 
Democratic Kampuchea's Red Cross Society; Ta Mok (also known 
as Chhet Choeun), vice chairman and chief of the general staff of 
the NADK and reportedly Pol Pot's right-hand man; and Nuon 
Chea (also known as Long Reth) — a political hardliner loyal to Pol 
Pot — chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Repre- 
sentative Assembly of Democratic Kampuchea. Pol Pot, formerly 
prime minister, the KCP's general secretary, and commander in 
chief of the NADK, headed the Higher Institute for National 
Defense from September 1985 onward. Although reportedly in fail- 
ing health and in Beijing-induced retirement in China in 1987, Pol 
Pot was still the power behind the scenes, according to some ob- 
servers. 

Ieng Sary's status in 1987 was unclear because he had not been 
seen in public since August 1985. For years Ieng Sary and Pol Pot 
were named by their adversaries as the two figures most responsi- 
ble for mass murders in Cambodia, and Hanoi and the Heng 
Samrin regime insisted on their exclusion from any future politi- 
cal accommodation with the CGDK. 



205 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

The Khmer People's National Liberation Front 

From its inception in October 1979, the right-wing, pro-Western, 
former prime minister Son Sann, noted for his integrity and for 
his unyielding personality, led the Khmer People's National Liber- 
ation Front (KPNLF — see Appendix B). The organization was the 
strongest of the country's noncommunist resistance forces. Its key 
figures were formerly prominent in the administrations of Siha- 
nouk and of republican leader Lon Nol. A number of displaced 
Cambodians sheltered in temporary camps on Thai soil near the 
Thai-Cambodian border backed the KPNLF, which had originated 
in the anti-Khmer Rouge movement of the 1960s. It controlled 
about 160,000 civilians confined at "Site 2," a camp in Thailand 
barely a kilometer from the Cambodian border. Most of the peo- 
ple in the camp were toughened survivors of the Pol Pot era, and 
they were therefore a potential pool from which to recruit armed 
rebels for the KPNLF. 

In the 1984 to 1985 Vietnamese dry-season offensive, the KPNLF 
reportedly lost nearly a third of its 12,000 to 15,000 troops in bat- 
tle and through desertions (see Khmer People's National Libera- 
tion Armed Forces, ch. 5). This setback, which was blamed on Son 
Sann for his alleged meddling in military matters, aggravated the 
long-standing personality conflicts within the KPNLF. Some 
KPNLF members criticized Son Sann's alleged tendency toward 
being dictatorial and unbending, and they questioned his lukewarm 
attitude toward the idea of a unified military command that in- 
cluded Sihanouk's ANS. Criticism mounted after reports that some 
of the organization's field commanders were involved in the black 
market and in other forms of corruption. Charges of human rights 
violations in the KPNLF-run camps for displaced persons further 
fueled internal dissension. 

In December 1985, a dissident faction, wanting to limit Son 
Sann's role to ceremonial duties, announced the formation of a 
Provisional Central Committee of Salvation, which would be the 
new executive body of the KPNLF. The new group asserted that 
it had seized power from Son Sann in order to put an end to the 
internal problems of the KPNLF. Key members of the group in- 
cluded two KPNLF vice presidents: General Sak Sutsakhan, for- 
merly Lon Nol's chief of staff; and General Dien Del, commander 
in chief and chief of staff of the KPNLF armed forces. Other nota- 
bles were Abdul Gaffar Peangmeth and Hing Kunthon, two ex- 
ecutive committee members whom Son Sann had dismissed earlier, 
and Huy Kanthoul, a former prime minister. 

Son Sann countered with the formation of a new military com- 
mand committee under General Prum Vith. He said, however, 



206 



Government and Politics 



that General Sak would remain as commander in chief of the Joint 
Military Command (that now included the ANS), which was 
launched in January 1986, reportedly as a concession to the dissi- 
dent group. Under a compromise worked out through a third party, 
General Sak regained his control of the armed forces in March 1986. 
Son Sann, then seventy-four years old, withdrew a previous threat 
to resign as CGDK prime minister. By early 1987, unity in the 
KPNLF had been restored, and Son Sann retained his presidency, 
while General Sak remained in full control of the military. 

In a major reshuffle of the military high command in March, 
General Sak placed his deputy, Dien Del, in charge of anticorrup- 
tion measures. The need for sweeping internal reform already had 
become a pressing issue in January 1987, when morale was so low 
that several hundred KPNLF soldiers defected to Sihanouk's ANS. 

National United Front for an Independent, Peaceful, Neutral, 
and Cooperative Cambodia 

Sihanouk's political organization, the National United Front for 
an Independent, Peaceful, Neutral, and Cooperative Cambodia 
(Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independant Neutre, Paci- 
fique, et Cooperatif — FUNCINPEC — see Appendix B), emerged 
in 1987 as an increasingly popular resistance group, that drew sup- 
port from a broad range of Cambodians. FUNCINPEC 's in- 
dispensable asset was Sihanouk himself. He maintained residences 
in Pyongyang, in Mougins (located in southern France), and in 
Beijing. His son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was Sihanouk's sole 
authorized spokesman and was the head of FUNCINPEC 's office 
in Bangkok. Among his confidants were Nhek Tioulong, a former 
cabinet minister under Sihanouk; Buor Hel, a cousin of Sihanouk's; 
and Chak Saroeun, FUNCINPEC secretary general. As vice presi- 
dent of the organization's Executive Committee and commander 
in chief of the ANS, former prime minister In Tarn was also a key 
FUNCINPEC loyalist, but he resigned in March 1985 as the result 
of a feud with Prince Ranariddh. 

FUNCINPEC had its share of internal problems. After In Tarn's 
departure, Ranariddh, to the dismay of In Tarn's supporters, be- 
came the ANS's temporary commander in chief. In January 1986, 
Sihanouk reshuffled the ANS high command, formally appoint- 
ing his son commander in chief and, in addition, ANS chief of staff. 
Sihanouk also dismissed General Teap Ben, who had been chief 
of staff since 1981, for alleged embezzlement of refugee funds and 
for disloyalty; Teap Ben was relegated to the nominal post of deputy 
commander in chief of the Joint Military Command. In May 1986, 
Sihanouk, citing Ranariddh's heavy workload, was reported to be 



207 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

considering the appointment of General Toal Chay as the new ANS 
chief of staff. At the end of 1987, however, Sihanouk's son con- 
tinued to hold the two key military posts. 

The People's Republic of Kampuchea 

The People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK — see Appendix B) 
has ''its ultimate origin," according to Cambodia expert Michael 
Vickery, "in the same revolutionary victory of 17 April 1975 as 
does the rival Pol Pot [Democratic Kampuchea] group." The 
PRK's patron since 1979 has been Vietnam, and in late 1987, many 
observers believed that the survival of the Phnom Penh regime de- 
pended on Vietnam's continued occupation of the country. 

The PRK was established in January 1979 in line with the broad 
revolutionary program set forth by the Kampuchean (or Khmer) 
National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS— see Ap- 
pendix B), which was formed on December 2, 1978, in a zone liber- 
ated from the Khmer Rouge. Of the front's fourteen central 
committee members, the top two leaders — Heng Samrin, presi- 
dent, and Chea Sim, vice president — were identified as "former" 
KCP officials. Ros Samay, secretary general of the KNUFNS, was 
a former KCP "staff assistant" in a military unit. The govern- 
ment of Democratic Kampuchea denounced the KNUFNS, as "a 
Vietnamese political organization with a Khmer name," because 
several of its key members had been affiliated with the KCP. 

The initial objectives of the KNUFNS were to rally the people 
under its banner, to topple the Pol Pot regime, to adopt a new con- 
stitution for a "democratic state advancing toward socialism," to 
build mass organizations, and to develop a revolutionary army. 
Its foreign policy objectives included pursuing nonalignment, 
settling disputes with neighbors through negotiations, putting an 
end to "the border war with Vietnam" provoked by the Pol Pot 
regime, and opposing foreign military bases on Cambodian soil. 
On December 26, 1978, the day after the Vietnamese invasion, 
the KNUFNS reiterated its opposition to foreign military bases. 

On January 1, 1979, the front's central committee proclaimed 
a set of "immediate policies" to be applied in the ' 'liberated areas. ' ' 
One of these policies was to establish "people's self-management 
committees" in all localities. These committees would form the basic 
administrative structure for the Kampuchean People's Revolution- 
ary Council (KPRC), decreed on January 8, 1979, as the central 
administrative body for the PRK. The KPRC served as the rul- 
ing body of the Heng Samrin regime until June 27, 1981, when 
a new Constitution required that it be replaced by a newly elected 
Council of Ministers. Pen Sovan became the new prime minister. 



208 



Government and Politics 



He was assisted by three deputy prime ministers — Hun Sen, Chan 
Si, and Chea Soth. 

The Constitution 

The Constitution of the PRK, promulgated on June 27, 1981, 
defines Cambodia as "a democratic state . . . gradually advanc- 
ing toward socialism. " The transition to socialism was to take place 
under the leadership of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's 
Revolutionary Party (KPRP — see Appendix B), a Marxist-Leninist 
party founded in June 1951 (see The Emergence of Nationalism, 
ch. 1). The Constitution explicitly defines the country's position 
in international relations. It places Cambodia within the Soviet 
Union's orbit. The country's primary enemies, according to the 
Constitution, are "the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in 
Beijing, acting in collusion with United States imperialism and other 
powers." 

The Constitution guarantees a broad range of civil liberties and 
fundamental rights. Citizens are to be equal before the law and 
are entitled to enjoy the same rights and duties regardless of sex, 
religion, or race. They have the right to participate in the politi- 
cal, economic, social, and cultural life of the country and to be paid 
according to the amount and quality of work they perform. Men 
and women are entitled to equal pay for equal work. All 
individuals — including monks and soldiers — over the age of eigh- 
teen may vote, and citizens over twenty-one may run for election. 
The Constitution also guarantees the inviolability of people and 
of their homes; privacy of correspondence; freedom from illegal 
search and arrest; the right to claim reparation for damages caused 
by illegal actions of the state, social organizations, and their per- 
sonnel; and freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly. The 
exercise of fundamental rights, however, is subject to certain re- 
strictions. For example, an act may not injure the honor of other 
persons, nor should it adversely affect the mores and customs of 
society, or public order, or national security. In line with the prin- 
ciple of socialist collectivism, citizens are obligated to carry out "the 
state's political line and defend collective property." 

The Constitution also addresses principles governing culture, 
education, social welfare, and public health. Development of lan- 
guage, literature, the arts, and science and technology is stressed, 
along with the need for cultural preservation, tourist promotion, 
and cultural cooperation with foreign countries. 

Provisions for state organs are in the constitutional chapters deal- 
ing with the National Assembly, the Council of State, the Council 
of Ministers, the local people's revolutionary committees, and the 



209 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

judiciary. Fundamental to the operation of all public bodies is the 
principle that the KPRP serves as the most important political in- 
stitution of the state. Intermediary linkages between the state 
bureaucracy and grass-roots activities are provided by numerous 
organizations affiliated with the KUFNCD (see The Kampuchean 
(or Khmer) United Front for National Construction and Defense, 
this ch.). 

Government Structure 

An administrative infrastructure, functioning under the KPRC, 
was more or less in place between 1979 and 1980. With the promul- 
gation of the Constitution in June 1981, new organs, such as the 
National Assembly, the Council of State, and the Council of 
Ministers, assumed KPRC functions (see fig. 11). These new bodies 
evolved slowly. It was not until February 1982 that the National 
Assembly enacted specific laws for these bodies. 

The National Assembly 

The "supreme organ of state power" is the National Assem- 
bly, whose deputies are directly elected for five-year terms. The 
assembly's 117 seats were filled on May 1, 1981, the date of the 
PRK's first elections. (The KNUFNS had nominated 148 candi- 
dates.) The voter turnout was reported as 99. 1 7 percent of the elec- 
torate, which was divided into 20 electoral districts. 

During its first session, held from June 24 to June 27, the as- 
sembly adopted the new Constitution and elected members of the 
state organs set up under the Constitution. The assembly had been 
empowered to adopt or to amend the Constitution and the laws 
and to oversee their implementation; to determine domestic and 
foreign policies; to adopt economic and cultural programs and the 
state budget; and to elect or to remove its own officers and mem- 
bers of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers. The 
assembly also was authorized to levy, revise, or abolish taxes; to 
decide on amnesties; and to ratify or to abrogate international 
treaties. As in other socialist states, the assembly's real function 
is to endorse the legislative and administrative measures initiated 
by the Council of State and by the Council of Ministers, both of 
which serve as agents of the ruling KPRP. 

The National Assembly meets twice a year and may hold addi- 
tional sessions if needed. During the periods between its sessions, 
legislative functions are handled by the Council of State. Bills are 
introduced by the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, the 
assembly's several commissions (legislative committees), chairman 



210 



Government and Politics 



of the KUFNCD, and heads of other organizations. Individual 
deputies are not entitled to introduce bills. 

Once bills, state plans and budgets, and other measures are in- 
troduced, they are studied first by the assembly's commissions, 
which deal with legislation, economic planning, budgetary mat- 
ters, and cultural and social affairs. Then they go to the assembly 
for adoption. Ordinary bills are passed by a simple majority (by 
a show of hands). Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds 
majority. The Council of State must promulgate an adopted bill 
within thirty days of its passage. Another function of the assembly 
is to oversee the affairs of the Council of Ministers, which func- 
tions as the cabinet. Assembly members may make inquiries of cabi- 
net officials, but they are not entided to call for votes of confidence 
in the cabinet. Conversely, the Council of Ministers is not em- 
powered to dissolve the National Assembly. 

The Constitution states that in case of war or under "other ex- 
ceptional circumstances," the five-year life of the Assembly may 
be extended by decree. In 1986 the assembly's term was extended 
for another five years, until 1991. 

The Council of State 

The National Assembly elects seven of its members to the Council 
of State. After the assembly's five-year term, council members re- 
main in office until a new assembly elects a new council. The chair- 
man of the council serves as the head of state, but the power to 
serve as ex officio supreme commander of the armed forces was 
deleted from the final draft of the Constitution. 

The council's seven members are among the most influential 
leaders of the PRK. Between sessions of the National Assembly, 
the Council of State carries out the assembly's duties. It may ap- 
point or remove — on the recommendation of the Council of 
Ministers — cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and envoys accredit- 
ed to foreign governments. In addition, the Council of State or- 
ganizes elections to the National Assembly, convenes regular and 
special sessions of the assembly, promulgates and interprets the 
Constitution and the laws, reviews judicial decisions, rules on 
pardons and on commutations of sentences, and ratifies or abrogates 
treaties. Foreign diplomatic envoys present their letters of accredi- 
tation to the Council of State. 

The Council of Ministers 

The government's top executive organ is the Council of 
Ministers, or cabinet, which in late 1987 was headed by Hun Sen 
(as it had been since January 1985). Apart from the prime minister 



211 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



CONSTITUTION OF 1981 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 



COUNCIL OF 
MINISTERS 



PEOPLE'S 
SUPREME COURT 






PUBLIC 
PROSECUTOR 


I 




PEOPLE'S 
REVOLUTIONARY 
COURTS 







MINISTRIES 


AGRICULTURE 


INDUSTRY 


COMMUNICATIONS, 


INFORMATION 


TRANSPORT, POSTS 


AND CULTURE 


EDUCATION 


INTERIOR 


FINANCE 


JUSTICE 


FOREIGN AFFAIRS 


NATIONAL DEFENSE 


HEALTH 


PLANNING 


HOME AND 


SOCIAL AFFAIRS 


FOREIGN TRADE 


AND INVALIDS 



PROVINCIAL/MUNICIPAL 
REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES 



DISTRICTS/CITY WARDS 
REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES 



Figure 11. Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, 1987 



(formally called chairman), the Council of Ministers has two deputy 
prime ministers (vice chairmen) and twenty ministers. The National 
Assembly elects the council's ministers for five-year terms. They 
are responsible collectively to the assembly. When the assembly is 
not in session, they are responsible to the Council of State. The prime 
minister must be a member of the assembly; other council mem- 
bers, however, need not be. The council's five-year term continues 
without hiatus until a new cabinet is formed after general elections. 

The Council of Ministers meets weekly in an executive session, 
which is attended by the prime minister, the deputy prime ministers, 



212 



Government and Politics 



and a chief of staff who is called the Minister in Charge of the Office 
of the Council of Ministers. The executive group prepares an 
agenda for deliberation and adoption by the council's monthly ple- 
nary session. (A secretary general of the Council of Ministers pro- 
vides administrative support for the cabinet.) The executive group 
also addresses measures for implementing the plenary session's deci- 
sions, and it reviews and coordinates the work of government agen- 
cies at all levels. Decisions made in the executive sessions are 
' 'collective," whereas those in the plenary sessions are by a major- 
ity. Representatives of KUFNCD and other mass organizations, 
to which all citizens may belong, may be invited to attend plenary 
sessions of the council "when [it is] discussing important issues." 
These representatives may express their views but they are not 
allowed to vote. 

Government ministries are in charge of agriculture; communi- 
cations, transport, and posts; education; finance; foreign affairs; 
health; home and foreign trade; industry; information and culture; 
interior; justice; national defense; planning; and social affairs and 
invalids. In addition, the cabinet includes a minister for agricul- 
tural affairs and rubber plantations, who is attached to the Office 
of the Council of Ministers; a minister in charge of the Office of 
the Council of Ministers; a secretary general of the Office of the 
Council of Ministers, who is also in charge of transport and of 
Khmer- Thai border defense networks; a director of the State Affairs 
Inspectorate; and the president-director general of the People's 
National Bank of Kampuchea. 

The Office of the Council of Ministers serves as the administra- 
tive nerve center of the government. Directed by its cabinet-rank 
minister, this office is supposed "to prepare, facilitate, coordinate, 
unify, and guide all activities of individual ministries and locali- 
ties." Fiscal inspection of public institutions is the responsibility 
of the State Affairs Inspectorate, which has branch offices in all 
provinces. 

The Judiciary 

The restoration of law and order has been one of the more press- 
ing tasks of the Heng Samrin regime. Since 1979 the administra- 
tion of justice has been in the hands of people's revolutionary courts 
that were set up hastily in Phnom Penh and in other major provin- 
cial cities. A new law dealing with the organization of courts and 
with the Office of Public Prosecutor was promulgated in February 
1982. Under this law, the People's Supreme Court became the 
highest court of the land. 



213 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

The judicial system comprises the people's revolutionary courts, 
the military tribunals, and the public prosecutors' offices. The 
Council of State may establish additional courts to deal with spe- 
cial cases. The Council of Ministers, on the recommendations of 
local administrative bodies called people's revolutionary commit- 
tees, appoints judges and public prosecutors. Two or three peo- 
ple's councillors (the equivalents of jurors or of assessors) assist the 
judges, and they have the same power as the judges in passing sen- 
tence (see Protection Under the Law, ch. 5). 

Local People's Revolutionary Committees 

In late 1987, the country was divided into eighteen provinces 
(khet) and two special municipalities (krong), Phnom Penh and Kam- 
pong Saom, which are under direct central government control. 
The provinces were subdivided into about 122 districts (srok), 1,325 
communes (khum), and 9,386 villages (phum). The subdivisions of 
the municipalities were wards (sangkat). 

An elective body, consisting of a chairman (president), one or 
more vice chairmen, and a number of committee members, runs 
each people's revolutionary committee. These elective bodies are 
chosen by representatives of the next lower level people's revolu- 
tionary committees at the provincial and district levels. At the 
provincial and district levels, where the term of office is five years, 
committee members need the additional endorsement of officials 
representing the KUFNCD and other affiliated mass organizations. 
At the commune and ward level, the members of the people's 
revolutionary committees are elected directly by local inhabitants 
for a three-year term. 

Before the first local elections, which were held in February and 
March 1981, the central government appointed local committee 
officials. In late 1987, it was unclear whether the chairpersons of 
the local revolutionary committees reported to the Office of the 
Council of Ministers or to the Ministry of Interior. 

The Media 

The state controls printed and electronic communications media 
and regulates their content. The most authoritative print medium 
in 1987 was the ruling KPRP's biweekly journal, Pracheachon (The 
People), which was inaugurated in October 1985 to express the 
party's stand on domestic and international affairs. Almost as im- 
portant, however, was the weekly of the KUFNCD, Kampuchea. 
The principal publication of the armed forces was the weekly Kangtap 
Padevat (Revolutionary Army). As of late 1987, Cambodia still had 
no daily newspaper. 



214 



Government and Politics 



Radio and television were under the direction of the Kampuchean 
Radio and Television Commission, created in 1983. In 1986 there 
were about 200,000 radio receivers in the country. The Voice of 
the Kampuchean People (VOKP) radio programs were broadcast 
in Khmer, Vietnamese, French, English, Lao, and Thai. With Viet- 
namese assistance, television broadcasting was instituted on a trial 
basis in December 1983 and then regularly at the end of 1984. As 
of March 1986, Television Kampuchea (TVK) operated two hours 
an evening, four days a week in the Phnom Penh area only. There 
were an estimated 52,000 television sets as of early 1986. In 
December 1986, Vietnam agreed to train Cambodian television 
technicians. The following month, the Soviet Union agreed to 
cooperate with Phnom Penh in the development of electronic media. 
Cambodian viewers began to receive Soviet television programs 
after March 1987, through a satellite ground station that the Soviet 
Union had built in Phnom Penh (see Telecommunications, ch. 3). 

Beginning in 1979, the Heng Samrin regime encouraged peo- 
ple to read official journals and to listen to the radio every day. 
Widespread illiteracy and a scarcity of both print media and radio 
receivers, however, meant that few Cambodians could follow the 
government's suggestion. But even when these media were avail- 
able, "cadres and combatants" in the armed forces, for example, 
were more interested in listening to music programs than in read- 
ing about "the situation and developments in the country and the 
world or articles on good models of good people." 

The Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary 
Party 

In late 1987, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolution- 
ary Party (KPRP — see Appendix B) continued to be the ruling 
Marxist-Leninist party of the PRK (see fig. 12). It is an offshoot 
of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP — see Appendix B), 
which played a dominant role in Cambodian resistance against the 
French and the Japanese (see The French Colonial Period, ch. 1). 
Some leaders of the anticolonial Cambodian resistance, or Khmer 
Issarak (see Appendix B), had been members of the ICP, and they 
had helped found the KPRP in 1951 . The party was formed after 
the decision by the ICP's Second Party Congress in February 1951 
to dissolve itself and to establish three independent parties for Viet- 
nam, Cambodia, and Laos. On September 30, 1960, the KPRP 
party was renamed the Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK — 
see Appendix B). Pol Pot emerged as the key figure. In 1966, shortly 
after Pol Pot returned from talks with Chinese leaders in Beijing, 
the party's name was changed to the KCP. 



215 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



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216 



Government and Politics 



The communist party in Cambodia has a history of bitter fac- 
tional feuds. After the Second Party Congress in 1960 and the dis- 
appearance of party General Secretary Tou Samouth in 1 962 , the 
party split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions. The dominant 
faction, led by Pol Pot, adopted a position that was pro-Chinese 
and anti-Soviet. In January 1979, the split became irreversible as 
the pro-Vietnamese/pro-Soviet faction under Pen Sovan replaced 
the Pol Pot faction as the de facto ruler in Phnom Penh. The rival 
factions even disagreed on the founding date of the communist party 
in Cambodia: the Pol Pot faction, under Khieu Samphan, in late 
1987, claimed September 30, 1960; however, the other group, the 
mainstream KPRP under Heng Samrin, continued to honor 1951 
as the founding year. 

The Heng Samrin faction held the Third Party Congress of what 
would later become the KPRP between January 5 and 8, 1979. 
Heng Samrin 's faction claimed that it alone was the legitimate 
descendant of the communist party founded in 1951. Very little 
is known about the Third Party Congress (also known as the Con- 
gress for Party Reconstruction) except that Pen Sovan was elected 
first secretary of the Central Committee and that the party then 
had between sixty-two and sixty-six regular members. 

Some key figures in the Pen Sovan leadership were former col- 
laborators with Pol Pot, but this information, and the communist 
ideological convictions of the new leadership were not publicized 
because the leadership feared backlash from people who had been 
brutalized by the Pol Pot regime. Such concern was implicit in Pen 
Sovan 's political report to the Fourth Party Congress held from 
May 26 to May 29, 1981 . In the report, he was careful to distance 
the KPRP from Pol Pot's KCP, and he denounced the KCP as 
a traitor to the party and to the nation. 

The KPRP decided at the Fourth Party Congress to operate 
' 'openly." This move seemed to reflect the leadership's growing 
confidence in its ability to stay in power. The move may have had 
a practical dimension as well because it involved the people more 
actively in the regime's effort to build the country's political and 
administrative infrastructure. 

The Fourth Party Congress reviewed Pen Sovan 's political report 
and defined the party's strategy for the next several years. The Con- 
gress adopted five * ' basic principles of the party line," which were 
to uphold the banners of patriotism and of international proletarian 
solidarity; to defend the country (the primary and sacred task of 
all people); to restore and to develop the economy and the culture 
in the course of gradual transition toward socialism; to strengthen 
military solidarity with Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and other 



217 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

socialist nations; and to develop "a firm Marxist-Leninist party." 
At the Congress it was decided that henceforth the party would 
be known as the KPRP, in order to distinguish it from "the reac- 
tionary Pol Pot party and to underline and reassert the communi- 
ty of the party's best traditions." The Fourth Party Congress also 
proclaimed its resolve to stamp out the "reactionary ultra-nationalist 
doctrine of Pol Pot," to emphasize a centralized government and 
collective leadership, and to reject personality cults. The "ultra- 
nationalist doctrine" issue was an allusion to Pol Pot's racist, anti- 
Vietnamese stance. The Congress, attended by 162 delegates, 
elected twenty-one members of the party Central Committee, who 
in turn elected Pen Sovan as general secretary and the seven mem- 
bers of the party inner circle to the Political Bureau. It also adopted 
a new statute for the party, but did not release the text. 

According to Michael Vickery, veterans of the independence 
struggle of the 1946 to 1954 period dominated the party Central 
Committee. A majority of the Central Committee members had 
spent all or part of the years 1954 to 1970 in exile in Vietnam or 
in the performance of "duties abroad." 

The KPRP's pro- Vietnamese position did not change when Heng 
Samrin suddenly replaced Pen Sovan as party leader on Decem- 
ber 4, 1981 . Pen Sovan, who was reportedly flown to Hanoi under 
Vietnamese guard, was "permitted to take a long rest," but ob- 
servers believed that he was purged for not being sufficiently pro- 
Vietnamese. In any case, the new general secretary won Hanoi's 
endorsement by acknowledging Vietnam's role as senior partner 
in the Cambodian- Vietnamese relationship. The party recognized 
the change in leadership symbolically by changing the official found- 
ing date of the KPRP from February 19, 1951, to June 28, 1951, 
in deference to the Vietnam Workers' Party (Dang Lao Dong Viet 
Nam), which was established in March 1951. 

In mid- 1981, the KPRP was essentially a skeletal organization. 
It had few party branches except for those in Phnom Penh, in Kam- 
pong Saom, and in the eighteen provincial capitals. Party mem- 
bership was estimated at between 600 and 1,000, a considerable 
increase over 1979 but still only a fraction of the number of cadres 
needed to run the party and the government. In 1981 several of 
the 18 provinces had only 1 party member each, and Kampong 
Cham, the largest province with a population of more than 1 mil- 
lion, had only 30 regular members, according to Cambodia 
specialist Ben Kiernan. 

The party held its Fifth Party Congress from October 13 to Oc- 
tober 16, 1985, to reflect on the previous five years and to chart 
a new course for the next several years. The party's membership 



218 



Government and Politics 



had increased to 7,500 regulars (4,000 new members joined in 1985 
alone). The party had an additional pool of 37,000 "core" mem- 
bers from which it could recruit tested party regulars. There were 
only 4,000 core members in mid- 1981 . According to General Secre- 
tary Heng Samrin's political report, the KPRP had twenty- two 
regional committees and an undisclosed number of branches, cir- 
cles, and cells in government agencies, armed forces units, inter- 
nal security organs, mass organizations, enterprises, factories, and 
farms. The report expressed satisfaction with party reconstruction 
since 1981, especially with the removal of the "danger of authoritari- 
anism" and the restoration of the principles of democratic centralism 
and of collective leadership. It pointed out "some weaknesses" that 
had to be overcome, however. For example, the party was "still 
too thin and weak" at the district and the grass-roots levels. Ideo- 
logical work lagged and lacked depth and consistency; party poli- 
cies were implemented very slowly, if at all, with few, if any, timely 
steps to rectify failings; and party cadres, because of their propen- 
sities for narrow-mindedness, arrogance, and bureaucratism, were 
unable to win popular trust and support. Another major problem 
was the serious shortage of political cadres, economic and manage- 
rial cadres, and technical cadres. Still another problem that had 
to be addressed "in the years to come' ' was the lack of a documented 
history of the KPRP. Heng Samrin's political report stressed the 
importance of party history for understanding "the good traditions 
of the party." 

The report to the Fifth Congress noted that Heng Samrin's ad- 
ministration, in coordination with "Vietnamese volunteers," had 
destroyed "all types" of resistance guerrilla bases. The report also 
struck a sobering note: the economy remained backward and un- 
balanced, with its material and technical bases still below pre-war 
levels, and the country's industries were languishing from lack of 
fuel, spare parts, and raw materials. Transition toward socialism, 
the report warned, would take "dozens of years." 

To hasten the transition to socialism, the Fifth Congress unveiled 
the PRK's First Plan, covering the years 1986 to 1990 (see Eco- 
nomic Role of the KPRP, ch. 3). The program included the addi- 
tion of the "private economy" to the three sectors of the economy 
mentioned in the Constitution (the state sector, collective sector, 
and the family sector). Including the private economy was neces- 
sary because of the "very heavy and very complex task" that lay 
ahead in order to transform the "nonsocialist components" of the 
economy to an advanced stage. According to the political report 
submitted to the congress, mass mobilization of the population was 
considered crucial to the successful outcome of the First Plan. The 



219 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

report also noted the need to cultivate "new socialist men" if Cam- 
bodia were to succeed in its nation-building. These men were sup- 
posed to be loyal to the fatherland and to socialism; to respect 
manual labor, production, public property, and discipline; and to 
possess "scientific knowledge." 

Heng Samrin's political report also focused on foreign affairs. 
He recommended that Phnom Penh strengthen its policy of alliance 
with Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and other socialist coun- 
tries. He stressed — as Pen Sovan had in May 1981 — that such an 
alliance was, in effect, "a law" that guaranteed the success of the 
Cambodian revolution. At the same time, he urged the congress 
and the Cambodian people to spurn "narrow-minded chauvinism, 
every opportunistic tendency, and every act and attitude infring- 
ing on the friendship" between Cambodia and its Indochinese 
neighbors. (He was apparently alluding to the continued Cambo- 
dian sensitivity to the presence of Vietnamese troops and of about 
60,000 Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia. CGDK sources main- 
tained that there were really about 700,000 Vietnamese settlers in 
the country.) The KPRP's three objectives for the period 1986 to 
1990 were to demonstrate military superiority "along the border 
and inside the country" for complete elimination of all anti-PRK 
activities; to develop political, military, and economic capabilities; 
and to strengthen special relations with Vietnam as well as mutual 
cooperation with other fraternal countries. Before Heng Samrin's 
closing address on October 16, the 250 party delegates to the con- 
gress elected a new Central Committee of 45 members (31 full mem- 
bers and 14 alternates). The Central Committee in turn elected 
Heng Samrin as general secretary, a new Political Bureau (nine 
full members and two alternates), a five-member Secretariat, and 
seven members of the Central Committee Control Commission. 

After the Fifth Congress, the party's organizational work was 
intensified substantially. The KPRP claimed that by the end of 
1986 it had more than 10,000 regular members and 40,000 candi- 
date members who were being groomed for regular status. 

The Kampuchean (or Khmer) United Front for National 
Construction and Defense 

The ruling KPRP grew slowly in membership over the years 
and was supported by a mass organization from which it drew its 
applicants and support. This organization, known as the KNUFNS, 
had been formed in late 1978 with Vietnamese backing, as a com- 
mon front against the Pol Pot regime in Phnom Penh. The organi- 
zation underwent various name changes, emerging eventually in 



220 



Government and Politics 



late 1981 as the Kampuchean (or Khmer) United Front for National 
Construction and Defense (KUFNCD — see Appendix B). In the 
meantime, its role in the political life of the nation had been offi- 
cially established in the Constitution, which states in Article 3 that 
"The Kampuchean Front for National Construction and the revolu- 
tionary mass organizations constitute a solid support base of the 
state, encouraging the people to fulfill their revolutionary tasks." 

The KUFNCD' s specific missions were to transmit party poli- 
cies to the masses, to act as an ombudsman, and to mobilize the 
people around the regime's efforts to consolidate the so-called 
"worker-peasant alliance." The front's cadres were required to 
stay in close touch with the people, to report their needs and 
problems to authorities, and to conduct mass campaigns to gener- 
ate support for the regime, or to lead "emulation" drives to spur 
the population to greater efforts in pursuit of specific goals. The 
cadres were also responsible for organizing networks of KUFNCD 
activists in villages and in communes and for coordinating their 
functions with cadres of various mass organizations. 

The KUFNCD also was responsible for conducting "activities 
of friendship," which were aimed at improving the climate for close 
cooperation with "the Vietnamese people and the Vietnamese army 
and experts." Another major function of the front was to reedu- 
cate Buddhist monks so that they would "discard the narrow- 
minded views of dividing themselves into groups and factions" and 
would participate more actively in the revolutionary endeavors of 
the KUFNCD. 

Among the more important mass organizations affiliated with 
the KUFNCD were the Kampuchean Federation of Trade Unions 
(KFTU— 62,000 members in December 1983), officially described 
as "the training school of the working class for economic and ad- 
ministrative management"; and the Kampuchean People's Revolu- 
tionary Youth Union (KPRYU), an important reservoir of 
candidate members for the KPRP and "a school of Marxism" for 
people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-six. As of March 
1987, when the Youth Union held its Second National Congress, 
there were more than 50,000 members in villages, factories, en- 
terprises, hospitals, schools, public offices, and the armed forces. 
Other mass organizations included the Kampuchean Revolution- 
ary Youth Association (KRYA), an 800,000-member group for chil- 
dren (aged 9 to 16); the Kampuchean Young Pioneers Organization 
(KYPO), a 450,000-member group for pre-schoolers under the 
general guidance of the KPRYU and the KRYA; and the 
Kampuchean Revolutionary Women's Association (KRWA), 
which claimed 923,000 members as of October 1983. All these 



221 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

organizations held rallies to arouse public awareness on national 
commemorative occasions such as the Kampuchea-Vietnam 
Solidarity Day on February 18, the Day of Hatred ("against the 
genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique and the 
Sihanouk-Son Sann reactionary groups") observed on May 20, 
and the day of solidarity between the people and the army on 
June 19. 

Foreign Affairs 

In 1987 the two Cambodian regimes continued to compete for 
respect and for legitimacy, and they both continued to proclaim 
a foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence, neutrality, and 
nonalignment. The CGDK, however, had the major share of inter- 
national recognition as de jure representative of Cambodia, even 
though it did not possess supreme authority within the borders of 
Cambodia. De facto control of national territory was in the hands 
of the PRK, but, because the PRK had originated during the Viet- 
namese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, it was unable to 
gain legitimacy in the eyes of the United Nations. The United 
Nations would not validate an illegal act consummated by force 
of arms (see Cambodia in Turmoil, this ch.). Recognizing the PRK 
regime would be contrary to the UN Charter, which calls for peace- 
ful settlement of all conflicts and for nonintervention in the inter- 
nal affairs of sovereign and independent nations. In July 1982, the 
Phnom Penh regime, recognizing the futility of challenging the 
legality of the CGDK, announced that "in the immediate future" 
it would not seek "to reclaim the Kampuchean seat at the United 
Nations." 

The Coalition's Strategy 

The CGDK had formal diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial 
level with Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Malaysia, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, and Yugoslavia (as of late 
1987). Chinese and North Korean relations with the coalition occa- 
sionally were in the limelight in the 1980s — Chinese relations be- 
cause of China's role as the principal donor of material and military 
assistance to the CGDK, and North Korean relations because 
Sihanouk maintained his "private" residence in Pyongyang (a 
palace built for him by the president of North Korea, Kim II Sung, 
in the early 1970s). Bangkok also was mentioned frequentiy in Cam- 
bodian foreign affairs because it had hosted meetings of CGDK 
leaders with Chinese and Thai officials regarding events in Indochi- 
na. Bangkok was also the site for the Office of Samdech Norodom 
Sihanouk's Personal Representative for Cambodia and Asia, which 



222 



Former royal palace, Phnom Penh 
Courtesy Bill Herod 



was headed by Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh. This 
office was Sihanouk's informal embassy. 

The CGDK had a permanent mission — consisting of represen- 
tatives from all three of the CGDK partners — to the United Na- 
tions in New York. In formal debates in the UN General Assembly, 
however, the chief delegate of the Khmer Rouge group represented 
the CGDK because the coalition's June 1982 agreement said that 
the diplomatic envoys of Democratic Kampuchea who were in office 
at that time would remain in their posts. The permanent mission 
became active each September during the UN General Assembly's 
opening session. Mission representatives sought to obtain reaffir- 
mation of the General Assembly's September 1979 resolution calling 
for an unconditional withdrawal of "foreign' ' (Vietnamese) troops 
from Cambodia and for Cambodian self-determination free of ex- 
ternal constraints. In 1979 ninety-one nations backed the resolu- 
tion, twenty-one nations opposed it, and twenty-nine abstained. 
In 1987, although 117 nations reaffirmed the same resolution, the 
number of countries which opposed it remained essentially un- 
changed. Some countries, such as the United States, supported reso- 
lutions but did not recognize Democratic Kampuchea, the CGDK, 
or the PRK. Britain and Australia withdrew recognition of Demo- 
cratic Kampuchea in December 1979, and in October 1980, respec- 
tively, but both supported the CGDK's effort to get the Vietnamese 



223 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

troops out of Cambodia and to determine its future freely under 
UN supervision. 

Phnom Penh and Its Allies 

Following its establishment, the primary foreign relationships 
of the PRK were those with Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and 
the countries of Eastern Europe. The PRK had only one resident 
mission in a noncommunist state, the one in India. The PRK also 
maintained diplomatic relations with about twenty other Third 
World nations, including Afghanistan, Angola, the Congo, Ethio- 
pia, Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Panama. 
In 1980 about thirty countries recognized the PRK; seven years 
later, that number had not changed. In 1987 nearly eighty coun- 
tries recognized Democratic Kampuchea. 

The Search for Peace 

The most intractable foreign policy question facing the rival Cam- 
bodian regimes in the 1980s was that of how to establish an in- 
dependent, neutral, and nonaligned Cambodia under a set of terms 
agreeable to all those, both at home and abroad, who were inter- 
ested. Despite differing perceptions of potential gains and losses, 
all parties to the Cambodian dispute were striving for reconcilia- 
tion. This was a positive sign, especially because in 1979 and in 
1980, no one, except perhaps Sihanouk, believed that reconcilia- 
tion was possible. 

In the first two years of the Cambodian crisis, the rival Cambo- 
dian regimes had different priorities. The Heng Samrin regime's 
overriding concern was to consolidate its political and its territorial 
gains, while relying on the Vietnamese to take the lead in foreign 
affairs and in national security. The political price of this external 
dependence was high because it contributed to Phnom Penh's image 
as a Vietnamese puppet. Vietnam also paid a price for its asser- 
tion that it had intervened only "at the invitation" of Heng Samrin 
"to defend the gains of the revolution they have won . . . at a time 
when the Beijing expansionists are colluding with the United 
States." Phnom Penh and Hanoi also asserted speciously that 
political turmoil inside Cambodia constituted a civil war and was, 
therefore, of no concern to outsiders. Vietnam's attempts to shield 
the Cambodian crisis from external scrutiny led its noncommunist 
neighbors to suspect that Hanoi was finally moving to fulfill its 
historical ambition of dominating all of Indochina. 

Anti-Heng Samrin resistance groups pursued an opposite course. 
Their strategy was to internationalize the Cambodian question — 
with political support from China and from the ASEAN nations — as 



224 



Government and Politics 



a case of unprovoked Vietnamese aggression, in order to put pres- 
sure on Vietnam and to undermine the legitimacy of the Heng 
Samrin administration. At the same time, the resistance groups 
sought to destabilize the Heng Samrin regime by challenging the 
Vietnamese occupation forces. The regime in Phnom Penh, with 
support from Vietnam and from the Soviet Union, nevertheless 
continued to consolidate its gains. 

In 1981 the rival camps pressed on with their confrontational 
tactics. The anti- Vietnamese resistance factions, despite their long- 
standing, internal feuds, began to negotiate among themselves for 
unity against their common enemy. On the diplomatic front, they 
worked closely with ASEAN to convene the UN-sponsored Inter- 
national Conference on Kampuchea, which took place from July 13 
to July 17, 1981, in New York. The conference, attended by 
representatives from seventy-nine countries and by observers from 
fifteen countries, adopted a declaration of principles for settling 
the Cambodian crisis. The central elements of the declaration were 
those contained in the UN General Assembly resolution of 1979 
and in the proposals for Cambodian peace announced by the 
ASEAN countries in October 1980. The declaration called for the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces in the shortest possible time under 
the supervision and the verification of a UN peacekeeping-observer 
group; for arrangements to ensure that armed Cambodian factions 
would not prevent or disrupt free elections; for measures to main- 
tain law and order during the interim before free elections could 
be held and a new government established; for free elections under 
UN auspices; for the continuation of Cambodia's status as a neu- 
tral and nonaligned state; and for a declaration by the future elected 
government that Cambodia would not pose a threat to other coun- 
tries, especially to neighboring states. The declaration also called 
on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, 
France, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States) and on 
all other states to pledge to respect Cambodia's independence, its 
territorial integrity, and its neutral status and to declare that they 
would neither draw Cambodia into any military alliance, nor in- 
troduce foreign troops into the country, nor establish any military 
bases there. The declaration's principles were reaffirmed in suc- 
cessive UN General Assembly resolutions, and they formed the 
basis of the ASEAN-sponsored framework for resolving the Cam- 
bodian question in the 1980s. 

Since 1979 the ASEAN countries have played a significant role 
on behalf of the Cambodian resistance factions. Individually and 
collectively, through the annual conferences of their foreign 
ministers, these countries consistently have stressed the importance 



225 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

of Vietnam's withdrawal as a precondition for a comprehensive 
political settlement of the Cambodian question. They have rejected 
all moves by Hanoi and Phnom Penh that were aimed at legitimiz- 
ing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the Heng Samrin 
regime. Together with China, they also were architects of the Coa- 
lition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. 

Phnom Penh's principal foreign policy spokesman has been Viet- 
nam, and its major diplomatic moves have been coordinated by 
and proclaimed by the annual conference of foreign ministers of 
the three Indochinese states meeting consecutively in Hanoi (or 
Ho Chi Minh City), in Phnom Penh, and in Vientiane. Hanoi's 
position on Cambodia has been that the "so-called Kampuchean 
problem is but the consequence of Chinese expansionism and 
hegemonism," that Vietnam's military presence in Cambodia was 
defensive because it was meeting the Chinese threat to Cambodia 
and to Vietnam, and that Hanoi would withdraw from Cambodia 
when the Chinese threat no longer existed. 

Thailand's stance on the Cambodian issue has been of particu- 
lar concern to Phnom Penh and to Hanoi. ASEAN initially main- 
tained the position that Thailand was not a party to the Cambodian 
conflict but an "affected bystander" entitled to adopt a policy of 
neutrality. Hanoi and Phnom Penh denounced that posture as 
"sham neutrality" and accused Thailand of colluding with China; 
they alleged that Thailand allowed shipment of Chinese arms 
through its territory to the "remnants of [the] Pol Pot-Ieng Sary 
clique," which was operating inside the Thai border. They also 
claimed that Bangkok sheltered and armed Pol Pot's guerrillas and 
other Cambodian "reactionaries." 

Nevertheless, the Heng Samrin regime made friendly overtures 
to Bangkok. In June 1980, for example, it proposed a meeting to 
discuss resuming "normal relations" and turning their common 
border into "a border of friendship and peace. " The Heng Samrin 
regime stated that its primary concern was the elimination of "all 
hostile acts" between the two countries and that it was willing to 
forget the past and "all the provocations launched by Thailand 
against Cambodia." Thailand replied that talks with the Heng 
Samrin regime would solve nothing. Besides, Thai officials said, 
such talks would lend an inappropriate appearance of recognition 
to the Phnom Penh regime. They also stressed that Vietnam had 
to withdraw from Cambodia before constructive talks could take 
place. 

In July 1980, the three Indochinese states proposed the signing 
of multilateral or bilateral treaties of peaceful coexistence, non- 
aggression, and noninterference among themselves and Thailand. 



226 



Independence monument 
in Phnom Penh 
Courtesy Mr. and Mrs. 
Robert E. Hammerquist 



They added that the treaties should also be signed by "other 
Southeast Asian countries." The proposal also called for the crea- 
tion of a Southeast Asian zone of peace and stability and for a 
demilitarized border zone between Cambodia and Thailand. Bang- 
kok, however, viewed the proposal as an attempt to divert inter- 
national attention from the fundamental question of Vietnamese 
occupation and as a gambit to get indirect or "back-door" recog- 
nition for the Heng Samrin regime. 

The Indochinese states sought to open a dialogue with the 
ASEAN countries in 1981 by proposing a regional conference, 
which was to be attended also by observers such as the UN secre- 
tary general and by representatives from several countries. The 
proposal was Hanoi's way of internationalizing the Cambodian 
issue: Vietnam would be able to link its role in Cambodia to the 
roles of Thailand and of China in aiding the anti-Vietnamese 
resistance groups. To highlight the linkage, Hanoi made two sug- 
gestions: first, the regional conference could address "the Cam- 
bodian question" if the Thai and Chinese connections also were 
discussed; and second, Vietnam would immediately withdraw some 
of its troops if and when Thailand stopped aiding the resistance 
groups and if the UN withdrew its recognition of Democratic Kam- 
puchea. 

In July 1982, Hanoi, aware that no one was taking it seriously, 
departed from its previous position. It announced that it had gone 



227 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

ahead with a partial withdrawal and now demanded only that 
Thailand promise to stop aiding Khmer insurgents. At that time, 
the Indochinese foreign ministers revealed that "in the immediate 
future," the PRK would not plan to reclaim the Cambodian seat 
at the United Nations if the Pol Pot clique were expelled from that 
organization. The Thai government dismissed Hanoi's statement 
as a rhetorical concession designed only to mislead the world and 
characterized the partial withdrawal as nothing more than a dis- 
guised troop rotation. 

At the first Indochinese summit held on February 22 and Febru- 
ary 23, 1983, in Vientiane, the participants declared that all Viet- 
namese "volunteers" would be withdrawn when external threats 
to Cambodia no longer existed, but that Hanoi, would reassess its 
option to return to Cambodia if a new threat emerged after it had 
withdrawn from the country. 

Hanoi contended that its partial withdrawal was a positive first 
step toward eventual restoration of peace in Cambodia, but some 
observers felt that the real reason for the withdrawal was Hanoi's 
realization that a deadlock over the Cambodian issue would cre- 
ate too much of a drain on its limited resources. Another likely 
reason for the withdrawal was the growing Cambodian irritation 
with the movement of Vietnamese nationals into Cambodia's fer- 
tile lands around the Tonle Sap (see Migration and Refugees, 
ch. 2). This population migration was a potential source of renewed 
ethnic conflict. 

In July 1983, the Indochinese foreign ministers denied "the slan- 
derous allegation of China, the United States, and a number of 
reactionary circles within the ASEAN countries" that Vietnam was 
aiding and abetting Vietnamese emigration to Cambodia. (Khmer 
Rouge sources claimed that as of 1987, between 600,000 and 
700,000 Vietnamese immigrants were in Cambodia; the Heng 
Samrin regime put the number at about 60,000.) 

In September 1983, ASEAN foreign ministers issued a joint 
"Appeal for Kampuchean Independence," proposing a phased 
Vietnamese withdrawal, coupled with an international peacekeeping 
force and with assistance in rebuilding areas vacated by the Viet- 
namese. Hanoi rejected the appeal, however, seeking instead a po- 
sition of strength from which it could dictate terms for a settlement. 
Vietnam launched a major dry-season offensive in 1984 in an 
attempt to crush all resistance forces permanently. The offensive 
destroyed most, if not all, resistance bases. 

In January 1985, the Indochinese foreign ministers claimed that 
the Cambodian situation was unfolding to their advantage and that 
the Cambodian question would be settled in five to ten years with 



228 



Government and Politics 



or without negotiations. At that time, PRK Prime Minister Hun 
Sen revealed Phnom Penh's readiness to hold peace talks with 
Sihanouk and with Son Sann, but only if they agreed to dissociate 
themselves from Pol Pot. On March 12, Hun Sen proposed a dia- 
logue with rival factions under a six-point plan. The proposal called 
for the removal of the Pol Pot clique from all political and military 
activities; for a complete Vietnamese withdrawal; for national recon- 
ciliation and for free elections under UN supervision; for peaceful 
coexistence in Southeast Asia; for cessation of external interfer- 
ence in Cambodian affairs; and for the establishment of an inter- 
national supervisory and control commission to oversee the 
implementation of agreements. Shortly afterward, Hanoi stressed 
that the question of foreign military bases in Cambodia was an issue 
that could be negotiated only between Vietnam and Cambodia. 
Hanoi also signaled that the Khmer Rouge regime could partici- 
pate in the process of Cambodian self-determination only if it dis- 
armed itself and broke away from the Pol Pot clique. 

From "Proximity Talks" to a "Cocktail Party" 

The conciliatory gestures of Hanoi and of Phnom Penh were 
part of a spate of proposals and counterproposals made in 1985. 
On April 9, Malaysia suggested "proximity," or indirect, talks 
between the CGDK and the Heng Samrin regime. Vietnam, the 
PRK, and the Soviet Union reacted favorably. Sihanouk voiced 
"personal" support for indirect negotiations. He was, however, 
uncertain whether his CGDK partners and unnamed foreign powers 
would go along with the Malaysian proposal because such talks, 
indirect as they might be, not only would imply de facto recogni- 
tion of the Phnom Penh regime but also would obscure the ques- 
tion of Vietnamese occupation. ASEAN 's deputy foreign ministers 
met in Bangkok in May, nevertheless; they endorsed the Malay- 
sian plan and referred the matter to CGDK's representatives in 
Bangkok. At the time of the ASEAN meeting, Sihanouk released 
a memorandum that called for unconditional peace talks among 
all Cambodian factions and for the formation of a reconciliation 
government comprising both the CGDK and the Heng Samrin 
regime. 

During the ensuing diplomatic exchanges, the Malaysian plan 
was discarded. The ASEAN foreign ministers, who met in Kuala 
Lumpur from July 8 to July 9, 1985, adopted a Thai compromise 
proposal that called for "a form of indirect or proximity talks" be- 
tween the CGDK and Vietnam. The proposal noted that the Heng 
Samrin regime could attend the talks only as part of the Vietnamese 
delegation. The CGDK, China, and the United States backed the 



229 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Thai proposal, but Phnom Penh and Hanoi rejected it as a scheme 
to restore the Pol Pot faction to power. 

In yet another attempt to break the Cambodian impasse, In- 
donesia offered in November 1985 to host an informal "cocktail 
party" for all warring Cambodian factions. (At that time Indone- 
sia served as ASEAN 's official "interlocutor" with Vietnam.) Indo- 
nesia apparently had concluded that such an informal gathering 
was timely in view of two recent developments: the Khmer Rouge 
announcement in July that it would acquiesce, if necessary, to being 
excluded from a future Cambodian coalition government; and 
Hanoi's disclosure in August that it would complete its withdrawal 
from Cambodia by 1990 (five years sooner than had been indi- 
cated in its April 1985 announcement), even in the absence of a 
political settlement on the Cambodian issue at that time. Another 
notable development was the Khmer Rouge disclosure in Septem- 
ber that Pol Pot had stepped down from his post as commander 
in chief of the armed forces to take up a lesser military post. On 
December 30, Khieu Samphan stated that Pol Pot's political- 
military role would cease permanently upon Hanoi's consenting 
to complete its withdrawal by the end of 1990. Hanoi, in an ap- 
parent departure from its previous stand, pledged that its pullout 
would be completed as soon as the Khmer Rouge forces disarmed. 

In 1986 the Cambodian stalemate continued amid further 
recriminations and new conciliatory gestures. On March 17, the 
CGDK issued an eight-point peace plan that included the Heng 
Samrin regime in a projected four-party Cambodian government. 
The plan called for a two-phase Vietnamese withdrawal; for a cease- 
fire to allow an orderly withdrawal — both the cease-fire and the 
withdrawal to be supervised by a UN observer group, for the in- 
itiation of negotiations, following the first phase of the withdrawal, 
and for the formation of an interim four-party coalition govern- 
ment with Sihanouk as president and Son Sann as prime minister. 
According to the plan, the coalition government would then hold 
free elections under UN supervision to set up a liberal, democratic, 
and nonaligned Cambodia, the neutrality of which would be 
guaranteed by the UN for the first two or three years. The new 
Cambodia would welcome aid from all countries for economic 
reconstruction and would sign a nonaggression and peaceful coex- 
istence treaty with Vietnam. Hanoi and Phnom Penh denounced 
the plan and labeled it as a vain attempt by China to counter the 
PRK's "rapid advance." Sihanouk shared some of the misgivings 
about the plan, fearing that, without sufficient safeguards, the 
Khmer Rouge would dominate the quadripartite government that 
emerged. Perhaps to allay such misgivings, China signaled the 



230 



Government and Politics 



possibility of ending its aid to the Khmer Rouge if Vietnam with- 
drew from Cambodia. 

In late October 1986, Hanoi, through an Austrian intermedi- 
ary, suggested two-stage peace negotiations to Sihanouk. In the 
first stage, there were to be preliminary talks in Vienna among 
all Cambodian parties, including the Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot, 
however, was to be excluded). The second phase was to be an inter- 
national conference that included the contending Cambodian fac- 
tions, as well as Vietnam, and other interested countries. Sihanouk 
responded with a counterproposal that called for his meeting with 
a top-level Vietnamese leader. This meeting was to be followed 
by an all-Cambodian session and then by an international confer- 
ence. According to unconfirmed reports, Pol Pot, now gravely ill, 
had been transferred to Beijing shortly after Hanoi's offer to Siha- 
nouk. If these reports were true, Pol Pot's role within the Khmer 
Rouge camp may have ended with his illness. 

A new phase in the Cambodian peace strategies began in 1987. 
At the beginning of the year Hanoi renewed its October bid to 
Sihanouk. Hanoi appeared eager to seek a way out of the Cambo- 
dian imbroglio, but continued to argue that Vietnam had "secu- 
rity interests" in Cambodia and that China was the main threat 
to Southeast Asia. It also was evident that Hanoi was attempting 
to split ASEAN 's consensus on Cambodia by claiming that Indone- 
sia and Malaysia had a correct view of the Chinese threat while 
rejecting the view of Thailand and Singapore that Vietnam was 
ASEAN 's principal nemesis in the region. 

In addition, as Soviet interest in Cambodia grew, there was 
speculation among observers that Moscow might involve itself in 
the quest for a negotiated settlement. A visit to Phnom Penh in 
March 1987 by Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze sig- 
naled a departure from Moscow's long-standing position that it 
was only "a third party" to the Cambodian conflict. It also con- 
stituted tacit acknowledgment that the Soviet Union had been 
supporting — at least indirectly — Vietnam's presence in Cambodia 
through economic and military aid, which totaled the equivalent 
of US$2 billion per year (see Foreign Trade and Aid, ch. 3; Mili- 
tary Developments in Postwar Cambodia, ch. 5). 

The Heng Samrin regime became more assertive in articulat- 
ing its policy options than it had been before. It became known 
in early April that Hun Sen had sent word to Sihanouk suggesting 
a meeting in Canberra, or Paris, or Stockholm at the prince's con- 
venience. (It was Hun Sen's second effort to initiate such a dia- 
logue. In 1984 he had proposed a similar meeting, but Sihanouk 



231 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

had declined because of objections by China and by his CGDK 
partners.) 

Sihanouk's one-year leave of absence from the CGDK, effec- 
tive May 7, 1987, was a good sign for Cambodia because he could 
now freely explore possibilities for a settlement without squabbling 
with his coalition partners. On June 23, Sihanouk agreed to see 
Hun Sen in Pyongyang, but two days later, hours after Chinese 
acting premier Wan Li had met with Sihanouk's wife, Princess 
Monique, Sihanouk abruptly canceled the meeting. China appar- 
ently objected to any negotiations as long as Vietnam kept troops 
in Cambodia. Sihanouk said in July that he preferred to talk first 
with a Vietnamese leader because the Cambodian conflict was be- 
tween the Khmer and the Vietnamese and not among the Cam- 
bodian factions. He said that he would not mind meeting with Hun 
Sen, however, as long as the initiative for such a meeting came 
from Hun Sen or his regime and not from Hanoi. 

Events occurred rapidly in the summer of 1987. In June UN 
secretary general Javier Perez de Cuellar issued a compromise plan 
that called for a phased Vietnamese withdrawal; for national recon- 
ciliation leading to the formation of a new coalition government 
with Sihanouk as president; for a complete Vietnamese pullout and 
for free elections; and for special provisions to deal with the armed 
Cambodian factions. On July 1, while ostensibly on vacation in 
the Soviet Union, Hun Sen had talks with Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze. The two agreed that "the realities which prevail 
in the region" must not be ignored in any plan for Cambodian 
settlement. On July 25, the Khmer Rouge faction publicly dis- 
avowed any intention to return to power at the expense of other 
factions and stated that to do so would jeopardize its national union 
policy and would alienate "friends in the world." 

Hanoi, meanwhile, continued to put off discussions about its 
presence in Cambodia, thereby forcing the resistance to deal direcdy 
with the Heng Samrin regime. Between July 27 and July 29, Viet- 
nam's foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach, conferred with his 
Indonesian counterpart in Ho Chi Minh City and called for "an 
informal meeting" or cocktail party of all Cambodian factions 
without any preconditions. The cocktail party, to be held in Jakarta, 
was to be followed by a conference of all concerned countries, in- 
cluding Vietnam. On July 30, Heng Samrin journeyed to Moscow 
to consult with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Then in an 
interview published in the Italian Communist Party daily L 'Unita 
on August 1 2 , Hun Sen sought to exonerate the Soviet Union from 
blame for Cambodia's plight and instead blamed China for the 
country's difficulties. Referring to the proposed meeting with 



232 



Phnom Penh Hill 
Courtesy Mr. and Mrs. 
Robert E. Hammerquist 




Sihanouk, Hun Sen insinuated that Sihanouk had "bosses" who 
would not let him engage freely in a dialogue. On August 13, the 
Indochinese governments endorsed "the Ho Chi Minh formula" 
(Hanoi's term for Indonesia's original cocktail party idea) as a sig- 
nificant "breakthrough" toward a peaceful setdement in Cambodia. 

The ASEAN foreign ministers met informally on August 16 to 
discuss the cocktail party idea, and they forged a compromise that 
papered over some of the differences among the six member states 
concerning the Cambodia situation. Even this attempt to achieve 
unanimity proved fruitless, however, as Hanoi rejected the ASEAN 
suggestion. 

The Sihanouk-Hun Sen Meeting 

Hun Sen's April 1987 proposal for a talk with Sihanouk was 
resurrected in August when the prince sent a message to Hun Sen 
through the Palestine Liberation Organization's ambassador in 
Pyongyang. Sihanouk was hopeful that his encounter with Hun 
Sen would lead to another UN-sponsored Geneva conference on 
Indochina, which, he believed, would assure a political settlement 
that would allow Vietnam and the Soviet Union to save face. Such 
a conference, Sihanouk maintained, should include the UN secre- 
tary general, representatives of the five permanent members of the 
UN Security Council, Laos, Vietnam, and the four Cambodian 
factions. He also suggested the inclusion of ASEAN countries, 



233 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

members of the defunct International Control Commission (India, 
Canada, and Poland), and other concerned parties. 

The Heng Samrin regime had apparently envisioned a meeting 
between Sihanouk and Hun Sen when it announced on August 27 
a "policy on national reconciliation." While artfully avoiding the 
mention of Vietnam, the policy statement called for talks with the 
three resistance leaders but not with "Pol Pot and his close associ- 
ates." An appeal to overseas Cambodians to support Phnom Penh's 
economic and national defense efforts and assurances that Cam- 
bodians who had served the insurgent factions would be welcomed 
home and would be assisted in resuming a normal life and in par- 
ticipating in the political process were key features of the policy. 
The regime also expressed for the first time its readiness to negoti- 
ate the issue of Cambodian refugees in Thailand. The offer to 
negotiate undercut the resistance factions, which, Phnom Penh con- 
tended, were exploiting displaced Cambodians by using them 
against the Heng Samrin regime for military and political purposes. 

Resistance leaders questioned Phnom Penh's sincerity in promul- 
gating its policy of reconciliation and were uncertain how to 
respond. At their annual consultation in Beijing, they and their 
Chinese hosts predictably called for a Vietnamese pullout as a 
precondition to a negotiated settlement. Sihanouk, however, launch- 
ing a gambit of his own through Cambodian emigres in Paris, called 
for reconciliation among all Khmer factions. The initiative met with 
a favorable, but qualified, response from PRK Prime Minister Hun 
Sen and, in early October, the Phnom Penh government unveiled 
its own five-point plan for a political settlement. The PRK proposals 
envisioned peace talks between the rival Cambodian camps and 
"a high position [for Sihanouk] in the leading state organ" of the 
PRK, Vietnamese withdrawal in conjunction with the cutoff of out- 
side aid to the resistance, general elections (organized by the Heng 
Samrin regime) held after the Vietnamese withdrawal, and the for- 
mation of a new four-party coalition. The October 8 plan also pro- 
posed negotiations with Thailand for the creation of a zone of peace 
and friendship along the Cambodian-Thai border, for discus- 
sions on an "orderly repatriation" of Cambodian refugees from 
Thailand, and for the convening of an international conference. 
The conference was to be attended by the rival Cambodian camps, 
the Indochinese states, the ASEAN states, the Soviet Union, China, 
India, France, Britain, the United States, and other interested coun- 
tries. The CGDK, however, rejected the plan as an attempt to con- 
trol the dynamics of national reconciliation while Cambodia was 
still occupied by Vietnam. 



234 



Government and Politics 



Sihanouk and the PRK continued their exploratory moves. On 
October 19, Hun Sen agreed to meet with Sihanouk, even though 
Sihanouk had cancelled similar meetings scheduled for late 1984 
and for June 1987. At the end of October, Hun Sen flew to Moscow 
for diplomatic coordination. The CGDK announced on October 31 
that a "clarification on national reconciliation policy" had been 
signed by all three resistance leaders. It was likely that the two main 
goals of the clarification, which was dated October 1 , were to restate 
the CGDK's position on peace talks and to underline the unity 
among the resistance leaders. The statement said that "the first 
phase" of Vietnamese withdrawal must be completed before a four- 
party coalition government could be set up, not within the frame- 
work of the PRK but under the premises of a "neutral and non- 
communist" Cambodia. 

Sihanouk was clearly in the spotlight at this point. It was possi- 
ble that his personal diplomacy would stir suspicion among his coa- 
lition partners, as well as among Chinese and ASEAN leaders. It 
was also possible that he might strike a deal with Phnom Penh and 
Hanoi and exclude the Khmer Rouge faction and its patron, China. 
Mindful of such potential misgivings, Sihanouk went to great 
lengths to clarify his own stand. He said that he would not accept 
any "high position" in the illegal PRK regime, that he would 
disclose fully the minutes of his talks with Hun Sen, and that he 
would not waver from his commitment to a "neutral and noncom- 
munist" Cambodia free of Vietnamese troops. 

Sihanouk and Hun Sen met at Fere-en-Tardenois, a village 
northeast of Paris, from December 2 to December 4, 1987. The 
communique they issued at the end of their talks mentioned their 
agreement to work for a political solution to the nine-year-old con- 
flict and to call for an international conference. The conference, 
to be convened only after all Cambodian factions reached an agree- 
ment on a coalition arrangement, would support the new coali- 
tion accord and would guarantee the country's independence, 
neutrality, and nonalignment. The two leaders also agreed to meet 
again at Fere-en-Tardenois in January 1988 and in Pyongyang at 
a later date. The communique ended with a plea to the other Cam- 
bodian parties — Sihanouk's coalition partners — to join the next 
rounds of talks. 

The communique offered no practical solution. In fact, it did 
not mention Vietnam, despite Sihanouk's demand that the com- 
munique include a clause on Vietnamese withdrawal. At a Decem- 
ber 4 press conference, Hun Sen disclosed an understanding with 
Sihanouk that "concrete questions" would be discussed at later 
meetings. Included in the concrete questions were "the withdrawal 



235 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

of Vietnamese troops, Cambodia's future government, and Noro- 
dom Sihanouk's position." Hun Sen also revealed that during the 
meeting Sihanouk had told him that 4 'the future political regime 
of Cambodia" should be a French- style democracy with a multi- 
party system and free radio and television. In an official commen- 
tary the following day, Hanoi was deliberately vague on Hun Sen's 
concrete questions, which, it said, would be dealt with 4 'at the next 
meetings." 

In foreign capitals, there were mixed reactions to what Hun Sen 
called the "historic meeting." Officials in Phnom Penh, Hanoi, 
Vientiane, and Moscow were enthusiastic. Thai officials, however, 
were cautious, if not disappointed, and they stressed the need for 
Vietnamese withdrawal and for Thailand's participation in peace 
talks with the Cambodians. Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta both wel- 
comed the unofficial, or indirect, talks as a promising start toward 
a political solution. They agreed with Bangkok on the necessity 
of Vietnamese withdrawal. Officials in Pyongyang said the meet- 
ing was "a good thing," but declined to accept the suggestion of 
Hun Sen and Sihanouk that they mediate between China and the 
Soviet Union on the Cambodian issue. China stressed that it sup- 
ported Sihanouk's efforts to seek "a fair and reasonable political 
settlement of the Kampuchean question." Such a settlement was 
said to be possible only when Vietnam withdrew all its troops from 
Cambodia. 

On December 10, Sihanouk abruptly announced the cancella- 
tion of the second meeting with Hun Sen. He said that such a meet- 
ing would be useless because Son Sann and Khieu Samphan refused 
to participate in it and because they also refused to support the 
joint communique. He added that — out of fear that the govern- 
ments in Phnom Penh, Hanoi, and Moscow might realize an un- 
warranted propaganda advantage from the meeting — he would not 
meet Hun Sen. But on December 15, Sihanouk announced abrupdy 
that he would resume talks with Hun Sen because ASEAN mem- 
bers saw the cancellation as "a new complication" in their efforts 
to pressure the Vietnamese into leaving Cambodia. By Decem- 
ber 20, Sihanouk and Hun Sen had agreed to resume talks on Janu- 
ary 27, 1988. On December 21, Son Sann expressed his readiness 
to join the talks in a personal capacity, provided that Vietnam 
agreed to attend the talks or, if this was not possible, provided that 
Vietnam informed the UN secretary general and the five perma- 
nent members of the UN Security Council of its plan to vacate 
Cambodia as quickly as possible after all Cambodian factions had 
embarked on the process of internal reconciliation. 



236 



Government and Politics 



As 1987 drew to a close, talking and fighting continued amid 
hopes and uncertainties about the future of Cambodia. It was 
equally clear that progress toward a political settlement hinged 
chiefly on the credibility of Vietnam's announced intention to with- 
draw from Cambodia by 1990 and that this withdrawal alone was 
insufficient to guarantee a peaceful solution to Cambodia's prob- 
lems. At least three more critical issues were at stake: an equitable 
power- sharing arrangement among these four warring factions, an 
agreement among the factions to disarm in order to ensure that 
civil war would not recur, and an effective international guaran- 
tee of supervision for the implementation of any agreements reached 
by the Cambodian factions. Still another critical question was 
whether or not an eventual political settlement was sufficient to 
assure a new Cambodia that was neutral, nonaligned, and non- 
communist. 

Cambodia: 1975-1982 by Michael Vickery provides an instruc- 
tive discussion on the throes of transition from Pol Pot's Democratic 
Kampuchea to Heng Samrin's People's Republic of Kampuchea. 
Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society, also by Michael Vickery, 
presents a wide-ranging treatment of the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea. Other studies include Ben Kiernan's How Pol Pot Came 
to Power; Craig Etcheson's The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kam- 
puchea; Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays, edit- 
ed by David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan; Milton Osborne's Before 
Kampuchea: Preludes to Tragedy; and Kampuchea: Decade of the 
Genocide — Report of a Finnish Inquiry Commission, edited by Kimmo 
Kiljunen. 

External factors impinging on Cambodia in the 1970s and the 
1980s are analyzed from various perspectives in William Shaw- 
cross's Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia; The 
Third Indochina Conflict, a collection of essays edited by David Elliot; 
Chang Pao-min's Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam, which 
describes Cambodia as a pawn in Sino- Vietnamese rivalry for in- 
fluence in Southeast Asia in general and Indochina in particular; 
and Henry Kissinger's White House Years and Years of Upheaval. 
Kishore Mahbubani's "The Kampuchean Problem: A Southeast 
Asian Perspective," in the Winter 1983-84 issue of Foreign Affairs, 
analyzes the complexity of the Cambodian problem, a topic also 
covered in Justus van der Kroef's " 'Proximity Cocktails' and 
'Provisional Salvation': Cambodia's Tortuous Course," in the 
April 1986 issue of Issues & Studies. The Fall 1986 issue of the 



237 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

International Journal of Politics is a special edition of six essays devot- 
ed entirely to the subject of "Cambodia: Politics and Internation- 
al Relations." 

Further insights into the politics of warring Cambodian factions 
are offered in the following publications: Indochina Chronology, a 
quarterly publication of the Institute of East Asian Studies, Univer- 
sity of California at Berkeley, which contains a section on Kam- 
puchea; Southeast Asian Affairs, an annual publication of the Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore; the Far Eastern Economic 
Review's annual Asia Yearbook; "Kampuchea" in the Yearbook on In- 
ternational Communist Affairs, of the Hoover Institution on War, Revo- 
lution and Peace; and the occasional "Kampuchea Diary" columns 
by Jacques Bekaert, in the Bangkok Post. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



238 



Chapter 5. National Security 




(Top) Male officers and female militia member of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) 
People's Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(Bottom ) Guerrillas of the Khmer People 's 
National Liberation Front 



HISTORY ATTESTS TO CAMBODIA'S martial origins. In 
antiquity Cambodia, having conquered Laos, parts of Thailand, 
and the Malay Peninsula, held sway over a vast area of Southeast 
Asia. Khmer martial prowess waned in the early fifteenth century, 
however, and Cambodia subsequently endured periods of coloni- 
zation, occupation, and vassalage by its more militarily powerful 
neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam. This long period of decline 
reached its nadir in the early nineteenth century, when Cambodia 
nearly ceased to exist as a sovereign state as the result of encroach- 
ments by its neighbors. In 1863 the Cambodian king acquiesced 
in the establishment of a French protectorate over his nation, in 
order to preserve it from extinction. The protectorate's authority 
was extended often by force of arms, and ultimately Cambodia be- 
came a de facto colony that eventually gave birth to a modern state 
with its own armed forces and military doctrine. 

Since World War II, Cambodia has enjoyed few strife-free peri- 
ods. Its people have suffered colonization, prolonged civil war, and 
occupation by a foreign power almost continuously. During this 
time, it has been ruled by three authoritarian governments of differ- 
ing ideological orientations and varying degrees of repression. 

American military aid to Cambodia began indirectly in 1950 in 
the form of a security assistance program for the French forces in 
Indochina, that enabled them to expand a recently created in- 
digenous army. In 1955 the United States agreed to continue this 
aid to the independent kingdom of Cambodia. The program, which 
included military training and a resident Military Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG), lasted until terminated by the Cambo- 
dian government. Security assistance was again extended to the 
Khmer Republic (see Appendix B) from 1970 until that govern- 
ment fell in 1975 to the Khmer Rouge (see Appendix B). After 
1975 the United States extended humanitarian assistance through 
United Nations (UN) agencies to Cambodian refugees on the Thai 
border and gave nonlethal aid, only, to the two noncommunist com- 
ponents of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(CGDK — see Appendix). 

In 1987 Cambodia was the reluctant host to a substantial Viet- 
namese military presence, reinforced by its Cambodian surrogate 
army. History thus appeared to be repeating itself, and foreign 
observers and Cambodian nationalists feared that the country 
eventually might become part of a Hanoi-dominated Indochinese 



241 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

federation. The UN recognized the tripartite CGDK as the legiti- 
mate government of Cambodia. The insurgent forces of the coali- 
tion were capable only of conducting guerrilla raids and sabotage 
missions within Cambodian territory, against the Vietnamese 
occupation forces and the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF — see Appendix B) of the 
Phnom Penh government, the People's Republic of Kampuchea 
(PRK — see Appendix B). A number of foreign observers assessed 
the military situation as a stalemate and doubted that Hanoi would, 
or could, fulfill its public commitment to withdraw its forces by 
1990 from a Cambodia that was becoming a "strategic append- 
age" of the "indivisible strategic unit of Indochina" claimed by 
Vietnamese military doctrine. 

Historical Background 

The Time of Greatness, A.D. 802-1431 

Bas-relief friezes in galleries of the vast Angkor Wat complex 
in Siemreab depict Cambodia's land and naval conquests during 
its "time of greatness," the Angkorian Period, which spanned the 
years from A.D. 802 to 1431 (see The Angkorian Period, ch. 1). 
During this time, the Khmer Empire, by force of arms, extended 
its dominions to encompass much of Southeast Asia. The warrior 
kings, who actually led troops in battle, did not customarily main- 
tain standing armies but raised troops as necessity required. His- 
torian David P. Chandler has described the relationship between 
the monarch and the military: 

Though the king, who led his country into batde, some- 
times engaged his chief enemy in single combat, Khmer 
military strength rested on the junior officers, the cap- 
tains of militia. These men commanded the loyalty of 
peasant groups in their particular locality. If the king con- 
quered a region, a new captain of militia would be en- 
rolled and put under an oath of allegiance. The captains 
were simply headmen of the outlying regions, but their 
connection with the king enhanced their status. In time 
of war they were expected to conscript the peasants in 
their district and to lead them to Angkor to join the Khmer 
army. If the captains disobeyed the king they were put 
to death. The vast majority of the Khmer population were 
of the farmer-builder-soldier class. 

Little is known conclusively about warfare in early Cambodia, 
but much can be assumed from the environment or deduced from 
epigraphic and sculptural evidence. The army was made up of 



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National Security 



peasant levies, and because the society relied on rice cultivation, 
Khmer military campaigns were probably confined to the dry season 
when peasant- soldiers could be spared from the rice fields. Battles 
were fought on hard-baked plains from which the padi (or rice) 
had been harvested. Tactics were uncomplicated. The Khmer 
engaged their foes in pitched frontal assaults, while trying to keep 
the sun at their backs. War elephants were widely employed, for 
both tactical and logistical purposes. Late in the Khmer Empire, 
the ballista (a kind of catapult, often shaped like a giant crossbow) 
took its place in regional warfare. It probably was introduced to 
the Cambodians by Cham (see Glossary) mercenaries, who had 
copied it earlier from Chinese models. 

The Khmer Empire's principal adversaries were the Thai, the 
Vietnamese, and the Cham from the powerful kingdom of Champa 
in central Vietnam. Warfare, seemingly, was endemic, and mili- 
tary campaigns occurred continuously. The Cham — attacking by 
land in 1177 and again by water in 1178 — sacked Angkor twice. 
In 1181 a young nobleman who was shortly to become Jay avar- 
man VII, and to emerge as one of the greatest of the ancient Khmer 
kings, raised an army and defeated the Cham in a naval battle. 
After his death, ca. 1218, Kambuja entered a long decline, result- 
ing in eventual disintegration. 

Period of Decline, 1431-1863 

Scholars frequently assert that the decline of the Khmer Empire 
was precipitated by the drain on its economy, and on the morale 
and energy of its people, caused by the continual and monumen- 
tal construction program at Angkor. Dynastic rivalries took their 
toll, and slave rebellions are also thought to have hastened the 
demise of the empire. 

Over the centuries, the Khmer kings never completely pacified 
the countryside. Khmer martial spirit survived, as was demon- 
strated by uprisings and rebellions, either spontaneous or contrived, 
throughout periods of foreign encroachment and domination. 
Among the significant rebellions was one that occurred beginning 
in 1840 which resulted in Cambodia's being placed under the joint 
suzerainty of Thailand and Vietnam (see Domination by Thailand 
and Vietnam, ch. 1). 

The French Protectorate, 1863-1954 

Following entreaties that had been made a decade earlier by Cam- 
bodian King Ang Duong to Napoleon III for protection from the 
Vietnamese, his "traditional enemies," a delegation of French naval 
officers in 1863 proceeded to Phnom Penh from Saigon to con- 
clude a treaty with Duong's son, now King Norodom (1859-1904), 



243 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

that created a French protectorate (see The French Protectorate, 
ch. 1). It is generally accepted by historians that only the inter- 
vention of the French prevented the extinction of Cambodia. 

Heavy taxation as well as resentment against foreign domina- 
tion and the puppet rulers who sat on the throne in Phnom Penh 
were the causes of the intermittent rebellions that marked the colo- 
nial period. Revolts erupted in 1866 and in 1870 that attracted con- 
siderable support in the countryside. They were quelled by the 
French, assisted by Norodom's half brother (the future king), 
Sisowath, who led his troops alongside the French in the suppres- 
sion of both rebellions. 

Another serious rebellion occurred in 1884, when the French 
forced upon King Norodom a new treaty that tightened their con- 
trol over Cambodia. The reforms stipulated in the new accord, such 
as the abolition of slavery and the institutionalization of land owner- 
ship, struck at the very heart of the privileged status enjoyed by 
the Cambodian elite in the countryside. The result was a widespread 
insurrection evoking such support that a local French official in 
Kampong Cham noted in 1886 that "... the entire Cambodian 
population acquiesces in the revolt." Quelling the rebellion took 
one and one-half years, and it tied down some 4,000 French and 
Vietnamese troops that had been brought in from Cochinchina (the 
southern part of Vietnam). 

Unrest surfaced periodically before World War II, and various 
episodes of Cambodians' defying colonial rule were recorded. 
Reports by French officials also hinted at widespread insecurity 
in the countryside, where peasants frequently were at the mercy 
of bandit gangs. The colonial military forces in Cambodia, which 
were available to quell potential insurrections during this period, 
consisted of a light infantry battalion (Bataillon Tirailleurs Cam- 
bodgiens) and a national or native constabulary (Garde Nation- 
ale, also called Garde Indigene). 

The light infantry battalion, a Khmer unit with French officers, 
was part of a larger force, the third brigade, which had responsi- 
bility for Cambodia and for Cochinchina. In addition to the Cam- 
bodian battalion, the brigade was composed of French colonial and 
Vietnamese light infantry regiments and support elements. The 
brigade, headquartered in Saigon, was ultimately responsible to 
a supreme military command for Indochina located in Hanoi. 

Under the French pre- World War II colonial regime, the con- 
stabulary consisted of a force of about 2,500 men and a mixed 
Franco-Khmer headquarters element of about forty to fifty officers, 
technicians, and support personnel. The force was divided into 
about fifteen companies deployed in the provinces. Control of the 
constabulary was vested in the colonial civil administration, but 



244 



National Security 



in times of crisis, command could pass quickly to military authorities 
in Saigon or in Hanoi. Service in the constabulary theoretically 
was voluntary, and personnel received a cash salary. Enlistments, 
however, were rarely sufficient to keep pace with personnel require- 
ments, and villages occasionally were tasked to provide recruits. 

The Japanese Occupation, 1941-45 

In 1940 the Japanese government, after negotiating a treaty of 
friendship with Thailand, sought special concessions in Indochina 
from the French colonial authorities. The Vichy administration in 
Hanoi, under pressure from the German government, signed an 
agreement with Tokyo that permitted the movement of Japanese 
troops through the transportation hubs of Indochina. 

Thailand subsequentiy sought to take advantage of both its friend- 
ship with Tokyo and French military weakness in the region by 
launching an invasion of Cambodia's western provinces. Although 
the French suffered a series of land defeats in the skirmishes that 
followed, a unique twist in the confrontation came from a naval 
batde that ensued near the Thai island of Ko Chang. A small French 
naval force intercepted a Thai battle fleet, en route to attack Saigon, 
and sank two battleships and other light craft. The Japanese then 
intervened and arranged a treaty, signed in Tokyo in March 1941 , 
compelling the French to concede to Thailand the provinces of Bat- 
dambang, Siemreab, and parts of Kampong Thum and Stoeng 
Treng. Cambodia thus lost one-third of its territory and nearly half 
a million citizens. 

The Japanese, while leaving the Vichy colonial government 
nominally in charge throughout Indochina, established in Cam- 
bodia a garrison that numbered 8,000 troops by August 1941. 
Preservation of order on a day-to-day basis, however, continued 
to be the responsibility of the colonial authorities, who were per- 
mitted to retain the constabulary and the light infantry battalion. 
These forces were sufficient to quell the first stirrings of nation- 
alistic unrest in 1941 and in 1942. 

Anti-French agitation assumed a more overt form, in July 1942, 
when early nationalist leaders Pach Chhoeun and Son Ngoc Thanh 
organized a demonstration in Phnom Penh over an obscure inci- 
dent involving Cambodian military personnel. In this occurrence, 
a monk named Hem Chieu attempted to subvert some Khmer mili- 
tary personnel by involving them in vague coup plotting against 
the colonial administration. The plot was discovered, and the monk 
was arrested; Chhoeun and Thanh, believing they had tacit 
Japanese support, staged a march on the French residency by some 
2,000 people, many of them monks. The repressive reaction by 



245 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

the colonial authorities resulted in many injuries and in mass arrests. 
Although the Japanese failed to support Thanh as he had expected, 
they spirited him away to Japan, where he was trained for the next 
three years and was commissioned a captain in the Japanese army. 
Chhoeun was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. 

On March 9, 1945, Japanese forces in Indochina, including those 
in Cambodia, overthrew the French colonial administration; and, 
in a bid to revive the flagging support of local populations for 
Tokyo's war effort, they encouraged indigenous rulers to proclaim 
independence (see The Emergence of Nationalism, ch. 1). Dur- 
ing this period of Japanese-sponsored independence, the fate of the 
constabulary and of the light infantry battalion remained uncer- 
tain. The battalion apparently was demobilized for the most part, 
while the constabulary remained in place but was reduced to in- 
effectuality. Presumably both forces were leaderless because their 
French officers were interned by the Japanese for the remainder 
of the war. 

Tokyo, however, did not plan to leave the Indochinese coun- 
tries without a military force following the March 9 coup. Plans 
had been prepared for the creation of 5 volunteer units of 1,000 
troops each. There was no thought that such a native force would 
fight alongside Japanese troops, but rather that it would be used 
to preserve public order and internal security. It was intended that 
recruitment of indigenous personnel for the volunteer units would 
be through physical and written exams. Before the plan could be 
implemented in Cambodia, however, the war ended, and the con- 
cept died without further action. 

The conclusion of World War II caused considerable turmoil 
in Cambodia: a defeated Japanese military contingent waited to 
be disarmed and repatriated; French nationals newly released from 
internment sought to resume their prewar existence; diverse Allied 
military units returned to Phnom Penh to reimpose a colonial ad- 
ministration. In the countryside there were two sources of unrest. 
On the western fringes of the country, the Khmer Issarak (see 
Appendix B), nationalist insurgents with Thai backing, declared 
their opposition to a French return to power in Cambodia, 
proclaimed a government-in-exile, and established a base in 
Batdambang Province (see fig. 1). On the eastern frontier, the Viet- 
namese communist forces, or Viet Minh (see Appendix B) infil- 
trated the Cambodian border provinces, organized a "Khmer 
People's Liberation Army" (not to be confused with the later Cam- 
bodian force, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's National Liber- 
ation Armed Forces [KPNLAF — see Appendix B], which is 



246 



A sub-lieutenant of the 
Cambodian national army, 
ca. 1952 
Courtesy National Archives 




sometimes called the Khmer People's National Liberation Army), 
and began seeking a united front with the Khmer Issarak. 

The First Indochina War, 1945-54 

It was under such exigencies that a Cambodian army was created, 
primarily by Prince Monireth, the heir to the throne, who earlier 
had been passed over by the French in favor of Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk, who was considered more pliable. In the fall of 1945, 
Monireth gained the concurrence of returning French authorities 
in his plan to raise an indigenous military force to fill the vacuum 
left by the defeated Japanese and to counter mounting internal dis- 
order. On November 23, in his capacity as defense minister, he 
made public two decisions concerning this issue. The first was to 
form the first battalion of a nascent Cambodian army, and he in- 
vited former noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of the demobilized 
colonial light infantry battalion to join the new unit. The second 
was to open an officer-candidate school, and he extended an invi- 
tation to young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five 
with a junior high-school education to apply for admission. The 
school duly opened on January 1 , 1946, and part of it was reserved 
for NCO training. 

Two important agreements between Phnom Penh and Paris gave 
the Cambodian military forces a firmer official footing in 1946. 
The first, the Franco-Cambodian Modus Vivendi of January 7, 



247 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



1946, for the most part concerned political matters. In military 
affairs, however, it gave official recognition to the existence of a 
Cambodian army, although it placed French advisers in the Cam- 
bodian Ministry of Defense and declared that French authorities 
had responsibility for maintaining order in Cambodia. 

The second agreement, the Franco-Khmer Military Convention 
of November 20, 1946, was more significant in Cambodian mili- 
tary history because it established the organization and the mis- 
sion of the nation's armed forces. The pact affirmed that Cambodia, 
as an autonomous state within the French Union, would have at 
its disposal indigenous forces, the missions of which were to up- 
hold the sovereignty of the king, to preserve internal security, and 
to defend the frontiers of the country. The accord also noted that 
Cambodia participated in the defense of the French Union by plac- 
ing its military units at the disposal of the French High Commis- 
sioner for Indochina, and that, reciprocally, other French Union 
forces helped to defend Cambodia. The Cambodian forces were 
to be composed of units with a territorial responsibility and a mo- 
bile reserve. The supreme commander would be the king, who 
would exercise his powers through a Ministry of Defense assisted 
by a Franco-Khmer general staff. The Cambodians also were 
granted the responsibilities of recruiting, of determining obliga- 
tory military service, of designating unit tables of organization and 
equipment, and of deploying troops internally. The stationing of 
Cambodian units outside the country, however, was to be based 
on mutual understanding between the king and the French High 
Commissioner for Indochina (see The Struggle for Independence, 
ch. 1). 

In 1947 the Cambodian government faced a mounting threat 
from several thousand Khmer Issarak combatants, whose numbers 
would swell to around 10,000 by 1949. In an effort to keep pace 
with their domestic adversaries, the Cambodian military forces 
slowly but inexorably grew in numbers as the months and years 
passed. In January 1947, the effective strength of the Cambodian 
military stood at about 4,000 personnel, of which 3,000 served in 
the constabulary. The remainder were in a mobile reserve of two 
battalion- sized units (one of them newly formed) named, respec- 
tively, the First Cambodian Rifle Battalion and the Second Cam- 
bodian Rifle Battalion (Bataillon de Chasseurs Cambodgiens). 
These first Cambodian military units went into action in 1947 
against the Khmer Issarak. During the next two years, two more 
rifle battalions were added, bringing total strength up to 6,000 per- 
sonnel, with about half serving in the Garde Nationale and half 
in the mobile reserve. The latter at this time comprised three rifle 



248 



National Security 



battalions (one battalion had been allocated to French Union forces 
elsewhere in Indochina). 

In July 1949, in another military agreement with France, Cam- 
bodian forces were granted autonomy within operational sectors 
in the provinces of Siemreab and Kampong Thum, which had been 
part of the territory returned to Cambodia by Thailand in early 
1947. Under an additional protocol signed in June 1950, provin- 
cial governors were assigned the responsibility for the pacification 
of the territories under their jurisdictions; to accomplish this mis- 
sion they were each given a counterinsurgency force consisting of 
one independent infantry company. 

The early 1950s were marked by further milestones in the de- 
velopment of the Cambodian military forces. In the fall of 1950, 
a military assistance agreement between the United States and 
France provided for an expansion of indigenous forces in Indo- 
china, and by 1952 Cambodian troop strength had reached 13,000 
personnel, greater than that of French forces in the country. In 
the meantime, more rifle battalions were formed, combat- support 
units were established, and a framework for logistical support was 
set up. Cambodian units were given wider responsibility: protec- 
tion of the rubber plantations in the area of the middle Mekong, 
and, to prevent infiltration by the Viet Minh, surveillance of the 
coastal areas of the southern provinces and of the eastern frontier 
with Cochinchina. 

In June 1952, Prince Sihanouk — determined to transcend his 
figurehead role — seized power, staging what was termed a ' 'royal 
coup d'etat." He suspended the constitution "to restore . . . order 
and security throughout the country." Taking command of army 
operations, he led his troops against Son Ngoc Thanh's Khmer 
Issarak forces in Siemreab Province, where he announced that he 
had driven "700 red guerrillas" across the border into Thailand. 
As the year wore on, the French returned to Cambodian control 
the battalion that had been assigned to the French Union forces 
since the late 1940s. The unit returned ceremoniously to Phnom 
Penh in October. In December the Cambodian operational sector 
of Siemreab was enlarged by the addition of Batdambang Province, 
and the subsector of Batdambang City came under the command 
of a previously obscure lieutenant colonel, Lon Nol. The opera- 
tional sector of Kampong Thum was given its own combat element, 
the Third Cambodian Rifle Battalion, an elite unit that was sub- 
ject to the direct orders of the monarch. 

In early 1953, Sihanouk embarked on a world tour to publicize 
his campaign for independence, contending that he could "check- 
mate communism by opposing it with the force of nationalism." 



249 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Following his tour, he "retired" to Batdambang Province, which 
was declared a "free zone of independence" and where he was 
joined by 30,000 Cambodian troops and police in a show of sup- 
port and strength. Elsewhere, Cambodian troops under French 
officers staged slowdowns or refused the commands of their supe- 
riors, as a demonstration of solidarity with Sihanouk. Full indepen- 
dence was granted by France in November 1953, and Sihanouk, 
returning to Phnom Penh, took command of the army of 17,000 
troops, which had been renamed the Royal Khmer Armed Forces 
(Forces Armees Royales Khmeres — FARK — see Appendix B). 

In March 1954, combined Viet Minh and Khmer Issarak forces 
launched attacks from Vietnam into northeastern Cambodia. 
Sihanouk personally directed a sustained counterattack. Conscrip- 
tion was instituted for men between fifteen and thirty-five years 
of age, and national mobilization was declared. Following the con- 
clusion of the Geneva Conference on Indochina in July, Viet Minh 
representatives agreed to withdraw their troops from Cambodia. 
After a brief rebellion by the Khmer Issarak in late 1954, one of 
its principal leaders, Son Ngoc Thanh, surrendered in response 
to an amnesty decree, but, upon denial of an audience with Siha- 
nouk, he departed for Thailand. FARK force levels were 47,000, 
but, with demobilization after Geneva, this dropped to 36,000, the 
approximate level at which it was to be maintained for the next 
fifteen years except during periods of emergency. 

The Second Indochina War, 1954-75 

In May 1955, the United States and Cambodia signed an agree- 
ment providing for security assistance and for the establishment 
of a thirty-person MAAG. During the next eight years, until the 
assistance program was discontinued at Cambodian request in 
November 1963, FARK received from the United States supplies 
and equipment worth approximately US$83.7 million, in addition 
to military budget support. In the meantime, the French also re- 
tained a military training mission in Cambodia that was to remain 
until 1971. FARK traditions and doctrine remained French, and 
there was some incompatibility with United States military doc- 
trine and outlook. 

Although the United States undertook a substantial security- 
assistance program in Cambodia, and the kingdom was included 
as a "protocol state" in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), failure to obtain more concrete assurances of defense 
assistance motivated Cambodia to adopt a neutralist foreign pol- 
icy. Subsequently adopted as law, this policy declared that Cam- 
bodia would "abstain from military or ideological alliances" but 



250 



King Norodom Suramarit troops the line of 
FARK military units at his coronation in March 1955. 

Courtesy National Archives 

would retain the right to self-defense. Cambodia continued to be 
aware of the serious threat to its independence posed by the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). 

FARK's mission thus became a defensive one, that is, to insure 
Cambodia's territorial integrity within the framework of neutral- 
ity. The FARK high command remained fairly stable, staffed by 
a limited number of well- trained personnel, many of whom had 
been educated abroad. Ranking officers, however, became highly 
politicized, if not subservient, because they were more or less com- 
pelled by Sihanouk at his whim to perform active roles in national 
political life. Throughout the years that followed the Geneva Con- 
ference, Sihanouk, supreme commander of FARK, controlled 
national policies affecting the military establishment, and FARK's 
operational parameters were circumscribed by his frequent policy 
vacillations. Because of this, FARK never developed as an effec- 
tive or viable military organization. 

In addition to the Vietnamese threat, the Cambodian govern- 
ment perceived a menace to internal stability from Son Ngoc 
Thanh's resurgent antimonarchist Khmer Serei (see Appendix B). 
Although contemporary observers suggested that the Khmer Serei 
seemed "to be more of a nuisance . . . than a genuine threat," 
the group's insurgent activities and subversive efforts were viewed 



251 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

with increasing alarm by Phnom Penh. In March 1959, for exam- 
ple, the provincial governor of Siemreab, General Dap Chhuon, 
a former Khmer Issarak leader who once had fought alongside 
Sihanouk, was implicated in an attempted Khmer Serei uprising 
(known at the time as the Bangkok Plot) and was executed. Siha- 
nouk believed the United States had been behind the plot, and his 
proclivity for assuming complicity between Washington and the 
Khmer Serei became a particularly significant factor a few years 
later. In approximately 1965 to 1966, the United States Military 
Assistance Command — Vietnam (MACV) began recruitment for 
the Studies and Operations Group and civilian irregular defense 
groups of Khmer Krom (see Appendix B) living in the Mekong 
Delta, many of whom were Khmer Serei members. In his public 
pronouncements regarding Khmer Serei activity, Sihanouk charged 
that the group had originated in South Vietnam and Thailand, 
and had the backing of both governments. Over the years, there 
were coundess Khmer Serei incidents, followed by amnesties, sur- 
renders, executions, and acrimonious Cambodian charges against 
South Vietnam, Thailand, and the United States. After Sihanouk 
was deposed in 1970, the Lon Nol government pardoned some 
500 political prisoners, the majority of whom were Khmer Serei. 
Charges surfaced in 1987 that during his rule Sihanouk had 
executed as many as 1,000 Khmer Serei suspects. 

In the uneasy peace between the First Indochina War and the 
Second Indochina War, a number of incidents occurred on Cam- 
bodia's border with South Vietnam. In June 1958, two South Viet- 
namese battalions briefly occupied a village in Stoeng Treng 
Province, and Sihanouk appealed for United States intervention. 
Receiving no response that satisfied him, Sihanouk established 
diplomatic relations with China and announced that this action was 
a direct consequence of South Vietnam's violation of Cambodian 
territory. Cambodia was also not silent during the early stages of 
border violations by North Vietnam. In 1959 Phnom Penh com- 
plained that North Vietnamese regulars were using northeastern 
Cambodia to infiltrate South Vietnam. Cambodia made concerted 
efforts to demonstrate that it was policing its eastern borders, but, 
although the incursions were publicly admitted, the existence of 
base areas was not. By the mid-1960s, sites along Cambodia's 
eastern borders were serving as bases for North Vietnamese and 
for South Vietnamese communist, or Viet Cong (see Appendix B) 
forces fighting the South Vietnamese government. FARK, re- 
strained by Sihanouk's policies, which, in effect, constituted a 
modus vivendi with the intruders, could do little more than moni- 
tor these activities. The continuation of border incidents, and 



252 



Armored cars pass in review during coronation 
parade of King Norodom Suramarit in March 1955 
Courtesy National Archives 

Sihanouk's repeated charges of United States complicity with the 
Khmer Serei, led to a steady deterioration in Cambodian- American 
relations. 

In November 1963, after the clandestine Khmer Serei radio 
resumed anti-Sihanouk broadcasts that the Cambodian government 
alleged were beamed from Thailand and from South Vietnam with 
transmitters supplied by the United States, Sihanouk terminated 
the economic and security assistance agreements with Washing- 
ton. He also demanded the departure from Cambodia of all non- 
diplomatic United States government personnel. The final rupture 
in diplomatic relations came two years later, after Cambodia 
filed a complaint in the UN Security Council against the United 
States and South Vietnam for their "repeated acts of aggression 
against Cambodia." Relations were formally terminated May 3, 
1965. 

Although still receiving French military assistance and training 
(a program that was to continue until 1972), Cambodia began 
soliciting and accepting military assistance from communist coun- 
tries as well, after the termination of United States aid. In 1963 
FARK received four Soviet MiG aircraft at the beginning of a pro- 
gram in which China also joined. The inevitable results of a variety 
of suppliers were mixed equipment inventories. 



253 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

In 1966 Sihanouk secretly granted access to the deep-water port 
of Sihanoukville (later called Kampong Saom), in western Kam- 
pot Province, to the North Vietnamese. With the complicity of rank- 
ing FARK officers, Sihanoukville became a main entrepot for North 
Vietnamese military supplies from China and from the Soviet 
Union. Armaments were then transported to North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong sanctuaries on the border with South Vietnam, iron- 
ically over the "Friendship Highway" built with United States aid 
and sometimes in FARK trucks supplied as part of the United States 
security-assistance program. This effective supply route enabled 
the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong to stockpile substantial 
amounts of armaments and equipment for the 1968 Tet Offensive 
against the Saigon government. FARK profited from armaments 
pilfered from the Vietnamese shipments, and suborned FARK 
officers derived personal advantage from the Sihanoukville traffic 
through fees, bribes, and other special arrangements. 

In 1967 a peasant uprising broke out in the Samlot district of 
Batdambang Province. Its significance was not appreciated immedi- 
ately. At the time, Sihanouk attributed the attacks, which first 
occurred in about January, to "the Khmer Viet Minh" (see Appen- 
dix B), whom he also labeled "Khmer Rouge" (see Appendix B) 
to distinguish them from the "Khmer Bleu" (see Appendix B). 
Sihanouk vacillated in placing the blame for the unrest, however, 
and later charged the "Thai patriotic front" with being its insti- 
gators. Acting on his orders, FARK harshly suppressed the Bat- 
dambang insurgents, who had acted spontaneously, and not at 
Khmer Rouge direction. Although Sihanouk announced two 
months later that the Batdambang rebellion was "completely at 
an end," there were subsequent references to continuing Khmer 
Rouge activity in the countryside. 

The uprising convinced the Khmer communists (including a 
former school teacher named Saloth Sar, later to emerge under the 
alias Pol Pot) who earlier had gone underground, that the time 
was at hand to escalate the armed struggle against the Phnom Penh 
government. Shortly thereafter, the Revolutionary Army of Kam- 
puchea (RAK — see Appendix B) came into being. The Khmer 
Rouge dated its own founding from January 17, 1968. RAK lead- 
ers, including Pol Pot, who had just returned from a prolonged 
visit to China, retreated to the jungle and mountains of Rotanokiri 
Province (Ratanakiri) in northeastern Cambodia. There they hoped 
to exploit the disaffection of the Khmer Loeu (see Appendix B) 
over the policies of the Phnom Penh government concerning taxa- 
tion, forced labor, and the resettlement of lowland Khmers in the 
Khmer Loeu areas. For the next two and one-half years, the newly 



254 



National Security 



formed RAK remained small (estimates varied from 400 to 2,000 
personnel), and poorly equipped with captured weapons. The 
Khmer Rouge found that, in spite of the Samlot rebellion, discon- 
tent against the government in Phnom Penh was then insuffi- 
cient to attract large numbers of people to the rigors of an armed 
insurgency. As for external support, there was no move on the part 
of Hanoi to provide military assistance to the Khmer Rouge be- 
cause such action would have alienated Sihanouk's government 
and would have imperiled continued North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong access to Cambodian territory as well as their use of the port 
of Sihanoukville. 

In 1969 the United States undertook the first of two bombing 
campaigns against enemy targets in Cambodian territory. Code- 
named the Menu series, these air operations consisted of tactical 
strikes against North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas on the 
Cambodian- Vietnamese border. They partially dislodged the North 
Vietnamese and the Viet Cong and drove them more deeply into 
Cambodia in quest of safer havens. This brought FARK elements 
into more frequent hostile contact with the communists, and there 
were reports of FARK forces' being involved in joint operations 
with South Vietnamese forces against the North Vietnamese and 
the Viet Cong. Sihanouk became increasingly distressed with these 
developments; his attitude toward the communist Vietnamese 
changed, and authorization for continued use of Sihanoukville was 
terminated. In April, speaking in Rotanokiri Province, Sihanouk 
stated that "to deal with the Viet Cong and Viet Minh," he had 
ordered General Lon Nol "to give up the defensive spirit and adopt 
an offensive spirit." Sihanouk announced during a press confer- 
ence on June 11, 1969 that "... at present there is war in 
Rotanokiri [province] between Cambodia and Vietnam." 

Sihanouk left Cambodia for medical treatment in France in Janu- 
ary 1970. Citing disagreement over economic and administrative 
matters, after week-long anticommunist rioting in Phnom Penh, 
the Cambodian National Assembly on March 18 passed a unani- 
mous vote of nonconfidence in Sihanouk and replaced him as chief 
of state (see The March 1970 Coup d'Etat, ch. 1). Although Siha- 
nouk's deposition was nominally a parliamentary action, the leaders 
of the participants consisted primarily of FARK officers, headed 
by Lon Nol, who had been the prime minister since the previous 
August (and who, Sihanouk had once suggested, would be his like- 
liest successor). The coup was bloodless, although FARK contin- 
gents were on the alert in Phnom Penh and took control of key 
installations, such as the airport and the radio station. 



255 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



At the time Sihanouk was deposed, FARK, soon to be renamed 
the Khmer National Armed Forces (Forces Armees Nationales 
Khmeres— FANK— see Appendix B), had 35,000 to 40,000 per- 
sonnel, organized for the most part as ground forces. The Lon Nol 
government repeatedly sought negotiations for a peaceful with- 
drawal of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong forces from 
its territory. These overtures were rejected, and in April the Viet- 
namese communists began moving out of their sanctuaries and 
deeper into Cambodia, in efforts to preserve their lines of com- 
munication and to maintain the corridor to the port of Sihanouk- 
ville. President Richard M. Nixon spoke on April 30, 1970 to the 
American nation, and said that "thousands of their [North Viet- 
namese and Viet Cong] soldiers are invading the country from the 
sanctuaries and they are encircling the capital." Lon Nol, in the 
meantime, had called up military reserves, had requested UN in- 
tervention, and, while reiterating Cambodia's position of neutral- 
ity, had issued a call for international assistance. 

Between April 29 and May 1, 1970, South Vietnamese and 
United States ground forces drove into Cambodia's border areas 
in a determined bid to overrun and to destroy North Vietnamese 
and Viet Cong logistical depots and sanctuaries. There also was 
hope at United States MACV headquarters that the offensive would 
result in the capture of the Central Office for South Vietnam, the 
Viet Cong headquarters for directing the war against the Saigon 
government. The operation resulted in the capture of vast quanti- 
ties of enemy materiel and it bought time for Washington and Sai- 
gon to proceed with ' 1 Vietnamization, ' ' the process of turning over 
the conduct of the war to the South Vietnamese government. For 
the shaky Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh, however, the 
results of the incursion were destabilizing and far-reaching. In 
retreating before United States and South Vietnamese troops, North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces penetrated farther west into Cam- 
bodian territory, overrunning government outposts as they went. 
Soon all of northeastern Cambodia had fallen to the North Viet- 
namese or to the Viet Cong, who then proceeded to turn the cap- 
tured areas over to the Khmer insurgents and to forge them into 
a full-fledged revolutionary army. 

To help hard-pressed FANK, Nixon laid down guidelines for 
United States assistance to Cambodia, promising, among other 
things, to turn over to the government in Phnom Penh equipment 
captured during the incursion, and to "provide military assis- 
tance ... in the form of small arms and relatively unsophisticated 
equipment in types and quantities suitable for their army." Thus 
began a structured military assistance program, supplementing the 



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National Security 



ad hoc support begun shortly before the incursion, that was to total 
US$1.18 billion by the fall of the Lon Nol government in April 
1975. Although all United States troops were withdrawn from Cam- 
bodian territory, South Vietnamese forces were accorded "auto- 
matic authority" to operate in Cambodia in a sixteen-kilometer 
corridor along the frontier. 

The Lon Nol government very shortly afterwards declared mar- 
tial law and total mobilization, and it began expansion of its army. 
United States government studies conducted shortly before Siha- 
nouk's deposition had expressed serious reservations about the capa- 
bilities of the government forces, noting the "lack of combat 
experience, equipment deficiencies, .... lack of mobility," and 
citing "incompetent and corrupt officers" as the "greatest short- 
coming." 

The same officers were, however, retained by FANK and their 
inadequacy rapidly became apparent as military rosters were pad- 
ded with non-existent "phantom troops." United States advisers 
attempting to keep track of FANK's development were constantly 
hampered by the difficulty of accurately estimating the number of 
Cambodian troops. (Accurate numbers were important because 
the United States was then providing assistance for FANK's mili- 
tary pay and allowances.) United States Senate staff investigators 
reported that United States officials acknowledged in January 1972 
that the Khmer Republic's military strength figures were "gross- 
ly exaggerated" by at least 10 percent. The Senate report concluded 
there was "no greater mystery in Cambodia than the size of the 
Cambodian Government's armed forces." In December 1972, the 
information minister of the newly proclaimed Khmer Republic an- 
nounced that 100,000 troops were found to be "nonexistent." 
According to the United States secretary of state's report to the 
Congress for the years 1969 and 1970, FANK grew "from under 
40,000 in March 1970 to some 200,000 in January 1971." In real- 
ity, FANK levels probably never reached such a high number, and 
many of its new soldiers were youthful and inexperienced. 

Limited basic training of the inductees, some of it in Thailand 
and in South Vietnam, began almost immediately after the in- 
troduction of martial law. Such training, however, could not satisfy 
FANK's pressing need to teach peasant farmers to man the equip- 
ment provided by the United States, to fight effectively in sizable 
units, and to comprehend modern military doctrine. 

In spite of a steady infusion of United States security assistance 
and the influx of new FANK personnel, the government forces were 
unable to hold their own against their adversaries. Because much 
of the country remained under North Vietnamese control after the 



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Cambodia: A Country Study 

withdrawal of United States and South Vietnamese troops, initial 
FANK strategy focused on holding the heartland of Cambodia south 
of a line of demarcation dubbed the "Lon Nol Line." This strat- 
egy conceded about half the country to the enemy, but it was the 
heavily forested, sparsely populated, northern half. If the Lon Nol 
Line could be held, the government would control the southern 
half with most of the population and all of the rich, rice- growing 
areas. 

To defend this territory, FANK unleashed its two most ambi- 
tious offensives: Chenla I, in August 1970, and Chenla II, in Au- 
gust 1971. Both had as their objectives the reopening of Route 6 
to Kampong Thum and the reassertion of government control over 
this fertile agricultural area. Both operations failed. Chenla I stalled 
short of its objective in the face of fierce resistance from the North 
Vietnamese Ninth Division. FANK units were then withdrawn to 
protect the capital from enemy commando teams. Chenla II was 
successful in securing its initial goals, and FANK columns from 
north and south met jubilantly on Route 6 along the way to Kam- 
pong Thum. As the government forces celebrated, however, their 
old nemesis, the North Vietnamese Ninth Division, tore into the 
extended FANK lines with ferocity, slaughtering many of them 
and leaving the rest cut off and compelled to fight their way back 
to their own lines as best they could. Former FANK commander 
General Sat Sutsakhan noted ruefully about Chenla II after the 
war that, "In this operation FANK lost some of its best units of 
infantry as well as a good part of its armor and a great deal of trans- 
port, both military and civil." 

The North Vietnamese, however, were neither the only, nor the 
most determined adversary with whom FANK had to deal. A far 
more lethal threat was soon posed by a revitalized Khmer Rouge- 
dominated force that had evolved considerably since its days as the 
ragtag, poorly armed band of irregulars known then as the RAK. 
The development of the RAK had owed much to the opportunism 
of the Khmer Rouge leaders, who had been able to transform a 
forlorn communist insurgency with no chance of succeeding in the 
late 1960s, into a war of national liberation headed by the coun- 
try's most eminent nationalist, Sihanouk. 

From Beijing, where he had been stranded by the coup that de- 
posed him, Sihanouk in 1970 announced the formation of a Royal 
Government of National Union of Kampuchea (Gouvernement 
Royal d' Union Nationale du Kampuchea — GRUNK — see Appen- 
dix B). This government, he said, would be under the leadership 
of a broad umbrella organization, the National United Front of 
Kampuchea (Front Uni National du Kampuchea — FUNK — see 



258 



Insurgents of the KPNLAF on patrol 
near the Thai-Cambodian border 
Courtesy Frank Tatu 

Appendix B). The prestige of Sihanouk's name thus helped the 
Khmer Rouge in their recruitment effort. Rural peasant volun- 
teers believed they were joining a broad-based national resistance 
movement, headed by the prince, against an ineffectual puppet 
regime in Phnom Penh. Several groups also rallied to the broad 
appeal of the GRUNK/FUNK. Such groups included the pro- 
Sihanouk Khmer Rumdo (see Appendix B), the Khmer Viet Minh, 
and the Khmer Loeu. 

To accommodate the disparate elements that were rallying to 
the resistance cause, the RAK was renamed the Cambodian Peo- 
ple's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF — see Appen- 
dix B). As this force grew in size and in proficiency, it was able 
to relieve North Vietnamese units of their combat burden in Cam- 
bodia. By 1973 there were reportedly no more than 5,000 North 
Vietnamese combat troops in Cambodia, and of this number only 
2,000 to 3,000 were deployed against FANK units. 

After the Chenla campaigns, FANK was unable to regain the 
offensive, and its operations became a series of hard-fought defen- 
sive actions against an enemy whose momentum could not be 
stayed. Individual unit valor and fleeting tactical successes did lit- 
tle to relieve the unbroken string of FANK setbacks — overrun out- 
posts, annihilated battalions, cut-off columns, plummeting morale, 



259 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

exhausted supplies, steadily shrinking government territory, and 
enemy units that were drawing ever closer around Phnom Penh. 
A harbinger of future trends was discernible as early as Novem- 
ber 1972, two-and-one-half years before the final defeat. FANK 
strategists at that time acknowledged the waning capability of their 
armed forces and redrew the Lon Nol Line. The new line of demar- 
cation signified a profound strategic realignment because it con- 
ceded most of the country, including the rich rice- growing areas 
around the Tonle Sap, to the enemy. In accordance with the 
redrawn Lon Nol line, FANK was committed to defend no more 
than the triangular corner of southeastern Cambodia, which held 
a majority of the population and was bounded generally by Route 
4 from Phnom Penh to Kampong Saom on the west, and by Route 
1 from Phnom Penh to the Vietnamese border on the east. The 
apex of the triangle passed just north of Odongk, the former royal 
capital that was to be the scene of heavy fighting later in the war. 
Even this retrenchment, however, turned out to be impractical, 
as successive engagements failed to dislodge the enemy troops south 
of the new defense line, and FANK increasingly found itself hard 
pressed from that direction as well. 

By 1973 United States Department of State sources, possibly un- 
derestimating, noted that the Khmer Rouge-dominated CPNLAF 
controlled about 60 percent of Cambodia's territory and 25 per- 
cent of the population. Despite a sustained United States bomb- 
ing campaign that year to blunt the steady advance of the CPNLAF 
and to relieve pressure on FANK, the Khmer Rouge insurgent 
forces were able to absorb their losses, to maintain the initiative, 
and to subject an increasingly demoralized and cornered FANK 
to unremitting pressure. 

The denouement for FANK and for the Khmer Republic began 
on New Year's Day 1975 when the CPNLAF unleashed its final 
offensive. As winter turned into spring, the enemy battered the 
defenses of Phnom Penh from every direction. Routes into the city 
were cut, reopened, and cut again; river convoys were forced to 
run a gauntlet of hostile fire to reach the beleaguered capital and 
finally could no longer break through; United States aircraft, in 
a forlorn attempt to maintain a lifeline into the city, set up an airlift 
from bases in Thailand. The effort worked briefly, until the air- 
port itself was interdicted by hostile rocket fire. By early April, 
Phnom Penh was surrounded on all sides, and its defenses were 
crumbling. FANK attempts to break out of the encircled city stalled 
in the face of intense Khmer Rouge firepower. Government units 
were decimated, exhausted, and out of supplies; finally, they were 
unable to hold out any longer. The fall of the capital on April 17 



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National Security 

marked the demise of the Khmer Republic and the total defeat of 
FANK, which in the end had been totally outclassed and outfought, 
not by an army of guerrillas — that phenomenon so intensively 
studied during the period, but by a tough, disciplined, regular force 
in a conventional war of movement, by fire and by maneuver. 

Military Developments under the Khmer Rouge 
Khmer Rouge Armed Forces 

The 68,000-member Khmer Rouge-dominated CPNLAF force 
that completed its conquest of Cambodia in April 1975 was a highly 
dedicated and disciplined peasant army, trained in the rigors of 
guerrilla warfare as well as in full-scale combat. Its shadowy in- 
tellectual leaders, adhering to the Maoist principles of guerrilla 
warfare, had taken their core "fish" from only three scattered com- 
panies, when optimum conditions had been presented to them in 
1970, and had propelled them through the "water" of the people 
in the countryside, while collecting thousands of proselytes on the 
way. These leaders were fiercely independent, at first grudgingly 
accepting training and arms from the Vietnamese — the hated tradi- 
tional enemy — while on occasion violently turning on these nomi- 
nal allies, behavior that presaged the fatal conflict that was to come. 
When most North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combat divisions 
had withdrawn from the field in Cambodia at the end of 1972, the 
RAK had experienced phenomenal growth, reaching an estimated 
50,000. Its personnel continued to arm themselves by capturing 
or purchasing weaponry from FANK. The insurgents marched 
under the banners of nationalism, of legitimacy, and of national 
preservation — the escutcheon of Sihanouk. In the end, they defeated 
an army which had a strength on paper of 230,000, but which pos- 
sibly numbered as few as 150,000. FANK had been armed by the 
United States with military weaponry and equipment worth 
US$1.18 billion, an abundance of materiel that now fell into the 
hands of the CPNLAF. 

At the beginning of the regime of Democratic Kampuchea, the 
CPNLAF — now renamed the RAK once again, under its long-time 
commander and then Minister of Defense Son Sen, had 230 bat- 
talions in 35 to 40 regiments and in 12 to 14 brigades. The com- 
mand structure in units was based on three-person committees in 
which the political commissar ranked higher than the military com- 
mander and his deputy. The country was divided into zones and 
special sectors, the boundaries of which changed slighdy over the 
years. Within these areas, the RAK's first task upon "liberation," 



261 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

as a calculated policy, was the peremptory execution of former 
FANK officers and of their families, without trial or fanfare. 

The next priority was to consolidate into a national army the 
separate forces that were operating more or less autonomously in 
the various zones. The Khmer Rouge units were commanded by 
zonal secretaries who were simultaneously party and military 
officers, some of whom were said to have manifested "warlord 
characteristics." Troops from one zone frequently were sent to 
another zone to enforce discipline. It was such efforts to discipline 
zonal secretaries and their dissident or ideologically impure cadres 
that gave rise to the purges that were to decimate RAK ranks, to 
undermine the morale of the victorious army, and to generate the 
seeds of rebellion. As journalist Elizabeth Becker noted, "in the 
end paranoia, not enemies, was responsible for bringing down the 
regime." 

Khmer-Vietnamese Border Tensions 

Border tensions between Cambodia and Vietnam (aside from 
traditional Khmer fear and hatred of the Vietnamese) goes back 
to the controversy over the Brevie Line, drawn in 1939 by French 
colonial administrators and considered by Vietnam to be the offi- 
cial international boundary between the two countries. For years 
after the French departure, various Cambodian governments 
attempted to negotiate the return of Cochinchina — known in Cam- 
bodia as Kampuchea Krom, which they maintained was a French 
colony, not a protectorate, that had been promised to Cambodia 
by early French colonial authorities. Negotiations to solve the border 
dispute were held between 1975 and 1977, but they made no 
progress and were suspended. The Khmer Rouge also felt an abid- 
ing distrust of the Vietnamese, who, they believed, had never 
renounced their determination to incorporate Cambodia into a 
larger, Hanoi-dominated Indochina federation. 

Clashes between the RAK and Vietnamese communist forces 
began in Cambodia as early as 1970, when there were reported 
incidents of Khmer Rouge units firing on North Vietnamese. 
Reports continued of engagements of growing intensity, particu- 
larly after 1973. The North Vietnamese, because they urgently 
needed sanctuaries in Cambodia in order to pursue their war in 
South Vietnam, chose to ignore the incidents and were still pre- 
pared, at the end of Cambodia's long civil war, to send sapper and 
artillery groups to help the CPNLAF take Phnom Penh. After the 
communist victories of April and May 1975, clashes between Viet- 
namese and Khmer Rouge units centered on the border. Skirmish- 
ing began about a month after the fall of Phnom Penh, when Hanoi 



262 



National Security 



accused the Khmer Rouge of trying to seize Phu Quoc Island and 
of making forays into several Vietnamese border provinces. 

Ironically, some analysts believe that the Khmer Rouge would 
have made more noise about their offshore claims had it not been 
for the destruction by the United States of their air force and much 
of their navy during the Mayaguez incident. On May 12, 1975, a 
Khmer Rouge sector commander, zealously asserting Cambodia's 
territorial rights in the Gulf of Thailand, boarded and captured 
the American container ship S.S. Mayaguez, which carried a crew 
of forty, near the island of Wai (which later fell under Vietnamese 
jurisdiction). Failing to receive a timely response to demands for 
return of the ship, Washington notified the UN and invoked the 
right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The en- 
suing four-day engagement involved U.S. bombing raids on the 
airfield at Ream and on the port of Kampong Saom, as well as 
naval barrages and a Marine assault on the nearby island of Kaoh 
Tang. On orders from the Khmer Rouge leadership, the Mayaguez 
crew was released unharmed and was returned to United States 
custody. 

Deteriorating relations between Cambodia and Vietnam reached 
a crescendo of recrimination when, on December 31 , 1977, Radio 
Phnom Penh, citing "ferocious and barbarous aggression launched 
by the Vietnamese aggressor forces against Democratic Kam- 
puchea," denounced the "so-called Socialist Republic of Vietnam" 
and announced the "temporary severance" of diplomatic relations. 
Rhetorical exchanges between the two sides became more acrimoni- 
ous, and border skirmishes involving Cambodian and Vietnamese 
units erupted into pitched battles in the summer and the fall of 
1978. Major engagements were reported in the Parrot's Beak (part 
of Svay Rieng Province), in the Fishhook (part of Kampong Cham 
Province), and in Rotanokiri Province. In an effort to court world 
public opinion, in September 1978 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Democratic Kampuchea published its so-called "Black Book," 
the Black Paper: Facts and Evidence of Aggression and Annexation Against 
Kampuchea. The tract denounced Vietnam's "true nature" as that 
of "aggressor, annexationist and swallower of other countries' 
territories." 

In November 1978, rhetoric was succeeded by full-scale action: 
Vietnamese forces launched a sustained operation on Cambodian 
soil in the area of Snuol and Memot (both in Kracheh Province). 
This action cleared a liberated zone where anti-Khmer Rouge Cam- 
bodians could launch a broad-based political movement that would 
offer an alternative to the odious Pol Pot regime. Proclamation of 
this movement, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) National United 



263 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS — see Appendix B), took 
place in a rubber-plantation clearing on December 2, 1978, amid 
rigid security provided by heavily armed Vietnamese units rein- 
forced with air-defense weapons. 

Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia 

The public unveiling of the KNUFNS dashed any remaining 
expectations that Cambodian- Vietnamese disagreements could be 
solved without further armed conflict, because the Hanoi-backed 
front openly called for the ouster of the "reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng 
Sary clique." Because the KNUFNS was far too weak to topple 
the regime of Democratic Kampuchea, virtually the entire com- 
bat burden would fall on Vietnamese forces, which, for this pur- 
pose, had been steadily building up troop strength on the border 
during the preceding months. 

Nervous Khmer Rouge leaders in Phnom Penh did not have long 
to wait after the KNUFNS announcement, for, on December 25, 
1978, Hanoi launched its offensive with twelve to fourteen divi- 
sions and three Khmer regiments (that later would form the nucleus 
of the KPRAF), a total invasion force comprising some 100,000 
people. Vietnamese units struck across the Cambodian frontier in 
five spearheads that thrust initially into northeastern Cambodia. 
One task force drove west from Buon Me Thuot (in Dac Lac 
Province, Vietnam) along Route 13 and Route 14 to capture 
Kracheh City (the capital of Kracheh Province). A second column 
attacked west from Pleiku (in Gia Lai-Cong Turn Province, Viet- 
nam), and followed the circuitous Route 19 to capture Stoeng Treng 
City (the capital of Stoeng Treng Province). In thus concentrat- 
ing its initial thrusts in the northeast, Hanoi may have had several 
objectives. One of these may have been to capture quickly sub- 
stantial expanses of the Cambodian territory that had been an early 
spawning ground for the Khmer Rouge and its fledgling RAK in 
the late 1960s. The remoteness of this region would have rendered 
it difficult to dislodge Vietnamese forces, no matter what the out- 
come of the war. An early occupation also would have preempted 
Khmer Rouge units, if they were pressed harder elsewhere, from 
falling back to this area where they might have enjoyed a measure 
of public support. The attacks in the northeast also may have been 
intended to confuse the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea about 
where the full brunt of the Vietnamese offensive would fall. 

Khmer Rouge commanders were not deceived by the Vietnamese 
thrusts toward Kracheh and Stoeng Treng, however, and made 
no attempt to reinforce the northeast. Instead, they erected their 
main defense line in an arc across the flat, rice-growing plains of 



264 



KPNLAF insurgents cross a stream in northwestern Cambodia 

Courtesy Frank Tatu 

southeastern Cambodia, astride the most probable Vietnamese 
axes of advance. Their calculation of Vietnamese intentions 
proved correct, as Hanoi's forces unleashed the full weight of 
their offensive in this area. From Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province, 
heavily armed Vietnamese units drove along the axis of Route 7 
toward their objective, the river port of Kampong Cham. Far- 
ther south, Vietnamese units with air support attacked along 
Route 1 , in the direction of Phumi Prek Khsay (also known as 
Neak Luong), the Mekong River gateway to Phnom Penh. The 
fifth and final Vietnamese spearhead drove west from Ha Tien, 
Vietnam, to capture the ports of Kampot and Kampong Saom, 
and thus to prevent the resupply by sea of retreating Khmer 
Rouge forces. 

Resistance to the invading Vietnamese units by the RAK could 
have been suicidal, given the disregard for human life previously 
displayed by the forces of Democratic Kampuchea. Instead, heavy 
fighting was localized. Major engagements were fought before Kam- 
pong Cham and Phumi Prek Khsay and at Tani, inland from the 
coast of Kampot Province. RAK units, already deprived of ex- 
perienced commanders by party purges, withered under sustained 
pounding by Vietnamese artillery and airstrikes, and many of them 
simply scattered before the Vietnamese offensive, some to regroup 
later in western Cambodia. 



265 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

By January 5, 1979, the main Vietnamese spearheads had driven 
to the eastern banks of the Mekong River. Incomplete evidence 
hints that the Vietnamese offensive originally may have intended 
to go no farther. 

The way to Phnom Penh lay open, however, because the Khmer 
Rouge units were falling back. Vietnamese forces paused briefly, 
perhaps to wait for bridging and ferrying equipment and the latest 
orders from Hanoi, then proceeded to carry out the final assault 
on Phnom Penh. Khmer Rouge leaders elected not to defend the 
city, and it fell on January 7. 

After the fall of the capital, Vietnamese units continued their 
advance in two columns into western Cambodia, capturing Bat- 
dambang and Siemreab. The columns met at Sisophon and drove 
on to the Thai border, where there was heavy fighting in March 
and in April. In the meantime, some remaining Khmer Rouge units 
offered scattered resistance before they melted away into less acces- 
sible areas. There the Khmer Rouge leaders soon rekindled an in- 
surgency against the new government in power, just as they had 
in the late 1960s, and insecurity persisted in the countryside in spite 
of the continued Vietnamese presence. 

On the diplomatic front, Vietnam, maintaining it had no troops 
in Cambodia and attributing the lightning-like victory to the 
KNUFNS, at first denied responsibility for the invasion. When 
called before the UN Security Council, however, Hanoi's represen- 
tative, tacidy admitting the presence of Vietnam and citing numer- 
ous Western press reports of Pol Pot's genocidal actions, implied 
that his country had overthrown the Pol Pot regime in the name 
of humanitarian and human rights. 

The Vietnamese sweep through Cambodia produced an un- 
precedented level of turmoil on the Thai border, as disorganized 
and bypassed Khmer Rouge units and civilian refugees fled be- 
fore their advancing enemy. Amid this chaos, in 1979, two anti- 
Vietnamese insurgent movements, besides the Khmer Rouge, came 
into being. The first of these was the Khmer People's National 
Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF — see Appendix B), the armed 
wing of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF — 
see Appendix B), which gave allegiance to Son Sann, a noncom- 
munist, perennial cabinet minister in successive Sihanouk adminis- 
trations. The other was the Sihanouk National Army (Armee 
Nationale Sihanoukiste — ANS — see Appendix B), the armed wing 
of the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peace- 
ful, and Cooperative Cambodia (Front Uni National pour un 
Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif — 
FUNCINPEC — see Appendix B), which owed allegiance to 



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National Security 



Sihanouk. Fighting independently, these noncommunist guerrilla 
movements and the Khmer Rouge fomented continuous rebellion 
in the early 1980s that could not be quelled, despite a substantial 
Vietnamese military commitment to this purpose. Operating from 
refugee camps on the Thai frontier, the insurgents made forays 
into the Cambodian border provinces and kept the countryside in 
a permanent state of insecurity. 

In the 1984 to 1985 dry season, the Vietnamese military com- 
mand in Cambodia, frustrated because of depredations by the guer- 
rillas, undertook a sustained offensive to dislodge them from their 
sanctuaries in the refugee camps. These installations were pounded 
by artillery and were overrun by Vietnamese tactical units. The 
operation, which was intended to cripple the Khmer guerrillas, had 
the opposite effect, however. It drove them away from the border, 
and they undertook prolonged forays deeper into the Cambodian 
interior. 

To restrict guerrilla activity, the Vietnamese erected a physical 
barrier on the Thai-Cambodian border. Code-named Project K-5, 
the effort consisted of clearing jungle growth; of erecting obsta- 
cles, such as ditches, barbed wire, and minefields; and of building 
a road parallel to the border. Construction of the project, which 
began in 1985, was performed by forced labor. All districts in Cam- 
bodia were tasked to provide able-bodied males for tours of duty 
on the project that ranged from three to six months. Living condi- 
tions were primitive in the construction camps, and the diet was 
inadequate; the area was malarial, and unexploded ordnance from 
past conflicts was a constant threat. The barrier was completed in 
1987 at an unrecorded cost in Cambodian lives. Preliminary indi- 
cations shortly thereafter revealed that it was having little effect 
on guerrilla movements to and from the Cambodian interior. 

Military Developments in Postwar Cambodia 

Tenuous Security 

In the late 1980s, a Vietnamese military contingent of 140,000 
troops, and a Khmer force — a surrogate for the Vietnamese — of 
30,000 to 35,000 troops, which comprised the KPRAF of the new 
government in Phnom Penh, maintained tenuous control over the 
heartland of Cambodia. This territory included the population 
centers, the fertile rice- growing area around the Tonle Sap, and 
the main arteries of communication (see Population, ch. 2; Agricul- 
ture, and Transportation and Communications, ch. 3). The com- 
bined Vietnamese-KPRAF military effort was opposed by disunited 
and factious but persistent insurgent forces belonging to each of 



267 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

the three components of the tripartite Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK — see Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea, ch. 4). The insurgents had the capabil- 
ity to conduct long-range combat or reconnaissance patrols with 
as many as 100 troops. They could engage in small-scale propa- 
ganda missions, raids, and ambushes against poorly armed tar- 
gets, such as militia outposts, and in sabotage against stationary, 
infrastructural objectives, such as bridges and railroad tracks. They 
lacked sufficient troop strength, heavy weapons, trained leader- 
ship, and dependable logistical support, however, for sustained com- 
bat operations. From their jungle havens deep within the country 
and from their bases near the Thai border, the insurgents were 
reputed to range widely throughout Cambodia. Verifiable guer- 
rilla actions, however, were confined to the northwestern provinces 
of Batdambang and Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey (the two provinces 
were combined into one by the government of the People's Republic 
of Kampuchea prior to 1980), which continued to be the centers 
of insurgent activity. Most foreign observers in the late 1980s 
assessed the military situation as being at a stalemate. The rebels 
lacked the capability, actual or potential, to drive out the Viet- 
namese occupation force, while the combined Vietnamese-KPRAF 
armies, at foreseeable force and equipment levels, were incapable 
of destroying the CGDK guerrilla units. 

Coalition Government Resistance Forces 

The tripartite CGDK opposed both the Vietnamese military 
presence in Cambodia and the government of the People's Republic 
of Kampuchea that had been installed in Phnom Penh by Hanoi. 
Each component of the coalition maintained its own force of armed 
combatants (see fig. 13). Divided by deep-seated animosities among 
their leaders, these three distinctive and autonomous military forces 
were brought into a reluctant and uneasy coalition as a result of 
diplomatic activity by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). The common goal of contesting the Vietnamese oc- 
cupation, however, could not bridge the noncommunist coalition 
partners' deep suspicion toward the renascent Khmer Rouge. 
Throughout the 1980s, the three combatant forces remained unin- 
tegrated, and each maintained separate bases, command structures, 
and operational planning. An effort by ASEAN to unite the three 
resistance forces on the Thai border resulted, in May 1984, in the 
creation on paper of the Permanent Military Coordinating Com- 
mittee, which apparently never functioned. 

Limited tactical cooperation, however, occasionally was reported 
among the various coalition partners. In one rare example, the three 



268 



National Security 



forces participated jointly in a major operation in Batdambang 
Province in early 1986. Usually, Khmer Rouge units, under their 
shadowy zonal commanders, remained aloof from their coalition 
partners and, on occasion, even attacked their military forces and 
inflicted casualties. Such interfactional clashes were the subject of 
several complaints by Sihanouk, who charged over the years that 
Khmer Rouge guerrillas had "repeatedly ambushed and killed [his] 
troops." These allegations were the principal reason why he chose 
to step down from the presidency of the CGDK on a leave of ab- 
sence in May 1987. 

National Army of Democratic Kampuchea 

The National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK — see 
Appendix B) was the successor to the RAK of the Khmer Rouge, 
the name change having gone into effect in December 1979, in an 
apparent public relations effort that later saw the dissolution of the 
Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist Party (KCP — see Appen- 
dix B), (replaced by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, or 
PDK — see Appendix B) and the purported retirement of Pol Pot 
to an advisory role in 1985. NADK forces consisted of former RAK 
troops — large numbers of whom had escaped the 1978 to 1979 Viet- 
namese invasion of Cambodia — as well as conscripts coerced into 
submission during the Khmer Rouge retreat and new volunteers 
or recruits either pressed into service during in-country raids or 
drawn from among refugee groups. The New York Times reported 
in June 1987 that "the Khmer Rouge army is believed to be hav- 
ing some success in its recruitment, not only among the refugees 
in its camps but within Vietnamese-controlled Cambodia." The 
NADK did not make personnel figures public, but estimates by 
military observers and by journalists generally ranged between 
40,000 and 50,000 combatants. 

In 1987 the opinion that the NADK was "the only effective fight- 
ing force" opposing the Vietnamese was more often expressed by 
foreign observers. In an interview published in the United States 
in May 1987, Sihanouk reportedly said, "without the Khmer 
Rouge, we have no credibility on the batdefield . . . [they are] . . . 
the only credible military force." 

During the 1980s, the Khmer Rouge leadership, composed of 
party cadres who doubled as military commanders, remained fairly 
constant. Pol Pot retained an ambiguous but presumably promi- 
nent position in the hierarchy, although he was nominally replaced 
as commander in chief of the NADK by Son Sen, who had also 
been a student in Paris, and who had gone underground with him 
in 1963. There were reports of factions in the NADK, such as one 



269 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



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270 



National Security 



loyal to Khieu Samphan, prime minister of the defunct regime of 
Democratic Kampuchea, and his deputy Ieng Sary, and another 
identified with Pol Pot and Ta Mok (the Southwestern Zone com- 
mander who conducted extensive purges of party ranks in Cam- 
bodia in 1977 to 1978). Although led by party and military veterans, 
the NADK combatants were reportedly "less experienced, less moti- 
vated, and younger" than those the Vietnamese had faced in previ- 
ous encounters. Nevertheless, the new Khmer Rouge recruits still 
were ' * hardy and lower class, ' ' and tougher than the noncommunist 
combatants. 

During forays into Cambodia, NADK units employed terror tac- 
tics against Khmer civilians, including murder and destruction of 
economic resources. Such success as they achieved in recruiting 
was apparently owed to traditional Cambodian hatred of the Viet- 
namese invader, although there were reports that some of the 
peasantry would have preferred to endure a continued Vietnamese 
occupation rather than to suffer a return to Khmer Rouge rule. 

The Khmer Rouge divided the country into four military zones 
that functioned virtually autonomously under their respective com- 
manders. Within these four zones, three areas — the provinces 
around the Tonle Sap, the western border of Cambodia, and the 
remainder of the country — were sites of NADK tactical operations. 
It was the first area, the heartland of Cambodia, that the NADK 
viewed as the "Achilles' heel of the Vietnamese enemy," where 
NADK military efforts were concentrated. 

NADK units managed to keep the main routes linking Phnom 
Penh to western Cambodia "in a permanent state of insecurity," 
according to a senior Vietnamese military observer; traffic to and 
from the seaport of Kampong Saom was obliged to move in con- 
voys. Both highways and railroads from the capital were interdicted 
intermittently because of guerrilla activity. Officials in Phnom Penh 
told a Western correspondent in 1987 that the Khmer Rouge were 
then operating in small insurgent groups inside Cambodia in a battle 
for the villages, rather than fighting from the Thai border area, 
as had been the case prior to the 1984 to 1985 Vietnamese dry- 
season offensive. In carrying the war to the countryside, the NADK 
demonstrated that it had gone on the strategic defensive, that is, 
that it would adhere to a doctrine of guerrilla warfare until the 
balance of forces was about equal. If this parity were to be achieved, 
NADK strategists presumably would then switch to offensive oper- 
ations. 

In carrying on its protracted insurgency, the NADK received 
the bulk of its military equipment and financing from China, which 
had supported the previous regime of Democratic Kampuchea. One 



271 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

pro-Beijing source put the level of Chinese aid to the NADK at 
US$1 million a month. Another source, although it did not give 
a breakdown, set the total level of Chinese assistance, to all the 
resistance factions, at somewhere between US$60 million and 
US$100 million a year. 

The Chinese weaponry observed in the possession of NADK 
combatants included AK-47 (Automatic Kalashnikov) assault rifles, 
RPD light machine guns, RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) launch- 
ers, recoilless rifles, and antipersonnel mines. NADK guerrillas 
usually were seen garbed in dark green Chinese fatigues and soft 
"Mao caps" without insignia. No markings or patches were evi- 
dent on guerrilla uniforms, although the NADK had promulgated 
a hierarchy of ranks with distinctive insignias in 1981. 

To keep troops and supplies moving into the combat zone, the 
NADK, according to Vietnamese sources, followed two infiltra- 
tion routes. One of them ran south from Thailand through the Dan- 
grek Escarpment into Cambodia. The second ran north from Tra, 
a minor Thai seaport that may have been an unloading point for 
Chinese supplies for the Khmer Rouge. In spite of substantial 
Chinese material assistance, however, the NADK could not main- 
tain the logistical supply line needed to conduct a sustained mili- 
tary campaign. 

Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces 

The Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces 
(KPNLAF), the military component of the Khmer People's Na- 
tional Liberation Front (KPNLF), was formed in March 1979 from 
various anticommunist groups concentrated near the Thai border 
with Cambodia, which were opposed to Pol Pot's Democratic Kam- 
puchea. Many had become essentially warlord bands, engaging 
more in trade and in internecine fighting than in combat opera- 
tions. They were brought together by General Dien Del, a former 
career officer of the Khmer Republic, who became chief of the 
KPNLAF General Staff. 

The KPNLAF was loyal to Son Sann, a former Sihanouk 
minister and the founder of the KPNLF political movement. Be- 
cause of Son Sann's noncommunist credentials, the KPNLAF 
offered an alternative to those Cambodians who could support 
neither Hanoi nor the Khmer Rouge, and it quickly became the 
second largest guerrilla force in the country. By mid- 1981, with 
about 7,000 personnel under arms, it was able to protect its refu- 
gee camps and occasionally to conduct forays into Cambodia. 

Two developments in the mid-1980s, however, greatly dimin- 
ished KPNLAF capabilities as a fighting force. The first of these 



272 




273 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

was the Vietnamese dry-season offensive of 1984 to 1985, which 
dislodged these guerrillas from their havens on the Thai-Cambodian 
border. All three insurgent forces were affected by this setback, 
but the KPNLAF proved less able than the others to sustain the 
reversal and less flexible in adapting to new conditions. Critical 
sources noted that the KPNLAF had "made no significant contri- 
bution to the [1984-85] dry season fighting against the Vietnamese" 
and that its combatants had been "virtually immobilized by the 
loss of their camps." The second development, equally harmful 
to the KPNLAF cause, was the dispute that broke out among the 
top leaders. Following the loss of the border camps, contemporary 
reports noted that "open revolt" had broken out among guerrilla 
commanders over the "dictatorial ways" of Son Sann, who had 
continued as president of the KPNLF, and his "interference in 
military matters." The crisis resulted in the virtual paralysis of the 
KPNLAF, and the Thai military, presumably on a temporary ad 
hoc basis, took over the overall management of the insurgent force. 

Observers also reported that, as a result of the KPNLAF leader- 
ship dispute, members of guerrilla units had returned to the Thai 
border from the Cambodian interior to await the outcome of the 
controversy. There were desertions, and discipline became an in- 
creasingly serious problem. KPNLAF soldiers became suspect when 
it was reported that gangs of Khmer bandits had attacked Thai 
vehicles and buses, and had sometimes abducted or abused pas- 
sengers. There had long been allegations that Khmer insurgents 
on the border engaged in black marketing and in other criminal 
activity. 

In 1987 estimates of KPNLAF strength varied widely. At the 
upper limit, a widely quoted total was 14,000 personnel. In view 
of the leadership dispute that debilitated the movement in 1985 
and in 1986 and prevented its subsequent growth, this figure prob- 
ably was a considerable exaggeration. A more realistic total was 
about 8,000 combatants, and KPNLAF leaders expressed the hope 
that an earnest recruitment drive then beginning might increase 
the movement's strength to 18,000 by the end of the year. 

In accordance with its recruitment and reorganization plans, the 
KPNLAF divided Cambodia into nine military regions, or opera- 
tional zones. The force's chain of command was headed by a general 
officer (in 1987, by General Sak Sutsakhan) who functioned as com- 
mander in chief. Reporting to him was a chief of staff, who exer- 
cised responsibility over four deputy chiefs of staff. Each of these 
latter officers was in charge of one of four sections dealing respec- 
tively with military operations, general administration, logis- 
tical affairs, and planning/psychological operations. At the next 



274 



National Security 



subordinate echelon were two or three assistant chiefs of staff, whose 
functions were undefined. Military units of the KPNLAF were 
described as battalions, regiments, and brigades, operating 
presumably from semi-permanent camps in inaccessible areas. 
Combat elements reportedly, were operating in three provinces of 
western Cambodia: Batdambang, Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey, and 
Pouthisat. Actual deployment in the latter province, long a Khmer 
Rouge stronghold, however, was in question. 

The KPNLAF, like the NADK, received most of its military 
assistance from China. Some aid and training was granted by 
ASEAN nations, however, especially by Singapore and by Malay- 
sia. In late 1986, the Chinese reportedly delivered a shipment of 
rocket launchers; this was the first time the KPNLAF was equipped 
with effective antitank weapons. 

KPNLAF combatants sometimes were garbed in camouflage 
fatigues and combat boots, both probably of noncommunist ori- 
gin. At other times, they were observed, while on operations, to 
be wearing merely odds and ends of clothing, gleaned in refugee 
camps, rather than uniforms. No rank or branch insignia were dis- 
cernible, but KPNLAF troops frequently wore plastic-laminated 
chest pocket badges with a photo of Son Sann and the noncom- 
munist Cambodian flag. 

Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste 

The smaller of the two noncommunist resistance groups, the 
Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS) owed allegiance to Sihanouk. 
It was the armed adjunct of FUNCINPEC, which rallied Sihanouk 
supporters clustered on the Thai border. The force was formed in 
June 1981 , by consolidating the Movement for the National Liber- 
ation of Kampuchea (Mouvement pour la Liberation Nationale 
du Kampuchea — MOULINAKA — see Appendix B) and at least 
two other armed groups of Sihanouk supporters grouped on the 
Thai border. These groups existed at first in conditions of near 
penury, their members poorly armed and equipped as well as half 
starved. Following the proclamation of the Coalition Government 
of Democratic Kampuchea, international support consisting of 
armaments, supplies, and other nonlethal aid, principally from the 
ASEAN countries and from China, began to transform the ANS 
into a more effective movement. In about 1986 to 1987, it became 
the principal noncommunist insurgent force by default when the 
KPNLAF slipped from that position because of its internal leader- 
ship dispute. 

No authoritative figures for the personnel strength of the ANS 
were available in the late 1980s. The most frequently cited totals 



275 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

ranged from a low of 7,000 to a high of 1 1,000 combatants. The 
former figure was quoted by Sihanouk, the latter by Sihanouk's 
son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, some time afterward. In late 
1987, Sihanouk also declared that the ANS maintained "8,500 
fighters permanently inside Cambodia." (This number would not 
necessarily include headquarters, staff, and support elements on 
the Thai border.) 

The ANS was organized into a command structure and maneu- 
ver elements. The command structure was headed by the com- 
mander in chief of the ANS, who was assisted by both a chief and 
a deputy chief of staff. In 1987 the positions of commander and 
of chief of staff were held concurrently by Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh, and that of deputy chief of staff by Major General 
Prince Norodom Chakrapong, both middle-aged sons of Sihanouk. 
Maneuver elements consisted of battalions, grouped under the first 
through the sixth brigades. There were, in addition, four indepen- 
dent regiments, at least one reportedly composed of Khmer Rouge 
deserters who had rallied to Sihanouk's cause, and five indepen- 
dent commando groups, each composed of about seventy personnel. 

Following the Vietnamese dry-season offensive of 1984 to 1985, 
the ANS made a major effort to deploy its fighters away from the 
border camps and more deeply into Cambodia. In 1987 accord- 
ing to Sihanouk, ANS combatants were deployed in five Cambo- 
dian provinces, including Batdambang and Siemreab-Otdar 
Meanchey on the western border with Thailand. Limited deploy- 
ments also were reported as far east as Kampong Thum. 

Photographic evidence indicated that the ANS, like the 
KPNLAF, was equipped principally with Chinese weapons. This 
included AK assault rifles, light machine guns, RPG (rocket- 
propelled grenade) launchers, and recoilless rifles. ANS comba- 
tants were dressed in a panoply of uniforms, some of them of 
ASEAN origin. These included camouflage fatigues and (T-shirts), 
visored caps, and combat boots. Indications of rank were not evi- 
dent on uniforms; however, ANS members sometimes wore plastic- 
laminated chest pocket badges bearing a photograph of Sihanouk 
and a noncommunist Cambodian flag. 

Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed Forces 

The Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed 
Forces (KPRAF) constituted the regular forces of the pro-Hanoi 
People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Soon after the downfall 
of the Khmer Rouge, two reasons for the necessity of such forces 
became apparent to the PRK's Vietnamese mentors when they in- 
stalled the new Cambodian government in early 1979. First, if the 



276 



KPNLAF insurgents assist peasants with their 
rice planting along the Thai-Cambodian border 
Courtesy Frank Tatu 

new administration in Phnom Penh was to project internationally 
the image of being a legitimate sovereign state, it would need a 
national army of its own apart from the Vietnamese forces. Sec- 
ond, if the Vietnamese army was not to have to shoulder indefinitely 
its internal security mission in Cambodia, it would need to develop 
a Khmer military force that could be put in place as a surrogate 
for Vietnamese troops. Raising such an indigenous force presented 
no insurmountable obstacle for Hanoi at the time because several 
precedents already had been established. In Laos, the Vietnamese 
armed forces maintained a close training and coordinating rela- 
tionship with their Laotian counterparts as a result of Hanoi's mili- 
tary presence in the country. In Cambodia, Vietnam had been a 
mainstay for Khmer communist factions since 1954. The Viet- 
namese army also had helped train Pol Pot's RAK and its succes- 
sor, the CPNLAF, following the coup that deposed Sihanouk in 
1970. More recendy, Hanoi had helped raise and train a few, prob- 
ably battalion- sized, regiments of Khmer troops that had fought 
alongside the Vietnamese during the invasion of Cambodia. With 
further Vietnamese tutelage, these Khmer units became the nucleus 
of a national army. From such ad hoc beginnings, the KPRAF 
grew as a military force and eventually gained its position as an 
instrument of both the party and the state. This development, 



277 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

however, was carefully shielded from the scrutiny of outsiders, and 
much that could be concluded about the armed forces of the PRK 
was based on analysis rather than incontrovertible hard data. 

Threats and Capabilities 

The major impetus for the establishment of the KPRAF was the 
security threat faced by the government in Phnom Penh. Inter- 
nally this threat consisted of the armed insurgents belonging to the 
three CGDK components. The total strength of the three forces 
was impossible to gauge with any precision; it may possibly have 
reached between 55,000 and 75,000 combatants, but it could have 
been considerably less than that figure. The insurgent forces were 
incapable of mounting a sustained offensive and of massing for any 
tactical operation beyond sporadic patrols in companies, because 
they could not overcome their destructive factional rivalries. Least 
of all were they able to bring down the Phnom Penh government. 
They were capable, however, of keeping Cambodia in a perma- 
nent state of insecurity; they raised the cost to Hanoi of its large 
military presence in the country; and, backed by China, they offered 
a persistent obstacle to the coalescence of an Hanoi-dominated 
Indochinese federation. 

In addition to the Khmer insurgents in Cambodia itself, the 
KPRAF and the Phnom Penh government felt that they faced a 
substantial external menace as well that consisted of the numeri- 
cally superior Royal Thai Army, supplied by China, the United 
States, and Thailand, which played host to legions of Khmer guer- 
rillas who crossed the border to prey on KPRAF units and on PRK 
assets at will. To what extent this perception was realistic was a 
disputable point. Bangkok did acquiesce to the presence on Thai 
soil of Khmer refugee camps, which the insurgents used for rest 
and recuperation. The Thai Army, however, was neither massed 
nor deployed in an especially threatening posture along the border 
with Cambodia; moreover, the resistance that the Thai could have 
offered to a hypothetical Vietnamese offensive into Thailand was 
the subject of legitimate speculation. Phnom Penh's denunciations 
of alleged Thai bellicosity were made with such regularity, however, 
that it was possible that the KPRAF (and the PRK) stood in some 
danger of being the victims of their own propaganda concerning 
Bangkok's aggressive intentions. 

A lesser, but nevertheless real, threat was posed by the possibil- 
ity of unauthorized landings along Cambodia's irregular and un- 
protected coastline. Chinese vessels could exploit this vulnerability 
by putting in at secluded coves and inlets uncontrolled by the 
KPRAF, and there they could unload arms and supplies for the 



278 



National Security 



insurgents. In 1987 this threat was not decisive, but it had the poten- 
tial to become so, if the network of obstacles and minefields em- 
placed on the Cambodian border proved to be an unexpectedly 
effective barrier in impeding the flow of Chinese supplies to the 
Khmer guerrillas. 

Along its northeastern and eastern borders with Laos and with 
Vietnam, Cambodia faced no noteworthy external security threat. 
As long as friendly communist governments remained in power 
in Vientiane, Phnom Penh, and Hanoi, their interests in protect- 
ing the inviolability of their common frontiers converged. In spite 
of this, however, government control in the upland border areas 
of all three states probably was tenuous, and insurgent (or bandit) 
groups, if not too large, could pass back and forth unhindered. The 
security threat posed by such bands was vexatious but minor, and, 
in the case of Cambodia, it could probably be contained by the 
provincial units without requiring the intervention of the KPRAF 
or of Vietnamese main forces. 

The capability of the KPRAF to meet the threats, real or per- 
ceived, arrayed against it in 1987 was open to question. Western 
observers, in consensus, rated the forces of the Phnom Penh govern- 
ment as generally ineffectual, possessed of only a limited capability 
for any combat mission. In their view, the KPRAF was over- 
stretched and understaffed and could neither cope with the sus- 
tained guerrilla activity of the CGDK insurgents, nor prevent their 
infiltration into Cambodia from Thailand, nor patrol the country's 
extended coastline. In the face of such limitations, it was neces- 
sary to acknowledge, nevertheless, that the KPRAF had been built 
literally from nothing in a war- torn and devastated country, the 
population of which had been decimated previously by a brutal 
dictatorship. The establishment, in the space of a few years, of a 
credible force under such circumstances would have been a daunting 
task for any government, let alone one so deprived of resources 
and of leadership and so dependent upon external support. The 
most conclusive analysis that could be made about the KPRAF 
was that Hanoi had laid the foundation for an indigenous Cambo- 
dian military force and, by its recurrent insistence that Vietnamese 
units would be withdrawn by 1990, may have imparted to its clients 
in the Phnom Penh government a certain degree of urgency in 
regard to developing an effective force. 

Organization and Control 

The establishment of a legal and a bureaucratic structure for the 
armed forces was concurrent with the founding of the KPRAF. 
The legal basis was found in the Constitution of the PRK, which 



279 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



went through several versions before being adopted by the National 
Assembly in 1981 (see The Constitution, ch. 4). Article 9 of the 
Constitution acknowledges the existence of the KPRAF and notes 
that its obligation is "to defend the fatherland and the revolution- 
ary power, safeguard the revolutionary gains and the peaceful life 
of the people and join with the latter in national construction." 
The Constitution also imposes a reciprocal obligation on the peo- 
ple, declaring that it is their "supreme duty and honor" to "build 
and defend the fatherland," and that all citizens without respect 
to gender "must serve in the armed forces as prescribed by law." 

In an early draft, the Constitution had specified that the chair- 
man of the Council of State was concurrently the supreme com- 
mander of the armed forces and the chairman of the National 
Defense Council. In a curious deviation from the initial draft, 
however, the definitive version of the Constitution omitted this key 
passage. Its omission provoked speculation about the true locus 
of authority over the KPRAF and fueled suspicions that the dele- 
tion could have been related to the relief, under murky circum- 
stances, of then-chairman and armed forces head Pen Sovan. In 
1987, however, supreme command of the KPRAF was vested once 
again in the chairmanship of the Council of State (see Government 
Structure, ch. 4). 

The KPRAF was answerable to two organizations below the 
Council of State, namely, the Ministry of National Defense and 
the General Staff. The minister of national defense, a position es- 
tablished sometime in 1979, was a member of the Council of 
Ministers, the executive body empowered by the Constitution "to 
consolidate and develop the national defense forces; to carry out 
the mobilization of the armed forces; to order curfews and take 
other necessary measures for national defense." To carry out his 
duties, the minister of national defense was assisted by four deputies 
who oversaw, in 1987, the work of at least nine departments (see 
fig. 14). The incomplete evidence available in 1987 suggested that 
functions such as administration, operations, and logistics, nor- 
mally reserved for general staff sections in some armed forces, were 
carried out at the Ministry of National Defense level. 

Below the Ministry of National Defense, the General Staff was 
the second echelon concerned with defense and security matters 
in the PRK. It was one of the earliest KPRAF organs to be estab- 
lished and was already in place by mid- 1979. In 1986 it was headed 
by a chief of general staff, with a secretariat and four deputies, all 
of whose responsibilities remained obscure. The General Staff ex- 
ercised jurisdiction over the three components of the KPRAF: the 
ground force (army), the embryonic coastal/riverine naval force, 



280 



National Security 



and the air force. It probably oversaw administratively the coun- 
try's military regions and certain specialized commands, such as 
the Signals and Special Warfare Command. It may have exercised 
operational control over some KPRAF tactical formations as well, 
especially those operating autonomously, apart from Vietnamese 
forces. The lines of authority delimiting General Staff responsibil- 
ities from Ministry of National Defense responsibilities appeared 
to be more blurred than in some contemporary armies. This may 
not have caused jurisdictional disputes, however, because, with the 
paucity of military leadership, key officers sometimes served con- 
currently in both bodies. 

Control of the KPRAF military establishment and its adherence 
to the political orthodoxy of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's 
Revolutionary Party (KPRP — see Appendix B) were ensured by 
a party network, superimposed upon the national defense struc- 
ture, that extended downward to units at all echelons. Party con- 
trol of the armed forces also was exercised by the assignment of 
senior officers to top-echelon military and party positions with, for 
example, key Ministry of National Defense or General Staff officers 
also serving on the KPRP Central Committee. At the national level, 
supervision of party work in the armed forces was entrusted to the 
General Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense. 
Incomplete evidence suggested the presence, among the country's 
regional military commands, of political officers with small staffs 
or commissions at their disposal. Logically, such officers would have 
kept in close contact and would have coordinated party activities 
in their military jurisdictions with their counterparts in KPRAF 
tactical units and on party provincial committees. 

During the 1980s, party activity in the KPRAF focused on build- 
ing support for the "socialist revolution" in Cambodia, and on 
increasing membership in all military units. In late 1984, party 
goals were to establish a committee in each regiment of the provin- 
cial forces, as well as a party cell or chapter in each battalion and 
in each company at the district level. This endeavor reportedly had 
achieved partial success by mid- 1985. In a relentless effort to build 
party membership in the KPRAF, cadres at all echelons over the 
years have been urged to spot capable military personnel with poten- 
tial and to induct them quickly into the party. Such appeals hinted, 
that for KPRAF members, the trial or waiting period for party 
acceptance was waived, and that even the act of joining may not 
have been completely voluntary. KPRP officials also sought to ex- 
pand membership by junior officers and by KPRAF rank and file 
in the People's Revolutionary Youth Union of Kampuchea 
(PRYUK — see Appendix B). As the party's mass organization to 



281 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



KPRAF 1 
MINISTRY 
OF DEFENSE 




CABINET 





FOUR DEPUTY 
MINISTERS 



GENERAL 
DEPARTMENTS 



POLITICAL 
LOGISTICAL 
OTHER 



DEPARTMENTS 



ADMINISTRATION 
CADRE 

ORGANIZATION 
COMBAT PLANNING 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
PROPAGANDA 

AND EDUCATION 
TRAINING 
TECHNICAL 



CHIEF OF STAFF 



GENERAL STAFF 



PRINCIPAL 
TACTICAL UNITS 



DIVISIONS/ 
BRIGADES 



179th 
196th 
286th 
640th 
688th 
689th 
691st 



FOUR 
MILITARY 
REGIONS 



TRAINING 
SCHOOLS/ 
CENTERS 



PROVINCIAL/ 
REGIONAL 
FORCES (?) 



Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed Forces 



Figure 14. Organization of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolu- 
tionary Armed Forces, 1986-87 



which all young people could belong, the PRYUK was in a strong 
institutional position to accept all applicants, and it could make 
deeper inroads into the KPRAF than the more elitist party. In an 
exhortatory message in early 1987, defense officials proudly noted 
the existence of PRYUK "structures" in more than 80 percent 
of the armed forces, and they acknowledged a debt of gratitude 



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National Security 



to the mass organization for occupying the forefront of a national 
effort to induce Khmer youth to serve in the KPRAF. 

When considering the dynamics of the KPRAF, the possibility 
of factionalism should at least be considered. In some armies, 
this factionalism may take the form of interservice rivalry, of the 
coalescence of groups around certain leaders, or of shared com- 
monalities, such as military schooling, unit affiliation, or combat 
experience. In the case of the KPRAF, it is unlikely that such fac- 
tionalism existed. Vietnamese advisers, for example, present at all 
KPRAF echelons, would have detected such activity at an early 
stage and would have suppressed it promptly, because it would have 
detracted from the building of an effective Khmer fighting force, 
which it was the Vietnamese army's mission to develop. 

Interservice rivalry also could be dismissed as a cause of faction- 
alism in the KPRAF for the time being. The ground forces clearly 
were the dominant service both by size and by seniority. The 
coastal/riverine naval force and the air force were newly established; 
very small in numbers, they were not in a position to challenge 
the primacy of the larger service, despite the possibility of some 
elitism engendered by their more technical orientation. 

The composition of the KPRAF officer corps also militated 
against the rise of factionalism. As members of a comparatively 
small armed force, the officers were relatively few in number and 
were subject to a system of rotational assignments, which bred 
familiarity with a variety duties. The consequent personnel inter- 
changeability presumably prevented the creation of warlord fiefs 
and the development of inordinate personal loyalties within the mili- 
tary establishment. As is true of the military elite in other small, 
undeveloped countries, KPRAF officers were personally known to 
one another, and they were thoroughly acquainted with one 
another's family and political antecedents. This network of per- 
sonal and family relationships, always important in Asia, may have 
fostered a spirit of cooperation rather than competitiveness; 
moreover, the ubiquity — the perhaps even suffocating presence — of 
Vietnamese military advisers also may have been sufficient induce- 
ment for Khmer personnel to submerge whatever differences existed 
among them. 

The final factor that may have inhibited the rise of factions within 
the KPRAF was the range of options available to its dissident officers 
and to its enlisted troops. Unlike the armed forces in other Third 
World countries, where disaffected military personnel had little 
choice but to plot coups or to swallow their resentments, KPRAF 
personnel could (and many did) simply walk away from their mili- 
tary commitments and join the anti- Vietnamese insurgents, which 



283 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

had policies of welcoming KPRAF defectors. If they exercised this 
option, they had an additional choice: they could join the com- 
munist NADK, the nationalist KPNLAF, or the royalist ANS. For 
the armed forces of the Phnom Penh government, this range of 
options meant that those personnel who remained in the KPRAF 
did so voluntarily because of common purpose and loyalty to the 
institution or the regime. Although in the short term this dynamic 
may have had a purgative effect on the KPRAF, ensuring its ideo- 
logical purity, it was based on Khmer acquiescence to the continued 
Vietnamese domination of the PRK and of its armed forces. 
Whether or not continued acceptance of this domination would long 
prevail in the face of Khmer nationalism among military person- 
nel remained debatable. 

Although logic might argue against the existence of factions in 
the KPRAF, the case is not entirely one-sided. It could be noted, 
after all, that Cambodia since 1970 has been subjected to cataclysmic 
events that have produced deep cleavages within Khmer society 
and that may well have been reflected in the armed forces them- 
selves. In the KPRAF, even among personnel who had chosen not 
to join the insurgents, it was possible to note a variety of back- 
grounds; there were ex-Khmer Rouge turncoats, Vietnamese sup- 
porters, former royalists, and a younger generation of junior officers 
and of men without political antecedents. Although it could not 
be proved by outside observers, it could be inferred that factions 
in the KPRAF might have coalesced around such shared former 
political loyalties, affiliations, or backgrounds. If this were the case, 
such coalescence could take several forms in the future: either there 
could be a hardening of factional lines as the KPRAF itself becomes 
more entrenched as an institution of the PRK, or as stated at the 
outset, Vietnam, in its role of mentor to the armed forces of the 
Phnom Penh government, could keep a tight rein on the KPRAF 
and could forcibly prevent its polarization around internal factions. 

Mission and Doctrine 

In the late 1980s, the KPRAF had several missions. Some were 
implicit in Cambodia's situation; others were prescribed in the Con- 
stitution. Foremost were the duties to defend the nation from for- 
eign aggression, to safeguard the gains of the Marxist revolution 
in Cambodia, and to ensure domestic security by engaging in com- 
bat against insurgents and against domestic foes as determined by 
the government and the party. In addition to the combat role that 
was part of their internal security responsibilities, the KPRAF also 
engaged in propaganda activity on behalf of the government, per- 
formed various civic action tasks, and participated in economic 



284 



National Security 



production. Because of the poverty of the country, and because 
the defense budget was not sufficient to meet KPRAF's needs, the 
KPRAF had to help pay its own way by generating income. In 
the 1980s, its efforts were limited to growing vegetables and rais- 
ing poultry and livestock for military use, but, in the future, they 
could include manufacturing commodities and processing raw 
materials in military-owned factories. 

To accomplish its combat missions, the KPRAF developed its 
own military doctrine. Although not available in written form to 
Western observers, this doctrine could be inferred from the Con- 
stitution, from the circumstances in Cambodia, and from the dy- 
namics of the Vietnamese military establishment which had acted 
as mentor and as role model for the KPRAF from its inception. 
In both the KPRAF and the Vietnamese army there was no doc- 
trinal dichotomy between civilian society and the military estab- 
lishment as there is in most Western nations. Everyone was 
potentially a member of the armed forces; in Cambodia as in Viet- 
nam, there were total mobilization of the population and total dedi- 
cation of whatever resources the nation could muster in order to 
achieve the military goals the government or the party wished to 
formulate. The total involvement of the Cambodian population 
in warfare was enshrined doctrinally in the constitutional statement 
that "the people as a whole participate in national defense." Be- 
cause of the security imperatives faced by the Phnom Penh govern- 
ment in fighting a persistent insurgency, virtually the entire 
able-bodied population was organized into various military and 
paramilitary bodies. This doctrinal concept worked well defensively 
when patriotism could be invoked to rally a population against a 
foreign invader or against a real or fancied, but easily understood, 
external threat. It worked less well when used to rally indigenous 
support for a foreign occupier, as the Phnom Penh regime had to 
do for Vietnam. Hanoi, therefore, incessantly evoked the specter 
of the return of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge to induce the Cam- 
bodian population to join the KPRAF, and through active per- 
sonal involvement, to render unflinching support to the PRK. 

The KPRAF probably was also subject to other doctrinal in- 
fluences from the military establishments of Vietnam and, ulti- 
mately, the Soviet Union, which maintained a substantial advisory 
presence with the Vietnamese armed forces and a smaller one with 
the KPRAF. The relevance of the military doctrine of the large 
armies of the Soviet Union and of Vietnam to the small, question- 
ably trained and equipped KPRAF remained speculative, however, 
especially in the counterinsurgency environment of Cambodia. 
Soviet advisers, directly or through Vietnamese counterparts, may 



285 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

have relayed their experiences in Afghanistan and they may have 
advised on measures for countering Chinese or Western equipment 
and weapons, on methods of controlling or suborning the popula- 
tion, and on means of employing weapons and weapons systems — 
such as artillery, helicopters, and land mines. Vietnamese advisers, 
focusing on their army's neutralization of insurgent base camps 
on the Thai border — through large-scale operations supported by 
indirect fire — in the dry season offensive of 1984 and 1985, may 
have unwittingly imparted to their Cambodian understudies a 
predilection for this tactical doctrine. 

Composition and Deployment 

Cambodia was divided geographically into four KPRAF mili- 
tary regions (see fig. 15). These regions originally bore numbers 
assigned by the Vietnamese to conform to the system used by the 
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN — see Appendix B). In the 
mid-1980s they were renumbered to present, at least, the illusion, 
of their autonomy from the Vietnamese armed forces. Little was 
known conclusively about the functions of the military regions, espe- 
cially about the operational control exercised by their headquar- 
ters over KPRAF tactical units and missions. It was possible that 
their responsibilities were restricted to administrative tasks, such 
as conscription, training, economic production, and coordination 
with Vietnamese military units and advisers. 

Below the level of military region headquarters, the KPRAF was 
composed of three types of units: main or regular forces, provin- 
cial or regional forces, and village militia or local forces. Official 
strength figures were lacking in 1987, but the main and provincial 
forces together may have numbered more than 40,000 troops. It 
was the intention of the KPRAF 's Vietnamese mentors to build 
a reliable Khmer force of between 30,000 and 50,000 personnel, 
presumably by about 1990, by which date Vietnamese units were 
to be withdrawn. 

In the mid-to-late 1980s, KPRAF regular or main force units 
consisted of seven understrength infantry divisions, several indepen- 
dent infantry brigades and regiments, as many as four tank bat- 
talions, and combat support formations, such as engineer battalions. 
The forerunners of all these units were several Khmer battalions 
raised by Hanoi in 1978 as it prepared for the invasion of Cam- 
bodia. In approximately 1980, the battalions were reorganized 
into four brigades, each one posted to one of the four Cambo- 
dian provinces of Batdambang, Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey, 
Kampong Spoe, and Kampong Cham. In these areas, the brigades 
performed static defense tasks, and they occasionally participated 



286 



National Security 



with Vietnamese forces in joint operations against the insurgents. 
As conscription and voluntary enlistments brought more person- 
nel into the KPRAF, the four brigades were upgraded to infantry 
divisions, and two additional divisions were founded.. In spite of 
such apparent progress in force development, however, all units 
remained chronically under strength, according to Western ob- 
servers. In the mid-to-late- 1980s, KPRAF authorities deployed 
much of their main force strength semipermanently in western 
Cambodia, and division headquarters were reported to have been 
established in Batdambang City, in Treng, and in Sisophon in Bat- 
dambang Province. There was little agreement among observers 
on unit designations or on the movements of main force units below 
division level within Cambodia, or on the extent to which such 
Khmer units were able to operate independently of Vietnamese 
forces. 

Equipment for the main force units was furnished by Vietnam 
and by the Soviet Union. Armaments consisted of small arms of 
Soviet origin, including the AKM (updated version of the AK-47) 
assault rifle and various crew-served weapons, including towed 
medium howitzers, and air-defense weapons in several calibers. 
Tanks in the KPRAF armored battalions included the T-54/55, 
an old, but capable, main battle tank of Soviet origin; the obsoles- 
cent PT-76 light amphibious tank; and the Type-59, an older 
Chinese main battie tank, probably handed down from Vietnamese 
stocks. Armored fighting vehicles in the main force inventory con- 
sisted of the Soviet BTR series of wheeled vehicles, and some aging 
American equipment — such as V-100 armored cars and M-113 
armored personnel carriers — either bequeathed by Vietnam or left 
behind from the days of the Khmer Republic (see table 16, 
Appendix A). 

The provincial/regional forces were second echelon troops, ranked 
below main force regulars in capability, in sustainability, and in 
equipment. The forerunners of the provincial forces were Khmer 
units that were raised hastily in 1979. They were composed of defec- 
tors or refugees who were pressed into service by the Vietnamese 
in their invasion of Cambodia. The units numbered perhaps 100 
personnel each, and they were allocated, one per province, to 
accompany officials of the newly proclaimed government in Phnom 
Penh as they filled the places left vacant by the Khmer Rouge and 
set up provincial administrations. To extend the government 
presence to the districts, some provincial units were broken down 
into platoons or squads and were dispatched to accompany newly 
appointed district officials. At this time, the provincial forces were 
merely adjuncts of the Vietnamese occupation forces; they were 



287 



Cambodia: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from "The Military Occupation of Kampuchea," Indochina 
Report, Singapore, No. 3, July-September 1985. 

Figure 15. Military Regions, 1987 

untrained, and they had few capabilities beyond those needed to 
provide rudimentary passive defense to their provincial or district 
administrations. 



288 



National Security 



In 1987 little authoritative information was available on the 
deployment and the total strength of the Cambodian provincial 
forces. If the KPRAF followed the examples of its Vietnamese and 
Laotian counterparts, however, troops for provincial units were 
raised from among local residents and were deployed exclusively 
in their home provinces. Such practices may have given these forces 
an edge, in recruitment and in morale, over their main force coun- 
terparts because village youths generally preferred to serve their 
military obligation closer to home. In a counterinsurgency like the 
one in Cambodia, provincial forces also could have had an advan- 
tage because of their greater knowledge of the area of operations 
and of local conditions, both friendly and hostile. 

An early goal of the government in Phnom Penh was to raise 
two battalions of provincial forces per province. Given the man- 
power limitations of the nation, a more realistic goal would have 
been a single battalion per province. In 1987 Western analysts be- 
lieved that the latter goal had been achieved and had even been 
exceeded in some provinces on the Thai border, where the insur- 
gent threat was greatest. It continued to be impossible to gauge 
the overall strength of the provincial forces with any accuracy, but 
based on an estimate of 1 battalion per province in general, with 
2 to 4 battalions per border province, a figure of 10,000 personnel 
may have been realistic. 

The connections among the provincial forces and the Ministry 
of National Defense and the KPRAF General Staff were unclear. 
At subordinate echelons, however, provincial units were respon- 
sible to a local military committee. This committee was composed 
of the chairman, the military commander and his deputy, and a 
small staff headed by a chief of staff. The military committee re- 
ported to the provincial committee of the mass organization of the 
KPRP, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) United Front for National 
Construction and Defense (KUFNCD — see Appendix B). The 
KUFNCD coordinated military affairs with the corresponding party 
and government committees at each organizational level. It was 
assumed, although unproved, that the provincial forces, irrespec- 
tive of intervening committees, kept in close touch with KPRAF 
main force units and headquarters, and with Vietnamese military 
garrisons in the vicinity. 

The provincial forces had two missions, military and political. 
In the performance of the former, some Western analysts hypothe- 
sized that the provincial units at last might have broken their de- 
pendency on their Vietnamese military mentors and have learned 
to operate by themselves. This premise might hold true if the provin- 
cial forces were deployed only in their home provinces, as suspected, 
and if the insurgents continued to be unable to mass large units. 



289 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

In the performance of their political mission, the provincial forces 
were expected by the government to play an important role be- 
cause they were closer to the people than were the regular forces. 
This role included both propaganda work and psychological 
warfare. Propaganda work involved building the loyalty of provin- 
cial residents both to government and to party as well as indoctri- 
nation in KPRP orthodoxy and in Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
Psychological warfare involved measures taken against the enemy, 
such as inducements to defect, arousal of hatred against them, and 
neutralization of their propaganda appeals. 

The third echelon in the KPRAF consisted of the village militia, 
or local forces. This armed force originated in the 1979 to 1980 
period, when directives by the party and the newly proclaimed 
government mandated the raising of a militia in each village and 
subdistrict. This objective coincided with the desire of the Viet- 
namese military authorities to create small local force units in the 
rural communities along the Thai-Cambodian border, thereby 
transforming these frontier settlements into combat hamlets that 
would help to keep the insurgents at bay. According to instruc- 
tions relayed to village authorities, former officials and soldiers of 
the defunct Democratic Kampuchea regime were to be excluded 
from the militia, and preference was to be given to recruiting former 
Khmer Rouge victims. This recruitment policy initially was quite 
successful, as there was no dearth of Cambodians who had either 
grievances against the previous regime or the simple desire to pro- 
tect their homes and their villages from attack by Khmer Rouge 
guerrillas. In some localities, former soldiers of the Khmer Republic 
who had escaped the purges of Democratic Kampuchea were able 
to dominate the militia. In others, local peasants without political 
antecedents were in the majority. Villages were able eventually to 
raise militia forces of ten to twenty personnel each, while subdis- 
tricts mustered fifteen to thirty personnel. In virtually all cases, 
militia members were ill-trained and ill-equipped, possessing only 
Soviet small arms from Vietnam, or hand-me-down United States 
weapons provided years before to the Khmer Republic. 

In the mid-to-late 1980s, party and military authorities were at- 
tempting to consolidate the militia. Indirect evidence suggested that, 
among the Cambodian citizenry, enthusiasm for joining the local 
forces had waned considerably since the early years of the decade. 
Militia units were formed throughout the country, nevertheless, 
even in the hamlets, in the individual factories, and in the solidar- 
ity groups working in the rice fields, in some cases. Some units 
had offensive missions to search out guerrilla bands in their locali- 
ties and to destroy them, or at least to report their movement 
to higher military authorities. On the Thai border, the militia 



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National Security 



participated in Project K-5. The militia also had the duties of 
patrolling and protecting this barrier. Away from the frontier, 
however, the local forces generally were oriented defensively and, 
according to official Cambodian sources, were "entrusted with the 
duty of defending production, communication lines, production 
sites, rubber plantations, fishing grounds, forest exploitation areas, 
and so on." In all of their duties, the militia units reported to local 
party and government committees, which in turn were responsi- 
ble for the recruitment, indoctrination, and training of militia mem- 
bers. Some financial support from the central government, however, 
may have been available to local authorities to raise militia units 
within their jurisdictions. In addition to their military and secur- 
ity duties, militia members were expected to participate in econom- 
ically productive activities and to make their units as self-sufficient 
as possible. 

Aside from the three levels of the KPRAF that were essentially 
ground forces, the military establishment included a small river- 
ine and coastal navy. This latter force consisted of one battalion, 
of undisclosed strength, which had the mission of patrolling the 
Tonle Sap (Great Lake) and the Tonle Sab — a river emanating 
from the Tonle Sap — between the lake and Phnom Penh. To ac- 
complish its mission, the riverine navy was equipped with at least 
three patrol craft, each armed with turret-mounted 75mm guns 
and with twin open-mounted 20mm guns. The force possessed at 
least one landing craft with a modest lift capability of about one 
platoon at a time. The commander of the riverine navy served con- 
currently on the KPRAF General Staff, where he may have per- 
formed the functions of a naval chief of staff. 

An embryonic air defense corps or air force was being recon- 
stituted in the mid-to-late 1980s, after having been defunct since 
the days of the Khmer Republic. Cambodian pilots and techni- 
cians were in training in the Soviet Union; some already had 
returned home. Thai sources reported that about forty 
MiG-21/FISHBED fighter aircraft were either on order or already 
in the inventory. The delivery or order of Mi-8/HIP transport 
helicopters was also reported, but not verified, as of late 1987. 

Conditions of Service 

Military service was compulsory in the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea. Cambodian males between the ages of eighteen and 
thirty-five faced an obligation to serve in the armed forces for five 
years, an increase from three years was made in 1985 because of 
personnel shortages in the country. Recruitment councils made up 
of party and government officials existed at all administrative levels; 



291 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

they may have performed functions, principally the selection of eligi- 
ble youths to be inducted into the military services, similar to those 
of local United States Selective Service Boards. The establishment 
of these recruitment councils may have supplanted the earlier press- 
gang tactics of KPRAF units who, according to refugee accounts, 
had forcibly rounded up Khmer youths and had inducted them 
en masse into the armed forces. In spite of this bureaucratic inno- 
vation, however, draft dodging was reported to be widespread, a 
situation that was acknowledged obliquely by the government and 
party media in their unrelenting emphasis on recruitment and on 
the patriotic duty of serving in the armed forces. It was not known 
whether or not Khmer youths themselves could elect to serve in 
the main, provincial, or local force, or whether or not a quota sys- 
tem prevailed. 

Women as well as men were eligible for military service. A party 
organ reported authoritatively in the early 1980s that the KPRAF 
was composed of "cadres and male and female combatants," and 
"our people's sons and daughters." Women were heavily repre- 
sented in the local forces, according to official disclosures, which 
stated that in 1987 more than 28,000 were enrolled in militia units 
and that more than 1 , 200 had participated in the construction of 
frontier fortifications on the Thai-Cambodian border. The presence 
of women in the provincial and in the main forces, however, could 
not be verified. 

The KPRAF, with the aid of its Vietnamese and Soviet advisers, 
made a considerable effort to establish a network of military schools 
and training centers for its personnel. In the early 1980s, about 
thirteen such institutions were reported to be already in existence. 
Two of the better known schools in Phnom Penh were the Engineer- 
ing School and the Technical School. Each of these schools enrolled 
about 300 students, in curricula lasting one year. The Engineer- 
ing School, located in the former Cambodian military academy, 
offered courses in radio, telecommunications, topography, map 
reading, mechanics, and civil and military engineering. Success- 
ful completion of courses at the Engineering School qualified gradu- 
ates for the Technical School (not to be confused with the civilian 
Kampuchean — USSR Friendship Technical Institute). The Tech- 
nical School offered military science subjects, such as weapons and 
tactics, a higher level than those given by the Engineering School. 
Both institutions offered language instruction in Vietnamese 
and in Russian as well as heavy doses of ideology. In Phnom Penh, 
there also was an Infantry School, presumably for junior offi- 
cers in the KPRAF; a Political School to train party cadre for the 
armed forces; a military medical school; and a school for logistics. 



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National Security 



Promising graduates of the KPRAF school system had the chance 
to go abroad for further military education. In the mid-1980s, about 
1,000 KPRAF officers had been sent to schools and to training 
centers in Vietnam, and an additional 500 were being trained in 
the Soviet Union. This international military education and training 
program, as well as the entire network of service schools, was be- 
lieved to be administered by the Training Department of the 
KPRAF General Staff, which issued specialized training directives 
in the name of the Ministry of National Defense to subordinate 
echelons down to the local force level. 

Below national level, each KPRAF military region had its own 
training schools, and Cambodian youths who joined the armed 
forces were believed to receive their initial military training in such 
institutions. Instruction reportedly covered political, military, tac- 
tical, and vocational subjects. According to a training directive is- 
sued in 1984, provincial and local forces were ordered to stress unit 
training and to vary these instructions with actual combat patrols 
and operations. Local commanders also were directed to conduct 
drills for cadres and combatants, to arrange for training areas and 
materials, to select qualified training officers, to develop training 
schedules, and to select personnel for course enrollment. 

Recent data on pay and allowances in the KPRAF were lack- 
ing. In the early 1980s, military salaries for common soldiers 
amounted to the riel (for the value of the riel — see Glossary) equiva- 
lent of three to four dollars a month. This was supplemented by 
a rice ration of sixteen to twenty- two kilograms a month, supplied 
at the concessionary rate of one riel per kilogram. Local com- 
manders at all echelons were enjoined to ensure the timely distri- 
bution of pay and of rations to all personnel under their jurisdiction. 
Soldiers in permanent garrisons were expected to supplement their 
meager salaries by planting individual or unit vegetable gardens 
and by raising poultry or livestock wherever possible. On the home 
front, the care of veterans and of military dependents whose spon- 
sors were away on active service was decentralized and entrusted 
to the solidarity groups (krom samaki) and to various party and 
government committees at the local level. 

A system of military justice existed in the KPRAF, but its func- 
tional details were unknown. The Constitution provides for mili- 
tary tribunals, and the KPRAF maintained a network of military 
prisons. At the national level, the principal military prison was T-l , 
located in the Tuol Sleng area of Phnom Penh. Administrators of 
T-l reported to the Ministry of National Defense. Other military 
prisons existed in the four military regions of the KPRAF, and 



293 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



Table B. Branch Insignia of the Kampuchean, or Khmer, 
People's Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1987 



Branch 


Insignia 


A • T? 

Air Force 


Wing on a star 


Armored 


Tank 


Artillery 


Crossed cannon barrels 


Lmemical 


Chemistry sign (retort?) 


Cultural 


Musical notes 


XJllclllCvl 


T-Tali ia crparprl wKf^l prrwQpH qKiovpI q n rl rnpk 
licui ex g^ai wiittij u uoo^u oiiuvti aiiu u i >x 


Infantry 


AK assault rifle on a star 


Judge Advocate 


Shield with stars and crossed swords 


Medical 


Red cross on a white disk 


Military Band 


Trumpet 


Navy 


Anchor 


Quartermaster 


AK assault rifle with star and rice sheaves 


Radar 


Radar mounted on a truck 


Transportation 


Steering wheel over spring shock absorber 



Source: Based on information from Kangtap Padevat (Revolutionary Army), 1 July 1987. 



possibly at the provincial level as well. Military police of the KPRAF 
served as guards and as administrators of the military penal system. 

Military uniforms in the KPRAF were worn by the main and 
by the provincial forces, although apparently not by the militia. 
In general, these uniforms resembled those of Vietnam and the 
Soviet Union. Battle dress for the soldiers consisted of green or 
khaki fatigues, with Soviet- style soft campaign hats (such as the 
Soviet Army wore in Afghanistan), or visored caps with a cloth 
chin strap. Although not part of the uniform, soldiers on an oper- 
ation widely wore the krama, a checkered scarf knotted loosely about 
the neck. Junior officers serving on staff duty or attending service 
schools in Phnom Penh wore khaki shirts with ties, brown trou- 
sers, and the round service cap. The cap device for all ranks con- 
sisted of a five-towered, stylized rendition of Angkor Wat on a red 
field, surrounded by a wreath. The device for senior ranks showed 
more elaborate gold ornamentation around the wreath. The 
KPRAF owned a garment factory in Phnom Penh, and it may have 
produced at least some of the uniforms it needed at this facility. 
The KPRAF also authorized a system of rank and branch insig- 
nia in July 1987. Although photographic evidence was lacking, these 
insignia were believed to resemble closely those of the Vietnamese 
army; they were worn on collar tabs of varying colors: scarlet for 
the army, dark blue for the navy, and sky blue for the air force 
(see table B). These branch insignia were worn by personnel up 
to the rank of deputy platoon commander. Platoon commanders 
to deputy regimental commanders wore rank insignia on collar tabs 
with silver borders; regimental commanders to deputy chiefs of 



294 



National Security 



military regions wore similar insignia with golden borders. Senior 
officers from military region commander to deputy defense minister 
wore collar tabs with a golden dragon surrounded by an ornate 
border on a maroon background. 

After coming to power, the PRK instituted an array of awards 
and decorations for individuals, military units, and other organi- 
zations which performed noteworthy services for the party and the 
state. Identified awards or decorations included the Order of Ang- 
kor, the Fatherland Defense Order (first and second class), the Vic- 
tory Medal (first, second, and third class), the National Defense 
Medal (first, second, and third class), and the Labor Medal. In 
addition to these medals, a number of citations, banners, and 
streamers were awarded by various government ministries, includ- 
ing the Ministry of National Defense, to both individuals and 
organizations for meritorious or distinguished performance of duty. 

Foreign Troops and Advisers 

In the late 1980s, Vietnamese units stationed in Cambodia 
represented a military force that had broken away from its revolu- 
tionary tradition and had become an army of occupation, a dra- 
matic role change in view of the fact that its most formidable 
adversaries, the Khmer Rouge, were fellow communists and former 
allies. Consistendy designated by Hanoi as "the Vietnamese volun- 
teer army in Kampuchea," the Vietnamese force, comprising some 
ten to twelve divisions, was made up of conscripts who supported 
a "regime of military administration." 

Military units totalling as many as 200,000 troops invaded Cam- 
bodia at the end of 1978 to eradicate the Khmer Rouge regime 
of Democratic Kampuchea and to install a more pliant government 
in Phnom Penh. After several years, Vietnam ostensibly began to 
decrease the size of its military contingent in Cambodia. The first 
recorded, but unannounced, withdrawal occurred in June 1981, 
when Vietnam's 137th Division returned home. In July 1982, 
Hanoi announced publicly that as an "act of goodwill" it would 
withdraw an unspecified number of troops from Cambodia. These 
withdrawals became annual occurrences. In 1986 Vietnamese 
sources announced a pullout of 12,000 troops. In November 1987, 
an additional 20,000 Vietnamese military personnel were with- 
drawn. These retrenchments were conducted with considerable pub- 
licity and fanfare, including departure ceremonies in Phnom Penh 
and featuring medals for commanders and citations for units. Skep- 
tics, however, contended that these movements were merely troop 
rotations. A 1987 study conducted by Chulalongkorn University 



295 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



in Bangkok reached the same conclusion, after its researchers in- 
terviewed groups of Vietnamese defectors. 

Hanoi publicly committed itself to withdraw its occupation forces 
by 1990. It first announced this decision following an August 1985 
meeting of Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian foreign ministers. 
The commitment to a pullout engendered continuing discussion, 
both by foreign observers and by Indochinese participants. What 
emerged was the clarifying qualification that a total Vietnamese 
military withdrawal was contingent upon the progress of pacifica- 
tion in Cambodia and upon the ability of the KPRAF to contain 
the insurgent threat without Vietnamese assistance. Prime Minister 
Hun Sen declared in a May 1987 interview that "if the situation 
evolves as is, we are hopeful that by 1990 all Vietnamese troops 
will be withdrawn . . . [but] if the troop withdrawal will be taken 
advantage of, we will have to negotiate to take appropriate mea- 
sures. . . Shortly thereafter, a KPRAF battalion commander 
told a Phnom Penh press conference that "Vietnamese forces could 
remain in Cambodia beyond 1990, if the Khmer Rouge resistance 
continues to pose a threat." In an interview with a Western cor- 
respondent, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach 
repeated the 1990 withdrawal pledge, insisting that only foreign 
military intervention could convince Hanoi to change its plans. 
Some ASEAN and Western observers greeted declarations of a total 
pullout by 1990 with incredulity. Departing Vietnamese units 
reportedly left equipment behind in Cambodia, and it was suggested 
that they easily could return if it looked as though a province might 
be lost. 

As Hanoi's military presence in Cambodia approached its ninth 
year, it appeared that the Vietnamese troops stationed there were 
not frontline veterans. Most of Vietnam's main force units and 
its best troops were deployed in the Red River Delta or on Viet- 
nam's northern border to contain any armed threat from China. 
Units in Cambodia were composed of conscripts from the southern 
provinces of Vietnam, or, according to refugee accounts, of mili- 
tary misfits and "troublemakers." Some Vietnamese defectors in 
Thailand declared that they had volunteered for military service 
to get out of Vietnam and to have an opportunity for resettlement 
in third countries. 

Vietnam's presence in Cambodia reportedly consumed 40 to 50 
percent of Hanoi's military budget. Although substantial portions 
of the cost had been underwritten by Soviet grant aid, Vietnamese 
troops in Cambodia apparendy were on short rations. Radio Hanoi 
reportedly commented on troops "dressed in rags, puritanically 
fed, and mostly disease ridden." The parlous state of Vietnamese 



296 



International solidarity: a Cambodian repairman fixes the 
motorbike of a Vietnamese soldier at a Phnom Penh curbside. 

Courtesy Bill Herod 

forces in Cambodia also was the subject of a report by the director 
of an Hanoi military medical institute. According to media ac- 
counts, the report acknowledged that Vietnamese troops in the 
country suffered from widespread and serious malnutrition and that 
beriberi occurred in epidemic proportions. 

The Vietnamese military headquarters in Cambodia was located 
at Chamka Morn in Phnom Penh. In the mid-1980s, it was respon- 
sible to the Vietnamese Fourth Corps commander, at that time 
General Le Due Anh (subsequentiy promoted to minister of na- 
tional defense). Vietnamese military authorities divided Cambo- 
dia into four military regions. These areas probably coincided with 
KPRAF regions. Each of these regions, in turn, corresponded to 
a Vietnamese military front that exercised tactical responsibility 
over it. The four Vietnamese military fronts were Front 479, head- 
quartered at Barai Toek Thla Airport, Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey 
Province; Front 579, at Stoeng Treng City, Stoeng Treng Province; 
Front 779, at the Chhupp rubber plantation, Kampong Cham 
Province; and Front 979, at Somrong Tong, Kampong Spoe 
Province. Front 479 was considered the most critical because of 
heavy insurgent activity in the area. A Special Military Adminis- 
trative Zone was also created, comprising the vital heartland of 
the country around the Tonle Sap and the alluvial plain to the 



297 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



southeast. The relationship of the zone to the military regions and 
to the fronts was undetermined. Along the Cambodian coast, the 
Vietnamese established another type of military jurisdiction. Naval 
Zone Five comprised the shore lines of Kaoh Kong and Kampot 
provinces and their contiguous territorial waters. The headquar- 
ters of the naval zone was at Kampong Saom. 

Vietnamese military advisers also were detached to serve with 
KPRAF main and provincial forces down to the battalion, and 
perhaps even the company, level. The functions and the chain of 
command of these advisers remained unknown, except that it could 
be assumed that they reported to the Vietnamese military region 
or front headquarters. 

Law Enforcement and Countersubversion 

People's Security Service 

Law enforcement was the responsibility of the minister of in- 
terior, who, as a member of the Council of Ministers, was charged 
by the Constitution "to protect the interests of the people, preserve 
security and public order and protect the legal rights and interests 
of the citizens." To carry out these functions, the ministry exer- 
cised control over its own corps of plainclothes police and over the 
People's Security Service. In the late 1980s, nothing was known 
publicly about the ministry's agents, except that they fulfilled coun- 
tersubversion responsibilities and that they may have been advised 
by Vietnamese and by German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
man) personnel. In 1987 the People's Security Service consisted 
of a plainclothes branch and a uniformed police force called the 
Nokorbal (civil police). Total personnel strength was undisclosed. 
Day-to-day administration of the entire organization was carried 
out by the deputy minister of interior, under whom People's Secu- 
rity Service staff functions were carried out by fifteen departments 
or bureaus. Some of these subministerial offices, such as the traffic 
and the criminal police bureaus, performed routine law-enforcement 
functions. Others rendered support services, such as internal ad- 
ministration and supply, and still others fulfilled countersubver- 
sion responsibilities. Among the latter were the political ideology- 
bureau, which performed loyalty checks on party cadres; the po- 
litical security bureau, which arrested persons suspected of politi- 
cal offenses: and an internal defense bureau, or unit, which 
investigated government ministries and offices. 

In Phnom Penh itself, police were organized into seven precinct 
or ward offices, with an additional thirteen precincts in the greater 
capital area. In the mid-1980s, the chief of the Phnom Penh police 



298 



National Security 



served concurrently as the deputy minister of interior. The organiza- 
tional functions of the capital police staff approximately replicated 
those of the Ministry of Interior at the national level. Observers 
identified fourteen different bureaus, dealing with political security, 
interrogation, political ideology, internal defense, clandestine in- 
vestigations, case analysis, organization/ appointments, supply, 
forensics/poly technics, administration, statistical, defense police 
(embassy and government building security guards), firefighting, 
and traffic control. A defecting police official estimated that arrests 
in the capital for both political and criminal offenses averaged about 
100 per month in the 1980s. 

At the provincial level, police authority was vested in a chief of 
the People's Security Service who was responsible to the KUFNCD 
provincial committee and, through channels, to the Ministry of 
Interior. The police sought to maintain a physical presence at least 
as far down as the district level and, where possible, as far down 
as the commune level. Police officials in the countryside were 
responsible both to their local party and government committees 
and to law-enforcement authorities at the next higher echelon. In 
areas without a police presence, law-enforcement responsibilities 
devolved upon local party or government officials. 

Police control of the population outside the cities was assisted 
by a pass system. Such passes were issued by local committees and 
were required for travel among villages, districts, and provinces. 
Frequent checkpoints by police and by military personnel along 
principal routes ensured compliance by travelers. Violators of the 
pass system were subjected to brief incarceration upon being ap- 
prehended and to heightened surveillance upon returning home. 
According to defectors, however, checkpoint personnel were sus- 
ceptible to bribery. 

Protection under the Law 

The protection of all Cambodians by the law is guaranteed by 
the 1981 Constitution, which declares that the state "recognizes 
and respects human rights" and that it protects "the honor, dig- 
nity and life of its citizens" (see The Constitution, ch. 4). In the 
mid-1980s, lawyers in the Ministry of Justice had published some 
legal texts and statutes, but by late 1987, it was not possible to verify 
the existence of a comprehensive criminal and civil code. Decree- 
laws promulgated in 1980 paid considerable attention to political 
offenses, and they prescribed five levels of punishment for such 
crimes. A first-level offense, such as aiding or abetting an individual 
known to be "a traitor to the revolution," was punishable by two 
to seven years' imprisonment. A second-level offense, such as 



299 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



subversion or economic sabotage, was punishable by imprisonment 
for between five and ten years. Third-level offenses, which included 
the crime of taking up arms against the state, were punishable by 
five to fifteen years' imprisonment. A fourth-level offense, defined 
as plotting to overthrow the state or committing " treason against 
the revolution," and punishable by ten to twenty years' imprison- 
ment. Fifth-level offenses, which included compounded acts of se- 
dition by individuals in positions of authority, acts of rebellion by 
insurgent leaders, and acts of spying by operatives who maintained 
espionage networks carried sentences of twenty years to life im- 
prisonment and even the death penalty. A further decree-law, 
promulgated around 1983, also addressed crimes against the state, 
such as treason, but included common-law offenses, such as murder, 
rape, and theft. Penalties for political crimes generally remained 
the same as they were in the earlier law. For common-law crimes 
such as murder, however, offenders were subject to ten to twenty 
years' imprisonment; for aggravated assault, six months to ten 
years; for rape, two to five years; for rape followed by murder, 
twenty years to life with the possibility of a death sentence. People 
convicted of theft were subject to confinement for a period of six 
months to fifteen years. Former Khmer Rouge cadres who were 
convicted of outrageous crimes against humanity faced the death 
sentence. Such sentences, however, had to be approved by the 
Council of State (see Government Structure, ch. 4). 

The first courts in the PRK were the people's revolutionary courts 
set up almost on an ad hoc basis by the Kampuchean People's 
Revolutionary Council in 1979. Establishment of a more institu- 
tionalized system took place in approximately 1983. At this time, 
a network of courts was extended to each province and municipal- 
ity. Officers of each court included a president, one or two vice 
presidents, and a judge. A reporting channel presumably connected 
these local courts to the Ministry of Justice, but, as of late 1987, 
its existence had not been confirmed. Similarly, a People's Supreme 
Court, evidently under the Ministry of Justice, was established in 
the early 1980s, but its functions continued to be obscure. 

The independence of the judiciary at all levels remained in ques- 
tion. According to a 1982 decree-law, the purpose of the courts 
was to uphold the policies of the government. Officers of the court 
were appointed by local party and government committees with 
the apparent concurrence of the Ministry of Justice. Court offi- 
cials thus were responsible to the committees that recruited them. 

The power to arrest and to detain for political or for criminal 
offenses was quite widespread among government bodies. It ex- 
tended from the agents of the Ministry of Interior to the People's 



300 



Divided loyalties: 
A Phnom Penh policeman 
minds his child while 
guarding a hotel. 
Courtesy Bill Herod 




Security Service and to the military units of the main, provincial, 
and local forces. Refugee and defector accounts indicate that sus- 
picion rather than evidence frequently sufficed to cause the arrest 
of a suspect. A 1987 Amnesty International report stated that ar- 
rested individuals were denied information about the charges against 
them and were frequendy imprisoned without trial. Detention rou- 
tinely was followed by interrogation, accompanied by repeated beat- 
ings and by torture. In an effort to correct the most flagrant of these 
abuses, the government promulgated its decree-law of March 12, 
1986. According to Amnesty International, this statute "codifies 
and modifies non-legislative instructions against torture, rules on 
search procedures and regulations concerning powers of arrest and 
length of detention for interrogation." Amnesty International fur- 
ther observed that this was "the first PRK law to address issues 
directly related to human rights in these areas." 

Accused persons were accorded relatively few constitutional 
safeguards. They had the right to a defense counsel, but they could 
represent themselves. Fragmentary information reaching Amnesty 
International demonstrated that individual guilt or innocence — 
especially that relating to political crimes — was not decided on the 
basis of judicial proceedings, but was determined beforehand by 
the arresting authorities following interrogation. Guilty persons then 
were sentenced administratively without due process. In the few 
cases brought to trial, the court confined itself to ratifying the 



301 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

sentence already decided upon behind the scenes. Defendants who 
were dissatisfied with a court ruling theoretically had the right to 
appeal, but the procedures remained unclarified, and the role of 
the People's Supreme Court as the final arbiter of judicial deci- 
sions was unknown. 

Penal System 

Individuals sentenced to imprisonment, as a result of adminis- 
trative or judicial proceedings, were incarcerated in one of a na- 
tionwide network of about 200 prisons. These installations were 
administered by the Prison Directorate of the Ministry of Interior 
and by the People's Security Service. They constituted a many- 
tiered system extending from the national level to the local level. 
At the national level, the principal prison was T-3, located in 
Phnom Penh. This institution was built in the early twentieth cen- 
tury, and it has served as a prison for every successive regime to 
hold power in Cambodia. The facilities were enlarged when the 
present government was installed in 1979. In the mid-1980s, it held 
about 1,000 prisoners. Administration of T-3 was shared by the 
Ministry of Interior and by the Phnom Penh People's Security Ser- 
vice, which used the facility to confine some its own prisoners ap- 
prehended in the capital area. In addition to the T-3 central prison, 
two other national penal institutions, code-named T-4 and T-5, 
were reported. Both functioned as labor camps, and they appeared 
not to be maximum security prisons. T-4, located on the outskirts 
of the capital, was administered by the Phnom Penh People's Secu- 
rity Service; T-5, in Kampong Cham, administered by the provin- 
cial People's Security Service. Overall responsibility for T-4 and 
for T-5 may have rested with the Bureau of Reform Offices of the 
Prison Directorate. 

Each of Phnom Penh's twenty wards or precincts had its own 
short-term confinement facility. The precincts, however, had to 
transfer their prisoners after three days to the central People's Secu- 
rity Service headquarters for confinement in T-3 . Away from the 
capital, independent municipalities (such as Kampong Saom), 
provinces, and districts all had their own jails and prisons. These 
facilities usually were administered by the People's Security Ser- 
vice at the provincial level, and at lower lower echelons. One of 
the better known provincial prisons was TK-1 in Batdambang city; 
the installation was taxed to the utmost in its role as a detention 
facility for captured guerrillas, smugglers, border-crossers, and in- 
surgent sympathizers, because of its location in an area of heavy 
resistance activity. The capacity and status of other provincial pri- 
sons could not be verified. Given the regime's lack of resources, 



302 



National Security 



conditions in all of them must have been spartan, if not appalling. 
In some of them, inmates were taken out on work details to per- 
form manual labor, such as brush-clearing, ditchdigging, or dike- 
construction; however, this may have been on an ad hoc, rather 
than on an institutionalized, basis. Prisoners who had served their 
sentences were freed by a release order signed by People's Security 
Service or Ministry of Interior officials and were permitted to return 
to their home areas. Former detainees kept their release papers on 
their persons or near at hand, as a safeguard against rearrest. 

The law-enforcement apparatus in the PRK, like the armed 
forces, became more institutionalized as the decade of the 1980s 
progressed, but how well the two establishments coordinated to in- 
sure national security at all levels remained open to question. These 
establishments did represent, however, the institutional founda- 
tions laid down by the regime and by the ruling party in order to 
retain power, ensure ideological orthodoxy, and impart a measure 
of internal stability. In the turmoil of a war-ravaged country, the 
fact that these institutions had been created represented an 
accomplishment — human rights issues aside — for the government 
and for its Vietnamese mentors. In a broader sense, these institu- 
tions were part of the sovereign nationhood that Cambodia was 
striving to regain while deferring uneasily, but pragmatically, to 
Vietnam. 

* * * 

No published monographs address, either comprehensively or 
specifically, the armed forces or law-enforcement bodies of Cam- 
bodia. Fragmentary accounts are given in the works described 
below. The reference for Khmer warfare in ancient times is Horace 
Geoffrey Quaritch Wales's, Ancient South-east Asian Warfare. The 
Japanese occupation period is briefly covered in Joyce C. Lebra's 
Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia. For the French colonial 
period and for the early part of the Sihanouk era, up to 1953, use- 
ful information is found in Maurice Laurent's L 'Armee au Cambodge 
et dans les pays en voie de developpement du Sud-est asiatique. The most 
concise reference on the Cambodian armed forces of the Khmer 
Republic is Sak Sutsakhan's The Khmer Republic at War and the Final 
Collapse. For information on United States security assistance to 
the Cambodian armed forces and on its associated problems, an 
authoritative source is by the General Accounting Office of the 
United States, U.S. Assistance to the Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Report 
to the Congress. The armed forces under the Khmer Rouge are dis- 
cussed in two essential sources: Craig Etcheson's, The Rise and Demise 



303 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

of Democratic Kampuchea and Ben Kiernan's How Pol Pot Came to 
Power. Authoritative accounts of the Vietnamese invasion and of 
the reconstitution of the Cambodian armed forces, are given in 
Nayan Chanda's Brother Enemy, The War After the War and in 
Elizabeth Becker's When the War Was Over. Timothy Carney's 
"Heng Samrin's Armed Forces and the Military Balance in Cam- 
bodia," International Journal of Politics, Fall 1986, continues to be 
a seminal piece indispensable to a discussion of the KPRAF, 
although by the late 1980s some of the information was dated. Other 
treatments of the KPRAF and the insurgency in Cambodia are 
given in Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook. This publication is 
issued annually, and its discussion of Cambodian affairs from a 
defense point of view has become more comprehensive over the 
years. Personnel and military equipment figures for Cambodia are 
given in The Military Balance. 

Law-enforcement and security agencies, discussed from a human 
rights perspective rather than as government institutions, are dealt 
with in Floyd Abram's and Diane Orentlicher's Kampuchea: After 
the Worst and Kampuchea: Political Imprisonment and Torture by Amnesty 
International. (For further information and complete citations, see 
Bibliography). 



304 



Appendix A 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population, Selected Years 

3 Population Distribution, 1987 

4 Growth of Schools and of Student Enrollment in the People's 

Republic of Kampuchea, 1979-84 

5 Land Use, 1980-85 

6 Production of Wood and Lumber, Selected Years 

7 Area under Principal Food Crops, Selected Years 

8 Rice Production by Harvest Season, Selected Years 

9 Rice Production, Selected Years 

10 Production of Principal Secondary Crops, Selected Years 

11 Index Number of Agricultural Production, Selected Years 

12 Seafood Catch, Selected Years 

13 Long-term External Debt, 1980-84 

14 Trade with the Soviet Union, 1982-87 

15 Net Flows of Resources of Cambodia, Selected Years 

16 Major Weapons of the Kampuchean, or Khmer, People's 

Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1987 



305 



Appendix A 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 






0.04 


inches 






0.39 


inches 








feet 






0.62 


miles 




Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 


2.47 


acres 




Square kilometers . . 


0.39 


square miles 




35.3 


cubic feet 






0.26 


gallons 






2.2 


pounds 






0.98 


long tons 






1.1 


short tons 






2,204 


pounds 






9 


degrees Fahrenheit 


(Centigrade) 


divide by 5 








and add 32 






Table 2. Population, Selected Years 


Province 


1950 


1968 (est.) 


1981 1 




371,000 


685,000 


719,000 




570,711 


977,000 


1,070,000 


Kampong Chhnang 


196,000 


331,000 


221,000 




176,469 


361,000 


340,000 




211,500 


379,000 


379,000 




252,968 


414,000 


354,000 




527,993 


805,000 


720,000 






45,000 


25,000 




79,439 


162,000 


157,000 






17,000 


16,000 






50,000 


Siemreab 2 




129,653 


223,000 


175,000 






45,000 


70,000 




361,029 


558,000 


672,000 






56,000 


45,000 




215,000 


371,000 


477,000 




207,050 


346,000 


292,000 




47,000 


44,000 


39,000 




364,295 


541,000 


531,000 


TOTAL 


3,710,107 


6,410,000 


6,302,000 



1 The last census taken by the People's Republic of Kampuchea was in 1981. 

2 Indicates population included in the province the name of which follows. 

Source: Based on information from David J. Steinberg, Cambodia: Its People, Its Society, Its 
Culture, New Haven, 1959, 291 ; Jacques Migozzi, Cambodge: faits et problemes de popu- 
lation, Paris, 1973, np; and Kimmo Kiljunen, ed., Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide — 
Report of a Finnish Inquiry Commission, London, 1984, 31. 



307 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



Table 3. Population Distribution, 1987 
(in thousands) 



Percent of 

Categories Population total population 

Male 3,231,000 50.0 

Female 3,232,000 50.0 

TOTAL 6,463,000 100.0 

Urban 724,000 11.2 

Rural 5,739,000 88.8 

TOTAL 6,463,000 100.0 

Age 0-14 2,227,000 34.5 

Age 15-64 4,040,000 62.5 

Age 65+ 196,000 3.0 

TOTAL 6,463,000 100.0 



Source: Based on information from United States, Bureau of the Census, unpublished com- 
puterized data on world population, Washington, 1987. 



Table 4. Growth of Schools and of Student Enrollment in the People's Republic 
of Kampuchea, 1979-84 

Grade 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1983-84 
Grades 1-4 (Level I) 

Schools 5,290 4,334 1 3,521 1 3,005 1 

Pupils 947,317 1,328,053 1,508,985 1,542,825 

Teachers 21,605 30,316 37,000 2 33,479 

Grades 5-7 (Level II) 

Schools 14 62 108 200 

Pupils 5,104 17,331 39,434 146,865 

Teachers 206 671 1,600 2 4,329 

Grades 8-10 (Level III) 

Schools 1 2 5 13 

Pupils 301 555 1,521 6,969 

Teachers 20 28 78 2 277 

1 Reflects regrouping and consolidation of schools. 

2 Planned figures. 

Source: Based on information from Michael Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics, and 
Society, London and Boulder, Colorado, 1986, 155; and Kimmo Kiljunen, ed., Kam- 
Decade of the Genocide — Report of a Finnish Inquiry Commission, London, 1984, 40. 



308 



Appendix A 



Table 5. Land Use, 1980-85 
(in thousands of hectares) 



Land Use 


1980 


1985 




3,046 


3,056 




89 


90 




2,957 


2,966 




580 


580 




13,372 


13,372 




654 


644 



Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1986-87, Bangkok, 
1987, 107. 



Table 6. Production of Wood and Lumber, Selected Years 
(in thousands of cubic meters) 

Type 1979 1981 1983 1985 
Fuel wood 

(including charcoal) 4,189 4,271 4,498 4,736 

Industrial wood 

(sawn logs, veneer, etc.) 567 567 567 567 

TOTAL 4,756 4,838 5,065 5,303 

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1986-87, Bangkok, 
1987, 108. 



Table 7. Area under Principal Food Crops, Selected Years 
(in thousands of hectares) 



Crop 1980 1982 1984 1986 



Rice 1,356 1,680 1,700 1,700 

Maize 99 30 33 31 

Cassavas 25 10 13 15 

Sweet potatoes 2 2 3 3 

Groundnuts 5 5 9 10 

Soybeans 1 1 1 1 

Sesame seeds 8 10 12 13 

Dry beans 28 3 7 40 41 



Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1986-87, Bangkok, 
1987, 108. 



309 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



Table 8. Rice Production, Selected Years 
(in thousands of tons) 





1980 


1982 


1984 


1986 


Paddy rice 


1,470 


1,400 


1,970 


2,140 




911 


868 


1,221 


1,327 



* Milled rice is computed as 62 percent of the paddy crop 



Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1986-87, Bangkok, 
1987, 108, and Asian Development Bank, Economic Office, Key Indicators of De- 
veloping Member Countries of the Asian Development Bank, xviii, New York, 1987, 15. 



Table 9. Rice Production by Harvest Season, Selected Years 
(in thousands of tons) 





1980-81 


1982-83 


1984-85 


1986-87 


Paddy rice 


1,300 


1,563 


1,113 


2,000 1 




806 


969 


690 


1,240 2 



1 Estimate. 

2 Milled rice is computed as 62 percent of the paddy crop. 



Source: Based on information from Peter Schier, "Kampuchea in 1985 — Between Croco- 
diles and Tigers," in Southeast Asian Affairs, 1986, Singapore, 1987, 157, and 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, 1987-88, Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cam- 
bodia, London, December 1987, 46. 



Table 10. Production of Principal Secondary Crops, Selected Years 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crops 1980 1982 1984 1986 



Maize 100 46 90 92 

Cassavas 150 61 95 100 

Sweet potatoes 15 17 30 34 

Groundnuts 3 5 8 10 

Soybeans 1 1 1 2 

Sesame seeds 3 3 6 6 

Dry beans 17 26 30 37 

Rubber 6 8 13 24.5 



310 



Appendix A 



Table 11. Index Number of Agricultural Production, Selected Years* 

1980 1982 1984 1986 



All commodities 113 117 154 165 

Food 113 118 154 163 

Cereals 130 117 173 176 

Per capita food 

production 115 113 140 142 

Per capita cereal 

production 132 112 157 152 



•1979-81 = 100 ' 

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1986-87, Bangkok, 
1987, 107. 



Table 12. Seafood Catch, Selected Years 
(in thousands of tons) 



Source 


1980 


1982 


1984 


1986 




20.0 


68.7 


57.0 


62.2 


Deep sea/Coastal waters 


7.0 


5.5 


5.5 


n.a. 


TOTAL 


27.0 


74.2 


62.5 


62.2 



n.a. — not available 



Table 13. Long-Term External Debt, 1980-84 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Year 


Amount 


1980 


251 


1981 


244 


1982 


368 


1983 


426 


1984 


491 



Source: Based on information from Asian Development Bank, Economic Office, Key Indi- 
cators of Developing Member Countries of the Asian Development Bank, xviii, New York, 
1987, 55. 



311 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



Table 14. Trade with the Soviet Union, 1982-87 
(in millions of rubles *) 





1982 2 


1983 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1987 


Imports (from the 
















53.4 


67.8 


76.2 


91.2 


114.0 


112.0 


Exports (to the 














Soviet Union) 


2.3 


4.0 


5.2 


9.1 


8.7 


11.2 


TOTAL 


55.7 


71.8 


81.4 


100.3 


122.7 


123.2 



1 For value of the ruble — see Glossary. 

2 No trade is recorded prior to 1982. 



Source: Based on information from Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ministry of For- 
eign Trade, Vneshniaia Torgovlia (Foreign Trade) Moscow, various issues, 1983-87. 



Table 15. Net Flows of Resources of Cambodia, Selected Years 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1979 


1981 


1983 


1985 




108.1 


130.0 


36.7 


12.9 




108.2 


130.0 


36.7 


12.9 




0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 



Source: Based on information from Asian Development Bank, Economic Office, Key Indi- 
cators of Developing Member Countries of the Asian Development Bank, xviii, New York, 
1987, 66-69. 



312 



Appendix A 



Table 16. Major Weapons of the Kampuchean, or Khmer, 
People's Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1987 



Equipment 



Quantity 



Model 



Origin 



Ground Forces 

Main battle tanks 60 T-54/55 Soviet Union 

Type-59 China 

Light amphibious tanks 10 PT-76 China 

Armored personnel carriers .... 150-175 BTR-40/BTR-60 Soviet Union 

BTR-152/M-113 United States, 
pre-1975 

Artillery 350-380 

76mm gun (towed) M-1942 Soviet Union 

122mm gun (towed) M-1938 -do- 

130mm gun (towed) Type-59 China 

122mm howitzer (towed) .... D-30 Soviet Union 

105mm howitzer (SP l ) M-108 United States, 

pre-1975 

155mm howitzer (SP l ) M-109 -do- 

107mm MRL 2 Type-63 China 

132mm MRL 2 BM 13-16 Soviet Union 

140mm MRL 2 BM 14-16 -do- 

14.7mm AA/AD 3 gun ZPU-1/-2/-4 -do- 

37mm AA/AD 3 gun M-1939 -do- 

57mm AA/AD. 3 gun S-60 -do- 
Mortars 

82mm mortar M-37 -do- 

120mm mortar M-43 -do- 
Antitank weapons 

82mm recoilless gun B-10 -do- 

107mm recoilless gun B-ll -do- 
Portable rocket launcher .... RPG-2 Soviet Union 

and China 

RPG-7 -do- 
Small arms 

7.62mm assault rifle AK-47 -do- 

7.62mm assault rifle AKM -do- 

5.56mm rifle M-16 United States, 

pre-1975 

7.62mm light machine gun . . . RPD Soviet Union 
Naval Forces 

Patrol craft 82 4 SWIFT/PBR classes United States, 

pre-1975 

Landing craft 6 4 LCU -do- 
Air Forces 

Tactical fighters 12 4 MiG-21/FISHBED Soviet Union 

Transport helicopter 6 4 Mi-8 HIP -do- 

1 SP = Self propelled. 

2 MRL = Multiple rocket launcher. 

3 AA/AD = Anti-aircraft air-defense. 

4 Estimated. 

Source: Based on information from Pacific Defense Reporter 1988 Annual Reference Edition, 
Kunyung, Australia, 14, 6-7, December 1987-January 1988, 156, and The Mili- 
tary Balance, 1987-1988, xii, London, 1987, 161-62. 



313 



Appendix B 



Major Political and Military Organizations 

ANS — Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste, or Sihanouk National Army: 
Umbrella organization of the military forces (including 
MOULINAKA (q.v.) loyal to Sihanouk, founded in 1981 as 
armed wing of FUNCINPEC (q.v.). 

CGDK — Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (See 
also KPRP). Recognized by the United Nations as the official 
government of Cambodia, the ruling coalition in Democratic 
Kampuchea, a loose political and military coalition of the three 
resistance groups — Democratic Kampuchea, the KPNLF (q.v.), 
and FUNCINPEC (q.v.). 

CPNLAF — Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed 
Forces. New name given to the RAK (q.v.) in the early 1970s. 

FANK (formerly FARK) — Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres, 
or Khmer National Armed Forces. Military component of Lon 
Nol's Khmer Republic (q.v.). 

FARK — Forces Armees Royales Khmeres, or Royal Khmer Armed 
Forces. Armed forces in the newly independent Cambodia in 
1953, replaced by FANK (q.v.). 

FUNCINPEC— Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indepen- 
dant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif, or National United 
Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Coopera- 
tive Cambodia. Sihanouk's main political organization, formed 
in 1981. An autonomous part of the CGDK (q.v.). 

FUNK — Front Uni National du Kampuchea, or National United 
Front of Kampuchea. Established by Sihanouk in Beijing in 
1970, shortly after the Lon Nol coup ousted him from power; 
a political and military coalition committed to destroying the 
Lon Nol regime. 

GRUNK — Gouvernement Royal d' Union Nationale du Kam- 
puchea or Royal Government of National Union of Kam- 
puchea. Government-in-exile formed by Sihanouk after his 
ouster in 1970. 

ICP — Indochinese Communist Party; founded by Ho Chi Minh 
in 1930 and dismantled in 1951 into its component parties, i.e., 
the Vietnam Workers' Party, the KPRP (q.v.), and the Lao 
Itsala. 

KCP — Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist Party. Formerly 
called the WPK (q. v.); renamed in 1966. The CPK dominated 



315 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



the Khmer Republic (q.v.) resisting forces from 1970 to 1975 
and ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1978. Succeeded by the 
KPRP (q.v.). 

Khmer Bleu (Blue Khmer) — Sihanouk's domestic opponents on 
the right, whom he so named to distinguish them from his 
domestic opponents on the left, the Khmer Rouge (q.v.). 

Khmer Issarak (Free Khmer) — Anti-French, nationalist movement 
organized with Thai backing in 1945 from elements spanning 
the political spectrum; within a year split into factions, and by 
independence all but one of them were incorporated into 
Sihanouk's political structure. Located in western Cambodia, 
they were on the wane after 1954. The only dissident group, 
under Son Ngoc Thanh, they became known as the Khn*er 
Serei (q.v.), a heterogeneous left-wing guerrilla movement oper- 
ating in border areas, in the 1970s. 

Khmer Krom — Members of a Cambodian minority who lived in 
Cochinchina; early nationalists. Several major nationalist lead- 
ers came from this group. 

Khmer Loeu (Highland Khmer) — Hill tribes comprising several 
ethnolinguistically diverse groups living in Cambodia, mainly 
along the northeastern and the eastern frontiers; upland- and 
forest-dwelling ethnic minorities, especially from Rotanokiri 
Province, an early RAK (q.v.) stronghold. 

Khmer Republic — Established in 1970 by Lon Nol. 

Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer) — The name given to the Cambodian 
communists by Sihanouk in the 1960s. Later (although a mis- 
nomer) it was applied to the insurgents of varying ideological 
backgrounds who opposed the Khmer Republic (q. v. ) regime 
of Lon Nol. Between 1975 and 1978 it denoted the Democratic 
Kampuchea regime led by the radical Pol Pot faction of the 
Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist Party. After being driven 
from Phnom Penh by Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 
December 1978, the Khmer Rouge went back to guerrilla 
warfare, and it joined forces with two noncommunist insur- 
gent movements to form the CGDK (q.v.). Also known as the 
NADK (q.v.). 

Khmer Rumdo (Liberation Khmer) — Sihanoukists; pro- Sihanouk 
Cambodians recruited from the country's eastern provinces, 
trained and armed by Hanoi. 

Khmer Serei — (Free Khmer). An anti-Sihanouk group under Son 
Ngoc Thanh's leadership emanating from the anti-French 
resistance movement called the Khmer Issarak (q.v.), located 
in southeastern Cambodia; in armed opposition to the Siha- 
nouk regime from 1959 on, but dissolved itself shortly after 



316 



Appendix B 



the deposition of Sihanouk in March 1970. Right wing, anti- 
monarchical nationalists. 

Khmer Viet Minh — Cambodian communists; the 3,000 to 5,000 
Cambodian communist cadres who had repatriated to North 
Vietnam after the Geneva Conference; derogatory term used 
by Sihanouk to refer to Cambodian leftists organizing pro- 
independence agitation in alliance with the Vietnamese. 

KNUFNS— Kampuchean (or Khmer) National United Front for 
National Salvation; also known as the Kampuchean United 
Front for National Salvation and the Salvation Front. It was 
founded in 1978 by anti-Khmer Rouge (q. v.) Cambodians in 
Vietnam as an alternative to the Pol Pot regime, as a Cambo- 
dian structure to help legitimize the Vietnamese invasion and 
the ouster of Democratic Kampuchea. As the first incarnation 
of what has remained the main political organization in the 
PRK (q.v.) besides the KPRP (q.v.), the front had numerous 
noncommunists, including Buddhist clergy, in its leadership, 
although it was largely controlled by communists. Name 
changed in 1981 to KUFNCD (q.v.). 

KPNLAF — Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces, 
also known as the Khmer People's National Liberation Army 
(not to be confused with the Khmer People's Liberation Army, 
the opposition forces organized by the Vietnamese Viet Minh 
at the end of World War II). Military component of KPNLF 
(q.v.), formed in March 1979 under Son Sann. 

KPNLF — Khmer People's National Liberation Front. An autono- 
mous part of the CGDK (q.v.), the KPNLF is a political and 
military organization, founded and led by former prime 
minister Son Sann, for the purpose of resisting the Vietnamese. 

KPRAF — Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed 
Forces. Military component of PRK (q.v.). 

KPRP — Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party. 
The original party was founded in September 1951, when the 
ICP (q.v.) dissolved into three national parties (the leadership 
and policies of which were aligned with the Vietnamese com- 
munist movement) . The name of the party was changed to the 
WPK (q. v. ) in 1960 and then to the KCP (q. v. ) in 1966. Today 
this designation applies to the communist party that functions 
in the PRK (q.v.). In one sense it is a new organization; in 
another sense it is the continuation of the communist parties 
that preceded it. The date of its founding is uncertain, although 
the First Party Congress held publicly was convened in May 
1981; the party may have come into existence after mid- 
1978. 



317 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



KUFNCD — Kampuchean (or Khmer) United Front for National 
Construction and Defense. Umbrella organization of the KPRP 
(q.v.). (Formerly KNUFNS (q.v.). 

MOULINAKA — Mouvement pour la Liberation Nationale du 
Kampuchea, or Movement for the National Liberation of Kam- 
puchea; a pro-Sihanouk group formed in August 1979 by Kong 
Sileah after he broke ranks with General Dien Del; mili- 
tary organization based among the civilian camps on the 
Cambodian-Thai border. 

NADK — National Army of Democratic Kampuchea. The succes- 
sor to the RAK (q.v. — name change effective December 1979), 
as the armed forces of the Khmer Rouge (q.v.). 

NFLSVN— National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. 
Called the Viet Cong by opponents, it led the struggle against 
the United States. 

PAVN — People's Army of Vietnam. The military forces of North 
Vietnam (until 1976) and, after unification, of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam. During the Second Indochina War 
(1954-75), PAVN bore the brunt of the fighting against United 
States military forces in Vietnam. 

PDFGNUK— Patriotic and Democratic Front of the Great National 
Union of Kampuchea. A mass organization established by the 
exiled KCP (q.v.) in September 1979 and headed by Khieu 
Samphan with the aim of ousting the Vietnamese from 
Cambodia. 

PDK — Party of Democratic Kampuchea. New name given to the 
communist party in Cambodia in December 1981, when the 
party allegedly dissolved itself, probably to distance itself from 
the brutality of Pol Pot's regime. 

PRK — People's Republic of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese- 
sponsored Phnom Penh regime established in 1979. 

PRYUK — People's Revolutionary Youth Union of Kampuchea. 
Mass organization for young people that was less elitist than 
the communist party. 

RAK — Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea. Founded by Pol Pot 
in 1968, this force was renamed the Cambodian People's Na- 
tional Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF (q. v.)) in the early 
1970s. Also known as the People's National Liberation Armed 
Forces of Kampuchea (PNLAFK). In 1979 it became the 
NADK (q.v.). 

Viet Cong — Contraction of the term Viet Nam Cong San (Viet- 
namese Communists), the name applied by the governments 
of the United States and of South Vietnam to the communist 
insurgents in rebellion against the latter government, beginning 



318 



Appendix B 



around 1957. As used in the Khmer Republic (q.v.) the term 
applied to South Vietnamese communist troops operating in 
South Vietnam and in Cambodian territory as well. 
Viet Minh — Contraction of the term Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong 
Minh Hoi (League for the Independence of Vietnam), a coa- 
lition of nationalist elements dominated by the communists and 
led by veteran Vietnamese revolutionary Ho Chi Minh. Origi- 
nally a broadly based Vietnamese nationalist organization in 
armed opposition to both the French and the Japanese; by 1951 
taken over by communists. As used in the Khmer Republic 
(q.v.), the term applies to Vietnamese communists, North Viet- 
namese in particular. 



319 



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State. (General Foreign Policy Series 260, Publication 8634.) 
Washington: GPO, 1972. 

United States Foreign Policy, 1972: A Report of the Secretary of 

State. (General Foreign Policy Series 274, Publication 8699.) 
Washington: GPO, 1973. 

Rowan, Roy. The Four Days of Mayaguez. New York: W.W. Nor- 
ton and Company, 1975. 

Shawcross, William. The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust, and 
Modern Conscience. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. 

Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. New 

York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. 

Sihanouk, Prince Norodom. Ombre Sur Angkor. Phnom Penh: 
Sangkum Reastr Niyum, 1968. 

War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia. (Trans., Mary 

Feeney.) New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. 

Sihanouk, Prince Norodom (as related to Wilfred Burchett). My 
War with the CIA: Cambodia's Fight for Survival. London: Penguin 
Books, 1973. 



337 



Cambodia: A Country Study 

Sisowath, Prince Thomico. 1 4 Norodom Sihanouk and the Khmer 
Factions," Indochina Report [Singapore], No. 9, October- 
December 1986. 

Smith, Roger M. Cambodia's Foreign Policy. Ithaca, New York: Cor- 
nell University Press, 1965. 

Solarz, Stephen J. ' ' When to Intervene," Foreign Policy, No. 63, 
Summer 1986, 20-39. 

Sutsakhan, Sak. The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse. 
Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. 

Swaan, Wim. Lost Cities of Asia: Ceylon, Pagan, and Angkor. Lon- 
don: Elek Books, 1966. 

Teston, Eugene, and Maurice Percheron (eds.). LTndochine Moderne. 
Paris: Librairie de France, 1931. 

Thach Bunroeun. The Kampuchea-Krom Geopolitical Issue. New York: 
The National Association of Khmer Kampuchea-Krom, 1986. 

Thayer, Carlyle A. "The Vietnam People's Army Today," Indo- 
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United Kingdom. Central Office of Information. Vietnam, Laos and 
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United Kingdom. "Human Rights Violations in Democratic Kam- 
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United States. Congress. 93d, 1st Session. Senate. Committee on 
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339 



Glossary 



bodhisattva — One destined to become a buddha (enlightened one); 
a person who has achieved enlightenment, but who defers 
achieving nirvana in order to help others achieve it. 

Cham — Also known as Chams, as Khmer Islam, and as Cham- 
Malay; a Muslim minority people. 

fiscal year (FY) — Calendar year. 

Gross domestic product (GDP) — The value of domestic goods and 
services produced by an economy over a certain period, such 
as a year. Only output of goods for final consumption and for 
investment are included because the values of primary and of 
intermediate production are assumed to be included in final 
prices. GDP sometimes is aggregated and shown in market 
prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; 
when these have been eliminated, the reductions for deprecia- 
tion of physical assets have not been made. See also gross na- 
tional product. 

Gross national product (GNP) — gross domestic product (GDP) 
adjusted by net income (such as return on investments), or loss 
(such as debt service payments), arising from transactions with 
foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measure of the output 
of goods and of services by an economy. It can be calculated 
at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. 
GNP is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes 
and subsidies because these are only transfer payments. See also 
gross domestic product. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations; it is responsible for stabilizing 
international exchange rates and payments. The main busi- 
ness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members 
(including industrialized and developing countries) when they 
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- 
quently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- 
nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are 
developing countries. 

Phumphaek — Six areas into which Cambodia was divided in 1973. 

riel — The Khmer Republic's currency unit, divided into 100 sen. 
Since October 29, 1971, its exchange rate has been adjusted 
by the National Bank of Cambodia according to market fluc- 
tuations; the initial rate, set on October 29, 1971, was 140 riels 



341 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



to US$1 . Past exchange rates have been 35 riels to US$1 (Janu- 
ary 1955 to August 1969) and 55.4 riels to US$1 (August 1969 
to October 1971, following devaluation). 

ruble — The Soviet Union's currency unit. In June 1987, its value 
was approximately 0.64 rubles to US$1. 

sangha — Ascetic community within which a man can improve his 
karma; brotherhood of Buddhist monks; the Theravada Bud- 
dhist clergy. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund, 
administered, however, by the staff of the IBRD, was set up 
in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries 
on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. 
The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the 
IBRD through loans and through assistance designed specifi- 
cally to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises 
in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior 
officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC . The 
three institutions are owned by the governments of the coun- 
tries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World 
Bank group, member states must first belong to the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (q-v.). 



342 



Index 



Abdul Gaffar Peangmeth, 206 

achar (ritualist), 96, 97, 121 

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 

(AIDS), 135 
administrative divisions {see also Naval 

Zone Five; provincial divisions; Special 

Military Administrative Zone), 81; 

Khmer Rouge, 60-61; PRK, xxi, 214, 

261-62 

agriculture sector {see also irrigation sys- 
tem), 141, 145, 148; collectivization of, 
xvii, xxxii, 90, 151, 153-54, 157, 
160-62; commercial crops of, 164-65; 
development under Vietnamese- 
directed regime, 158; under Khmer 
Rouge regime, 58-59, 152-53; 
livestock production of, 165; principal 
food crops of, xvii-xviii, 162-64; slash- 
and-burn, 76, 85, 101; taxation of, 177 

air force: KPRAF, 181, 267, 291, 292 

Air Kampuchea, xix, 181-82 

airlifts, 48, 260 

airports/airfields, xix, 181-82 

airspace violations, 33, 41 {see also Menu 
series) 

air strikes {see also Arclight missions; 
Menu series), connected with Second 
Indochina War, xxix; against North 
Vietnam and Khmer Rouge, 5, 45; by 
United States, 45-46, 68, 255, 260, 
263; by Vietnam, 68 
Alliance of Communist Youth of Kam- 
puchea, 57 
Alliance of Democratic Khmer Youth, 57 
American Catholic Relief Services, 174 
American Friends Service Committee, 
174 

Amnesty International, 51, 301, 302 

Ang Chan (Khmer king), 13 

Ang Duong (Khmer king), 15, 16, 243 

Ang Eng (Khmer king), 15 

Angkar (Angkar Loeu), 47, 51-55, 61-62 

Angkor, xxvi-xxvii, 3, 12, 16, 25 

Angkorian period, xxvi, 9, 11, 36, 87, 242 

Angkor Thorn, xxvi, 3, 11, 12 

Angkor Wat, 10-11, 44, 242 

Ang Snuol, 47 

animism, 57, 124-25 



Annam, 18, 36 

ANS. See Sihanouk National Army (ANS) 

arak (spirits), 121 

Aranyaprathet (Thailand), 68, 86 

Arclight missions, 45-46 

armed forces: of CGDK, xxi; develop- 
ment and expansion of, 247, 257; of 
Vietnam occupation, 276-95; of PRK, 
xxii 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN), 33 

ASEAN. See Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

Asian Development Bank, xx, 150, 169 

assimilation, xxix, 103, 104, 108 

Association of Democratic Khmer 
Women, 54-55 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), 187, 224-25; assistance to 
and support for CGDK by, xxiii, 
xxxiv-xxxv; position on PRK of, 191, 
196; role in coalition government 
(CGDK) creation, 268, 275; role in 
conflict resolution in Cambodia of, 
xxxiv, 225 

Association of Vietnamese in Cambodia, 
136 

atrocities: by Khmer Rouge, 47, 68, 

190-92 
Australia, 149 
Austroasiatic origin, 6, 110 
Austronesian languages/groups {see also 

Cham; Jarai; Rade; Malay), 14, 15, 

101, 112 
autonomous zone, xxviii, 25 
Ayutthaya, 105 

Bahnaric language (Mon-Khmer), 111 
Ba Kev, 143 

balance of payments {see also trade deficit), 

xvii, xviii 
Bandung Conference (1955), 31 
bang classification, 107 
Bangkok, 25, 79 
Bangkok Plot, 252 
banking system, 176 
Bantay Meanchey province, xiv 



343 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



Baptists, 124 

barter system: under Khmer Rouge, 58, 
154; under PRK, 154; with Soviet 
Union, 172; with Vietnamese sister 
provinces, 170-71 

Basak River, 81, 110 

Batdambang airport, xix 

Batdambang City, 249 

Batdambang (Battambang) province, xiv, 
5, 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 26, 42, 49, 50, 
61, 66, 99, 100, 105, 110, 143, 148, 
166, 268 

the Bayon, xxvi, 11 

Becker, Elizabeth, 262 

Beijing, 200 

besach (demons), 121 

BGN. See United States Board of Geo- 
graphic Names (BGN) 

Bien Hoa, 99 

birth control. See family planning 
Black Book, 63, 263 
black market, 134, 150, 177 
bodhisattva, 11, 115 
bombing raids. See air strikes 
bonzes, 116-17, 125 
Borai refuge camp, 87 
boundaries/borders. See France; Laos; 

Thailand; Vietnam 
Boun Oum, 33 

Brao group (Khmer Loeu), 104 
Brevie Line, 68, 262 
Britain, 27, 223 
bronze use, 6 
the Buddha, 113 

Buddhism (see also Mahayana Buddhism; 
Theravada Buddhism), 11, 12, 112-22, 
130-31 

Buddhist education, 130-31 
Buddhist Institute, 131 
Buddhist monks' hospital, 134 
Buddhists: Cambodian, 115-22; persecu- 
tion of, 55 
Buddhist University, 130-31 
budget deficit, 159 
Bulgaria, 173 
Buor Hel, 207 
Burma, 10, 15, 20, 30 
Burmese in Cambodia, 110 

Calmette Hospital, 55, 135 
Cambodia (see also Kambuja; State of 
Cambodia), xiv, xv, 3 



Cambodian Buddhism. See Buddhists 
Cambodian People's National Liberation 

Armed Forces (CPNLAF), 44-45, 317, 

320; renamed RAK(1975), 261; U.S. 

air strikes against, 260 
Cambodian Red Cross, 136 
Cambodia- Vietnam border: Viet Cong 

bases at, 42 
Cantonese linguistic group, 106-7 
Cao Ha, 99 

Cardamom Mountains, xvi, 76, 79, 80 
CARE, 174 
cassava, 164 
Catholicism, 124 

CEMA. See Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA; CEMA; Comecon) 

Center for Pedagogical Education, 128 

Central Office for South Vietnam 
(COSVN), 45 

Central Zone, 54, 61 

CGDK. See Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) 

Chakri kings, 15 

Chak Saroeun, 207 

Chamcar Daung Faculty of Agriculture, 
128 

Champa kingdom, xxvi, xxvii, 10, 14, 99, 
243 

Cham people, xvi, 11, 14, 75, 76, 83, 84, 
87, 91, 99-101, 243; language of, 112, 
115; persecution in Democratic Kam- 
puchea of, 55-56, 122-24; religion of, 
122-24; society of, 99-101 

Chandler, David P., xiv, 20, 36, 242 

Chan Si, 209 

Chattomukh (Four Faces), 81 

Chea Sim, 208 

Chea Soth, 209 

Cheng Heng, 48 

Chenla I, 258, 259 

Chenla II, 258, 259 

Chenla kingdom, xxv, xxvi, 3; Land 

(Upper) Chenla and Water (Lower) 

Chenla, 9 
Chey Chetta II (Khmer king), 14 
Chhea Song, 162 
Chhet Chuen. See Ta Mok 
children, 94-95, 97 

China, People's Republic of, 10, 13, 27, 
29, 41, 42, 43-44, 52, 57, 65, 244; aid 
to/support of Khmer Rouge by, 
191-92, 196, 271-72; aid to Royal Thai 
Army by, 278; assistance to CGDK by, 



344 



Index 



xxiii, xxxiv-xxxv, 222; economic as- 
sistance from, 148, 152; influence on 
Democratic Kampuchea of, 65; invades 
Vietnam, 192-93, 209; position on 
PRK of, 191-93; relations with, 4, 
30-35, 252; trade with Khmer Rouge 
regime, 58 

Chinese: in Cambodia, xvi, 20, 83, 84, 
87-88, 106-8, 152; as refugees, 48-49, 
86, 91; religion of Cambodian, 122; 
treatment in Democratic Kampuchea 
of, 56-57 

Chinese hospital, 134 

Chinese Hospital Committee, 107 

chol chnam (New Year Festival), 120 

chol vossa, 120 

Chong subgroup (Pearic), 105 
Christian and Missionary Alliance, 124 
Christianity, 124-25 
Christians, 55 

Chulalongkorn (king of Thailand), 18-19 

Chuon, Nath, 111 

Church World Service, 174 

CIA. See U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) 

civil war in Cambodia: international im- 
pact of, xxxiv-xxxv 

class structure, 97-99 

climate (see also weather), xvi, 76, 79- 
80 

clothing: of Cham people, 100; of Khmer 
people, 92, 94 

CMEA. See Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA; CEMA; Comecon) 

Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea (CGDK), xv, xx, 195, 
205, 317, 318; activity of, xxxiv-xxxv, 
189-90, 275; armed forces of, xxi- 
xxii; assistance to, 225; Chinese aid 
for, 278; competes for power, 189, 
222; effect of insurgent forces of, 
267-68, 278; formation and structure 
of, 199-203, 204, 225-26; relations 
with and recognition by other coun- 
tries of, 222-23; United Nations repre- 
sentatives of, 223 

Cochinchina (see also Kampuchea Krom), 
16, 18, 20, 21, 36, 262 

Coedes, George, 11 

collectivization. See agriculture sector 

Comecon. See Council for Mutual Eco- 
nomic Assistance (CMEA; CEMA; 
Comecon) 



communist intellectuals. See Ieng Sary; 
Khieu Samphan; Pol Pot 

communist movement in Cambodia (see 
also Indochinese Communist Party 
(ICP); Khmer Rouge; Khmer Viet 
Minh), 5, 35-41, 42, 60, 217; alliance 
with Sihanouk in exile, xxxi; Paris stu- 
dent group role in, 38-40 

Communist Party, France, 39 

concubinage, 96 

Confederation of Khmer Nationalists, 195 

Confucianism, 36, 122 

conscription: KPRAF, 287, 291-92 

constabulary, 244-45, 246 

constitutions: of Cambodia: 1946, xxviii, 
24; of People's Republic of Kam- 
puchea: 1976, 52, 55, 60-61, 61-62, 
153; of People's Republic of Kam- 
puchea: 1980, 193-94; of People's 
Republic of Kampuchea: 1981, xxxv, 
156-58, 209-11, 299-300; as rationale 
for armed force in PRK, 279 

Consultative Assembly, 23, 24 

Cooperation Internationale pour le De- 
veloppement et la Solidarite, 174 

corn, 19-20, 164 

COSVN. See Central Office for South 
Vietnam (COSVN) 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA; CEMA; Comecon), xviii, 
142, 146, 168; economic assistance 
from, 173; trade with Cambodia of, 
168, 169 

Council of Ministers (CGDK), 202-3 
Council of Ministers (PRK), xxi, 210, 

211-14, 280 
Council of State (PRK), xxi, 210, 211 
counterinsurgency, 284, 285, 289 
coup d'etat (1970), 5, 43, 44, 127, 255 
coup d'etats, attempted, 64, 65, 69 
court system: PRK, xxi, 213-14, 300- 

302 

CPNLAF. See Cambodian People's 
National Liberation Armed Forces 
(CPNLAF) 

criminal offenses: PRK, 299-300 

currency (see also foreign exchange; riel); 
abolition under Khmer Rouge of, 58, 
154; change in value of riel, 146; non- 
negotiability of, xix; recall and return 
to use of, 154, 157 

Czechoslovakia: economic assistance 
from, 148-49, 173; trade with, 172 



345 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



damban (regions), 61 

Dangrek Mountains, xvi, 76, 79, 81 

Dap Chhuon, 33, 252 

Dean, John Gunther, 48 

death, 97 

debt, external, 169 
deGaulle, Charles, 22 
Delvert, Jean, 124 

Democratic Kampuchea. See constitu- 
tions; People's Republic of Kampuchea 
(PRK); Khmer Rouge 

Democratic Party, xxviii, 23, 24, 25, 
28-29 

Deng Xiaoping, 65 

Devaraja cult, xxvi 

Dien Del: KPNLAF, 194, 206-7, 272, 

320 
diet, 91-92 
disease, 132 
divorce, 96 
drainage, 80-81 
dress. See clothing 
drought, 141, 164 
dry beans, 164 

earth satellite station, xix, 182 
Eastern Baray, 10 

Eastern Zone, 53-54, 61, 64, 65, 66, 
68-69 

East Germany: trade with, 172 

Ebihara, May Mayko, 118 

economic assistance (see also humanitari- 
an assistance; military assistance), 4, 5, 
142, 146, 148-49, 151, 170, 189; from 
ASEAN and China to ANS/FUNCIN- 
PEC, 275; from Comecon countries, 
173; from international organizations, 
173; from Soviet Union, 193; from 
Vietnam, 170-71, 193 

economic decline, xxix 

economic growth, 148 

economic planning (see also First Plan: 
1986-90), 141 

Economic Support Fund, 151 

educational system (see also schools), xvi- 
xvii, 125-31; in Buddhist tradition, 
130-31; divisions in, 125, 128; higher 
education in, 127; under Khmer Rouge 
regime, 57; primary education in, 
125-26, 128, 130; private, 131; secon- 
dary education in, 126, 128, 130 

elections: for Consultative Assembly, 23, 



24; for National Assembly, 24, 25, 30, 
37 

Elephant Range, xvi, 76, 79, 80 
emigration, 83, 85; of Chinese, 106 
Engineering School, 292 
enlistment: KPRAF, 287 
Etcheson, Craig, 54, 63, 65 
ethnic groups (see also Khmer people; 
Cham; Khmer Loeu; Chinese; Viet- 
namese; Europeans; Indians), xvi 
Europeans, 13, 83, 110 
evacuees. See refugees 
exchange rate system, xix, 150 
executions: by Khmer Rouge, 50-51, 56; 

at Tuol Sleng, 66 
executive branch: PRK, 61 
export-import agency: SONEXIM, 150 
export license suspension, 150 
export partners. See trading partners 
exports, xviii, 149, 159, 168-69 



factories. See industrial sector 

Faculty of Medicine, Pharmacy, and 

Paramedical Science, 133 
Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy, 128, 

133, 134-35 
Fallaci, Oriana, 44 
family planning, 94, 135 
family structure, 75, 94, 95-97; of Khmer 

people, 88-89 
FANK. See Khmer National Armed 

Forces (FANK) 
FAO. See United Nations Food and 

Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
FARK. See Royal Khmer Armed Forces 

(Forces Armees Royales Khmeres, 

FARK) 

Federated Association of Chinese of Cam- 
bodia, 107-8 

female role, 89, 94, 98, 101, 114, 133 

First Five-Year Program of Socioeco- 
nomic Restoration and Development. 
See First Plan (1986-90) 

First Plan (1986-90), xvii-xviii, 141, 144, 
156, 158-59, 165, 189, 219; emphasis 
on exports of, 168-69 

fiscal policy, 150, 177 

fishing and fisheries, xvii-xxviii, 7, 158, 
165 

Fishhook engagement, 263 
flooding, 81, 90, 164 



346 



Index 



food, 91-92; production of, 158; short- 
ages, 155, 159 
food aid, 151 

forced-labor, xxvi, xxix, xxxii, 11, 19, 53, 
145, 152, 154, 160 

foreign aid. See economic assistance; hu- 
manitarian assistance; military as- 
sistance 

foreign exchange, 169, 177 

foreign policy, nonaligned. See Sihanouk 
(as prince) 

Foreign Trade Bank, 168, 169 

forestry, xvii-xviii, 144 

France (see also Franco-Cambodian 
Modus Vivendi; Franco-Khmer Mili- 
tary Convention; Free French; Vichy 
government), Cambodia as protec- 
torate of, xxvii, 4, 12, 16, 18, 103, 
241, 243-44; colonial domination by, 
xxvii, 4, 12, 18; colonial military 
forces of, 244; concession of Cambo- 
dian provinces by, 245; dissolution of 
colonial administration, 22; economic 
assistance by, 149; established in In- 
dochina, 16; influence in Cambodia 
of, 125; military assistance agreement 
with United States of, 249, 253; 
military force agreement with 
Cambodia of, 247-48, 249; represen- 
tation at Geneva Conference by, 
27-28; role during and after World 
War II, 20-26 

Franco-Cambodian Modus Vivendi, 
247-48 

Franco-Khmer Military Convention, 248 

Franco-Siamese War, xxvii 

Free French, 22 

French Protectorate. See France 

French Union, 22, 24, 27, 248, 249 

Friendship Highway, 254 

FULRO. See United Front for the Liber- 
ation of Oppressed Races (FULRO) 

Funan kingdom, xxv, 3, 6-7, 9, 87, 112, 
115 

FUNCINPEC. See National United Front 
for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, 
and Cooperative Cambodia (FUN- 
CINPEC) 

FUNK. See National United Front of 
Kampuchea (FUNK) 



Gang of Four, 65 



GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs 

and Trade (GATT) 
Gautama Buddha, 113, 122 
gem mining, 143 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), xx 

General Staff: PRK, 280-81 

Geneva Conference on Indochina (1954), 
4, 27-28, 30, 36, 251 

geography, xv-xvi, 76, 78 

Germany, Democratic Republic of (East 
Germany), 173 

Germany, Federal Republic of (West 
Germany), 149 

Gia Long (emperor of Vietnam), 107 

GNP. See gross national product (GNP) 

government, xx-xxi 

government administration. See adminis- 
trative divisions 

government class, 97 

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 
22 

gross domestic product (GDP), xvii, 148, 
165 

gross national product (GNP), xvii, 148 
Group of 77, xx 

GRUNK. See Royal Government of Na- 
tional Union of Kampuchea (GRUNK) 

guerrilla activity: Cambodian, xxviii, 23, 
178; of CGDK forces, 242, 268; of 
Khmer Rouge, xxxiii, 6, 188, 193, 261, 
267, 271,318;ofKPNLAF/ANS non- 
communist force, xxxiv, 272-73; non- 
communist, 266-67; of Pol Pot forces, 
41 

Gulf of Thailand, 76, 79, 80, 143-44 



Hainanese linguistic group, 106-7 

Hakka linguistic group, 106-7 

handicraft industry, 167 

Hariharalaya, 10 

Headley, Robert, 110 

health. See disease; forced-labor; health 
care; herbal remedies; hospitals; mor- 
tality rates; public health 

health care, xvii, 132-35; in Democratic 
Kampuchea, 58 

Hem Chieu, 21, 245 

Heng Samrin, 66, 141, 142, 145, 156, 
158, 159; leader of faction of KCP, 217; 
president of KPRC, 191 ; PRK regime 
of, 75-76, 160-62, 187-89, 193, 205, 



347 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



213, 215, 219, 220, 224-26; replaces 
Pen Sovan, 218; role in KNUFNS, 208 

herbal remedies, 133-34 

highways, 149, 178 

Hindu cults, 11, 12 

Hing Kunthon, 206 

Ho Chi Minh, 34, 36, 189, 317, 321 

Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), 14, 158 

Ho Chi Minh Trail, 34, 42 

Hokkien linguistic group, 106-7 

hospitals, xvii, 133-35 

housing: of Khmer Loeu people, 101; of 
Khmer people, 90-91 

Hou Yuon, 4, 19, 29, 30, 38-39, 40, 43, 

63, 64, 66 

Huay Chan refugee camp, 87 
humanitarian assistance, 173, 241 
Hungary, 173 

Hu Nim, 4, 29, 30, 38-39, 40, 43, 63, 

64, 66 

Hun Sen, xiv, 209; on KPRAF troop 
withdrawal, 296; in KPRP puppet 
government, 189; in PRK government, 
211, 231, 232-36 

Huy Kanthoul, 206 

hydroelectric power, xviii, 143 

ICP. See Indochinese Communist Party 
(ICP) 

Ieng Sary, 5, 37, 38-39, 40, 44, 55, 65, 
68, 151, 153; as leader of Khmer 
Rouge, 205; role in NADK of, 269, 271 

Ieng Thirith. See Khieu Thirith 

illiteracy, 128, 215 

immigration: from India, 7; of Viet- 
namese, 85-86 

imports, xviii, 149-51, 169 

independence, xv, xxviii, 4, 22, 24, 
25-26, 27, 37, 133, 249-50 

India, 30; religious and political influence 
of, 3, 7, 9 

Indian Ocean, 13 

Indians (East) in Cambodia, 110 

Indochina Union (Union Indochinoise), 
18 

Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), 35, 

36, 62, 189-90, 215, 317, 319 
Indochinese Peninsula, 6 
Indonesia, 30, 230 
Indravarman I, 10 

industrial sector, xviii, 141, 145, 153, 
165-66; under Khmer Rouge regime, 



59, 153; manufacturing industries in, 
166; under First Plan, 158-59 

Infantry School, 292 

inflation, 150 

infrastructure, xvii, 19, 142, 159, 177-83 

Institute of Commerce, 128 

Institute of Languages, 128 

insurgent forces, 42; anti- Vietnamese, 
266-68, 274, 279; base of, 57; of coali- 
tion government (CGDK), xxiii, 
278-79; communist-led, 5; of Khmer 
Rouge against Vietnam (North) 
government, 260, Son Sann-led 
KPNLF/KPNLAF, xxxiv 

In Tam, 48, 207 

intellectual elite, 98 

interest rates, 150 

Intergovernmental Commission for 
Trade, Economic, Scientific and Tech- 
nical Cooperation, 171 

International Commission for Supervision 
and Control. See International Control 
Commission 

International Committee of the Red 
Cross, 173, 175-76 

International Conference on Kampuchea 
(1981), 199, 201; declaration of prin- 
ciples of, 225 

International Control Commission, 28 

International Monetary Fund, xx, 150 

international organizations, 173-74, 
175-76 

International Red Cross, xx 
International Telecommunications 

Union, xx 
Interpol, xx 

Intersputnik space communications, 182 

iron ore, 6, 143 

Irrawaddy River, 10 

irrigation systems, xviii, 3, 7, 59, 142 

Islam, 99-100, 122-24 

Ith Sarin, 46-47 



Japan: dissolves French colonial adminis- 
tration, xxviii, 22, 246; economic as- 
sistance by, 149; occupation of Vietnam 
and Cambodia by, xxviii, 21, 245; role 
in Vichy government administration of, 
4; terminates aid, 142 

Jarai group (Khmer Loeu), 101, 104, 
105, 125 

Jarai people: language of, 112 



348 



Index 



Java, 9 

Jayavarman II, xxvi, 9, 10 
Jayavarman VII, xxvi, 3, 11, 135, 243 
journals, printed, 214 
judiciary: PRK {see also court system; law; 

power to arrest), 213-14, 302 
jute production, 158, 165 

Kambuja, xiv, 3, 10, 11-12, 243 

KAMPEXIM. See Kampuchean Ex- 
port and Import Corporation 
(KAMPEXIM) 

Kampong Cham (Kompong Cham) 
province, xiv, 40, 42, 49, 56, 64, 81, 
99, 100, 104, 108, 134, 148, 164, 166 

Kampong Chhnang (Kompong Chnang) 
province, xiv, 42, 46, 99, 105 

Kampong Saom Bay, 79 

Kampong Saom (Sihanoukville), 41, 42, 
49, 68, 79, 141, 149, 254; as entrepot, 
254-55; as major seaport, 141, 181 

Kampong Spoe (Kompong Speu) 
province, xiv, 42, 135 

Kampong Thum (Kompong Thorn) 
province, xiv, 33, 38, 42, 49, 99, 100, 

104, 105, 143, 166 

Kampot province, 42, 79, 88, 99, 100, 

105, 106, 143, 166 
Kampuchea, 3, 22 
Kampuchea Krom, 262 
Kampuchean Civil Aviation Company 

(AKASCHOR), 182 

Kampuchean Export and Import Corpo- 
ration (KAMPEXIM), 168, 169 

Kampuchean Federation of Trade Unions 
(KFTU), xxi, 221 

Kampuchean (Khmer) Communist 
Party: KCP {see also Angkar (Angkar 
Loeu)), 41, 42, 43-44, 45, 46-47, 49, 
52, 57, 62, 63, 154, 215, 317-18; be- 
comes Party of Democratic Kampuchea 
(PDK), 269; conflicting factions in, 
63-65; Heng Samrin faction of, 217; 
Pol Pot (pro-Chinese) faction of, 65, 
217; pro-Soviet/pro- Vietnamese fac- 
tion, 217; role in coalition government 
(CGDK) of, 204; role in Democratic 
Kampuchea of, 61 ; role in PDFGNUK 
popular front of, 194 

Kampuchean (Khmer) National United 
Front for National Salvation: 
KNUFNS, 69, 156, 189, 208, 210, 



220-21, 319; anti-Khmer Rouge polit- 
ical action, 263-64 

Kampuchean (Khmer) People's Revolu- 
tionary Armed Forces: KPRAF, 319; 
composition of, 283, 284; doctrine of, 
285; importance of provincial forces of, 
287-90; military assistance to, 287; op- 
position to, 242; organization of, 
280-81, 286-91; responsibilities of, 
284-85; Vietnam occupying forces in 
Cambodia of, 267, 276-95 

Kampuchean (Khmer) People's Revolu- 
tionary Party (KPRP), xxi, 5, 35, 36, 
37, 40, 62-63, 189, 210, 215, 318, 319; 
control of armed forces by, 281-83, eco- 
nomic structure under, 156-58; evolu- 
tion, structure and activities of, 217-20; 
Fifth Party Congress of, 141, 158, 
218-20; Fourth Party Congress of, 
156-57, 217-18; Marxist-Leninist 
foundation for, 209; Third Party Con- 
gress of, 217 

Kampuchean (Khmer) United Front for 
National Construction and Defense: 
KUFNCD, xxi, 119-21, 210-11, 221, 
289, 319, 320 

Kampuchean People's Representative 
Assembly (KPRA), 60-61, 62 

Kampuchean People's Revolutionary 
Council (KPRC), 191, 208, 210 

Kampuchean People's Revolutionary 
Youth Union (KPRYU), xxi, 221 

Kampuchean Radio and Television Com- 
mission, 215 

Kampuchean Revolutionary Women's 
Association (KRWA), xxi, 221 

Kampuchean Revolutionary Youth As- 
sociation (KRYA), xxi, 221 

Kampuchean Young Pioneers Organiza- 
tion (KYPO), 221 

Kampuchea-USSR Friendship Technical 
Institute, 128 

kanak or kena (committee), 61 

Kandal province, 64, 108 

Kang Keng airport, xix 

Kaoh Kong province, xiv, 85, 88, 103, 
106 

kathen, 120 

Katuic language (Mon-Khmer), 111 
KCP. See Kampuchean Communist Party 
(KCP) 

Kena Mocchhim (Committee Machine), 
47 



349 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



Keo Meas, 41 

KFTU. See Kampuchean Federation of 

Trade Unions (KFTU) 
Khao-I-Dang, 86 

Khasi language (Mon-Khmer), 111 

khet (provinces), 61 

Khieu Ponnary, 39, 53 

Khieu Samphan, 4, 5, 29, 30, 37, 38-40, 
43-44, 49, 51, 52, 57, 60, 151, 154, 
198, 199; as leader of anti-KCP coali- 
tion (PDFGNUK), 189; as leader of 
Khmer Rouge, 200, 205; replaces Pol 
Pot, 194; role in coalition government, 
201, 203; role in Democratic Kam- 
puchea of, 62; role in National Army 
of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) of, 
269, 271 

Khieu Thirith, 39, 52, 55, 57, 59, 205 

Khmer Bleu, 254, 318 

Khmer civilization, 3, 9 

Khmer Empire, 242-43 

Khmer Independence Party, 29 

Khmer insurgents, 86 

Khmer Issarak, xxviii, 22-23, 25, 26, 36, 
59, 63, 65, 215, 246-47, 248, 249, 318 
(see also Khmer Serei); combines with 
Viet Minh, 250 

Khmer Krok, 25 

Khmer Krom, 252, 318 

Khmer Krom people, 21, 36, 87 

Khmer language, xvi, 54, 56, 98-99, 
110-12; use of Sanskrit and Pali roots 
in, 111, 115 

Khmer Loeu people, 41, 42, 57, 76, 83, 
85, 87, 254, 318, 259; groups compos- 
ing, 104; religion of, 124-25; society of, 
101, 103-4 

Khmer National Armed Forces: FANK, 
317; Chenla I and II offensives of, 258, 
259; defeat of, 260-61; government 
troops, 44-45, 48, 256-58, 260, 317; 
U.S. military assistance to, 261 

Khmer nationalism, 4 

Khmer people, 3, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 
20, 21, 35, 49, 83, 85, 87-88, 100; 
family and social structure of, 88-99; 
relations with Chinese in Cambodia, 
108; religion of, 112-13 

Khmer People's National Liberation 
Armed Forces: KPNLAF, xxii, xxxvi, 
194-95, 206, 266, 319; formation and 
role of, xxxiv, 272-75 

Khmer People's National Liberation 



Front: KPNLF, xx, 317, 319; Cambo- 
dian support for, 206; noncommunist 
resistance by, xxxiv, 194, 266; refugee 
camp management by, 86-87; role in 
coalition government of, 198-203 

Khmer Republic (see also Lon Nol), 25, 
43, 46, 47, 50, 100, 108; end of, xxxi, 
260-61; establishment of (1970), xxx, 
5, 318; factors weakening government 
of, xxx-xxxi; massacres of Vietnamese 
in Cambodia by, xxx 

Khmer Rouge (see also Angkar Loeu; 
Cambodian People's National Lib- 
eration Armed Forces: CPNLAF; 
National Army of Democratic Kam- 
puchea: NADK; revolutionaries, 
Eastern Zone; Revolutionary Army of 
Kampuchea: RAK), 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 
19, 26, 27, 35, 36, 37, 43, 45, 318; 
armed forces: NADK, 194, 269; atroci- 
ties of, xxxii, 47-48, 50-51, 55-57, 60, 
68, 69, 75, 100; attacks Thai border vil- 
lages, 68; domination of CPNLAF by, 
260; forced evacuation of Phnom Penh 
by, xxxii, 49-50, 152; founding and de- 
velopment of, 254-55; goal for self- 
sufficient economy of, xxxi-xxxii, 
58-59; insurgency of, xxxi; killings by, 
51, 69, 75; leaders of, 205; opposition 
to PRK regime by, 194; Pol Pot as 
leader of, 190; recognition internation- 
ally, 191; refugee camp management 
by, 86-87; replacement by CGDK of, 
204; role on coalition government by, 
198-203; in Samlot revolt, 254 

Khmer Rouge regime, 5-6, 85-86, 90, 
91, 96, 99, 100, 108, 118-19, 132; after 
rout by North Vietnam, 187; economic 
policy of, 58-59, 151-55; economic self- 
reliance of, 145-46; education under, 
128; social structure under, xiii, 51-55 

Khmer Rumdo (pro- Sihanouk), 63, 259, 
318 

Khmer Serei, 23, 33, 43, 251-52, 253, 

318-19 
Khmer state, xxv-xxvii 
Khmer students, 38 
Khmer Students' Association (KSA), 39 
Khmer Students' Union, 39 
Khmer Viet Minh, 254, 259, 319 
khmoc (ghosts), 121 

Khmuic language (Mon-Khmer), 111 
khum (subdistricts), 61 



350 



Index 



Kiernan, Ben, 63, 65, 106, 124, 218 

killings. See atrocities; executions 

Kingdoms, centralized, 3 

kinship, 88-89 

Kirk, Donald, 47 

Kissinger, Henry, 46 

kloeu relationship, 89 

KNUFNS. See Kampuchean (Khmer) 
National United Front for National Sal- 
vation (KNUFNS) 

Ko Chang, 245 

Kola group (Burmese), 110 

Kong Sileah, 195, 320 

Korat Plateau, 10, 79 

Korea, North, 222 

Korea, South. See Republic of Korea 
(South Korea) 

KPNLAF. See Khmer People's National 
Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF) 

KPNLF. See Khmer People's National 
Liberation Front (KPNLF) 

KPRA. See Kampuchean People's Repre- 
sentative Assembly (KPRA) 

KPRAF. See Kampuchean (Khmer) Peo- 
ple's Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(KPRAF) 

KPRC. See Kampuchean People's Rev- 
olutionary Council (KPRC) 

KPRP. See Kampuchean (Khmer) Peo- 
ple's Revolutionary Party (KPRP); 
Kampuchean People's Revolutionary 
Council: KPRC 

Kracheh (Kratie) province, xiv, 45, 
80-81, 101, 104, 143 

Kracheh Special Region Number 505, 61 

krama, 92 

krom (groups), 61, 75 

km (shaman), 121, 134 

KRWA. See Kampuchean Revolutionary 

Women's Association (KRWA) 
KSA. See Khmer Students' Association 

(KSA) 
Kuala Lumpur, 201 
KUFNCD. See Kampuchean (Khmer) 

United Front for National Construction 

and Defense: KUFNCD 
Kuy group (Khmer Loeu), 104 

labor force (see also forced labor), 144-45 
Land Chenla kingdom, xxv, 9 
land ownership. See ownership; property 
language lexicons, 99 



languages, xvi, 110-12; linguistic groups, 
110; linguistic groups among Chinese, 
106-7 

Lan Xang kingdom, 12 
Lao Itsala, 36, 317 

Laos, xxvi, 3, 6, 9, 18, 30, 33, 16; bor- 
der with Cambodia of, 76, 81, 279; 
Cambodian minority groups in, 104; 
representation at Geneva Conference 
by, 27-28; Vietnamese forces in, 277 

law: due process: PRK, 301-2; enforce- 
ment: PRK, 298 

Le Due Anh, 297 

Le dynasty, 14 

legal code, India, 9 

legislature, PRK, 60-61 

leprosarium, 134 

Liberal Party, xxviii, 23-24 

light infantry battallion, 244, 246, 247 

linguistic groups. See languages 

livestock production, 165 

Long Boret, 48 

Long Chhim, 120 

Long Reth. See Nuon Chea 

Lon Nol, 5, 25, 26, 30, 32, 38, 42, 45, 
46-48, 116; as commander of Cambo- 
dian armed forces, 5; coup against 
Sihanouk by, xxx, 43-44; economic 
policy of regime of, 1 50-5 1 ; emergence 
of, 249, 255; establishes Khmer Repub- 
lic, 318; fall of regime of, 257; regime 
of, 35, 145, 252, 256 

Lon Nol Line, 258, 260 

Lon Non, 48 

Lovek, 3, 13, 14 

lower class, 97-98 

Luang Prabang, 16 

Lutheran World Service, 174 

Lycee Kambuboth, 40 

lycees, Buddhist, 130-31 

Lycee Sisowath, 20, 38 

MAAG. See United States Military As- 
sistance Advisory Group (MAAG) 

MACV. See United States Military As- 
sistance Command- Vietnam (MACV) 

Mahayana Buddhism, xxv, 11, 12, 110, 
114-15, 122 

Malay Peninsula, xxvi, 9, 10, 20 

Malay people: language of, 112; religion 
of, 122 

Malaysia, 201, 229 



351 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



male role, 89, 94-95, 98-99, 101, 114, 
133 

malnutrition, 155 

manganese ore, 143 

Manu laws, 9 

Mao Zedong, 62, 65 

Marcos, Ferdinand, 30 

marriage, 95-96; among Cham, 101 

martial law: 1953, 25 

Martin, Marie A., 92, 119-20, 128-29 

Marx, Karl, 38 

Marxism-Leninism, 39, 62, 75, 136, 191 
Mayaguez incident, 68, 263 
meak bochea, 120 
meba (spirits), 121 
media, 214-15 

medical supplies and personnel, 132-33 
Mekong Delta, xxxii, 3, 9, 13, 14, 69, 76, 
79 

Mekong River, 3, 7, 13, 16, 48, 76, 
80-81, 99, 110, 142-43, 178, 181 

Mekong River valley, 6, 79 

Memot, 263 

Menu series, 35, 255 

middle class, 98 

migration, 83, 85, 155 

military assistance, 4, 5, 151, 241, 250; 
from ASEAN and China to Sihanouk- 
led (ANS) forces, 275; from China, 42, 
253, 271-72, 278-79; from France, 
253; from North Vietnam to Khmer 
Rouge, 261; of North Vietnam to 
RAK/CPNLAF, 277; from Soviet 
Union, 42, 253, 291; from United 
States, 32, 33 

Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG): United States, 241, 250 

military awards and decorations: 
KPRAF, 295 

military class, 97-98 

military forces: development of, 248-49; 
indigenous, 247-48; of Khmer Rouge 
during Vietnam occupation (NADK), 
269-72; of KPNLAF (noncommunist, 
anti- Vietnam), 272-75; of noncom- 
munist resistance (ANS/FUNCIN- 
PEC), 275-76; of Vietnam and 
KNUFNS in Cambodia, 263-67; of 
Vietnam occupation (KPRAF), 267-68 

military fronts, Vietnam in Cambodia, 
297 

military logistics school, 293 
military medical school, 292 



military pay: KPRAF, 293 

military prisons, 293-94 

military regions: under KPRAF rule, 
286; of Vietnam in Cambodia, 297 

military schools, 292-93 

military service: PRK {see also conscrip- 
tion; enlistment), 291-95 

military schools and training centers, 292, 
293 

military tribunals, xxi, 293 
military uniforms and insignia: KPRAF, 
294-95 

mineral resources, xviii, 143 
Ming dynasty (China), 13 
Minh Mang (emperor), 16 
Ministry of Agriculture, 141, 145 
Ministry of Communications, Transport, 

and Posts, 181, 182 
Ministry of Education, 125 
Ministry of Finance, 177 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Angkar, 55 
Ministry of Industry: Angkar, 55 
Ministry of Interior, 298, 299, 300, 302; 

Prison Directorate of, 303, 304 
Ministry of Justice, xxi, 300, 302 
Ministry of Local and Foreign Trade, 168 
Ministry of National Defense: PRK, xxii, 

280, 281, 295 
Ministry of Religion, 130 
minorities, xvi, 104-5; treatment in 

Democratic Kampuchea of, 55, 75; 

under Vietnamese, 76 
Mit Deuch, 66 

mneang phteah (house guardians), 121 
Mnong group (Khmer Loeu), 104-5 
Mohanikay monastic group, 116, 119 
Mondol Kiri (Mondolkiri) province, xiv, 

42, 85, 101, 103, 104 
monetary policy, 150 
monetization, 177 

Monic language (Mon- Khmer), 111 
Monireth (prince), 21, 247 
Monivong (king), 4, 18, 20-21, 39 
Mon-Khmer language, 104, 110 
Mon-Khmer languages: divisions within, 

110-111 
Mon-Khmer people, 6, 101 
Mon kingdoms, 10, 12 
monks, Buddhist, 116-19 
monsoons, xvi, 10, 76, 79-81, 142, 

163-64 

Monivong (king of Cambodia), 18, 20 
mortality rates, xvii, 83, 132 



352 



Index 



Mouhot, Henri, 16 

MOULINAKA. See Movement for the 
National Liberation of Kampuchea 
(MOULINAKA) 

Moung Roessei, 49 

Mount Meru, 11 

Movement for the National Liberation of 
Kampuchea (MOULINAKA), 195, 
275, 317, 320 
mrenh kongveal (animal guardians), 121 
Muslims {see also Sunni Muslims); perse- 
cution of, 55, 122 



NADK. See National Army of Democratic 

Kampuchea (NADK) 
Nagaravatta, 21, 22, 23 
Nam Viet kingdom, 10 
National Army of Democratic Kam- 
puchea (NADK), xxi-xxii, 194, 205, 
269, 318, 320; factions of Khmer 
Rouge in, 269, 271; infiltration routes 
of, 272; insurgent and guerrilla activ- 
ity of, 271; military assistance from 
China for, 271-72; succeeds RAK, 
269; terror tactics of, 271 
National Assembly, xx-xxi, 24, 25, 43 
National Assembly (PRK), 210-11 
National Cadres Conference, 104 
National Export-Import Corporation, 
29-30 

National Front for the Liberation of South 
Vietnam (NFLSVN), xxx, 34, 320 

National Institute of Legal, Political, and 
Economic Studies, 127 

nationalism, 4, 20-22, 29 

nationalization; under Khmer Rouge, 
151; under Sihanouk: 1963, 29-30, 146 

National Mutual Help Association, 136 

National Route 1, 178 

National Trade Commission, 168 

National United Front for an Indepen- 
dent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooper- 
ative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), xx, 
xxxiv, 195, 275-76, 317 {see also Siha- 
nouk National Army: ANS); role in 
coalition government of, 199-203, 
207-8 

National United Front of Kampuchea 
(FUNK), xxxi, 43-44, 63, 258-59, 317 
Na Trao refugee camp, 87 
Naval Zone Five, 298 



navy: KPRAF, 291 
neak ta (spirits), 121 
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 30 
Neolithic culture, 6 
Nepote, Jacques, 87 
NFLSVN. See National Front for the Lib- 
eration of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) 
Ngo Dinh Diem, 33 
Nguyen Co Thach, 296 
Nguyen dynasty, 16, 36 
Nguyen Van Thieu, 34 
Nhek Tioulong, 207 
Nhim Ros, 64 

Nixon, Richard M., 35, 256 
nobility, 97 

Nokorbal (civil police), 298 
Nonaligned Movement, xx 
noncommunist activity: of ANS and 

FUNCINPEC, 275-76; OF KPNLAF, 

272-73 

Normal Advanced School, 128 
Norodom Chakrapong (prince), 276 
Norodom (king), xxvii-xxviii, 4, 16, 18, 
243-44 

Norodom Norindeth (prince), 23 
Norodom Ranariddh (prince), xxxiv, 

207, 222-23, 276 
Norodom Sihanouk (king of Cambodia). 

See Sihanouk (as prince); Sihanouk (as 

king) 

Norodom Suramarit (king), 4, 25, 28 

Northeastern Zone, 54, 61 

Northern Zone, 54, 61, 65 

Northwestern Zone, 54, 61, 65 

Nu, U, 30 

nuns, Buddhist, 117 

Nuon Chea (Long Reth), 40, 41, 65, 205 



occupation force withdrawals. See troop 

withdrawals 
Oc Eo, xxv, 7 

Odongk (Udong), 14, 15, 16, 47, 100 
Office of Public Prosecutor, xxi 
officer corps: in KPRAF, 283 
Osborne, Milton E., 26 
O Smach, 79 

Otdar Meanchey province, xiv 
ownership: collective, 153, 160-61; of 
land, 89-90, 148, 153-54, 160-61; pri- 
vate, 160-62; of property, 89-90 
Oxfam, 174 



353 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



Pach Chhoeun, 21, 22 
Pacific Ocean, 6 
Pailin, 143 

Palaguic language (Mon-Khmer), 111 

Panaritis, Andrea, 134, 135 

Pang Khat, 115 

Paris, 38-39, 40, 62, 151 

Paris International Conference on Cam- 
bodia: 1989, xxxv-xxxvi 

Paris Peace Accords, 46 

Parrot's Beak engagement, xxxii, 263 

Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), 
204, 320, 269 

Patriotic and Democratic Front of the 
Great National Union of Kampuchea 
(PDFGNUK), 194, 195-96, 204, 205, 
320 

PAVN. See People's Army of Vietnam 
(PAVN) 

PDFGNUK. Patriotic and Democratic 
Front of the Great National Union of 
Kampuchea (PDFGNUK) 

PDK. See Party of Democratic Kam- 
puchea (PDK) 

Pearic group (Khmer Loeu), 104-5; lan- 
guage of, 110-11 

peasant class, 97 

penal system, 303-4 

Pen Sovan, 208-9, 217-18 

Penn Nouth, 43 

People's Army of Vietnam: PAVN, 286, 
320 

People's National Bank of Kampuchea, 
176-77 

People's Republic of Kampuchea 
(PRK), xiii, xv, xx, 6, 10, 12, 35, 39, 
40-41, 50, 75, 90, 100, 146, 208, 
319, 320; centralization of power of, 
xxxiii; coalition government (CGDK) 
resistance to, 268; competes with 
CGDK for power, 222; economic pol- 
icy of, 58-59; education under regime 
of, 128; establishment of (1979), 
155-56, 191; increasing influence of, 
136; international recognition of, 
191-93; question of United Nations 
representation, 192-93; relations with 
and recognition by other countries of, 
224; religion under regime of, 119; 
role of Vietnam's military (KPRAF) 
in, 276-95 

people's revolutionary committees 
(PRK), 214 



People's Revolutionary Youth Union of 
Kampuchea (PRYUK), 281-83, 320 

People's Security Service (PRK), 298-99, 
302, 303, 304 

People's Supreme Court, xxi, 213, 300, 
302-3 

Permanent Military Coordinating Com- 
mittee, 268 
petroleum, 143-44 
Pham Van Dong, 31 
pharmaceuticals, 134 
phchun ben, 120 
Philippines, 13, 30 

Phnom Penh, 4, 6, 13, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 
32, 38-40, 41, 45, 54, 60, 79, 81, 83, 
85, 100, 107, 108, 149, 155; evacua- 
tion of, 152; fall to Khmer Rouge 
CPNLAF of, xxxi, 47-49, 260-61; fall 
to Vietnamese of, xxxii-xxxiii, 69, 190, 
266; hospital resources of, 133-34; as 
river port, 181 

Phnom Penh Domestic News Service, 
172 

Phumi Banam, 7 
phumphaek, 47 
phum (villages), 47, 61 
Phu Quoc island, 66, 263 
Pochentong airport, xix, 181 
Po Dharma, 99, 100, 122 
Poland, 172-73 

police (see also power to arrest); PRK, 
298-91 

political activity, xx-xxi 

political crimes. See criminal offenses 

political institutions: adoption of Indian, 3 

political parties: formation of, xxviii, 23 

Political School, 292 

Pol Pot, 5, 26, 37, 38-41, 43, 45, 50-54, 
57, 68, 154; emergence of, 215, 231, 
254; insurgency by forces of, 69-70; in 
Kampuchean Communist Party 
(KCP), 59-60, 65, 318; opposition by 
KNUFNS, 69; opposition to Sihanouk 
by, xxix; purge by Khmer Rouge re- 
gime and, 6, 47-48, 50-51; replaced as 
leader of Khmer Rouge, 194; role in 
Khmer Rouge NADK of, 269, 271; 
role in PDK and Khmer Rouge of, 
204-5; trial in absentia of, 193 

Pol Pot regime, 142; cruelty of, 187; 
defeat by Vietnam of, 266; fall of, 
xxxii-xxxiii, 155 

Ponchaud, Francois, 38, 48-50, 51 



354 



Index 



Popular Socialist Community. See 
Sangkum 

population, xvi, 83, 144-45; density of, 
83, 85, 144; of Khmer Loeu people, 
101; of Phnom Penh, 141; rural, 87-88, 
160; urban, 85, 149 
population movement, forced, 85 
port cities: Kampong Cham, 263, 265; 

Kampong Saom, 141, 254; Kampot, 265 
ports, xix, 181; as entrepots, xxix-xxx 
Portugese explorers, 3 
Poulo Wai island, 68 
Pourtier, Roland, 88 
Pouthisat (Pursat) province, xiv, 42, 99, 

100, 105, 275 
power to arrest, 300-302 
Pracheachon (Citizens') Party, 29, 37, 63 
Prachin Buri province (Thailand), 86-87 
Preah Ket Mealea Hospital, 134, 136 
Preah Monivong military hospital, 134 
Preah Sihanouk Raj Buddhist University, 
130-31 

Preah Suramarit Buddhist Lycee, 130 
Preah Vihear, 104 
pret (demons), 121 
Prey Nokor, 14 

Prey Veng province, 7, 64, 108 

prisons {see also military prisons), 303-4 

private sector economy, xvii; enterprise 
in, 141,. 158, 167-68; under KPRP 
government, 156 

PRK. See People's Republic of Kam- 
puchea (PRK) 

Project K-5, 145, 267, 291 

propaganda role: of Khmer Rouge, 
103-4; of KPRAF, 284, 289-90 

property (see also ownership), 89-90 

protectorate: of France, 4 

Protestants, 124 

provinces (see also sister provinces); 
replacement in Democratic Kampuchea 
of, 61 

provincial divisions: PRK, xiv 
psychological warfare tactics: of KPRAF, 

289-90 
public health, 132-35 
purges (see also atrocities; executions; 

Khmer Rouge), 6, 59-60, 65-66 
Pyongyang, 195, 198 



Rade group (Khmer Loeu), 101, 104, 
105, 112, 125 



Radio Hanoi, 69 

Radio Phnom Penh, 55, 69 

radio sets, 182 

radio station, xix, 215 

radio station, Khmer Rouge, 201 

radio telephone link, xix 

railroads, xix, 159, 178 

rainfall, 80 

RA.K. See Revolutionary Army of Kam- 
puchea (RAK) 

Ream airport, xix, 181 

refugee camps: Cambodian insurgents in, 
267; in Thailand, xx, 86-87, 124, 278; 
UNBRO aid to people in, 176 

refugees (see also emigration; migration); 
from Cambodia, 85-87, 120, 266; so- 
cial problems of, 52-54 

regional divisions. See administrative di- 
visions 

relief aid. See economic assistance; food 
aid; humanitarian assistance 

religion, xvi, 55, 75, 76, 112-25 

religious leader class, 97 

repression: of Cham people, 100; of 
Chinese, 106, 108; of religion, 120; of 
teachers and educated people, 128; of 
wats, 136 

Republic of Korea (South Korea), 24 

resettlement policy, xxix, 103 

resistance groups (see also guerrilla activ- 
ity; insurgent forces); Khmer refugee 
camps, 86; noncommunist, 194-95, 
199, 201, 207, 224-26, 317; pro- 
Sihanouk, xxxi, 259 

resources. See hydroelectric power; min- 
eral resources 

revenues, government, 176 

revolutionaries, Eastern Zone, 64 

Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea 
(RAK) (see also Cambodian People's 
National Liberation Armed Forces 
(CPNLAF); National Army of 
Democratic Kampuchea (NADK)), 44, 
61, 63-64, 103, 254-55, 317, 320; com- 
munists establish, 42; conflict with 
Vietnamese forces of, 262-65; develop- 
ment of, 258, 261; organization after 
1975 conquest, 261-62 

revolutionary committees, 214 

rice: competition between state and pri- 
vate production for, 167-68; cultivation 
of, xvii, 3, 6, 7, 10, 20, 145, 148, 150, 
155, 159-64; export of, 149; production 



355 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



of, 141, 148, 149-50, 152-53, 155, 159, 

162-64 
riel, xix, 130, 146, 176-77 
rifle battalions, 249; First and Second 

Cambodian Rifle Battiions, 248; Third 

Cambodian Rifle Battalion, 249 
rivers, 80-81, 142-43 
roads, xix, 159, 178 
Ros Samay, 208 

Rotanokiri (Ratanakiri) province, xiv, 41, 
42, 85, 101, 103, 104, 110, 318 

Royal Faculty of Medicine of Cambodia, 
133 

Royal Government of National Union of 
Kampuchea (GRUNK), 43-44, 60, 
258, 317 

Royal Khmer Armed Forces (FARK) (see 
also Khmer National Armed Forces 
(FANK)), 32, 250-51, 252, 253-55, 
261, 317 

Royal Library, 131 

Royal Thai Army: threat to Vietnam- 
backed government by, 278 
royalty, 97 

rubber: cultivation and production of, 
xvii, 19-20, 110, 158, 164-65, 174; ex- 
port of, 149-50, 165 

ruble, 171 

rup arak (medium), 121 

sahakor (cooperatives), 61 
Sailendra dynasty, 9 
Sai Vuong, 14 

Sak Sutsakhan, 206-7; commander of 

KPNLAF, 274 
Sala Som Niat, 66 

Saloth Sar, 5, 35; role in Democratic 
Kampuchea of, 62; (see also Pol Pot) 
Samlot, 42 
Samlot region, 61 

Samlot revolt, xxix, 5, 42, 146, 254 
sampot, 92 

Samre subgroup (Pearic), 105 

samsara, 113 

Sam Sary, 28, 33 

sangha, 55, 113, 114, 117, 118 

Sangkum (Popular Socialist Community), 

xxviii, 4, 28-30, 37 
sanitation, 132 
Sanskrit language, 9, 111 
Saoch subgroup (Pearic), 105 
sarong, 92 



Sar Sarsdam, 47 

Sattha (Khmer king), 13 

Saukham Khoy, 48 

school, officer-candidate, 247 

School of Fine Arts, 128 

school of medicine, 133 

school of nursing, 133 

schools, Buddhist, 130-31 

schools, Chinese, 131 

schools, military. See military schools 

schools, private, 131 

schools, public, xvii, 125-30 

schools, Vietnamese, 131 

SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Or- 
ganization (SEATO) 

Second Indochina War, 5, 30, 149, 320 

service sector, xviii, 148 

Shawcross, William, 27, 35, 40, 46 

shortages in economy, 160 

Siddhartha Gautama. See Gautama 
Buddha 

Siemreab airport, xixl, 181 

Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey province, 
105, 268 

Siemreab (Siemreap) province, 10, 15, 
16, 19, 20, 24, 25-26, 33, 46, 47, 49, 
105 

Siemreab Special Region Number 106, 61 
Sieu Heng, 37-38 

Sihanouk (as king), 4, 21, 22-23, 24, 25, 
116, 247; crusade for independence of 
Cambodia, 24-26; strategy to gain in- 
dependence of, 25-26 

Sihanouk (as prince), 41-43, 44, 47, 52, 
97, 116, 249-50, 317; after Khmer 
Rouge victory, 57, 60; Beijing govern- 
ment in exile, xxx-xxxi; commander of 
FARK, 250-51, 252, 254, 255; creates 
GRUNK and FUNK, 258-59, 317; de- 
posed (1970), 5, 252, 255; economic 
policy of, 146-49; foreign policy of, 
xxx, 30-35, 145-46; government of, 
xxviii-xxix, 4, 5, 26-27, 29-30, 37, 38; 
as leader of anti-KPRP coalition, 189; 
as leader of RAK, 258; link with 
Khmer Rouge of, 5 ; nonalignment and 
neutrality policy of, 4, 26, 30-33, 
37-38, 41-42, 146; position on Khmer 
Rouge, 196; position on Vietnam 
presence in Cambodia, 192; recom- 
mendations for Cambodian govern- 
ment by, 198-200; role in ANS/ 
FUNCINPEC of, xxxiv, 207-8, 



356 



Index 



275-76; role in coalition government 

(CGDK) of, 201, 203, 232, 233-36, 

268; role in KPNLF of, 194; role in 

noncommunist resistance of, 194-95; 

suspicion of United States by, 32-33, 

37-38, 146, 252 
Sihanouk National Army (ANS), xxii, 

xxxiv, 195, 207-8, 266, 275-76, 317; 

organization and activity of, 275-76; 

refugee camp management by, 86 
Sihanoukville. See Kampong Saom 

(Sihanoukville) 
Singapore, 173, 200, 201 
Sino-Khmer group, 106, 108 
Sirik Matak, 43, 48 
Sisaket province (Thailand), 87 
Sisowath (king), 18, 244 
Sisowath Yuthevong (prince), 23 
sister provinces: in trade with Vietnam, 

170-71 

Site B refugee camp (Green Hill), 87 
Site 2 refugee camp, 87, 206 
Site 8 refugee camp, 87 
slaves, 11 
Snuol, 263 

social stratification, 97-99 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 15 
social mobility, 99 

social structure: under Khmer Rouge, 
51-55, 75 

society, Angkorian, 11 

Soeharto, 30 

solidarity groups, 160-62 

SONEXIM. See export-import agency 
(SONEXIM) 

Son Ngoc Minh, 36, 37 

Son Ngoc Thanh, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 29, 
33; leader of Khmer Issarak, 48, 245, 
249-50, 318; as leader of Khmer Serai, 
251, 318; nationalist, 22, 23, 25, 27, 36 

Sonn Mann Mental Hospital, 134 

Son Sann, 30; as leader of anti-KPRP 
coalition, 189; as leader of KPNLF/ 
KPNLAF, xxxiv, 194, 198, 199, 206-7, 
266, 272-73; position on Khmer Rouge 
of, 196, 200-01, and coalition govern- 
ment, 201, 203, 236 

Son Sen, 38, 40-41, 52, 55; as leader of 
Khmer Rouge and RAK/NADK, 205, 
261, 269 

So Phim, 64, 66, 69 

Sosthene Fernandez, 48 

South China Sea, 13, 76, 81, 144 



Southeast Asian Treaty Organization 

(SEATO), 30, 250 
Southwestern Zone, 54, 61, 65 
Soviet citizens in Cambodia, 110 
Soviet-Khmer Friendship Hospital, 134, 

135 

Soviet Union, 27, 32, 42, 142, 149, 151; 
economic assistance to KPRP govern- 
ment by, 173-75, 189; influence in 
Cambodia of, 209, 215; as major trad- 
ing partner, 169, 171-72; military as- 
sistance to Vietnam in Cambodia by, 
xxxiv-xxxv, 287; position on PRK and 
Khmer Rouge of, 192; recognition of 
PRK by, 191 ; relations with China of, 
209; training assistance to KPRAF by, 
291, 292 

Spanish: in Cambodia, 3, 13-14 

Special Military Administrative Zone, 
297-98 

spirit world, 94, 121-22 

Sri Lanka, 12 

srok (districts), 61 

Stalinism, 39 

starvation, 155 

state enterprises, 150 

State of Cambodia, xiv, xxxv-xxxvi 

Steinberg, DonaldJ., 108, 117, 124, 135 

Stieng group (Khmer Loeu), 104-5 

Stoeng Treng province, xiv, 101, 103, 
104, 143 

Sumatra, 9 

Sunni Muslims, 122 

Suoi subgroup (Pearic), 105 

Suryavarman II, xxvi, 10 

Svay Rieng province, 64 

Swank, Emory C, 46 

sweet potatoes, 164 

Szymusiak, Molyda, 64, 66 

Takev province, xiv, 79, 99, 100 
Ta Khmau, 134, 166 
Ta Luen refugee camp, 87 
Ta Mok, 65, 66; role in NADK of, 269, 
271 

Tampuon subgroup (Brao), 104 
Taoism, 122 

Ta Phraya (Thailand), 87 
taxation, 177 
Teap Ben, 207 
Technical School, 292 
telecommunications, xix, 182 



357 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



Television Kampuchea (TVK), 215 
television service, xix, 182, 215 
Teochiu linguistic group, 106-7 
Tep Vong, 120 

terror tactics {see also atrocities), 23; of 

NADK, 271; by Viet Cong, 47 
Tet offensive, 34 

Thailand, 3, 6, 10, 12, 14, 15, 25; annex- 
ation and return of Cambodian terri- 
tory by, xxvii-xxviii, 15, 16, 18-19, 
245; assumes command of insurgent 
anti- Vietnamese force, 274; border with 
Cambodia of, xxxvi, 76, 79, 81, 86-87, 
145, 191; Cambodian insurgents in, 
267; Cambodian minority groups in, 
104-5; Cambodians in, 86; effect of 
Vietnamese troops at border of, 
266-67; position on Cambodian 
governmental crisis of, 226-27; Project 
K-5 at border with Cambodia, 267; 
recognition of Cambodia by, 24; rela- 
tions with Cambodia of: 1954-1969, 
30-35; relations with CGDK of, 
222-23; relations with Japan of, 245; 
security concerns of, 191; trade with, 
173 

Thai people, 10-14, 243; persecution by 
Khmer Rouge of, 56; refugees from 
Mongols of, xxvi 

Theravada Buddhism, xvi, xxvi, 12, 29, 
55, 112-14 

Thieu Tri (emperor), 16 

Thion, Serge, 57 

thmup (witch), 121 

thoa relationship, 89 

Tho Chu island, 66, 68 

Thomas, David, 110 

Thommayut monastic group, 116, 119 

timber: production of, 158 

Toal Chay, 208 

Tokyo, 21, 22 

Tonkin, 18, 36 

Tonle Sab River, 7, 13, 81, 143 , 178 
Tonle Sap Basin-Mekong Lowlands 

region, 76, 79-80, 87 
Tonle Sap (Great Lake), xvi, xxv, 3, 7, 

10, 12, 76, 81, 99, 110, 143, 164, 178 
topography, xvi, 76, 78, 142 
Tou Samouth, 37-38, 40-41, 217 
trade, foreign {see also barter system); with 

Comecon countries, 168, 169; PRK 

government focus on, 168-73 
trade, historical, 7, 13 



trade, illicit: with Thailand and Singa- 
pore, 173 

trade deficit, 169 

trade policy, 150 

trade routes, international, 13 

trading partners, xviii, 169-73 

Training Department: KRAF General 
Staff, 293 

transportation system, 177-82 

Trat province (Thailand), 87 

Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression 
(1960), 32 

Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooper- 
ation (1979), xxi, 170, 191 

tripartite coalition {see also Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kam- 
puchea (CGDK)) 

tripartite coalition (1982), 201-4 

Tripitaka, 114 

Tripitaka Commission, 131 

troop withdrawals, Vietnam, xxxv, 187, 
295, 296 

Tu Due (emperor), 16 

Tung Kraham, 63 

Tung Padevat, 62-63 

Tuol Sleng detention center, 64, 66 

typhoons, 80 

United Front for the Liberation of Op- 
pressed Races (Front Uni pour la 
Liberation des Races Opprimes (FUL- 
RO)), 103, 106 

United Issarak Front, 36 

United Nations (UN), 151, 187; recog- 
nition of Democratic Kampuchea 
(CGDK) government, 190, 203-4, 242, 
317; Security Council deliberation of 
Cambodian question (1979), 191-93 

United Nations Border Relief Operation 
(UNBRO), 86 

United Nations Children's Fund, 173, 
175 

United Nations Food and Agriculture Or- 
ganization (FAO), 162, 173, 175 

United Nations General Assembly; delib- 
erations on Cambodia (1979), 193; 
resolution; resolution for principles of 
International Conference, 225; resolu- 
tion for withdrawal of Vietnamese 
troops, 225, 223 

United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 86, 173-74, 175 



358 



Index 



United Nations World Food Program 
(WFP), 173, 175-76 

United States, 29, 30; aid to Royal Thai 
Army by, 278; airlifts during CPNLAF 
offensive, 260; airlifts of supplies by, 48; 
bombing raids of, 45-46, 255, 263; eco- 
nomic assistance by, 149, 151; economic 
assistance through international organi- 
zations, 173, 175-76; end of diplomat- 
ic relations with Cambodia (1965), 253; 
at Geneva Conference, 27-28; hu- 
manitarian assistance to refugees, 241; 
influence in Cambodian armed forces, 
32; military assistance agreement of, 
250, 256-57; military assistance agree- 
ment with France of, 249; military as- 
sistance by, 32, 33, 261; offensive 
against North Vietnamese in Cambodia 
by, xxx, 45; position on Khmer Rouge 
return to power, xxxv; position on PRK 
of, 191 ; recognition of Cambodia by, 24; 
relations with, 4-5, 30-35 

United States Board of Geographic 
Names (BGN), xiv 

United States Military Assistance Advi- 
sory Group (MAAG), 32 

United States Military Assistance 
Command- Vietnam (MACV), 34-35, 
45, 252 

universities, provincial, 127 

University of Agricultural Sciences, 127 

University of Fine Arts, 127 

University of Paris, 39 

University of Phnom Penh, 39, 40, 127, 
133 

university system {see also Buddhist 

University), 127 
uprising, peasant (Samlot). See Samlot 

revolt 

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
66 



Vichy government, xxviii, 4, 21, 245 

Vickery, Michael, 26, 29, 53, 90, 118, 
119, 123-24, 125, 128, 208, 218 

Viet Cong, xxx, 5, 33, 34, 42, 44-45, 47, 
252, 255, 320-21 {see also National 
Front for the Liberation of South Viet- 
nam (NFLSVN)) 

Viet Minh, xxviii, 4, 22, 27-28, 36, 39, 
246, 321; combines with Khmer Is- 
sarak, 250 



Viet-Muong language (Mon-Khmer), 
111 

Vietnam, 3, 6, 12, 14, 15, 18, 64, 80-81, 
142; annexation of Cambodian terri- 
tory by, 3, 14-15; attacks and incur- 
sions by Cambodians, 66, 68; border 
dispute with Cambodia, 190, 262; 
border with Cambodia, 76, 81, 279; 
Cambodian minority groups in, 104-5; 
cost of Cambodian occupation for, 
296-97; economic and technical as- 
sistance to Cambodia by, 173, 175; in- 
vasion of Cambodia by, xxxii, 6, 
69-70, 75, 155, 241; as major trading 
partner of, 169, 170-71; military as- 
sistance to Cambodia by, 287, 293; 
military operations in Cambodia of, 
297; military presence in Cambodia by, 
295, 296-97; offensive (1978) against 
Khmer Rouge (RAK), 264-66; offen- 
sive in Cambodia: 1984-85, 273, 276; 
opposition to military forces in Cam- 
bodia of, 266-67, 269; position on re- 
lations with PRK government of, 191, 
192, 208, 224-35, 226; role in Cambo- 
dian civil war of, xxxiv-xxxv; role in 
KNUFNS of, 263-64; seizes Cambo- 
dian island, 68; withdrawal of troops 
in Cambodia by, xxxv, 187,228, 
295-96 

Vietnam, North, xxx, 27, 30, 41, 42, 
44-45; border clashes with Khmer 
Rouge, 262; Cambodian offensive 
against, 256-58; focus on Sihanouk by, 
37-38; incursions into Cambodia by, 
5; relations with Cambodia of, 4, 
30-38, 251; representation at Geneva 
Conference by, 27-28 

Vietnam, South, xxx, 27, 30, 33-34, 
37-38; border dispute with Cambodia, 
252; offensive to destroy North Viet- 
nam forces in Cambodia, 45 

Vietnamese: military forces, 187-88; 
operations against Cambodian guerril- 
las, 267 

Vietnamese Communist Party, 36 
Vietnamese in Cambodia, 20, 55, 83, 

85-86, 108, 110, 122 
Vietnamese people, 12, 14, 243 
Vietnam War. See Second Indochina War 
Vietnam Workers' Party, 36, 40, 63, 317, 

218 

village militia: of KPRAF, 290-91 



359 



Cambodia: A Country Study 



villages: of Cham people, 100; of Khmer 

Loeu, 101 
vissakh bochea, 120 
Vogt, John W., 46 

Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer 

Rouge radio station), 201 
Voice of the Kampuchean People 

(VOKP), xix, 182, 215 
Vo Nguyen Giap, 68 
Vorn Vet, 41, 64, 65, 69 
Vyadhapura, 7 



Wai island, 263 
warfare, historical, 242-43 
Warsaw Pact advisors: PRK, xxiii 
Water Chenla kingdom, xxv, 9 
water supply, 132 
water transportation, 178, 181 
waterways, inland, xix, 159 
wat, 116-17, 119-20, 125, 136; schools 
in, 130 

weapons and equipment: of CGDK, xxii; 
from China, xxix, 272, 276; of 
KPRAF: PRK, xxii, 287; of KPRAF 
village militia, 290; of NADK: coali- 
tion government, xxii 

weather (see also drought; flooding; mon- 
soons; typhoons), 10, 79-81, 141, 142, 
160 



welfare programs and organizations, 

135-36 
Western Zone, 54, 61, 65 
Willmott, William, 106, 108 
Women. See female role 
women in KPRAF, 292 
Women's Mutual Health Association, 

136 

Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK), 
(see also Kampuchean (Khmer) Work- 
ers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK)), 
40-41, 215, 317 

World Bank, xx, 150 

World Council of Churches, 174 

WPK. ^Workers' Party of Kampuchea 
(WPK) 



Yasovarman I, 10 
Yugoslavia, 149 
Yukanthor, 18 
Yunnan region, 10 
Yun Yat, 55 

Yuthevong. See Sisowath Yuthevong 
(prince) 



Zhou Enlai, 31, 52 

zones (see also administrative divisions); 
established by Khmer Rouge (NADK), 
271; replacement of provinces by, 61 



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